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Everything that needs to be said has already been said.  
But since no one was listening, everything must be said again. 
André Gide 
Sino-Russian relations have recently become much discussed, even popular, if 
not trendy. There is a certain logic in this fact. Because of objective reasons, 
such as the giant territories of the two countries, their position and political 
influence, geographical location, and economic and military potential, Sino-
Russian relations are one of the most important global political issues. How-
ever, since their spectacular rapprochement in 2014, Sino-Russian relations 
drew even closer attention which increases the interest in researching the Mos-
cow-Beijing dynamics.  
The aim of this publication is to depict the sophisticated relationship be-
tween Russia and China from the USSR’s dissolution (1991) to the Silk Road 
Forum in Beijing (2017), and to present the growing asymmetry in their rela-
tions. It shows that the Russia-China relationship is pragmatic, a political “mar-
riage of convenience” which serves as a means to increase their global influ-
ence. Russia and China are two different worlds, maybe even two different 
civilizations. They do do not trust each other; however, that does not stop them 
from developing relations and doing business together. Thus, they constitute a 
paradoxical relationship based on convience, yet successful and stable at the 
same time.  
The last two decades were decisive for the character of Moscow-Beijing 
relations. For the first time in contemporary history, Russia faces a China 
stronger than itself – Beijing achieved a multidimensional advantage and be-
came the senior partner. This book shows the origins of this process, presents 
how it happened and gives prognoses for the future. It explains that Beijing is 
implementing what may be described with a paradoxical phrase as “the asym-
metric win-win” agenda: both sides gain, but it is China that wins more, much 
more. The book shows the possible consequences of this situation – “a return 
to the past” – and claims that despite this asymmetry, Sino-Russian relations 
will remain strong.  
This book is a continuation of my PhD dissertation (“Growing asymmetry. 
Sino-Russian relations in 1991-2011”), published in Polish with the title 
“Niedźwiedź w cieniu smoka” (The Bear Overshadowed by the Dragon)1. This 
monograph, however, has undergone such major changes compared to the 
Polish edition that it has become a distinct book – around 35% of this book is 
                                                          
1 M.Lubina, Niedźwiedź w cieniu smoka. Rosja-Chiny 1991-2014 [The Bear Overshadowed 
by the Dragon. Russia-China 1991-2014], Kraków 2014.  
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entirely new. I supplemented the description for the period between 2015 and 
2017, and I had to shorten this book from its initial 623 pages, which forced 
me to systematize and synthesize the contents and to highlight the most im-
portant aspects. Presenting the book to international readers deprived me of 
one of my assets – contrary to the Polish edition, this is not the first book on 
contemporary Sino-Russian relations. Thus, I needed to transform the contents, 
to eliminate many aspects well-known to international readers and to empha-
size my original thesis: the “return to the past”, to the 17th century model of 
Sino-Russian relations.  
Therefore, in this book I will present Sino-Russian relations as the return to 
the past. Although the conditions and political decorum changed, a roughly 
similar model exists today. If one compares the 17th century relations between 
the two countries with the current ones, one can trace some striking similari-
ties. The most important one being that China is much stronger in this relation-
ship (like it used to be in the 17th century) and Russia accepts this fact (albeit 
quietly) and adheres to this situation by taking as many opportunities as possi-
ble. China’s policy towards Russia today is a pragmatic equivalent of the 17th 
century Manchu politics, focused on having a long-lasting deal with Moscow 
in order to have it not endanger China’s policies. This deal was made on Chi-
nese terms, though with some benefits for Russia as well. Therefore, this is an 
adaptation of the 17th century model of relations: both countries benefit from 
their mutual relations, however, it is China that benefits more.  
I am fully aware that some may not find this idea particularly innovative; it 
is a platitude to say that history repeats itself. Yet, I believe that applying this 
very obvious idea to contemporary Russia-China relations is something new – 
to my best knowledge nobody did this before, at least not in a book or in a 
peer-review journal article. And in my book, I will try to prove the hypothesis 
that Russia-China relations came back to its initial stage. After all, I believe – 
as many Asians do – that the world is spherical and historical periods come 
around in cycles.  
This book is a result of my fourteen years of study on Russia-China rela-
tions: first at Jagiellonian University at the faculties of the Russian Studies and 
the Far Eastern Studies, then at a scholarship in Beijing in 2009-2010, as well 
as during many visits to Russia (over a dozen since 2004) and China (annually 
since 2006), and innumerous discussions with Russian, Chinese and Western 
specialists in the field. That is why the list of acknowledgments would be too 
long, so I will limit myself to the people who supported me with this edition.  
Writing this book would have been impossible without the support of my 
family, friends, and colleagues. I would like to thank especially Professor Sal-
vatore Babones from University of Sydney who convinced me to publish this 
book in English and who helped me intellectually and technically with this 
work; to Barbara Budrich, my publisher, who has trusted an internationally 
unknown young Polish researcher and to Marcin Grabowski from Jagiellonian 
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University, whose support was instrumental in making the publication of this 
book possible. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Jagiellonian 
University’s Faculty of International and Political Studies for providing some 
sources for proofreading of this book, to Małgorzata Kmita who proofread it 
and to the three anonymous reviewers whose comments on my work helped 
me to improve it.  
In my research career at Jagiellonian University, I benefitted from the sup-
port of Professor Adam W. Jelonek and the mentorship of Professor Bogdan 
Góralczyk from University of Warsaw. I owe my gratitude to Professor Roman 
Bäcker, Professor Joachim Diec and Professor Mieczysław Smoleń, too. Con-
versations with Jacek Bartosiak, Andrzej Bolesta, Adrian Brona,  Łukasz 
Fyderek, Stefan Hejnowicz, Robert Krzesaj, Marcin Kaczmarski, Piotr 
Leszczewicz, Aleksandra Łopińska, Patrycja Pendrakowska, Tomasz Pugace-
wicz, Radosław Pyffel, Jacek Raś, Karolina Schab, Chen Yurong, Li Fengling, 
Zhou Hong, Jiang Shixue, Chong Pin Lin, Kong Tianping, Chen Xin, Shen 
Wei, Cheng Yuchin, Li Zengwei, Deng Ketang, Cho Byoung-se, Fyodor Luky-
anov, Oleg Timofeev, Luka Ezerski, Sanat Kushkumbaev, as well as my fac-
ulty colleagues at Jagiellonian University, had significant impact on the way I 
see Russia-China relations. Finally, I benefitted from the insights from re-
searchers and individuals from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Beijing, 
Harbin, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Seoul, Astana, Ashgabat, Prague, 
Paris, Oxford and Washington D.C.  
Writing this book, as well as my entire career, would have been impossible 
without my wife, Magdalena Kozłowska, my great supporter, who remains my 
ultimate source of inspiration of what it means to be a world-class researcher.  
Michał Lubina  




I. Theoretical Introduction 
This publication is an analysis of Russia-China relations from the point of view 
of political science and international relations theory. This chapter describes 
the present literature in the field and its theoretical findings. It uses tools of 
three approaches – political neorealism, social constructivism and asymmetry 
theory – and tries to combine these three. The most important argument is that 
the present model of Russia-China relations is a contemporary equivalent of 
their relations in the 17th century.  
The official narrative in Russia and China about their relations follows the 
pattern of what can be called “official optimism”, something that the Chinese 
would call gei mianzi, or “granting face”, “showing respect” in public, “com-
plimenting somebody in an exaggerated manner”. In general, the official nar-
rative “testifies to extraordinary transformation” in Russia-China relations: 
“ancient antagonisms and suspicions appear to have given way to an unparal-
leled convergence across multiple policy agendas”.2 The development of Rus-
sia-China relations then is “a rare case of two neighbouring great powers im-
proving their relations and then keeping them on an even keel, despite the fact 
that one has risen in importance while the other has gone through a difficult 
and painful post-imperial adjustment.”3 This official “strategic partnership” 
narrative presents Russia-China relations as being of “a qualitatively distinct 
nature” from the previous periods based on “collection of Russia’s and China’s 
shared interests.”4 This “official optimism” has naturally evoked reactions 
from international academic circles (though, equally naturally, not from Rus-
sian and Chinese academic circles which follow the “official optimism” line 
of their governments to lesser or greater extent), where a much different picture 
of China-Russia relations dominates. In the mainstream international academic 
narrative of Russia-China relations, the pessimistic approach built on neoreal-
istic assumption still dominates, yet it is naturally challenged by other points 
of view.  
                                                          
2 B. Lo, Axis of Convenience. Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics, London, Chatham 
House, 2008, p. 1.  
3 D. Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente, Carnegie Cen-
ter, 09.04.2015. 
4 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations in the Post-Crisis International Order, London-
New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 24. 
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1. Between Neorealism and Constructivism 
Among the main schools in international relations theory – liberalism, institu-
tionalism, realism and constructivism (including the English School) – it is 
very easy to tell which one does not apply to Russia-China relations: liberal-
ism. Although both Russia and China use phrases from a liberal understanding 
of international relations (interdependency, mutual benefits, win-win, etc.) this 
is merely a smoke screen. Chinese and especially Russian policymaking may 
serve as an archetypical antithesis to the liberal and institutional approach, with 
Moscow and Beijing vehemently rejecting the idea of transformative develop-
ments such as globalization, democratization, and the proliferation of interna-
tional institutions that are all – according to liberal and institutional schools – 
offering the possibility of an enduring peace.5 That leaves room for neorealism 
and constructivism only.  
Despite its criticism in the Western academia (“no one loves a political re-
alist”)6, neorealism remains the dominant school of political thinking in re-
searching Russia-China relations; foreign policy of Russia and China is usually 
viewed through the bluntly realist lens of immediate material interests and mil-
itary security. This is somehow natural. A neorealistic approach seems per-
fectly adequate to Russia and China: “the ruling elites in Moscow and Beijing 
have been brought up in a realist strategic culture that emphasizes the element 
of struggle in an often viciously competitive world, where power relations 
dominate at the expense of allegedly universal values.”7 Realpolitik remains 
the dominant school of political thinking in Russia, though naturally embodied 
in local understanding, wording and discourse.8 Russian political thinking, no 
matter with which ideological screen, “functions inclusively within Realpolitik 
framework” – the Russians consider others’ actions almost only in geopolitical 
terms.9 Putin and his team, like their Soviet predecessors, perceive the world 
as a zero-sum game (contest between communism and capitalism gave way to 
the one between authoritarian traditionalism and democratic liberalism) and 
believe in the “timeless character of international politics”: the worldview ac-
cording to Kremlin is, as Bobo Lo calls it, “a Neo-Hobbesian vision”. The 
world “is an alien and often hostile place, in which the strong prosper and the 
weak get beaten”; it is “a dog-eat-dog” world where the Leninist rule “who 
will beat whom” dictates the rules of the game and where one “cannot trust in 
the good intentions of others, but must concentrate on building up its own 
                                                          
5 R. O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond [in:] Neorealism 
and Its Critics, ed. R. O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 198.  
6 R. Giplin, No One Loves a Political Realist, “Security Studies” 1996, no 5(1), p. 3-26. 
7 B. Lo, The Axis of Convenience…p. 176.  
8 J. Collins et. all, Is Russia Ready for Change? Carnegie Moscow Center 2010, 6 II. 
9 M. Kaczmarski, Rosja na rozdrożu. Polityka zagraniczna Władimira Putina [Russia at the 
crossroads. The foreign policy of Vladimir Putin], Warszawa 2006, p. 168.  
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strength”; a world defined “as much by competition as cooperation; the pri-
macy of hard power; the centrality of the great powers; and the abiding im-
portance of geopolitics”, where great power poses a “divine right.”10 Certainly, 
the perception of China lies within this realistic perspective as well.11  
As for the Chinese, having such traditions as the ideas of Sun Zi and Han 
Feizi, they could be called Godfathers of realism. In China, as in Russia, polit-
ical realism remains the dominant school of political thinking, though naturally 
it is expressed in their own language and local wording12: “China is a realistic 
country”13, but its realism (best seen in Chinese strategic culture with its zero-
sum approach to international order in general and to the USA in particular14) – 
is specific, embedded in the past15, emphasizing moral leadership (“moral re-
alism”)16 and China’s uniquess (even in IR theory).17 Moreover, traditionally 
China has acted according to realist assumptions in international relations, but 
based not on the objective structure of the international system, but rather on a 
specific historical strategic culture – the roots of Realpolitik in China are idea-
tional and not predominantly structural.18 Although China “does not fit” into 
the Western understanding of realism19 as there are important differences be-
tween the Chinese and Western understanding of realism (e.g. dominance of 
hierarchy in Chinese thinking in opposition to “anarchy” in classic Western IR 
                                                          
10 B. Lo, Russia and The New World Disorder, London, Chatham House 2015, pp. xviii-xx, 
14, 20 and 47. 
11 М. Титаренко, Геополитическое значение Дальнего Востока. Россия, Китай и другие 
страны Азии [The Geopolitical importance of the Far East. Russia, China and the other 
Asian countries], Москва 2008, p. 246. 
12 Though not unrivalled, see: F. Godement, Contemporary China: Between Mao and Market, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2016, p. 217. 
13 Shen Dingli, Russian cooperation with China is tactical, not strategic, “Global Times”, 
27.06.2016. 
14 F. Godement, Introduction, [in:] China And Russia: Gaming the West?, ECFR, 05.11.2016. 
G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order. National Identities, Bilateral 
Relations, and East Versus West in the 2010s, Woodrow Wilson Center, Stanford University 
Press 2014, pp. 149 and 168. 
15 Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, Princeton University 
Press, 2010. 
16 Yan Xuetong, Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: Zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzheng [The Tran-
sition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition], Beijing 2015; for 
English overview (interview with Yan), see: Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More 
Assertive Foreign Policy, “New York Times”, 09.02.2016. 
17 B. Creutzfeld, Qin Yaqing on Rules vs Relations, Drinking Coffee and Tea, and a Chinese 
Approach to Global Governance, Tsingua Theory Talk #45, 2011. 
18 A. I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, 
Princeton University Press Princeton 1998. 
19 Zheng Yongdian, Preface, [in]: China and International Relations. The Chinese view and 
the contribution of Wangu Gungwu, London-New York, Routledge 2010, p. xiii. 
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works)20, or preference to achieve dominance via political/economic/other 
means rather than by military power; and the difference between Chinese and 
Russian understanding, too (the Chinese have less pessimism than Russians 
“regarding human nature and the capacity to realize an ideal order”; while the 
latter are skeptical about that, the former make “the repeated appeal to Da-
tong – Great Harmony”)21; nevertheless, despite all these reservations, Chinese 
policy making can be classified as generally realistic, too.  
Furthermore, even with all these differences, there is a meta-understanding 
between Russia and China on the philosophical level: in the perception of the 
nature of politics, China and Russia understand each other without words in 
such issues as political philosophy as the principle on which the international 
order should be based (such as non-intervention and the unconditional respect 
for sovereignty).22 In the Chinese vision of Realpolitik, as in the Russian one, 
the world is characterized by a constant struggle for power, and the USA re-
mains China’s main adversary.23 
The neorealist approach to Sino-Russian relations has been brilliantly sum-
marized by Bobo Lo in his seminal and much-quoted book “The Axis of Con-
venience”. According to him: Axis of Convenience “combines tactical expedi-
ency with strategic calculus and long views (…) This is not, however, “an axis 
in the sense of being a budding political-military alliance” for the conflicting 
reasons (…) this is an axis born of necessity, real and perceived, not natural 
inclination (…) the relationship works precisely because it is based on expedi-
ency, pragmatism, and no small degree of cynicism.”24 
According to this narrative, Russia-China rapprochement is based not on a 
common strategic vision or mutual values, but on common interests, both po-
litical and economic. Dmitri Trenin writes that contrary to rhetoric, there is no 
friendship between Russia and China: “There has never been a spirit of cama-
raderie about Russo-Chinese summits (…) but the summits are invariably busi-
ness-like and results-orientated (…) In the Sino-Russian official intercourse, 
politeness is the norm, while candor is a rare and precious quality.”25 In the 
absence of mutual trust, the China-Russia relations are “an example of prag-
matic and opportunistic co-operation – real, but shallow.”26 Thus they are 
                                                          
20 James C. Hsiung, A re-appraisal of Abrahamic values and neorealist IR theory: from a Con-
fucian-Asian perspective, [in:] Ibid., p. 18. 
21 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 64. 
22 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, p. 6. 
23 See writings of Yan Xuetong, for example Ancient Chinese Thought…, p. 199-223; 229-
252. 
24 B. Lo, The Axis of Convenience…, pp. 54-55 and 131. 
25 Д. Тренин, Верные друзья? Как Россия и Китай воспринимают друг друга, Carnegie, 
1 VI 2012, (for English version, see: True Partners? How Russia and China see each other). 
26 L. Jakobsen, P. Holtom, D. Knox, and Jingchao Peng, China’s Energy and Security Rela-
tions with Russia. Hopes, Frustrations and Uncertainties, SIPRI policy paper 29, Stockholm 
2011, pp. 3-5. 
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even, perhaps, “frienemies”: friends and enemies at the same time, as Minxin 
Pei put it.27 
The “axis of convenience”, or pessimistic narrative, claims that this rela-
tionship is convenient for Russia and China alike: for both domestic and inter-
national reasons. For Russia, it answers security interests and global geopolit-
ical ambitions. It strengthens the security of the Russian Far East, (“keep your 
friends close, keep your enemies closer”) and “in its most primitive (…) sense 
it is an ‘anti-relationship’ driven by the urge to neutralize or negate.”28 In gen-
eral, however, this narrative claims that this partnership, even after its 2014 
rapprochment, is limited: it is a “partnership of strategic convenience – prag-
matic, calculating and constrained.”29 
Although in the pessimistic narrative Russia is considered by China as an 
important, though secondary and limited partner – “generally speaking, Chi-
nese attitude toward Russia combines Middle Kingdom hauter, pragmatism, 
and cynicism”30 – nevertheless, it claims that the Chinese are very “careful not 
to irritate Russia” because “they do not want to encourage it to become more 
aggressive towards China.”31 For all the inadequacies in their bilateral ties, 
“Russia and China are each other’s strategic rear.”32 This approach suits 
China’s general policy of “peace on the borders” well: maintaining friendly 
relations with neighbours. Thanks to this, China secures its northern flank, and 
does not need to worry about security issues from this area and may concen-
trate on the most important issues, such as Taiwan, the South China Sea or the 
relations with the USA. That is why on both sides the axis of convenience is 
based on interests, not ideology.33 This “axis of convenience narrative” implic-
itly, or sometimes explicitly, emphasizes the neorealist explanations of Russia-
China relations. 
This dominant, neorealist perspective on Russia-China relations has been 
challenged by researchers who used the tools of social constructivist perspec-
tive (that pays attention to values and ideas that influence actions and 
choices).34 Craig Nation writes that “Sino-Russian relationship should be per-
ceived as something more than ‘an axis of convenience’ plagued by ‘fear, anx-
                                                          
27 Minxin Pei, China and Russia: Best Frenemies Forever?, “Fortune”, 28.03.2013. 
28 B. Lo, The Axis of Convenience…, pp. 3-44.  
29 Idem, A Wary Embrace. What the China-Russia relationship means for the world, Iowy 
Institute Papers, 03.04.2017. 
30 Idem, The Axis of Convenience…, p. 3. 
31 Д. Тренин, Верные друзья…, p. 20. 
32 Yu Bin, Russia Says ”No”to the West and ”Sort of”to China, “Comparative Connections” 
2007, vol. 9, no 1. 
33 B. Lo, The Axis of Convenience …, p. 6. 
34 More on constructivism, see: A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge 
University Press 2000, Idem, Constructing international politics, “International Security” 
20, p. 71-81.  
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iety and mistrust’ which is ultimately ‘of secondary importance’; if conven-
ience is defined as the pragmatic pursuit of interests, we have in fact arrived at 
the essence of statecraft – the Sino-Russian relationship is not a sacramentally 
consecrated marriage.”35 The Chinese elites point out the fact that, as Yu Bin 
put it, “frequent disagreements and even contractions” between Russia and 
China do not influence the general good mood in their relations: “temporary 
inability to conclude talks on specific cooperation or difficulty in implement-
ing something will not shake the overall bilateral relationship.”36 Dmitri Trenin 
writes that Russia and China accepted the formula “never being against each 
other, but not necessarily always with each other”; which allows them to “put 
a premium on a solid partnership where their interests meet, eschew conflicts 
where they don’t, and allow a lot of flexibility where interests overlap only 
partially; Russia and China will probably never become full allies; the im-
portant thing is that they abhor mutual hostility, and have mastered their dif-
ferences.”37 Alexander Gabuev echoes his words by calling Russia and China 
“friends with strategic benefits.”38 According to Marcin Kaczmarski, in the 
post 2008-crisis period “Russia-China relations have diverged from the ex-
pected pattern and failed to conform to the logic of power politics; rather than 
reversing or collapsing, rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing flour-
ished and collaboration expanded to encompass new areas”; moreover, Russia 
has not hedged against China or balanced its rise, but chose instead closer co-
operation and an even more unequal relationship – “breakthroughs in co-oper-
ation have transformed the relationship too much to be dismissed as ‘geopolit-
ical convenience.’”39 This argument points out the fact that despite the growing 
asymmetry and widening the material power in favour of Beijing after the 2008 
crisis, this did not lead to tensions or restrictions of the co-operation; instead it 
only accelerated the rapprochement of the two countries – Moscow and Bei-
jing “avoided the Thucydides trap.”40 That is why an analysis of Russia-China 
relations only in terms of strategic interactions (national interests, geopolitical 
response to the USA or power projection) is insufficient – it “does not explain 
how Moscow and Beijing managed to come to terms with an increasingly bal-
ance of power; Realpolitik considerations cannot account for Russia’s mount-
ing dependence on China (…) they do not explain why Russia chose to adapt 
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to a new distribution of material power, nor do they explain why China decided 
to exercise strategic restraint towards its neighbour.”41  
Therefore, this opposite narrative proposes a term of “peaceful power tran-
sition” between Russia and China where “Russia gradually accommodated it-
self to the power shifts, while China exercised self-restraint.”42 This process, 
visible in energy cooperation, arms trade, “protectorate” in Central Asia and 
Moscow’s Sinocentristic policy in East Asia, has in turn increased the already 
existent power asymmetry in favour of Beijing, and made Moscow a much 
more vulnerable partner. In a way, Russia had abandoned its attempts to bal-
ance the Chinese influence (evident before 2008) and came to terms with the 
reality of Chinese dominance. According to this narrative, the most important 
reason for this policy making lies in the social fact being the Russian elite’s 
reading of China’s intentions: “China appears to have convinced Moscow of 
its benign intentions by exercising self-restraint in policies implemented to-
wards Russia”; although China may be a difficult partner in economic projects, 
Beijing refrains from using its advantage to obtain political concession from 
Moscow – this is how China was able to make Russian elite believe in its good 
intentions.43 To conclude this narrative, Russia nolens volens accepted the Chi-
nese privilege and has been trying to use it as much as possible to favour Rus-
sian interests.  
Those two narratives (neorealist and constructivist) are not exactly contra-
dictory, in fact they may be rather complementary than contradictory. This 
book tries to combine these two above mentioned narratives: the pessimistic 
neorealistic approach of “axis of convenience” with the moderate optimistic 
constructivist “power transition” one. This eclecticism is reflected in the very 
title of this book (a direct reference to “axis of convenience”) and its subtitle 
(a reference to “optimistic narrative”), is done on purpose and intended to be, 
at least in a way, intellectually healthy. As in Taoism, where extremes meet 
and are complementary to one another, so here these two narratives on Russia-
China relations can be combined. These two approaches, however, need to be 
complemented even further: by the asymmetry theory.  
2. The Asymmetric Win-Win 
The case study of Sino-Russian relations can be tackled using the asymmetry 
theory that explains the fundamental reality of unequal power amongst states 
and the impact of power’s variables on states policies. Conceptually, in accord-
ance with asymmetry theory, the asymmetry between China and Russia can be 
described in a few ways. The first one would naturally be the Lowell Dittmer’s 
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“positive asymmetry” model that is characterized by economic dependence, 
but not enmity (as in his “negative asymmetry”), where chief beneficiary 
(China) continuously deludes or coerces lesser beneficiary (Russia), while the 
lesser beneficiary turns a blind eye on it by believing that this is a temporary 
necessity.44 Moreover, Ditmmer’s Cold War triangular model of “stable mar-
riage” relationship between three great powers45 can also be modified to pre-
sent relations, as now there is amity between the two (Russia and China) play-
ers and enmity between each of them and the third party (Russia-USA, China-
USA). Dittmer’s model has been modified to adjust it to the contemporary 
conditions by Brantly Womack who proposed his own asymmetric theory 
framework. According to him, “normal” relations between states are neither 
symmetric nor hegemonic, but rather constitute a comprehensive matrix of 
agreements with autonomy and deference being exchanged in increments ra-
ther than complete structural shifts. Here a “negotiated hierarchy” rather than 
dominance and subservience is the most frequent norm, whereas acknowledg-
ment for deference (AFD) is a stable alternative to war between unequal states. 
This AFD paradigm works in accordance with the following logic: the stronger 
country (here: China) is more resourceful, but less committed to bringing about 
specific results in the bilateral relationship, while the weaker country (Russia) 
is more vulnerable and therefore more alert to threat and committed to sur-
vival.46 That is why Russia and China would fit into Womack’s category of 
“normalized asymmetry”. Russia-China relations are asymmetrical (in favour 
of Beijing), but asymmetry in international relations does not necessarily mean 
that the more powerful partner dominates the less powerful one or that the 
weaker one is hopeless. In the Womack’s “normalized asymmetry”, the rela-
tionship is not harmonious, but both sides are confident of fulfilling their basic 
interests and expectations of mutual benefits.47 Finally, Russia-China can be 
described by Krystof Kozáks’s Asymmetric Option Model. Both sides’ ap-
proach towards one another is “open”, which translates into resolving bilateral 
issues cooperatively. China as the stronger partner acts to promote a stable 
asymmetric relationship, knowing that this is Beijing’s responsibility as the 
stronger partner to minimize misperception and increase involvement in its re-
lations to the weaker partner; and to promote voluntary deference instead of 
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facing resistance.48 Thus, all these proposed categories emphasize the rather 
optimistic state of relations between Russia and China – despite being asym-
metric, they are strong.  
The expression “asymmetric win-win” is naturally a reference to a famous 
slogan of Chinese win-win diplomacy. China loves to portray its interactions 
with other countries as mutually beneficial relationship and cooperation among 
different countries, that is based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
and mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality and cooperation, etc.49 In reality, 
however, it is usually China that wins most (though their partners do not nec-
essary lose, just gain less). The same story is true in case of Russia. As this 
book attempts to show, both sides gain, but it is China that wins more, much 
more. As China sets the agenda of bilateral relations, those relations reflect 
mostly the Chinese needs and visions. That is why China consequently pushes 
Russia, step-by-step, into being a raw material appendage to the Chinese econ-
omy. Although this is not detrimental to Russia – Moscow gets money for its 
resources – still China gains more from this relationship, thanks to Chinese-
dominated agenda of bilateral, asymmetrical relations.  
This asymmetry in favour of Beijing must be filtered through the Chinese 
strategic and political tradition that dates back to Sun Zi. The emphasis here is 
put on achieving victories by psychological methods and by avoidance of a 
direct clash. Building its own political and psychological position patiently is 
preferred, so as to persuade the opponent to conscious resignation (the biggest 
victory is to win without the need to fight). Victory does not mean armed forces 
triumph, but rather a final fulfillment of ultimate political goals. Instead of 
challenging the opponent, it is better to push him into an inconvenient position. 
The goal is to achieve victory indirectly, using against the opponent deception 
and manipulation in order to seize his resources with minimal losses and risks. 
Russia, as the weaker state vis-à-vis the stronger partner, may respond by 
conducting two main policies: to bandwagon or to balance.50 Moscow has been 
inconsistent in its approach towards China since 1991, switching from one pol-
icy to another; finally, however, after 2014, it chose the bandwagon strategy 
and decided that it must get as much as possible from cooperating with China 
on Chinese terms. Thus, Russia tacitly accepted the asymmetry of power 
                                                          
48 K. Kozák, Facing Asymmetry: Understanding and Explaining Critical Issues in U.S.-Mexi-
can Relations, lecture, International Studies Association 2010 Annual Conference, New Or-
leans, LA, quoted in: R. J. Basaldú, Two Eagles, One Dragon: Asymmetric Theory and the 
Triangular Relations between the U.S., China and Mexico, unpublished MA thesis, Baylor 
University 2011, pp. 64-68 and 122.  
49 The phrase win-win diplomacy appears in almost every Chinese statement; for recent usage 
of this slogan, see: Xi’s new diplomacy offers 'Chinese solutions', “China Daily” 11.05.2016.  
50 S. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mas. 1979, p. 73; J.Mearsheimer 2001, 
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, pp. 162–163. 
22 
(though naturally in public both states display the illusion of equality), and 
adjusted accordingly. 
3. The Argument: 17th Century as the Model  
for Sino-Russian Relations 
The main argument of this book – that Russia-China relations came back to 
their past state of affairs – derives from the realistic tradition that “appeals to 
historical precedent rather that abstract principle” and dismisses “a modernistic 
prejudice that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past.”51 
On the other hand, this very argument is built on the historical precedent – the 
17th century’s Russia and China’s modus vivendi, which prognosed a stable 
and peaceful relationship – a rather optimistic scenario in the very constructiv-
ist spirit. So, in other words, this book explains that the current Russia-China 
“power transition” is nothing new, but a return to the original situation from 
the 17th century.  
China first learned about Russia in the 13th century. Then, the Mongols who 
had invaded Ruthenia earlier, brought Russian captives to Beijing, back then 
capital of the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368).52 The first information about China 
reached Russia via circular route – through British merchants who wanted to 
find a shorter route to China. The pressure from the British and an awoken 
imagination for China’s riches contributed to sending the first Russian recon-
noiter mission to China lead by Cossak Ivan Petlin in 1618. It was more an 
intelligence mission than diplomacy – this explains why Petlin did not bring 
any gift and – as a result – was not received by the emperor.53 Nevertheless, 
emperor Wangli wrote two letters to the tzar. Unfortunately, in the Kremlin 
nobody was able to read Chinese, so the letters were put to the archives and 
remained there for… 57 years.54 The first chance of establishing bilateral rela-
tions failed. Nobody strived for it anyway.  
The next contact took place in a much less friendly atmosphere: it was as-
sociated with Russian conquests in Siberia. Russian colonization of Siberia and 
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Amur lead to conflict with the Qing Dynasty, for whom Manchuria was their 
fatherland.55 The leading role in colonizing Siberia was played by Yerofiei 
Khabarov – a Russian discoverer, colonizer, businessman, and conquistador. 
His expeditions mark the first clash of Russian and Chinese interests.56 The 
first round was won by Beijing, which sent an army that destroyed troops of 
Khabarov’s successor – Stepanov, and chased the Russians out of the Amur 
region. This, however, did not end the migration on these lands, simply the 
migration itself changed its character – it was now an activity of mostly indi-
vidual adventurers, fugitives and explorers, including such extravagant figures 
as a Pole, Nicefor Czernichowski (Nikifor Chernigovsky).57 The first failed 
diplomatic attempts between Moscow and Beijing were made in the meantime. 
The reason for failure was a difference in understanding of international rela-
tions. The Chinese based their view on the Sinocentric system waifan that ex-
cluded equality between states and assumed “natural” superiority of China 
over other states. The Russians, on their turn, tried to base their relations on 
the European tradition of equality of sides and horizontal relations between 
states. This is why the first official Ambassador to China, Baykov, failed to 
achieve recognition. He was sent off for rejecting to perform the koutou ges-
ture. After a long stand-off, the Manchu court finally decided that Baykov “did 
not turn toward civilization” and his embassy failed completely.58  
Trade relations were more successful. Merchant caravans from Russia 
brought mainly furs and exchanged them for gold, gems and tea. Initially, the 
Russian presence along the Amur did not disturb trade relations, until around 
1670 “the Manchus failed to identify the Cossacs with the Moscow mission.”59 
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Only when the Manchu court discovered that Cossacs are tzar’s subjects (it 
happened more less the same time when Albazin under Czernichowski 
switched to the Russian side), the trade relations were cut, while a prolonged 
Russian presence led to the decision of resolving the issue of the Russian col-
onization for good. In 1676, Moscow sent the Embassy to Beijing headed by 
Nikolai Milescu (known also as Spatharius or Spafari).60 The Manchus made 
to him a proposal that resembled an ultimatum: trade and commercial benefits 
in return for withdrawal from the Amur region and giving Albazin back. 
Milescu tried to maneuver, but despite his diplomatic talent, the embassy ended 
in failure.61 War became inevitable. In this confrontation Russia had no chance. 
A vast distance from Moscow, lack of communication, scarce population and 
most importantly – innumerous Cossacs’ army were not a match to a long-
planned and well prepared Chinese campaign. All of this led to China’s victo-
rious war in 1685-1686. Beijing’s victory paved way to a compromise reached 
in 1689 in Nerchinsk.62  
According to this treaty – signed between equal states (which in itself was 
a significant change from the Chinese policy toward European states; Russia 
was therefore the first foreign country to sign an equal treaty with China63) – 
the Amur basin was to remain in Manchu hands, while Albazin was to be de-
stroyed and abandoned. Russia kept the Baikal region and the lands near the 
Okhotsk Sea.64 In return for their concession, the Russians gained commercial 
privileges which they soon used effectively.65 Thus, it was a forced compro-
mise brokered on Chinese terms.  
The Nerchinsk treaty, with its subsequent modification at Kyakhta (1727), 
initiated the so called “Nerchinsk order”, or Nerchinsk/Kyakhta treaty sys-
tem – a specific model of Sino-Russian relations. Its essence was that Russia, 
                                                          
the missions from Moscow, which came overland, must be continental in origin; there was 
no reason for Pekin to identify the two as related in any way”, Ibid., p. 34.  
60 Ibid., p. 50.  
61 Ibid., p. 100. 
62 It was, naturally, a forced compromised. Russian sources like to point out that Chinese del-
egation was accompanied by 12.000 soldiers, whereas Russian by 1400 only. This applied 
psychological and physical pressure that led to Russian concessions, Русско-китайские 
отношения в XVII веке. Материалы и документы [Russo-Chinese relations in 17th Cen-
tury. Materials and Documents], Москва 1972, т. 2. 1686–1691, cост. Н. Ф. Демидова, 
В. С. Мясников, pp. 5-54; В. С. Мясников, Сведения китайцев о России в XVII в. [The 
Chinese People’s Relations on Russia in 17th Century], “Вопросы истории” 1985, № 12, 
p. 90-101.  
63 А. Д. Воскресенский, op. cit., p. 407.  
64 Русско-китайские отношения 1689-1916. Официалные документы [Russo-Chinese 
Relations 1698-1916. Official Documents], сост. П. С. Скачков, В. С. Мясников, Москва 
1958, pp. 9-11. 
65 Trade with China was very profitable for Russia; it had been seling fur and lether (salt to 
lesser extend) and buying textiles, tea, porcelain, tobacco, emalia and other luxurious goods, 
M. Mancall, Russia and China…, pp. 134-150. 
25 
in exchange for trade profits, made a concession, and against the European 
tradition, accepted Chinese superiority. It ceded claims to the Amur basin and 
received concord for lucrative trade with China. Although Russia was weaker 
and less significant than China, and in the eyes of Beijing certainly not equal 
(this would be impossible by the very definition of their Sinocentric outlook 
on the world), it did not become a part of the Chinese vassal system. Moscow’s 
position was better than that of the Western powers: “dealings with the Rus-
sians had been conducted not through the Ministry of Rituals, which handled 
the so-called tributary relations with such countries as Holland, Spain, and Por-
tugal, but through a special bureau, the Lifan Yuan (…) by putting Russian 
affairs under this bureau, the Manchu tacitly admitted that their northern neigh-
bour were a special case (…) required different handling from those in the 
southeast.”66 Russia’s unique position in China was best illustrated by the pres-
ence of the orthodox mission in Beijing.67 The Nerchinsk/Kyakhta treaty sys-
tem turned out to be long-lasting (until the mid 19th century) because – ac-
cording to Mark Mancall – it created “neutral institutions”, which could be in-
corporated into the structure of assumptions of each society without infringing 
upon the prerogatives or sensibilities of the other: “the system established very 
narrow paths of access from each society into the other and permitted each to 
control those paths on its own side (free access might upset either side’s inter-
nal socio-cultural equilibrium). At the same time, access was sufficient 
enough, so that neither party felt the need to go to war to obtain greater access 
to the other empire”. The same model, although on a much lesser scale, worked 
in Canton (and in Deshima, Japan).68  
With the exception of small amendments (in 1768 and 1792), the 
Nerchinsk/Kyaktha treaty system survived for a very long time – until the 19th 
century and regulated relations between Russia and China. The main reason 
why this system was so stable and lasted for so long was that it was based on 
what Mancall called “cultural neutrality”. According to this researcher, until 
the late 18th century the European powers entering Asia behaved on a basis of 
Grotius’s ‘natural law’ (jus gentium). The Russians, like the Dutch or the Por-
tuguese, could begin to accept Chinese ceremonial practices such as kowtow, 
as a custom that did not imply anything more than recognition under the natural 
law of the Emperor’s dignity in his own land.69 In other words, it was a local 
equivalent of what today is called political culture whose patterns should be 
followed if a state wants to maintain successful relations with a host country. 
This attitude was followed by the Dutch at Dezhima and originated from the 
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objective fact that Europe then was neither central to the world nor was it the 
most important of continents and could not demand an imposition of its cul-
tural patterns on others. 
The Nerchinsk and Kyakhta treaties were based on this ‘natural law of na-
tions’ and that is why the order lasted so long. It collapsed in the mid 19th 
century due to changes that were initiated by the intellectual revolution of the 
European Enlightenment in the late 18th century. The positivistic attitude put 
the concept of natural law outside the law entirely and instead introduced the 
construct of a “family of nations” in the center of political philosophy. Whereas 
under natural law, the family of nations was presumed to be a universal con-
tinuum, under the developing positive law it was redefined as those states that 
adhered to accepted international legal practices as proclaimed by the Euro-
pean states acting in concert – the entry into the family of nations was formal-
ized and symbolized by ‘recognition’, a concept that is purely European and 
positivist. A ‘modernization’ in the sense of ‘Europeanization’ started to be 
required for the participation in the international community. This intellectual 
change was accompanied by a growth in Europe’s technological ability to in-
sist on, even by force (e.g. gunboat) to others’ adherence to these new rules.70 
In other words, for a European Ambassador to China, a kowtow before the 18th 
century was not a problem; it was a recognition of the emperor’s right (alt-
hough, of course, in an extremely unpleasant way). Later, after this positivistic 
change, it was a violation of the rule he considered universal. Furthermore, the 
European powers in the 19th century were strong enough to follow their own 
way in international relations with China, the Westernocentric one that they 
considered universal. This, as a side effect, contributed to the collapse of the 
Nerchinks-Kyakhta model of Sino-Russian relations, as Russia had joined the 
Western powers and had begun exploiting China with them. 
Although the conditions and political decorum changed, some of the most 
important aspects still remain today. If we compare the 17th century relations 
between the two countries with the current ones, we can trace some striking 
similarities. The most important one is that China is much stronger now in this 
relationship (as it used to be in the 17th century) and Russia accepts this fact 
(albeit quietly) and adheres to this situation by taking as many opportunities as 
possible. This leads to the predominance of trade in the economic sphere of the 
relations. Secondly, although Russia is weaker, it is still strong enough not to 
fit into the category of Chinese “modern vassals”, such as Laos or Cambodia, 
thus it is again outside the China-centered world. China knows that Russia is 
still too strong, not to mention too proud, to be provoked or humiliated, and 
chooses to appease Moscow in order to keep it on Beijing’s side. Russia plays 
a delicate role in China’s relationships. If Russia tilted too much towards the 
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United States, becoming a junior partner of Washington, China’s overall stra-
tegic position would dramatically worsen. Russia would stop being the ‘safe 
rear’ for China, leading to Beijing’s fears of a ‘strategic encirclement’ by the 
United States. This is a pragmatic equivalent of the 17th century Manchu pol-
itics, which wanted to have a long-lasting deal with Moscow not to make them 
endanger the Amur basin. This deal was made on Chinese terms, though with 
benefits for Russia as well. So, the modern “asymmetric win-win situation” is 
just an adaptation of the the 17th century model of the relations: both countries 
benefit from their relations, however, it is China that benefits more. Finally, 
with reference to Mancall’s “cultural neutralism” in their 17th century rela-
tions, this can be matched with their axiological opposition against Western 
values, such as democracy and human rights. The limited communication be-
tween both societies is now being repeated and reflected in the famous sen-
tence that “China-Russia relations are hot on the top, but cold at the bottom” 
which does not bother the Chinese nor Russian leaders who have more im-
portant issues on their agenda than taking care of the bilateral friendship be-
tween their societies. The most important common factor, however, is their 
pragmatism. In the 21st century, much like in the 17th century, China and Rus-
sia do not have much in common. They are two different worlds, maybe even 
two different civilizations. They do not like each other and do not trust one 
another; however, they want to do business and do it successfully.  
II. The Domestic Determinants of Russia’s  
and China’s Policymaking 
No political event takes part in a vacuum; the domestic context inevitably in-
fluences the process of decision making. Such aspects as historical tradition, 
heritage, mentality that influence the patterns of political culture, political pref-
erences, interests and decisions, as well as political systems – they are all ex-
tremely important to understand the dynamics of Russia-China relations. His-
torical tradition should be presented first, as Russian and Chinese perceptions 
of international affairs take their roots from historical experiences. 
1. Historical and Cultural Determinants  
Ideas matter, even in societies notorious for their cynicism, such as Russian 
and Chinese ones.71 Although national identities do not automatically dictate 
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the destiny of a country, they signify “something deeply embedded in the way 
the country has evolved”; in the cases of China and Russia rising themes in 
their national identity are “Sinocentrism and Russocentrism” respectively.72  
In the case of Russia, the most important historical and cultural determinant 
is first and foremost the imperial tradition, dating back to “collecting of Rus-
sian lands” and integrating history of both the Russian Empire and the USSR. 
That is why the USSR’s dissolution was such an important event, shock and 
time limes (latin: boundary) for Russia: the state lost its superpower status. 
Since 1991, Russia’s various foreign policy concepts are in fact just attempts 
to reply to a question: how to rebuild an empire in post-modern conditions?73 
In the case of China, three determinants dominate its foreign policy: 1) rebuild-
ing the power status (“getting back the proper place in the world”), 2) self-
perception of China as a victim of Western colonialism (“hundred years of 
national humiliation”, bai nian guo chi), strongly emphasized in contrast to 
former glory (and apparent “peacefulness” of the Imperial China), and used to 
potray Western powers as denying China its due in the international system74; 
3) a defensive approach towards the international community (fear of “China’s 
encirclement”).75  
As for time limes in the contemporary conditions, for Russia, the USSR’s 
fall marks the most important date. In the post-cold war world Russia as a 
“post-imperial power”76 has been seeking a place for itself, being torn between 
bandwaggoning to the USA and balancing the USA hegemony. As for China, 
the proper time limes are Deng Xiaoping’s reforms: the Chinese modernization 
and going out to the world combined with awareness of having peaceful inter-
national surroundings (without peace there would be no space for Chinese re-
forms). The famous Deng’s 16 character formula best illustrates this way of 
thinking: out of all these sentences, two phrases are of particular importance: 
“hide your capabilities, wait for a proper moment” (tao guang, yang hui) and 
a warning frequently emphasized by Deng: “do not raise your heads” (bu dan 
tou) – China cannot provoke others with its actions to start a conflict, particu-
larly with the present hegemon, the USA, because Beijing is still unprepared 
for such a clash77. China may accept conflict only when it is strong enough to 
be sure that it can win (in accordance with Sun Zi’s advice).  
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Beside historical experience, cultural and civilizational aspects also matter. 
Both Russia and China define their national interests using a “holistic” ap-
proach, typical for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.78 This cultural con-
vergence is well seen in the light of business relations – both in China and 
Russia politics converges with economy: despite obvious differences (see: be-
low), the model of state-to-business relations dominates, as well as a high 
scope of state integration with economy. Moreover, both Russia and China 
consider themselves something more than a state or a nation – a separate civi-
lization (or civilization that became a nation state): “here originates their dif-
ferent ideas about the supreme values, domestic and international politics, as-
sessment of tendencies in the international situation and existing contradic-
tions.”79 
2. The “Russian Idea” 
For Russia, the most important cultural (civilizational) aspect is the conviction 
about its own exceptionalism and uniqueness, literarily expressed by 
Tyutchev’s famous poem that begins with the words “Russia cannot be under-
stood with the mind alone (…) in Russia, one can only believe”. Although 
these verses along with other classical Russian texts have been subject to 
“myth-making on an industrial scale” that led to “a host of trite simplifications 
and sometimes outright falsehoods” (many observers used this “cloud of mys-
ticism” to tell that Russia cannot be explained in rational categories)80, they 
nevertheless should not be dismissed in a “throwing the baby out with the bath-
water” manner as they indicate sets of values and beliefs different than Western 
ones.81 The conviction about its own uniqueness found its expression in the so-
called “Russian idea” (russkaya idea), a term that “on the one hand means dis-
tinctiveness of the Russian culture and institutions and on the other – an ideal 
model of society based on an extrapolation of these elements. The former ap-
plied to the specific interpretation of the Russian history, the latter was associ-
ated with practical realization of state regime.”82 The so called “Russian idea” 
was based on the assumption that “Russia possesses [its] own, independent and 
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unique tradition that puts it aside from the West and enables future develop-
ment.”83 It was the “essence of Russia’s history.”84 Moreover, Russia intro-
duces itself as a unique “organism”, specific type of civilization, with its own 
culture, history and customs, not just a nation-state.85 Specific understanding 
of community has been opposed to Western individualism, while orthodox 
spirituality – to Western materialism86; “thinking hostile to Western civiliza-
tion had mixed cultural exceptionism insistent on the uniqueness of Russian 
civilization (samobytnost), claims to Russia’s special role in international af-
fairs, and dismissal of freedom at odds with Russian ideas of community (sob-
ornost).”87 The West itself plays an important role in Russian self-identifica-
tion: “The Russians have defined themselves rather in opposition against oth-
ers, while the ‘Russian idea’ did not create ground for synthesis, a process of 
adaptation based on compromise (like in Chinese or Japanese cultures); in Rus-
sian mentality the antithesis ‘we’ and ‘them’ have been rooted for centuries; 
this also applies to international relations (Russians-aliens).”88 This contrib-
uted to a chronic feeling of discomfort based on a constant sense of threat; 
contradicting influences of West and East made Russia an alienated country 
that does not belong to any great “family of nations”89: Russia is in a way “a 
torn country”90, or a “lonely power.”91 As Benjamin Disraeli aptly summarized 
it, “Russia has two faces: an Asiatic face which always looks towards Europe, 
and a European face which always looks towards Asia.”92 The claim on 
uniqueness and exclusiveness came in response to these anxieties: Russia, 
then, “is a civilization unto itself (…) may pick and choose as it sees fit, thereby 
preserving its independence.”93 It is telling that it was this uniqueness that 
made Russians proud of their country: “Russia’s historic pride was more 
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grounded in distinctiveness than in claims to superiority.”94 This belief in 
uniqueness in turn influenced the Russian politics.  
One of the most important consequences of the “Russian idea” was that the 
Russians “consider their country in extraordinary categories. Ordinary inhab-
itants are not accustomed to think about their country as foreigners do. They 
tend to explain all disasters that have been falling on Russia via this magical 
form: we are not similar to anybody.”95 Russians see Russia as special: “as 
possessing a special status and aura—no longer an empire in the traditional 
sense, but certainly more than an ‘ordinary’ nation-state (…) Konstantin von 
Eggert once put it, ‘all peoples are unique, but Russians think they are more 
unique than the others.’”96 Messianism has been going hand in hand with this 
exceptionism: conviction about Russia’s “mission” (“the Holy Rus”, “the 
Third Rome”, “the Slav’s Defender”) that combines metaphysical and theolog-
ical features with great power and imperialism. The Soviet Union has contin-
ued the tradition of using the “uniqueness” factor in politics; so does the Rus-
sian Federation. Naturally, these claims do not have such ideological and emo-
tional intensity as before (but state’s power is much weaker than it used to be 
in the imperial or Soviet times), nevertheless they lie within the tradition de-
scribed above. The lack of coherent, all-encompassing “new Russian idea” is 
the exclusion that makes the Russian Federation different from the Russian 
Empire or the Soviet Union; according to many, after the USSR’s dissolution 
Russia “lost its idea”: communism was compromised and nothing appeared to 
replace it. Since then, there has not been such a strong ideological and emo-
tional vision. This somehow explains the failure of the Russian transformation 
in the 1990s: simple convergence to the West has been absolutely out of the 
question: this is one of the reasons why during Putin’s terms Russia has “left 
the West” for good.97  
Since the USSR’s fall, Russia had been “searching for an idea”: “many Rus-
sians are confident that without an idea similar to The Great American Dream, 
the country could not regain its status as one of global leading powers.”98 As 
Sergei Karaganov writes – “there is no new national idea with the exception of 
memory of the Great Patriotic War – we have not found anything that pushes 
country ahead.”99 Lack of a national idea translates somehow into foreign pol-
icy: Russia had real problems with defining its role on the world stage. Russia 
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had problems with finding a successful way to fulfill its superpower need – it 
was torn between many concepts, without eventually choosing and conse-
quently fulfilling any of them.100 This explains political thrashing and tactical 
changes of alliances. Yeltsin was striving to identify a “new Russian idea” but 
he failed in establishing “Rossiskyaia” (state, supra ethnic) nationality “as a 
melting point”; it was only his successor who was able to merge the tsarist, 
(post)communist and neoimperial elements into one concept.101  
When Putin came to power, this political-spiritual search has been simpli-
fied to a very easy message: being the great power for its own sake simply 
became the contemporary equivalent of the “Russian idea” – “the status of an 
independent global great power and a regional hegemon has been the core of 
the ‘Russian idea’ promoted by Vladimir Putin and the ruling elite; ‘making 
great power’ (derzhavnost’) the intristic element of the Russian identity helped 
to dilute tensions between Russian nationalism and the multi-ethnic character 
of the Russian Federation.”102 Putin’s Russian idea “combines gosudarstven-
nost (identification with state), patriotism, collectivism, and solidarity” and the 
fact that his vision prevailed means that “statists had won the debate on the 
“Russian idea”, even if they agreed on few specifics apart from sovereignty 
first, great power assertiveness in seeking multipolar world, and a defense of 
civilization against values imported from the West.”103 Putin’s Russian idea, 
derived from writings of nationalist thinkers such as Konstantin Leontiev and 
Ivan Ilyin and expressed in aggressive self-confidence, is based on “conserva-
tive political and social values, free of the contaminating influence of Western 
liberalism”, combined with “a resurgent nationalism that openly defies U.S. 
leadership” and the current international system.104 Although one may argue 
that from the spiritual point of view, being a superpower just for being it would 
be too little for the Russians – Putin’s vision of the “Russian idea” is a dramatic 
philosophical simplification of it – nevertheless, so far it has been working and 
Putin’s regime enjoys support and legitimacy.  
3. Russia’s Great Power Syndrome 
Putin’s reinterpretation of the “Russian idea” is another reason why imperial-
ism remains one of the keys to understand Russian politics. The conviction 
about Russia’s cultural and moral superiority that predestinates it to become a 
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superpower is an imperative deeply rooted within Russian mentality. Even to-
day, the ruling elite believes that to survive Russia must “be a great power; 
only on this basis can it (and its people) flourish”; hence, Russia’s destiny as a 
great power and unique civilizational identity are accepted as self-evident 
truths, while resentment of Western policies and actions is evident across the 
political spectrum; it helps too that the wider population shares these senti-
ments.”105  
The historical process of creating Russian identity tied it inseparably to the 
imperial tradition; Russia existed not so much in time, as in space.106 The Rus-
sian concept of nation-building was a concept of expansion: the Russians cared 
more about conquering more lands than about economic, political or cultural 
development.107 This imperative is deeply rooted in the survival instinct of the 
Russians: by living in the state of a chronic threat (due to open, continental 
borders Russia has “a special sense of vulnerability”,108 while “Russian history 
is a chronicle of the agony of surviving invasion after invasion”109) they follow 
the simple rule that the best defence is an attack: “in short, for Russia to be 
secure it must create some kind of empire”110. Thus, “geography has nourished 
a security outlook dominated by threat perceptions and geopolitical calcu-
lus.”111 
Gaining new lands, however, led to a paradox situation. New territorial con-
quests create new challenges and stimulate further expansion – a never ending 
vicious circle is the result. That is why the Russian ideology is based on a 
“siege fortress” mentality. The feeling of permanent threat strengthens think-
ing in the imperial categories. And the giant territory itself helps to keep the 
imperial mindset: “Russia’s vastness has also been critical in establishing and 
reinforcing its identity as an empire”112; “deeply embedded in Russian tradition 
was the notion that a vast, ever-expanding territory is essential to Russian 
power”.113 Thus happens what George Orwell once described: “an effect can 
become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same effect 
in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely. A man may take to drink because 
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he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely because 
he drinks”.114 
The territorial expansion has always played a compensation role, too: it 
compensated to the Russians their country’s civilizational backwardness and 
authoritarian governance. Thinking in great power categories has been a tool 
used by the authorities to keep social coherence and integrity – a lack of civil 
liberties, subjectivity of the inhabitants, low standard of living – all this was 
compensated by the glory of belonging to an imperial power115: “war or the 
preparation for a new war became the way Russian civilization has sur-
vived”116. Being a superpower remains a key aspect in Russian mentality. But, 
as Dmitri Orieshkin noted, being a power is not understood as in political sci-
ence (power as a state with force and resources) but rather “in reference to the 
19th century’s Tyutchev’s vague metaphysical concepts of an empire as a 
global leader and an exclusive centre of culture, statehood and spirituality.”117  
The great power syndrome still has an important influence on how Russia 
is functioning politically. The very number of proper names that Russians has 
been trying to use to depict their country today –“liberal empire”118, “Eurasian 
empire”119, “post-Imperium”120, “world’s third greatest power”,121 etc. – is tell-
ing. Perhaps the most adequate description comes, however, from an outsider: 
Australian scholar Bobo Lo, who calls contemporary Russia “a postmodern 
empire”. According to him “many of the physical features of empire have dis-
appeared, but the imperial spirit is still present and even resurgent (…) the idea 
of empire is very much alive”. Although Putin is not interested in rebuilding 
the Soviet Union (“oldstyle imperial dominion remains an unattractive propo-
sition”), he is reluctant to recognize ex-Soviet republics as sovereign, let alone 
to accept Western involvement there. This vision of a “pax Rossica” in the 
post-Soviet area is “a version of empire tailored to a post-imperial era in inter-
national politics”, an “indirect imperialism by bureaucrats”, which is more 
“calculating than messianic” and is characterized by: “indirect control rather 
than direct rule”, control of the strategic space (‘what we (still) have, we hold’), 
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dominant influence without imperial burden (“control, not conquest”), and cul-
tural mission civilisatrice.122  
In short, Putin is not “collecting Soviet lands”, he just wants other great 
powers to consider this area as a Russian zone of exclusive influence, as if 
politically following Oscar Wilde’s maxim “there are many things that we 
would throw away if we were not afraid that others might pick them up”.  
Hence, the worldview of the contemporary Russian elites synthesizes the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union traditions and may be characterized, too, 
as “moderate neoimperialism”, “post-imperialism”, or “trans-imperialism”: it 
promotes the zone of influence (CIS) and bases on the archetype of space and 
claim on geostrategic and cultural uniqueness of Russia.123 Russia’s pillars of 
“great power” (derzhavnost’) are traditional: the sheer geographic extent, a 
vast nuclear arsenal, and abundant natural resources: “Russian policy makers 
tend to view the world through Cartesian lens: ‘we think we are a great power, 
therefore we are.’”124 
Russian great power syndrome is associated, too, with the “need for recog-
nition and respect”, undermined by the USSR’s fall.125 The breakup was a 
“source of atavistic fears and humiliation”, comparable to Mongol invasion or 
to Chinese “hundred years of humiliation” (see: below), and the real disaster 
“was the transformation of the world’s second superpower into an impotent 
also-ran.”126 Due to these historical reasons, Russia possesses a great need for 
being recognized by other subjects. As Lilia Shevtsova put it, Russia in axious 
that others will not respect it.127 Leonid Radzikhovsky went further by writing 
that the Russians have a giant need for respect but throughout the centuries, 
the fear was the only means of being respected, that they mastered.128 As Bobo 
Lo put it, “here originates an almost pathological need for acceptance by oth-
ers”, “demand for ‘respect’ by others, meaning the respect due by right to one 
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of the world’s elite (…) respect is a state of mind rather than something quan-
tifiable. It is measured by the extent of Western acceptance of Russia’s ‘spe-
cial’ interests in the post-Soviet space, of its privileged place in international 
decisionmaking, and of its right to manage its domestic affairs free from “in-
terference.”129 This is where the need for a great power status and Putin’s pop-
ularity is coming from: “Russia pays a lot of attention to being treated and 
perceived as an equal and as one of the key decision makers in the multipolar 
world order; this self-perception as a great power is closely related to the syn-
drome of humiliation that Russia feels it experienced at the end of the Cold 
War; by imagining the state as a great power, the Russian elite hopes to over-
come and compensate for the period of smuta (or rather second smuta – M.L.) 
(trouble and depression) of the 1990s.”130 The great power status derives, too, 
from specific reading of Russian history “that has boasted great victories and 
achievements, along with tragedy and disaster; Russia has lost many battles, 
but few wars” which led its leaders to believe “that Russia generally finds itself 
on the right side of history” and the others will sooner or later be forced to 
accept its realities – it ends with “over-confidence and triumphalism.”131 
The current Russian leadership has been rather a traditional one in its nation-
building based on rebuilding the Russian state’s great power status. Most of 
the Russian population due to psychological determinants feel the need to be a 
part of an empire, so they widely accepted Putin’s politics. Thanks to high 
prices of oil and gas in the 2000s, Putin was able to play on these moods.132 
Russia’s “‘energetic superpower’” is nothing more than yesterday’s ‘resources 
reservoir’ but how commanding it sounds!”133 During Putin’s term “a histori-
cal revenge-ism”, based on rebuilding state greatness and creating Eurasian 
empire, became the state ideology.134  
Since Putin’s first presidential term energy resources started to play a dual 
role: they delivered financial resources (oil and gas make up around 50% of 
export) and secured the improvement of Russia’ strategic position.135 Combi-
nation of vast natural resources and a rising global need for energy allowed 
Russia to play an influential role in world politics. Russia became a petro-state, 
with an economy based on resources and built on the idea of an “energy super-
power” that “won the minds of Russian elites” – they imagined that Russia is 
a superpower again.”136 Kremlin elites were jubilating: “Russia is up, the USA 
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is down and the EU is out” was the slogan of those days.137 Energy became 
central to Russian policy not only as a revenue source but mostly as a tool of 
political pressure. Major energy concerns, such as Gazprom, have been active 
foreign policy players, at times more influential than conventional entities such 
as the MFA. It happened to such an extent that to “Kremlin.inc”138, its own 
interest is equal to the state interest”139, while the line between Putin’s group 
interests and national interests is “completely blurred in Russia.”140 Improve-
ment of the economic situation “led Russian elites to believe in the illusory 
conclusion that the ‘time of chaos’, so characteristic for the 1990s, has ended, 
while the country was gaining back its great power status.”141  
These hopes underwent a difficult fact check in 2014 and 2015 when energy 
prices hit low records. What had been the source of confidence became a 
“source of vulnerability”, as “keeping the elite happy” and society calm is the 
key to the survival of the current system.142 So far Putin’s team was able to 
compensate society’s lowered standards of living143 by using a strengthened 
great power nationalistic agenda (regaining Crimea, defending against the 
West, upholding traditional values). He used an anti-Americanism, too, as not 
only his ideological challenge to the West and/or his personal revenge for sup-
porting the protests in 2012, but also as a calculated strategy. Due to the fact 
that economic growth was over, and Putin could no longer rely on a “materi-
alist ‘social contract,’” he needed to find new sources of legitimacy and he 
exploited the old Russian tradition of “a Russia besieged by enemies abroad 
and traitors within”; thus “attacking Washington was no longer part of manag-
ing the United States, but became an extension of domestic politics by different 
means; the risk of a new crisis in bilateral relations paled into insignificance 
compared with the imperative of preserving power at all costs.”144 It works, at 
least for a while, domestically – society has bought into the Kremlin message 
and is happy to get Crimea back (though the spring 2017 youth protests showed 
first signs of crisis). In the circumstances of “a new world disorder”145, and in 
growing social cynicism (like in late Brezhnev times)146 that makes the people 
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apathetic towards the rhetoric of the regime147, however, it remains to be seen 
whether Kremlin will be able to find a new way to keep the Russia’s position, 
regain great power status and control society.  
4. Russia in Asia 
Geography dictates Russia to be a part of Asia (it is “Asian-ness” – without it 
Russia would rather still be Muscovy).148 Yet Russia understands Asia in nar-
row terms: as Asia-Pacific (East Asia) plus India, which are understood as 
“East”; this outlook excludes Central Asia and the Middle East (understood as 
“South”).149 Moreover, “Russia may be in Asia in a physical sense, but the 
historical and civilizational foundations for such an identity are flimsy (…) it 
has been said that “while Russia is in Asia, it is not of Asia”150 and has an 
“East-West dilemma,” where engagement with Asia is balanced by attachment 
to Europe.151 It is best seen in the Russian Far East – “not a gateway to Asia, 
but a natural geographical border for expansion; a frontier and a barrier”, “an 
extension of Europe” more than a part of Asia.152 This translates to the issues 
of mentality, in psychological, cultural and emotional terms, Russians remain 
more tied to the West than to the East: “theories that try to find the “Asian 
soul” inside Russians are ‘exotic.’”153 Russians judge their successes and fail-
ures through Western points of view: as Chen Yu correctly observed, “in spite 
of Putin’s (and all Kremlin’s elite – M.L.) ideological contempt for Europe’s 
liberalism, Russia’s values are closest to Europe’s.”154 Axiologically and men-
tally, Russia remains a European country and this makes logical its orientation 
towards the West. The Russians, as inhabitants of Europe, view the world via 
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Western lenses: “although the Russian eagle has two heads, out of habit it looks 
only to the West.”155 Unlike the West which represent “the known” (“a well-
rehearsed repertoire of behaviors, negotiating tactics, and policy positions”) 
for Russians the interaction with the Chinese and other Asians is “a more un-
familiar enterprise, requiring revised assumptions and different approaches. 
The Chinese have proved especially challenging partners, notwithstanding the 
upward trajectory of their relationship (…) with the Chinese, everything is so 
much more ambiguous (…) the reasons are not linguistic, but cultural in the 
wider meaning of the term.”156 For Russians, Chinese and other Asians are “the 
other”: “at times threatening, at other times an object of contempt or puzzle-
ment, but always alien”; despite more frequent visits to Asia, “this hardly sig-
nifies empathy, let alone identification. Asia represents exotica and differ-
ence— more accessible than before, but still a world apart.”157 Despite quarrels 
with the West, Russia considers itself a part of Europe and the West remains 
its main reference point. China and the East are good tactical points in political 
games with the West, but the East is certainly not a rival as an attractive civi-
lization: for long “Asia has mattered in Russia’s games with Europe; it was 
understood that being raw material appendage to Asia is bad, while being it to 
Europe is normal.”158 For centuries “the Russians regarded their East Asian 
neighbours with superiority and a pinch of contempt; the place accorded to 
China in their thinking was always secondary, at best.”159 Russia interest in 
Asian “has been uneven at best, often nonexistent and its focus overwhelm-
ingly instrumental; if Asia has mattered, then it has largely been because of its 
relevance to Russia’s interaction with the West, and, by extension, its position 
in the world”; cooperation with Asia “was frequently cast in revanchist terms 
(…) the accent was less on engaging with the East than withdrawing from the 
West (or teaching it a lesson).”160 This is where the characteristic thinking that 
China is important not per se, but as an informal partner against USA, origi-
nates: “this logic is so simple, even primitive. Strong China and India appear 
on the horizon, they would inevitably clash with the United States, Russia 
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would join them and enter the group of countries that would decide about the 
future of the world.”161 The condsideration of Asia as an extention of Europe 
led Russians to call Russia “a European civilization, but Eurasian empire” 
which emphasizes “both its distinctiveness and its geopolitical position as the 
heartland power” and implies that Russia is not “Asian as such, but rather an 
in- between—and independent—civilization; this self-identification is at the 
root of the popular notions of Russia as a bridge between civilizations, and 
geopolitical balancer between the United States and Chin.”162 Recently Russia 
has introduced a new term, “Euro-Pacific power” that highlights the changing 
international situation (decline of the West, the shift of global power to the 
East), and Moscow’s ambitions: “Russia that has arrived as a Euro-Pacific 
power would combine the dynamism of East Asia with the still powerful 
trumps of Western culture and technology, and, of course, Russian tradi-
tion.”163 
It is very symptomatic, however, that Russian attempts to play the role “of 
a bridge between Europe and Asia”164, being “like a bird and can only fly well 
if it uses both wings” (European and Asian)165, “respecting European pragma-
tism and Eastern wisdom alike”166, or building a Eurasian/Euro-Pacific identity 
are from Asian perspective – as well as from European – a failure. Russia “is 
not an Asia-Pacific nation by most criteria; historically and culturally, it is in-
controvertibly a European civilization; and politically, economically, and in 
terms of strategic culture, it looks far more to the West than to the East (…) 
from Asian perspective, Russia is just an European country that happens, 
through historical and imperialist ‘accident’ to have some of its territory in 
Asia.”167 Seen from this perspective, Russia is the “third West” (after the USA 
and Western Europe); for Asians Putin’s habits of practicing judo and eating 
Chinese food are examples of his “Asian superficiality” only168. Asians do not 
regard Russia as culturally Asian.169 As one Chinese “old-Russia hand” put it, 
“Russia's heart is always with the West. Its biggest hope is to earn the respect 
from the West and integrate into the Western hemisphere.”170 Asian elites see 
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Russia as backward, non-atractive and non-modernizing country with “a scle-
rosis worse than anything seen in the West”, and have a dismissive view of 
Russia’s engagement in Asia, too: “Russia was rarely serious about coopera-
tion for its own sake, but harbored ulterior motives born of an irredeemably 
Westerncentric outlook”; thus – they “view it as an outsider” which “will never 
be Asian except in the most literal sense of possessing” and “looks at Asia from 
the distorted perspective of an outside power.”171 Former Indonesian President 
Yudhoyono may sing for Putin “happy birthday” in public, but he does so not 
because he considers Putin as his follow Asian, but because he made good 
business with Russia (arms sales). 
Russia belongs to Asia formally not only because of the independent inter-
national processes (a weak position of the RF in Asia), but also due to the Rus-
sian way of conducting foreign policy.172 It “misunderstands the dynamics of 
regional political and economic processes.”173 Russia praises itself on making 
decisions alone without any consultations, let alone collective decision-mak-
ing174, while the latter is precisely the way politics is done in Asia. That is why 
it is difficult for Russia to find itself in Asian regional organizations – this 
would mean accepting the unpleasant fact that Moscow is an unimportant 
player in the region and that there is always the risk of being outvoted by 
smaller nations. For Russian policy makers it is difficult to accept – Moscow 
definitely prefers the realistic concept of the “great powers’ concert”175, which 
is currently impossible in Asia. First and foremost, during crises, “moments of 
truth” such as Georgian and Ukrainian crises, Russia behaves in the non-Asian 
way. Moscow’s resolve to force earns respect in Asia, but at the same time, it 
deepens the perception of Russia’s cultural and civilizational strangeness to 
Asia. Asians may feel respect for Russia, but its way of resolving matters re-
minds them of the worst patterns of the 19th century colonialism and imperi-
alism – this alienates Russia like nothing else from its Asian partners. 
This alienation is well seen in the example of the last Kremlin’s Asian ini-
tiative – “turn to the East”, internationally inaugurated during the APEC sum-
mit in Vladivostok in 2012. Choosing Vladivostok, however, showed Russia’s 
detachment from the Asian reality: making this city the center of the “Russian 
turn to the East” was an implicit, perhaps even unwanted reference to the 19th 
century’s imperialistic attempt to conquer the continent, best exemplified by 
city’s symbolic name (Vladivostok = “the Ruler of the East”). This is how it 
was interpreted in Asia, where Russia is still being considered a European 
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power with colonial heritage: “For many Asians (…) Russia had ‘pivoted’ to 
the region at least a century and a half before when (…) Russia got its ‘Treaty 
of Aigun’ (1858) in the wake of the second Opium War.”176 Although the 
Asian states have tactically welcomed Russia’s pivot to Asia (in hope of bal-
ancing China) this did not lead to reconsideration of Russia as the Asian state 
and it is unlikely in the future.  
5. China’s Sinocentricism 
In China, the most important cultural factor is Sinocentricism: the claim that 
China is central to other countries. This has given China “cultural confidence 
(…) unity, strength, and resilience”177; it has given it, too, a “deep reservoir of 
cultural pride” and the feeling of superiority: “China’s historic conceit centers 
on its superiority as a civilized state.”178 
In the traditional Sinocenctristic worldview, “the Chinese state was the ad-
ministration of civilized society in toto” whereas the emperor was the “pater-
familias of all mankind.”179 The emperor has been given the “Mandate of 
Heaven”, thus becoming chosen from chosen, the bearer of the supernatural 
permit to rule the world.”180 Chinese elites of power had “an absolute claim of 
superiority over ‘barbarians’ – all the other nations.181 Chinese had considered 
their country “the only civilization.”182 The Chinese Empire was understood as 
“the only universalistic entity that covers all the world (…) beyond its borders 
other countries were, naturally, spotted, but were not considered as fully sov-
ereign nor equal.”183 As Salvatore Babones writes, “to the extent that the po-
litical system of which China was the central state had a name, or at least a 
label, it might be identified with the Chinese word tianxia (‘all under 
heaven’)”; tianxia was “an abstract notion embodying the idea of a superior 
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moral authority that guided behaviour in a civilized world.”184 The main insti-
tutional mechanism through which the Chinese state managed their world-pol-
ity, was the tributary system in East Asia.185 Foreign relations were regulated 
by the waifan doctrine (“the outer tributaries”) based on a fundamental as-
sumption of inequality of sides; each country that maintained diplomatic rela-
tions with China was automatically becoming its vassal (in Chinese eyes, cer-
tainly not in these countries’ eyes). In this system, “the sovereigns of the other 
states (and quasi-states) of the East Asian world-polity regularly acknowledged 
the suzerainty of the Chinese emperor, who in exchange legitimized their rule 
over their various domains.”186 Tianxia’s system had put “primacy on harmony 
and order, not freedom” and was “premised on the notion that there is one all-
inclusive order.”187 Although this Sinocentric world order “did not necessary 
involve any significant political control by China, it did require the lesser po-
litical entities to recognize a hierarchical structure with China at the apex.”188 
Although is questionable whether China did indeed maintain such control, 
whether East Asian neighbours considered it as the center of the universe and 
even whether this vision is not entirely false189; what matters here is that this 
is the narrative Chinese elites believe in and it serves them as the idealized 
model for international relations, at least in East Asia.  
With this Sinocentric historical legacy, China entered the world of the 19th 
and the 20th century international politics and, especially after 1949, followed 
the Sinocentric patterns, counciously or not (see e.g., “three circles” concept, 
exporting Mao’s thought, or Deng’s “teaching Hanoi a lesson” in 1979). This 
tradition remains strongly present in China even now as it represents the ide-
alized vision of IR – “the Tianxia system is the key to China’s ideal world 
order.”190 The emphasis, explicit or implicit, on hierarchy in the Chinese ap-
proach to international relations, or relations in East Asia, with China at the 
top, is a clear indicator of this tradition.191  
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The idealization of the tianxia period is even stronger given the fact how it 
has been destroyed: by Western colonialism. The “hundred years of national 
humiliation” (bai nian guo chi, 1842-1949), or the period of colonial depend-
ence, is the central point in official Beijing’s nationalistic narrative that por-
trays the road from past glory through defeat and failure to rejuvenation192; 
colonial defeat from the hands of Westerners came as a shock for the Chinese: 
“regarding their nation as chosen, close to heaven, and civilized beyond com-
parison, the Chinese were traumatized as all elements of their national identity 
were disrupted” by foreign “barbarians”; communism then, as in Russia, 
“turned the tables” enabling the Chinese to feel respect again – and to restart 
rebuilding the Sinocentric world: “CPP’s revolution is steeped in heroic strug-
gle against imperialism, layed foundation for Sinocentrism.”193 Legitimization 
of the ruling of the CPC has been so strong until now, because the communists 
were able to make the society believe that they gave China back the national 
pride, strained and humiliated by colonialism (“gave back the lost face”). Now, 
when they are “regaining the proper place” for China, they reach for the Sino-
centristic patterns of relations with other countries. When admiral Yuan Yubai 
says that the South China Sea is the Chinese Sea “as the name indicates”194, he 
follows this tradition. As does Xi Jinping with his “Chinese dream” (see be-
low). In Sino-Russian relations one can find examples of Sinocentric approach, 
too. The most obvious example is the “Shanghai spirit” from the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization – a clear hint to China’s centrality; another one is the 
Chinese approach to the 2004 border agreement with Russia where Beijing, 
despite being stronger, finally compromised part of the disputed territory (ac-
cording to international regulations it should have received all disputed islands, 
instead it agreed on a 50:50 share): “China proceeded from a position of 
strength as it recalled the Sinocentric tradition of benevolence.”195  
6. China’s (post)Confucianist Ideational Eclecticism  
It is a platitude to describe Chinese culture as dominated by Confucianism 
(along with the other two parts of the great triade: Taoism and Buddhism; and 
by legalism as well). The dramatic and transformative events of the 20th cen-
tury, Maoist onslaught on Confucianism, post-1978 Westernization, consump-
tionism and many others factors, all challenged the traditional, pre-1911 pat-
terns of Chinese culture. Yet Confucian tradition remains the background of 
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Chinese thinking in a similar way as Judeo-Christian tradition remains the core 
of Western thinking.  
This is not a place to describe Confucianism per se or dwelve into the dis-
cussion over differences in Confucianism imperial, reformed or Neo. What is 
important here is to mention the most important assumptions as they influence 
Chinese policy making. Hence, in Confucian tradition the group (family, clan, 
society) takes priority over the individual, mind (reason) over emotions, obli-
gations over preferences, norms over beliefs, pragmatism over ideology; duties 
over rights; rationalism, lack of interest in transcendental issues (ethics more 
important than religion, very little interest in the latter), admiration for 
knowledge is propagated, alongside with morality, discipline, respect for au-
thority and elders, cult of the past, dislike for changes (uphold of the existing 
order); in Confucian idealized well-organized society every one should know 
his/her right place within the social and political structures and follow norms 
and obligations accordingly (“rectification of names”; that would lead to har-
mony; otherwise luan, chaos or anarchy ruins everything and society crum-
bles). The perfect state should be built on moral authority, governed by com-
petent, moral rulers (junzi) and exercise its power by persuasion and “soft” 
means rather than by hard power and military means (naturally, in reality the 
Chinese Empire had functioned rather in accordance with means of legalism, 
as it ruthlessly exercised power against the xiao ren, poor, simple men; the 
theory of power came from Confucianism, practice – from Han Fezi and other 
legalism thinkers). Confucianism is a political philosophy of the rulers and rul-
ing elites, as it propagates structure and order.196  
Nonwithstanding other traditions and different interpretations of Confucian 
tradition, in general terms, Confucianism was the core of pre-1911 China po-
litical thinking. Then, however, came the “interesting times” in the proverbial 
Chinese curse understanding of these words, with wars, anarchy, divisions, 
Chiang Kai-shek’s failed “conservative modernization” attempt and com-
munist victory. Mao Zedong and his comrades despite being Confucian them-
selves in a sense undermined many aspects of the traditional Confucian ap-
proach (probably most importantly the Confucian dislike for change). Com-
munists called for creating the New China (Xinhua) and indeed were able to 
mobilize society under communist slogans. PRC’s shortcomings, however, 
most importantly the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, com-
bined with successful market reforms in the post-1978 period compromised 
communism as the source of authority. Although the exact moment when Chi-
nese society ceased to believe in communism is difficult to spot197 (perhaps the 
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Tiananmen massacre is a good turning point), it is much easier to say what 
replaced it: an eclectic amalgam of (post)Confucianism, nationalism, pragma-
tism, cult of money, a surface Westernization and spiritual emptiness (wide-
spread cynicism). Politically, since the early 1990s, communism was brushed 
aside in everyday governance, and as a source of legitimacy has been replaced 
by nationalism, pride of economic achievements and re-emerged Confucian-
ism198, yet the communist legacy is still acknowledged in public and the rem-
nants of communist elements remain here and there, in concepts such as tifa 
(set phrases chosen to further ideological and identity objectives). Although 
most of Chinese apparatchiks, as most of society, do not believe in communist 
slogans199, Bejing still “takes pride in the era of traditional communism, no 
matter what shortcomings have been acknowledged.”200 The lack of an official 
rejection of communism (with acceptance of the free market), makes it hard to 
categorize China201, but does not especially bother the Chinese, culturally ac-
customed to syncretism, and serves the party as a means to maintain control 
over society. Culture plays an important role here: it is “the key to rebuilding 
pride” under the leadership of the CPC: “Chinese leaders take the offensive 
through a full-fledged effort to boost minzu yishi (national consciousness) and 
a sense of cultural sovereignty. Political identity is reinforced by wenhua yishi 
(cultural consciousness), interpreted to center on the state and the party.”202 
Here originates “the permanent emphasizing – in opposition to the West – [of 
the] Chinese distinctness and specifics based on concepts deeply rooted in 
Confucian traditions and modification of Marxism-Leninism in the spirit of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics.”203 Seen from this perspective, Western 
influences are dangerous, as they may show that such unwanted ideas as de-
mocracy or human rights are not necessarily alien to the Chinese cultural con-
text (Taiwan’s example, with its vibrant democracy, is a particularly horryfing 
example for the PRC), seen from this angle, Westernization is “synonymous 
with cultural imperialism, splittism, disunity in China and even regime 
change.”204 Nevertheless, politically speaking, China is much better 
“equipped” to resist Western political and cultural influences than Russia. Alt-
hough it is debatable which country, Russia or China, experienced the biggest 
spiritual onslaught in the transition period, in using ancient, communist and 
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post-communist ideas to keep the power, Chinese elites achieved better results 
than Russian elites: they “preserved much better than Russia the apparatus for 
coordinating and inculcating national identity (…) it had more clarity about 
premodern identity, a less complicated sense of anti-imperialist humiliation, 
more continuity with traditional communist identity, and a more elaborate or-
chestration of new identity construction.”205  
7. War and Peace by China and Russia 
The substantial differences between China and Russia are seen in their ap-
proach to war and peace. Or to put it in more favourable light, to chaos and 
stability: “China benefits from stability (still has more to lose than to gain from 
chaos), while Russia benefits from disruption.”206 
China rejects war, but not out on moral grounds. Chinese pacifism, contrary 
to the European one, does not originate from rejection of war as political 
means, but derives from pure political rationale. It is a reference to classical 
Sun Zi thought that it is better not to make war, unless it is absolutely neces-
sary – war is a risky, uncertain and dangerous means of politics. The essence 
of this approach is based on the following assumption: why use force and risk 
one’s own casualties, if the same result may be achieved through diplomacy or 
intrigues? That is why “military adventurism is very far from the Chinese tra-
dition.”207 China’s rise is based on stability and peace around the world (or at 
least in China’s neighbourhood). Although China will probably strive to 
change the international system in the future, currently it uses to the maximum 
the existing one according to its own needs. Establishing a stable geopolitical 
environment remains the top priority – China wants to have a secure and peace-
ful environment (neighbourhood) to modernize. China’s policy is “subjugated 
to pragmatic goals of building the regional security and the development of 
economic cooperation without enforcing on partners any political ballast.”208 
To fulfill these goals, China needs domestic and international, neighbourhood 
peace. That is why it stresses “peacefulness” and a “non-confrontational”209 
attitude, seen in such concepts as its “Peaceful rise/development” strategy, 
PRC’s “forth generation” official agenda.210 Peaceful development is not a 
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philosophical abstract idea, nor even a good propaganda slogan, but a practical 
political philosophy of China that originates from a realistic assumption of its 
limitations and possible implications for using force in order to improve its 
international position.211 Although since Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream”, China 
has become much more assertive, the most important principles mentioned 
above have not changed. This has well been seen recently, when China has 
been opposing Brexit, EU’s dissolution, has been frightened by Trump’s ac-
tions and defended (economic) globalization. Although China looked at it all 
with a mixture of schadenfreude (interpreting Western problems as “the ulti-
mate proof of democracy’s inherent weaknesses”), genuine concern prevailed: 
China still needs stability worldwide: open trade, stable markets and Western 
consumers and their demand for China’s goods and capital.212 In short, China 
still needs stability, order, or simply peace to continue its path to “regain the 
proper place”. 
With Russia, the opposite is true: its chosen element is war. “War or the 
preparation for a new war became the way Russian civilization has survived” 
wrote Bobo Lo and Lilia Shevtsova213; Chinese Academy of Military Science 
authors came to similar conclussions (Russia is a “warlike nation … founded 
and strengthened by war” that has never hesitated to use military force to de-
fend its interests).214 During peace, Russia’s weak potential and limited im-
portance is best seen. That is why conflicts and crisis situations are so im-
portant for Russia. Then such aspects as diplomacy and the army, traditionally 
the areas in which Russia is strong, become most important, whereas the econ-
omy is being relegated to the secondary status and “the primacy of politics over 
economics” follows. This allows Russia to play beyond its position and 
achieve much more than its economic potential allows. That is why “Moscow’s 
interests may be best served by a semi-permanent state of ‘controlled tension’ 
(…) in other words, a condition of ‘neither peace nor war’ (…) when other 
powers are in a state of ‘controlled’, but tense balance, even a modest Russia 
input can prove surprisingly effective.”215 Recent worldwide disorder is a good 
illustration. Moscow supports populist movements in the EU and hopes for its 
dissolution, Kremlin enjoys Brexit and had high hopes (that now waned a bit) 
for Trump. In general, Kremlin hopes to take advantage of the chaos in the 
West as it gives Russia another chance to play beyond its scale and to portray 
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the West as the scapegoat for Russia’s own problems.216 That is why Russia 
has much to win from chaos, instability and, indeed, war.  
8. Two Different Authoritarianisms  
Russian and Chinese quests for “authoritatianism on the basis of consent”, their 
dislike for Western democracy, human rights, transparency, check and bal-
ances etc.217 has led many to look for similarities in the Russian and Chinese 
political systems. Although there are some similarities, particularly on the level 
of the philosophical understanding of politics (see next chapter), they are too 
small to say that the two countries are ideologically or normatively convergent. 
As Bobo Lo has put it, “under Putin Russia remains a more democratic, plu-
ralistic and liberal polity than China.”218 Some researchers even say that the 
Russian system “achieved a sort of equilibrium, located at an indeterminate 
point between democracy and authoritarianism”, though they admit that “it has 
been sliding towards the authoritarian end of the spectrum.”219 Others say that 
the Russian and Chinese models “represent contrasting types of authoritarian-
ism, characterized by various combinations of personalized and bureaucratic 
power”, politically “Russia is a semi-authoritarian rather than authoritarian 
system, with substantial freedoms as well as restrictions”; the Russian system 
is based “on three fundamental principles borrowed from the past: personalized 
power, the fusion of power and property, and claims to great power status 
(derzhavnichestvo) and to “spheres of influence” in the post-Soviet space and 
even beyond”; it is a very eclectic system that includes, among other things: 
the imitation of Western institutions; the replacement of any coherent ideology 
by non-ideological “pragmatism”; bribing society; broad personal freedoms; 
selective repressions against opposition.220 As for China’s equivalent of post-
comunistic authoritarianism, it has chosen the opposite to the Russian path: 
retained communist symbols but brushed aside economic policies of com-
munism (the accent was on economy, not ideas) This produced a situation 
where there is much less freedom in China, but much more economic effi-
ciency and therefore the system is more successful221: “For all its weaknesses, 
the Communist Party is a much more dynamic and modernizing enterprise than 
‘Kremlin Inc.’. It has largely absorbed the historical lesson that true legitimacy 
comes from responding to the imperatives of change, not fetishizing ‘stability’ 
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for its own sake.”222 This is very different from Russia which has “become an 
international anti-model— a byword for non-modernization (and even de-
modernization), uncompetitiveness, and chronic corruption.”223 Hence, differ-
ent transformation paths from communism contributed to the present character 
of Russian and Chinese authoritarianisms.224 Thus, the claim for “normative 
convergence” between Russia and China is “a hoary myth, aimed at frightening 
Western policymakers into being more ‘understanding’ of (that is, compliant 
toward) Russian interests.”225  
9. Personalities in Russia-China Relations 
Writing on individuals in politics is not advocated within academic political 
science. Focusing on institutions, rules, norms, etc. is much more expected and 
appreciated.226 There are several arguments in favour of that, but the most im-
portant one is probably that transformative developments such as globalization 
or democratization have created a pattern where individuals matter much less 
than the rules and norms of the institution they work for or represent. This is 
certainly true in democracies where systems of check and balances have been 
intended to prevent a degeneration of authority from power-thirsty individuals. 
Therefore the importance of individuals in politics indeed decreases in demo-
cratic countries. In non-transparent and unaccountable authoritarian states like 
Russia and China however, the importance of individuals still cannot be over-
estimated. The culture of confidentiality is pervasive here and input is limited 
to the selected few; the decision making process is being carried out by a small 
group of policy makers with their leader to the detriment of official state struc-
tures that are legally responsible for legislation and execution.227 There is “pri-
macy of personalities over institutions”: they and their personal networks mat-
ter much more than formal institutions, or rather “individuals make institu-
tions, not institutions the individual”, influences of institutions “may wax and 
wane as individuals gain and lose favor”, individuals, not institutions or big 
ideas, “are paramount” at the “court”, be it Kremlin or Zhongnanhai; this “per-
sonalized model” is not limited to the leaders alone but “is replicated at all 
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levels of power.”228 The “strong culture of secrecy and informal networking” 
creates “two broad policy milieus— the real and the virtual (the latter is what 
outsiders see): the real policy world is exclusive and almost invisible. This is 
where the big decisions are made. The vast majority of the political class plays 
little role, and public input is minimal (… it) operates on the principle that 
‘fewer is better’ —at once more cohesive, more secure, and more effective (…) 
without exceptionally privileged access it is often impossible to know who in-
fluenced whom, what, and how; it is often a case of ‘those who know don’t 
tell, and those who tell don’t know.’”229 
Thus, one can rarely be sure who initiated or influenced the decision making 
process and clarity emerges only with time, if ever. In these circumstances, a 
human factor, or an individual with his/her personality, is still having the pre-
dominant influence on history, behaviour and change of state policy. This hap-
pens because the real power still lies in the hands of an individual, or a group 
of individuals, instead of being checked and balanced by control mechanisms, 
so dominant in democracies. In authoritarian countries, official structures only 
formalize or accept the decisions already made. That is why the importance of 
personalities is higher in authoritarian systems. Here “the role and possibilities 
of the leader depends mostly on the scope of power based in his hand or in the 
hands of a narrow group that surrounds him.”230  
This is the case both of Russia and China, where the decision-making pro-
cess is implemented by a small group of policy makers with the leader, in a 
narrow circle, often during informal meetings. That is why this book empha-
sizes the role of individuals – Yeltsin and Putin in Russia, Jiang Zemin, Hu 
Jintao and Xi Jinping in China.  
10. Yeltsin’s Russia and his Policy Concepts 
Russian foreign policy has been particularly influenced by the personal fea-
tures of its leaders. Yeltsin’s character in the 1990s made an impact on Russia’s 
foreign policy including its relations with China. Yeltsin governed via “con-
trolled instability” which was characterized by an expansion of the presidential 
“court” and regional leaders’ and oligarchs’ “courts”; in this system, Yeltsin 
dreamed of the position of a “final judge”, who often enough initiated conflicts 
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to strengthen his position.231 To make matters worse, he governed with an un-
stable coalition.232 This all led to chaos that Yeltsin was unable to control. This 
was true in foreign policy, too.233 Yeltsin desperately wanted to keep the su-
perpower status for Russia; he understood it, however, in prestigious terms, not 
as a new vision for the world. Worse still, he did not know how to achieve it, 
which deepened the chaos.  
Yeltsin had two competitive schools of foreign policy to choose from. Ini-
tially “the reformers”, or “atlantists”, such as Yegor Gaidar or Andrei Kozyrev, 
took the upper hand. Particularly Kozyrev is important here. He was the face 
of the “Atlantic” concept of Russia’s foreign policy from the early 1990s: its 
main features were common interests with the USA and Western Europe, and 
integration with the Western civilization.234 Kozyrev’s team dreamed of Rus-
sia’s “normalization”: its closer acquaintance with Western countries’ stand-
ards. The “Antlantists” counted on substantial help, investments and strength-
ening of the democratic transformation in Russia as well.235 Finally, the re-
formers hoped that closer cooperation with the United States and other devel-
oped democracies would lead to regaining Russia’s lost status in the world.236 
They cared little about Asia and had cut ties with Asian communist coun-
tries237, and considered China a “dangerous and vicious neighbour.”238 “Atlan-
tists” dominated Russian political thinking (including that towards China) dur-
ing Yeltsin’s presidency’s initial moments. With time, however, Eurasianist 
opposition grew. Supporters of this alternative approach (whose representa-
tives quite often had a background in science, think tanks or secret service, and 
not rarely an Asian experience) were quite an eclectic group that represented a 
wide spectrum of formations (often nationalistic) disappointed with the pro-
Western course. Eurasianists have claimed the necessity of departure from one-
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sided, pro-Western “Atlantic” policy. They criticized the turn of Russian di-
plomacy towards the West and the negligence of other dimensions, such as the 
Eastern and Southern ones. They advocated political and economic consolida-
tion of the “near abroad” and the CIS reintegration. Here relations with China 
were considered key to bring back the lost balance in the Russian foreign pol-
icy, which would give Russia more independence in dealing with the West. 
Eurasianists steadily gained more and more influence on Yeltsin and Mos-
cow’s foreign policy. Yevgeni Primakov’s nomination for foreign minister in 
1996 was the most visible sign of their growing importance. Yeltsin initially 
was favourable to the reformers, with time however, he started valuing Eura-
sianists more and more. Nevertheless, from the very beginning his politic 
was – as Bobo Lo put it – “erratic”. “Sino-Russian relations became hostage 
to extraneous geopolitical considerations. The ‘China card’, not partnership 
with China, became Kremlin’s priority, as strategic direction gave way to a 
series of ad hoc responses and a lowest common denominator to international 
relations (…) In these circumstances, China became Yeltsin’s ‘balancer’ of 
choice – he envisaged, at a minimum, that the ‘strategic partnership’ would 
force the West to take greater account of Russian interests. Better still, Russia 
might aspire to become the ‘swing power’ between the United States and China 
(…) Unfortunately for the Kremlin, others refused to play Moscow’s game 
(…) Yeltsin’s clumsy use of the China card betrayed Russia as an awkward 
but weak ‘partner’, whose appetites greatly exceed its modest capacities.”239 
Nonwithstanding Yeltsin’s failures, to his defence must be said that he, as all 
Russian leaders, wanted to secure great power status for Russia but contrary to 
his predecessors and successor, the domestic and international situation didn’t 
allow him to do much.240  
11. Putin and Putinism 
Putin’s rise to power has strengthened Russia’s position. He came to power 
with slogans of strengthening, stabilizing the state and bringing back its do-
mestic and international authority and he achieved that. Since taking power, 
Putin has been trying to modernize Russia by maintaing a strong and dominant 
central authority. Putin represents “gosudarstienniki” (state-orientated govern-
mental officials), people who assume that without the strong central authority, 
Russia would disintegrate; but with such strong central authority – would be-
come a great power again. In this approach, what is good for the state is good 
for the country. Strong state is here contrasted with the anarchy of the 1990s: 
the state had to be rebuilt after the chaos of the Yeltsin era.241 Putin “reinforced 
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the view that the state takes precedence over the individual and that the prime 
task ahead was to strengthen the state.”242 The claim of Putin’s team arose from 
a deep understanding of Russian history: the state must be strong to defend its 
inhabitants against each other and foreign enemies – this in turn implicates the 
great power status for Russia.243 This is why the majority of Russian society 
welcomed or was indifferent to establishing new system that evoked national 
pride of bringing back the lost, imperial glory. Putin guaranteed stability, social 
peace and even a relative prosperity244, finally, he brought back the dreams for 
a great power status. In short, he has been creating an image of Russia and him 
at top as the paternalistic state that is able to secure the population’s needs, 
achieve development and become a great power again.245 Apperently, he “con-
siders Russian destiny to be in his personal hands” and “sees himself as a trans-
formative figure in the tradition of Peter I and Peter Stolypin”.246 
From the point of view of the political system, since his coming to power, 
Putin has “attempted to establish his personal authority and control in the form 
of vertical power (vertical vlasti); this phrase encapsulated the top-down nature 
of political process, the ‘rebuilding’ of the Russian state and the concentration 
of power in the Kremlin.”247 He opted for a hierarchical model of the state, 
consolidated the central power and limited the powers of the regional “over-
lords”, moved away the secession and dissolution threat and finally, instead of 
supporting the compromised ideas of democracy and liberalism, he advocated 
the centralization of power and establishing the half-autocratic system.248 Par-
ticularly after 2003, when Putin launched a successful attack on Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and since then limited the economic influence of the oligarchs 
and diminished their political capabilities, Putin has started establishing a new, 
hierarchical structure of power. He, with his group of friends, has been on the 
top ever since. Putin has been ruling thanks to the control of a variety of key 
political institutions, such as state bureaucracy, security services, law-enforce-
ment agencies, the army (and its industrial complex), and two of the power 
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holders with economic resources – Gazprom and Rosoboronexport (arms-ex-
porting state monopoly). His most important inner circle of empowered indi-
viduals that supervised the particular state policies included: Igor Sechin, 
Dmitri Medvedev, Sergei Ivanov (until August 2016), Vladislav Surkov, 
Alexei Kudrin, Anatoliy Serdukov, Nikolai Patrushev and Sergei Shoigu. Dur-
ing the first two of Putin’s terms, this group exercised “the pluralism of the 
powerful”, coming back to the presidential office in 2012, however, Putin was 
able to “broaden his autonomy and diminish the overall importance of the inner 
circle.”249 He “had demonstrated heightened patrimonial activism.”250 There-
fore, his personal power as well as his personal influence in 2016 is much wider 
and broader than in 2000, 2004 or 2008. Consequently, power has been relying 
“more heavily on the personality of the leader than on institutions; conse-
quently the role of Vladimir Putin is instrumental for the stability of the con-
temporary political system in Russia.”251 He has created the “patronal presi-
dentialism” system in Russia252, where “everyone, no matter who, needs to 
check back with Putin or refer back to Putin to legitimate his own position, 
ideas, or general standing.”253 As Bobo Lo writes, Putin is now the “icon” (“his 
public self-confidence and unapologetic demeanor have become metaphors for 
a buoyant Russia— a far cry from the weak, humiliated nation of the 1990s, 
led by a disoriented Yeltsin”), “the supreme decisionmaker” via whom “all big 
decisions go through in some form or other” and “stands at the apex of a tall 
and thin pyramid of personalized power”. “No single person in the six decades 
since the death of Stalin has been so intimately identified with power and pol-
icy in Russia. Such is his domination that he has engendered his own ‘ism.’ 
Putinism has emerged as a hybrid of centralized political power, economic 
rent-seeking, social materialism, conservative morality, and an assertive inter-
national posture”; it is Putin, too, who determines the fortunes, on the Russian 
side, of key relationships, including this with China (see gas contract in 
2014).254  
12. Putin and China 
Putin, contrary to his predecessor, knows the world better, so from the very 
beginning he understood the implications of China’s rise and realized that for 
Russia a “close partnership with Beijing is neither a luxury nor even a case of 
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choice, but an absolute necessity in the long term.”255 Already in 2000 Putin 
wrote in the article “Russia: new eastern perspectives” that “we have never 
forgotten that the main part of our territory lies in Asia.”256 That is why, during 
his terms, Russian foreign policy has been more balanced and more concen-
trated on the Asian vector. Contrary to Yeltsin’s decade, the relations with Bei-
jing have not been entirely a function of Russia’s relations with the West. Dur-
ing Yeltsin’s time, there was little beyond geopolitics. During Putin’s terms 
geopolitics remained dominant, but there was something more: economics, 
growing trade and developing cooperation in many areas: “the radical im-
provement of bilateral relationship was due mainly to changes on the Russian 
side (…) although Putin has remained faithful to the Westerncentric tradition 
of Russian foreign policy, he has pursued a genuinely multi-vector foreign pol-
icy, consistent with Russia’s status and potential as a global power.”257  
During Putin’s terms Sino-Russian relations improved. Their cooperation 
deepened and relations on many aspects normalized (demarcation of the bor-
der, increase of the volume of trade, cooperation in Central Asia, development 
of the Russian Far East and calming down the anti-Chinese resentments there). 
Simply, China steadily has become one of the Russia’s most important part-
ners, not only as an alternative to the West, real or imagined. Relations with 
the People’s Republic of China touch upon many aspects of Russia’s domestic 
and foreign policy – only the United States are more important to Russia in this 
aspect. 
Strengthening the real ties with China meant that China became a factor in 
Russia’s domestic policy consideration. It happened both institutionally and 
domestically. On the institutional level, before Russia’s turn to Asia, the links 
with China were “primitive” – intergovernmental commission for preparing 
prime ministers’ meetings and strategic dialogue on energy issues; after Rus-
sia’s pivot, a new intergovernmental commission was formed, co-chaired by 
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Putin’s powerful point 
man for economic troubleshooting; this commission has become the key insti-
tution for negotiating large-scale bilateral projects. In addition to these institu-
tions, Putin made his friend Gennady Timchenko chair the Russian-Chinese 
Business Council.258 Additionally, from the intergovernmental commission 
separated the “Energy dialogue” and there is another commission on cultural 
(people to people) bilateral issues headed by Oleg Golodec; that creates a lot 
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of administrative bodies that deal with China which makes Russian policy 
prone to bureaucratic delays.259 On the personal level, a strong advocate for 
Sino-Russian partnership had been Igor Rogachev, “a patriarch of Sino-Rus-
sian relations”260 (Russia’s Ambassador to China from 1992 to 2005); although 
he died in 2012, his legacy endured.261 Since the late 2000s, those who advo-
cated and benefitted from closer cooperation with China out of Putin’s inner 
circle, were Igor Sechin, one of Putin’s closests colleagues, responsible for the 
Russian energy sector and personally engaged in developing ties with China, 
Sergei Ivanov (until August 2016) and Dmitri Rogozin associated with the mil-
itary-industrial sector; the energy sector in general has favoured cooperation 
with China, considering it a chance rather than threat, despite difficulties in 
negotiating with Beijing, the same can be said about bureaucracy for which the 
socio-political model of China seemed very appealing.262 Gennadiy Tim-
chenko is another example of the tendency of involvement of those closest to 
Putin in cooperating with China (and advocating stronger rapprochement).263 
The same can be said about Yuri Trutnev who does not belong to Putin’s inner 
circle, but is Presidential permanent envoy to the Russian Far East and is in-
fluential in Sino-Russian joint commissions.264 On the other hand, the army 
remained ambiguous, while secret services and law enforcement agencies were 
among the most critical actors of the cooperation with China. Nevertheless, 
those who supported the cooperation prevailed as there has been a general un-
derstanding among elites that China does not threaten Russia’s regime position 
(and vice versa).265 After Moscow’s “pivot to Asia”, or rather pivot to China, 
it turned out – as Alexander Gabuev put it – that China… has made “a pivot to 
Putin’s friends”. Due to a fall in commodity prices in 2015 and China’s eco-
nomic slowdown, Beijing has been reluctant to invest in Russia’s economy. 
Instead, China has provided a small set of Putin’s inner circle, such as Gennady 
Timchenko, with “favourable loans and sweetheart energy deals designed to 
keep Putin’s clique both happy and looking east.”266 
Personal corruption, however, is not the only reason why Russian elites sup-
port cooperation with China. The Russian elites are aware of the growing 
asymmetry in favour of Beijing and its negative consequences (“resource ap-
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pendage”) and are aware that “Russia needs China more than China needs Rus-
sia.”267 Nevertheless, since the economic crisis of 2008, they have chosen to 
cooperate anyway – they consider the rising China a chance rather than a 
threat – for them China is “a benign superpower in the making.”268 Firstly, de-
spite its attempts, Russia cannot balance the Chinese influence, so it prefers to 
bandwagon. Secondly, the rise of China is not threatening Russia (yet) because 
Moscow knows that – for now – the strategic ambitions of China are concen-
trated elsewhere. Thirdly, China respects Russia’s ambitions in the post-Soviet 
area and has a lot of sympathy for Russian actions there, which tunes down the 
anxieties and eliminates the reason for competition. Fourthly, although Rus-
sians acknowledge the success of the Chinese (with a mixture of envy and fas-
cination),269 they remain rather distanced about the ultimate triumph of the re-
forms: they realize that the Chinese modernization is still unfinished; China 
still has a long way to go.270 Russian elite chose bandwagoning to China not 
because they wanted to choose the “China-model” (that would require too 
many reforms which could undermine the Putin regime), but to diversify its 
commercial ties beyond the West to minimize risks from too much dependence 
on the global, Western-dominated economy: this is “about spreading the eco-
nomic and geopolitical risk.”271 Five, China does not meddle in Russia’s do-
mestic affairs.272 Six, a rising China weakens the United States and forms a 
more balanced international system, giving Moscow a place to manoeuver. 
Russia, although anxious about China, knows that Chinese historical resent-
ments are focused on the West rather than on Russia. Finally, the Ukrainian 
crisis has added one more reason: emotional bonds with Chinese elites based 
on a common outlook, which “constituted a kind of group psychotherapy for 
the Russian leadership after the trauma of the Ukraine crisis. An uneasy sense 
of isolation and feelings of rage about what was viewed as betrayal by the West 
was combined with the sense of belonging to a resurgent great power after the 
incorporation of Crimea into Russia, and this created a strong need for inter-
national soul mates.”273 
Putin’s achievements were recognized in Beijing. Until now, Putin has been 
very popular in China: “there is a brand in China: Vladimir Putin. The Chinese 
think he fights with corruption and against oligarchs and he is generally cool; 
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but this concerns ordinary people and is associated with its anti-Americanism; 
before Chinese looked at Putin, equalled it with their leaders and thought ‘how 
nice to have someone like him’; but now its gone, since comrade Xi became 
very popular in China.”274 Putin still enjoys a very good press in China, too. 
The period of his role is seen as “having brought back stability and predicta-
bility to Russian politics.”275 His authoritarian and centralistic tendencies were 
welcomed in Beijing with understanding as something obvious – a “return to 
normality”: “for Chinese political elites Russia quickly became the negative 
example of how democracy and glasnost do not pay off, as well as a confirma-
tion of the hpyothesis that to modernize a country one needs a dictatorship, not 
a democratic experiment that under Russian conditions ended up as a pipe 
dream.”276 When Putin says that “freedom without moral foundation leads to 
anarchy”277 the Chinese couldn’t agree more. They understand that since pere-
stroika, Russia “opened Pandora’s box” of civil and ethnic societal identities 
and “spent the better part of a decade trying to put all the ‘evils’ back in it.”; 
hence in Chinese eyes the Russian 1990s model was discreditated one.278 Yelt-
sin’s “democratic” era has a devastating opinion in China: it “was politically 
democratized and destabilized, economically shocked and confused, and stra-
tegically squeezed and eclipsed.”279 Chinese writings saw Russia as “being 
victimized by the West” which “sought to keep Russia weak, divided, and un-
able to resurrect its identity”; this narrative impicitely suggested that “this was 
also the fate planned for China” (by the West).280 Unsurprisingly, “Putin the 
strongman’s comeback was welcomed in Beijing not with hope but with un-
derstanding. Such leaders are being respected in China. If they kept the power 
it means that the Heaven supports them; in China one does not discuss with 
Heaven’s decision.”281 For the Chinese, Putin was “clearly a pragmatic and 
nationalistic response out of dismay and frustration with the U.S. post-Cold 
War dominance.”282 From the Beijing’s perspective, during his terms “Russia 
has gone from chaos to stability, fragmentation to recentralization, and poverty 
to initial prosperity”, in contrast to Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” – “meaning many 
shocks without therapy” – Russia has opted for a “development without any 
shocks”; Putinism “meaning political stability, economic statism, and a more 
                                                          
274 «Китайцы понимают, что… Lenta.Ru, 30.04.2015. 
275 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…p. 48. 
276 R. Pyffel, Chiny-Rosja: Kto kogo? [China-Russia Who will Beat Whom], polska-azja.pl, 
16.10.2009. 
277 В.Путин, Россия сосредотачивается — вызовы, на которые мы должны ответить 
[Russia Concentrates: Challenges We Should Answer], ”Известия” 16.01. 2012. 
278 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, pp. 190 and 224. 
279 Yu Bin, Crouching Missiles, Hidden Alliances, ”Comparative Connections” vol. 01, no 1. 
280 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 143. 
281 R. Pyffel, Chiny-Rosja: Kto kogo… 
282 Yu Bin, Crouching missiles… 
60 
nationalistic and proactive foreign policy” was for the Chinese something eas-
ily understandable: “the Yeltsin malaise – decline, disorder, decay, albeit with 
a more democratic society – was over, and Russia may have finally found its 
own identity and path.”283 The regime mouthpiece Global Times has called 
Putin an “outstanding statesman” with qualities of a “great leader”, such as 
decisiveness, wisdom, and ambition; “give me 20 years and I will make Russia 
strong and powerful again”, the article recalled Putin’s promise in the early 
days of his presidency.”284 The Chinese have no illusion, though: “an alliance 
with China is only a tactic, while Putin’s goal is to restore the Russia’s great-
ness.”285 
Admiration of Putin and official praise to Russia is part of the gei mianzi 
(“granting face” in Chinese) tactics, too: the Chinese learned how to tackle the 
Russians. They behave “nearly impeccably with regard to Russia: China is one 
of the few countries that spare Russia’s injured vanity (…) Chinese leaders 
have learned to play up the remnants of Russian greatness.”286 Beijing in public 
shows Russia respect and praises Russia as the ‘great power’ – the Chinese 
elites know how to make use of the Russian megalomania; they tell the Rus-
sians exactly what they want to hear: “Chinese leaders and media flatter Rus-
sian sensibilities (by) extolling Sino-Russian partnership, inflating Russia’s 
importance in the world, and praising the personal achievements of President 
Putin.”287 In short, the Chinese know they should not humiliate Russia. In re-
ality, however, China considers Russia a fallen power that lost its confrontation 
with the West, even though the Chinese elites respect Putin as a strong leader 
who wants to bring back the lost glory. From the Chinese perspective, Russia 
is a backward, unorganized and non-attractive country that cannot be compared 
with developed Western countries (the countries which possess something 
truly priceless: high technologies).288 Despite acknowledging that under Putin, 
Russia has “pull(ed) itself from the brink of the decline”, the Chinese see it as 
a country whose “fundamental weakness has been revealed by economic crisis 
(…) (it) failed to modernize and integrate into global economy, property law 
is not guaranteed, its economy underwent a process of ‘offshorisation’ and lost 
its attraction for foreign investors.”289 To make matters worse, the Chinese 
elites do not trust Russia either. They have learned that Moscow cannot be 
counted on. Since the 1990s, China has realized that trusting Russia is unwise. 
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Therefore, when dealing with Moscow, Beijing gives examples of the Chinese 
proverbial pragmatism: it takes what is to be taken, and does not care about a 
proclaimed ‘friendship’. 
13. China’s Third and Fourth Generation of Leadership 
As for Chinese leaders, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s “generations” con-
tinued the course set forth by Deng Xiaoping. Although they left their imprint 
on Chinese politics with their own concepts and actions, they did not change 
foundations laid by Deng. Until Xi Jinping’s generation what differentiated 
China from Russia was that individual Chinese power holders were less influ-
ential than the corporate ones. The most important corporate power holder is 
the CPP which position, though dominant, is not monopolistic, especially in 
the economic sphere, where such state agencies as China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec or the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
also matter; the same can be said about big private business, regional economic 
actors, central administrative branches responsible for economic relations 
(Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, National Development and Re-
form Commission), provincial governments responsible for their regions’ eco-
nomic development, armed forces and internal security services.290  
Jiang Zemin and his “third generation” have continued the concept of mul-
tipolarity based on “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. According to this 
idea, China recognized the USA as the only superpower, but considered its 
position likely to weaken with time. This would lead to establishing a multi-
polar world; until this materializes, China would conduct an independent pol-
icy of not joining any alliances nor military blocks. Beijing’s foreign policy 
goal since then has been to “develop and maintain good working relationships 
with both Washington and Moscow (…) Beijing should avoid two ‘extreme’ 
ends of the alliance-adversary spectrum in dealing with both countries; this 
maximizes China’s flexibility in the timeless geopolitical game between major 
powers.”291 This approach was combined with the necessity of a prolonged 
contact with the external world to continue modernization and break away 
from social problems of transformation.  
A normalization relation with Russia was Jiang’s big asset. Jiang found a 
common language with Yeltsin (it was the Russian language, Jiang mastered 
it during his studies in Moscow in the 1950s) – he was patient and indulgent 
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towards Yeltsin’s extravagancies and waited for his initially anti-Chinese atti-
tude to change. Their good personal relations292 enabled normalization and de-
velopment of Sino-Russian relations that ended in the “strategic partnership” 
in 1996. The success of rapprochement with Russia in the 1990s had wider 
meaning for China – “China-Russia relations can be viewed as the prototype 
of a new Chinese model of post-Cold War state-to-state relations”, “many key 
tenets of Chinese foreign policy: peaceful development, win-win diplomacy 
aiming towards multipolarization, and the creation of a harmonious world 
based on the democratization of international relations (…) may be found in 
Sino-Russian partnership document.”293. Nevertheless, despite their good rela-
tions and common, Russian language, there was a distance between them: “the 
Russian president never called his Chinese colleague ‘friend’, as he addressed 
former U.S. president Bill Clinton and former Japanese prime minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto.”294 
In 2002/2003, the Chinese leadership changed. Jiang Zemin’s team gradu-
ally gave way to the “forth generation” of Hu Jintao (Chairman of the CCP and 
the PRC) and Wen Jiabao (prime-minister of the PRC). This generation “has 
exercised power in a rather cautious manner, avoiding radical decisions”(his 
power was so limited that during his terms the party gradually weakened and 
its dominant position was replaced by the triangle of the party, the military and 
state-owned big companies)295 this was reflected in Hu’s major political slogan 
of a harmonious society.296 The “forth generation” initially was an unknown 
for Sino-Russian relations. These leaders came from technocrat backgrounds 
and made careers in the party’s regional structures. Contrary to the “third gen-
eration” they did not know Russia, did not study there nor speak Russian (they 
spoke English instead).297 It seemed that Russia would have “its own ‘who is 
Hu?’ problem in that the incoming generation of leaders in China are not Rus-
sian-speaking nor able to sing ‘Moscow Nights’”298 with culturally alien Rus-
sians.299 It turned out, however, that the pragmatic Chinese were able to find a 
common language with Russians. Although the leaders did not develop close 
relations (this might have been impossible given Hu Jintao’s unemotional na-
ture – “various interlocutors describe Hu as wearing the same inscrutable face 
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in all situations”),300 Sino-Russian relations developed during Hu Jintao’s 
term, despite the lack of harmony in energy issues. Hu Jintao’s team put its 
main emphasis on the security of supplies combining it with finishing China’s 
modernization (crucial for CCP’s stay in power). Unfortunately, the Chinese 
could not count on Russia here – this showed the limitations of the “strategic 
partnership” very well and led Beijing to diversify its supplies in Central Asia.  
As for China’s domestic actors, those who have supported cooperation with 
Putin’s Russia since Hu Jintao’s term have been state-owned energy agencies 
and all those who rely on natural resources, since Russia gave them a chance 
to access to these resources at a relatively low price and with little political 
strings attached; Chinese military also viewed Russia favourably (as a useful 
source of military equipment), as well as ruling party and bureaucracy as the 
Russian political model did not threat their position. There was no major po-
litical actor who would protest against closer cooperation with Russia.301  
14. Xi Jinping and his “Chinese Dream” 
A significant change in Chinese foreign policy occurred with Xi Jinping’s rise 
to power in 2012. His presidency “brought the strengthening of the primus in-
ter pares role” which was reflected in the shrinking size of the Standing Com-
mittee from nine to seven members, gaining immediate control over the army 
by becoming the chairman of the Central Military Commission and by creating 
a new institution – the National Security Council.302 Xi has also embarked on 
a campaign to limit the influence of other power holders, by initiating the anti-
corruption campaign.303 Xi is different from not only Hu Jintao, but all Chinese 
leaders since Deng Xiaoping. From the very beginning he showed that he is a 
strong and confident leader. Xi “reinstated personal leadership instead of Hu’s 
‘collective leadership’, re-established the primacy of the party over half-
hearted liberalization reforms, ignored statements about ‘low-profile’ foreign 
policy inherited from Deng Xiaoping and claims a role for China as a global 
power”; moreover, “his style differs from that of his predecessors: he speaks 
in the first person, emphasizes the greatness of China, and quotes Mao.”304 He 
is a strong leader: he “represents a new vigor in Chinese politics after Mr Hu’s 
studied grayness.”305 He even starts to introduce his own personality cult (“Un-
cle Xi”.)306 In domestic policy, Xi’s governance is an attempt to re-establish a 
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party state as the effective model for nation-building; economically its “top-
down approach” with stress on control and supervision.307 There is no place 
for political liberalization in this vision – Xi was quoted as saying that “the 
reason for the Soviet Union’s collapse was its straying from ideological ortho-
doxy.”308 As one researcher summarizes, Xi’s action represent “hard-line mod-
ernization” that combines “nineteenth-century geopolitics with twentieth-cen-
tury Leninist politics in order to gain the upper hand in a globalised twenty-
first-century world” while Xi Jinping is “the Chinese Yuri Andropov.”309 
This explicit assessment must be nuanced by a domestic factor: the compe-
tition of three socio-political schools in China and a vivacious debate on 
“China’s development model” (Zhongguo Moshi) that influences Xi’s political 
agenda. The first school “the dreamers” (from the “Chinese dream”, see below) 
claims that the world already entered the “post-American era”. The USA is 
being considered as a declining superpower that sooner or later will give way 
to China. The second school, with Prof. Hu Angang, orientates itself on the 
bases Chinese heritage and Chinese civilizations. Representatives of this 
school do not search for patterns in the West, but look into Chinese tradition 
and culture, civilizational heritage instead: they call for a return to look for 
inspiration as regards solutions and the country’s future in the Chinese tradi-
tion (Guo Qing). The third school, with Professor Chi Fulian, claims that the 
first stage of transformation is over and calls for “the second reform” (Di er ci 
gaige). In this approach effectiveness already ended and the party must opt for 
social justice instead of development.310 
Xi Jinping has been mostly influenced by the dreamers’ school, whose name 
comes from the “Chinese dream” concept (zhongguo meng). According to the 
most popular version, it comes from Liu Mingfu’s 2010 book “The China 
Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American 
Era”. Liu’s main hypothesis is that China should regain its position as the most 
powerful nation in the world, a position it had held for thousands of years be-
fore its humiliation. To make it happen, China needs the “Chinese dream” 
thanks to which “China’s era” would come – an era without hegemons, with 
China as the leader. To fulfill this vision, China needs to reform its economy, 
strengthen the state and the army and in foreign policy, to concentrate on rela-
tions with the weakening hegemon – the United States.311 The “Chinese 
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dream” became popular when Xi Jinping started using this concept (“great re-
newal of the Chinese nation”, Zhonghua minzu wei da fuxing).312 The combi-
nation of the “Chinese dream” with the “Chinese rejuvenation” created a dyad 
that symbolizes the new assertiveness of Chinese policy.313 The “Chinese 
dream” naturally relates to the “American dream”, but its meaning is different. 
It is not about middle class prosperity, but about the rejuvenation of China as 
a great power. Under Chinese conditions this concept is entirely different than 
everything else since 1976: “compared with his predecessors’ stodgy ideolo-
gies, it unashamedly appeals to the emotions, it makes no allusion to ideology 
or party policy. It chimes, quite possibly deliberately, with a foreign notion and 
seems designed to inspire rather than inform.”314 It is supposed to boost legit-
imization for the CCP in times of slower economic growth. 
Xi included many of the “Chinese dream’s” ideas in his new foreign policy 
strategy presented on 29 November 2014 during the party’s cadres’ confer-
ence. Xi called for a new development model and two centenary goals: com-
pleting the building of a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and – more 
importantly in the context of foreign policy: realizing the Chinese Dream of 
the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.315 Xi’s plans were a clear sign of “in-
tensification of Sinocentrism” in Chinese foreign policy as the Chinese Dream 
is a “forthright acknowledgment of the Sinocentrism at the core of Chinese 
identity;316 and perhaps the first step to restore the old China-dominated order 
in Asia.317 No matter what the main purpose may be, these goals, particularly 
the latter, challenge Deng’s “tao guang, yang hui” concept (though without 
naming it). It remains to be seen whether Xi Jinping will be able to fulfil his 
ambitious plans.  
15. Putin and Xi 
Vladimir Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s personal ties are the last factor in this “per-
sonal” approach to Russia-China relations. It is particularly important given 
the importance of personality ties in both cultures and their own characters as 
well: “It is well-known that Putin, a former KGB operative, attaches great im-
portance to individual diplomacy, preferring to rely on a friendly personal re-
lationship with other leaders to build stronger country-to-country ties.”318  
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Putin and Xi are supposed to like one another, at least if one is to believe 
Putin (who said that that they have “trustful, good, even friendly relations”)319, 
and influential analysts (“those who have seen them at the closed talks, say 
there is liking between them, personal chemistry).”320 This is different from 
the Putin’s relations with the former Chinese leaders – Jiang Zemin and Hu 
Jintao.321 Despite the language barrier, they were able to “develop deep per-
sonal ties.”322 Their friendship is supposed to have started during the APEC 
summit in Bali in 2013.323 There must have been a cozy atmosphere there. 
Putin celebrated his birthday and during the meeting with Xi, apparently Putin 
pulled out a bottle of vodka for a toast after Xi gave him a cake; unsurprisingly 
the meeting took place in a “warm and friendly atmosphere.”324 A close rela-
tionship with Xi is now even more important since all the other “old Putin’s 
friends”, such as Gerhard Schröder and Silvio Berlusconi are already out of 
politics; that is why “Xi remains the only world leader of a major country that 
Putin can call a friend.”325 
Certainly, they have very much in common philosophically – in political 
philosophy they both refer to the 19th century political realism. They under-
stand one another without words. According to the Russian press, Xi was sup-
posed to tell Putin that they “share common characters.”326 Certainly they share 
dramatic experiences from the past: “both men went through the worst of their 
nations’ times” (Cultural Revolution in China and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union); both men learned from their own experience the hard lesson that “they 
cannot have liberty without order.”327 That is why they detest Western inter-
ference in their domestic affairs so much: “Xi’s remarks in Mexico in 2009 
about ‘some foreigners with full bellies and nothing better to do [than] engage 
in finger-pointing at us’ did not go unnoticed in Moscow.”328 Putin and Xi are 
both realists, both dream of bringing back the lost glory and both want the end 
of the American hegemony. Xi Jinping’s policy has been called “Bismarck-
ian”329, as was Putin’s earlier. Although in many areas their interests contradict 
one another, this does not lead to serious conflicts: they do not burn the bridges, 
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they are predictable partners. Their good relations translated into concrete eco-
nomic deals: USD 12 billion loan for Yamal LNG from the Chinese state 
bank’s sale of a stake in Sibur to Sinopec, and the agreement to provide credit 
for the Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway without state guarantees.330 More 
importantly, Putin-Xi personal relations strengthen Russia-China relations by 
providing it with a “new structural element”, further strengthened by the fact 
that both are expected to stay in power into the 2020s, thus giving Russia-
China relations “a welcome ‘cadre stability.’”331 
16. “Hot on top, cold at bottom” 
Although Russian and Chinese leaders understood each other and display a 
considerable fondness for each other, the lower, the worse. Russian and Chi-
nese elites struggle to find a common language, and the Russian and Chinese 
masses still keep reserved approach towards the other side. A decade or two 
ago this phenomenon was described as “hot at top, cold at bottom” and despite 
growing fondness, signs of rapprochement towards one another, this rule re-
mains in place, though on a much lesser scale.  
When Sino-Russian relations matured politically in 2000s (see further chap-
ters), researchers started to mention “the missing link” in Russia-China rela-
tions: the society (or the masses, to use Marxist vocabulary). It was clearly 
seen that the social contacts between Russians and Chinese fall behind the po-
litical ones: “the lower the level, the weaker the sense of commonalities.332 Yu 
Bin wrote in the mid 2000s that “despite unprecedented progress in the more 
tangible aspects of bilateral relations, the intangible mutual perceptions/mis-
perceptions and understandings/misunderstandings, are still unstable, and even 
negative”333; and that ordinary Russians and Chinese do not have warm feel-
ings towards one another: “the Russians and Chinese do not very much know, 
like, let alone love, one another.”334 Mikhail Titarenko, a very Soviet-style 
Russian sinologist summarized it in the best nomenclatura-style way: “there is 
a wide gap between deep understanding between Russian and Chinese elites 
and lack of information for mass circles of Russian society.”335 That is why 
political elites in Beijing and Moscow were faced with the challenging task of 
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bridging misperceptions and dislike between the ordinary Chinese and Rus-
sians that persist despite a decade of strategic partnership.”336 Surveys of pub-
lic opinions showed that Russia’s positive views of China are “a mile wide and 
an inch deep.”337  
Common stereotypes and anxieties do not help here. The traditional nega-
tive stereotypes presented the Russians in China as “barbarians from the 
North” (lao maozi, “hairy”, or literally “old flurry”) and Chinese in Russia as 
Asian “hordes” from the East (a reflection of Mongol invasion of Ruthenia and 
“yellow peril” syndrome from late 19th/early 20th century). Despite ceasing to 
exist in official discourse or even private talks, these stereotypes remain in-
grained in both nations’ psyches. Today they are complemented by contempo-
rary ones (“Russians as culturally unable to accept the rise of China”, “the Chi-
nese as still culturally alien”), anxieties (“arrogant Chinese”, wanting a “re-
vival of charges of ‘tsarist imperialism’ and ‘unequal treaties’ once China is in 
commanding position”) and a sense of economic superiority (“Russia’s domes-
tic disorder and chaos”).338 As one Russian analyst put in, “for the Chinese 
youths Russia is non interesting and non attractive, in general, Chinese under-
stand that Russia used to be a great power that gave PRC much but due to 
corruption and ineffective management it is degradating and it has only re-
sources, giant territory and nuclear weapons left.”339 Add Russia’s lack of 
“Asianess” and remnants of a feeling of European superiority and deeply in-
grained Chinese Sinocentricism (see earlier in this book) to see the complicated 
picture of Sino-Russian social relations. Naturally, it is not easily spotted – 
“the lack of respect for each other’s social and political orders is tempered by 
mutual reserve in not openly raising criticism”340 – but it exists beneath the 
surface all the same.  
It is fair to admit that Russian and Chinese authorities have been trying to 
shape their respective societies in accordance with their political official opti-
mism. Nonwithstanding such heavy-handed events as “Years” (of Russia in 
China and China in Russia) and other top-to-bottom activities341, the general 
message from both Russia and China goverments to their societies can be de-
scribed as “start to like one another”. Russian state-controlled media have been 
portraying China in positive light since the early 2000s. It intensified after the 
Ukrainian crisis when the Russian elite suspended its suspicions about China 
(at least for a time being); since 2014 there has been an increasing number of 
TV programmes, documentaries, books as well as sponsored academic trips to 
China and exchanges with Chinese units (in some cases intensification of the 
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existing programmes)342; all for the propagation of the “China chance” image 
in Russia. This, combined with the Russian sense of offense by the West, cre-
ates a good ground for social rapprochement. As for China, the official, Beijing 
controlled media usually back Russia in its struggles with the West (e.g. the 
Malaysian Airlines plane crash in eastern Ukraine) and present the bright pic-
ture of bilateral relations. It works to some extent: according to Zhao Huans-
heng, “Russia’s image is improving in China, including among the younger 
generation – Russia is perceived as a country that resists ‘international hegem-
ony’”343 and sometimes is even considered a most China-friendly country for 
significant part of China’s population.344 To some extent newly found fondness 
overlaps with post-communist nostalgia among the older generation of Chi-
nese people who remember the “joint fight for socialism.”345 Moreover, the 
improved behaviour of Russian law-enforcement agents towards Chinese tour-
ists helps here, too.346 Yet this positive image is limited (as for most of the 
Chinese society Russia is irrelevant) and one-sided only (Chinese are more 
favourably inclined towards Russia than the other way round).347 
Hence, despite all these top-down attempts to improve people-to-people 
Sino-Russian relations, it is easier said that done. Mutual anxieties and resent-
ments went underground (like in the Russian Far East), but still exist. Personal 
conversation with ordinary Russians and Chinese are a good indicator, alt-
hough they are naturally hard to measure. In-depth sociological research is 
much better – for example, it shows that despite intensified contacts between 
ordinary Russians and Chinese, mutual sympathy does not rise (especially on 
the Russian side).348 Internet, the least censored medium in Russia and China 
alike, is another indicator, and good thermometer of social attitudes. Although 
usually irrelevant to bilateral issues, mutual resentments reappear in “moments 
of truth”: controversial events, such as pollution in China that affects Russia, 
sinking a Chinese ship or closing the Chinese market in Moscow. Each time 
something happens in Sino-Russian relations, voices of discord appear loudly, 
“showing (…) weak cultural ties and popular distrust.”349 Even Russian ana-
lysts admit that “despite good Sino-Russian relations, population still holds a 
significant amount of stereotypes and out-of-date images (…) although both 
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sides’ attempts give positive results, there is still not enough mutual under-
standing between both nations.”350 Thus, despite official propagation of a pos-
itive image by the other side by mass-media controlled by Kremlin and Zhong-
nanhai, Sino-Russian relations have still, though on a much lesser scale, been 
“hot at top and cold at bottom”351, or “warm on the outside, tepid on the inside, 
and chilly underneath”; this, however, does not frighten Russian and Chinese 
elites, as “apathy (towards Russia) is better than antipathy directed elsewhere” 
(the West).352 And after all, societies/masses are not so important in Russian 
and Chinese policy making.  
III. “Democratization of International Relations”: 
International Roles of Russia and China 
Despite differences and sometimes contradictory interests, Russia and China 
agree on the philosophical level on how the world system of international re-
lations should be built. Moscow and Beijing perceive the world through the 
prism of the 19th century power struggle, with the sole difference being that 
only a single hegemonic power – albeit weakening – exists now: the USA. 
Thus Moscow and Beijing reject, though softly, the current system which they 
consider unjust and want to modify it into a better one. Nothing better encap-
sulates these hopes as the somehow paradox, if not blatant phrase from their 
joint communiqués: the need for “democratization of international rela-
tions.”353 According to this rationale, US-dominated international relations are 
undemocratic and should be democratized by the inclusion of Russia and China 
(as well as other great powers) into collective decision-making on global mat-
ters. Further “democratization of international relations” (inclusion of more 
countries, particularly smaller, into decision making), is however neither 
needed nor wanted.354 
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1. “Soft Revisionists” 
Russia and China proclaim “strategic partnership”355, “new model of interna-
tional relations”356 that supports Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
stands against hegemonism357, the primacy of force over international law358, 
and heralds the “democratization of international relations”.359 Moscow and 
Beijing portray their relations “as the very model of international cooperation – 
pragmatic, enterprising, and innovative”, such is the “bombastic” language of 
their official communiqués.“360 It shows a mutual understanding on interna-
tional relations – Russia and China have converged views “on the global stra-
tegic situation, the principles on which the international order should be based 
and the role of the US”; according to them, this US dominance is “a temporary 
aberration” of international politics, and rejections of the Western values and 
norms create a strong bond between them.361 Hence, Russia and China “are 
united by a geopolitical worldview.”362 They are “the coalition of the unwill-
ing”363 or “conservative force”364 – they hail multipolarity365, object to the 
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Western use of force (military interventions sanctioned by universal values), 
defend territorial integrity and state sovereignty form of external interference, 
and detest democratization attempts.366 In Western media eyes, they are “part-
ners in crime at the United Nations.”367 In general, their international agenda 
reflects the philosophy of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which 
is a clear sign of China-based inspiration.  
A similar philosophical approach to politics made some authors describe 
Sino-Russian relations as a “strategic convergence”368 or a “normative conver-
gence”369; although it is not quite so (see the previous chapter); in the vision of 
the international relations, Moscow and Beijing agree: “China and Russia share 
elements of a common worldview. At the top of the list is the importance of a 
strong state that enjoys full freedom of action internationally.”370 “Russia and 
China see themselves as the co-architects of the international order on par with 
Western states (they) remain interested in the great-powers concert-type global 
politics”.371 Moscow and Beijing dream of the 21th century’s equivalent of the 
19th century “concert of powers”, with its rough equivalence between major 
powers and strategic check and balances to restrain hegemonic influences. 
Thus, they propose “exclusive clubs” of great powers, where those powers 
would not be restrained by others’ actions and would act in accordance with a 
concert of powers’ logic.372 In part this reflects their fears of “regime sur-
vival,”373 but fear itself is insufficient to explain their mutual understanding, 
they have on a deeper, philosophical level: they agree that authoritarianism is 
a much better system to achieve stability than liberal democracy and that out-
siders, particularly Westerners should not lecture any country on how to gov-
ern it, let alone conduct interventions based on high moral assumptions. Op-
position to Western values and norms are “not occasional policies of misguided 
leaders but the fundamental orientation of the political elite, supported by pop-
ulation.”374 Finally, Russia and China consider the present unipolarity as an 
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ending one: “Moscow and Beijing see the world going through an epochal 
change away from U.S. domination and toward a freer global order that would 
give China more prominence and Russia more freedom of action.”375 Moscow 
is much more vocal on the above mentioned claims, as it genuinely hopes for 
“retro constructs” such as “a new Westphalian order through a modern-day 
Concert of Great Powers” (in today’s vocabulary: multipolarity/polycentrism), 
or “global oligarchy.”376 China still wants to use opportunities of the current 
system and knows it is too early to replace it: “China may be revisionist in the 
sense of wanting a stronger position on the global chess board; but it has shown 
less inclination than Russia to tip over the board entirely.”377 
The Russians and the Chinese behave as if they considered the international 
system in the best realist way as anarchic, based on power politics and, conse-
quently, built on an “organized hypocrisy” rule, whereby the logic of expected 
consequences dominates over the logic of appropriateness, The reasons for the 
prevalence of the “organized hypocrisy” in international politics are power 
asymmetries and the absence of any universally recognized legitimate author-
ity. Stronger states can pick and choose from among those norms that best suit 
their material interests or ignore norms altogether, because they can impose 
their choices on weaker states in the absence of any legitimate institution that 
could constrain their coercion and take action against them378. Moscow and 
Beijing agree that the logic of consequences prevails – in their worldview, 
power relations dominate at the expense of allegedly universal values. They 
reject the Western idea of progress (e.g. in the Iranian and North Korean crisis 
they were unconcerned about non-proliferation) and consider the “US primacy 
and unipolarity as a temporary aberration of international politics”.379 Thus, 
their political behaviour is “based on traditional, 19th century Realpolitik im-
peratives: national security, power projection, management of the strategic bal-
ance and emphasis on the primacy of state sovereignty”; the only difference is 
the discourse: they have learned to use more modern and inclusive language.380 
All of this is, however, merely a smoke screen: ideology plays an instrumental 
role for the two nations381 (for them democratic ideology is only a new tool of 
influence; the Chinese opposition to democracy is, however, visibly stronger – 
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Russia, with its self-perception as a European country, cannot allow itself to 
reject this ideology completely, although it considers it as “window-dress-
ing”).”382.  
Therefore, Russian and Chinese perceptions are based on a common vision 
of the international system, based on combating American hegemony in inter-
national relations and axiological cohesion (shared approach to the UN role, 
sovereignty, international law or human rights) – “Moscow and Beijing” over-
lap in cultural pride in opposition to the threat of Western culture”: they insist 
“on distinct values” and share the conviction that these values are endangered 
by the West, which serves as ”a unifying force in bilateral relations.”383 As 
Radosław Pyffel, the current Alternate Director of AIIB wrote (before becom-
ing director of this China-dominated global bank): “China and Russia share 
common values which Westerners do not want or are unable to understand, 
intrusively demanding introduction of democracy in these countries”384. They 
agree that the Western democratic agenda “breeds chaos”385, serves as “the 
leading edge of neoimperialism”386 and reject the notion of global governance, 
claiming that this is a Western idea that reflects “Western norms and rules and 
was shaped by unequal power relations, i.e. Western primacy”;387 Russian and 
Chinese leaders “resent Western government criticisms and denounce what 
they see as biased Western media coverage, foreign funding for nongovern-
mental organizations, and the use of Internet mobilization techniques to foment 
revolution.”388 Democracy, human rights, “humanitarian intervention”, “re-
sponsibility to protect” or “limited sovereignty” etc., are thus understood as 
Western instruments of enlarging the zone of influence and interfering in do-
mestic affairs of other countries. Therefore, the opposition against this entire 
Western, normative, liberal, democratic and supranational superstructure is a 
well-conceived defence of national interests – it is a form of “soft balancing” 
against US hegemony.389 Thus, Russia and China may be called “soft revision-
ist” – they revise the current international system, but softly, without creating 
blocks or military alliances.390 They avoid any precipitous moves, are unwill-
ing to form an alliance and consequently face “entrapment”, as they do not see 
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a great advantage to formalizing the partnership.391 They themselves prefer to 
call relations “strategic alignment,”392, “flexible partnership” or “friendly neu-
trality”393, carefully avoiding words like alliance or axis. They are stronger in 
words than in actions and – as long as their core interests are not touched (Tai-
wan for China, post-Soviet area for Russia), they usually restrain themselves 
to rhetoric condemnation of Western actions and quietly acquiesce to the new 
situation. With rising tensions on the South China Sea (as well as between 
NATO and Russia), however, this may change in the future.  
2. “Strategic Screen” 
Despite the common philosophical approach to international system, however, 
there are important differences. These are differences in style and philosophy, 
but also in roles, expectations and visions. The most clearly visible difference 
is the style of policymaking. Russia “tends to favour strong, active, and often 
surprising diplomatic maneuvers”, whereas China “is more reactive and cau-
tious”394: “Russia is mastered in boxing, while China is skilled in tai chi”395; 
“whereas the Russians do not shy away from confrontation and brusque in-
your-face methods, the Chinese prefer Tai Chi gymnastics, with its many 
feints. Russian tactics can scare the Chinese; Chinese moves can confuse the 
Russians”.396 As Chong-Pin Lin underlines, “China prefers to play go rather 
than chess; in chess one side is often alarmed by the opponent’s moves and 
incoming danger, while in go one may lose without knowing it to the last mo-
ment, when the game is over.”397 More deeply, there is difference in the phi-
losophy, where “the cold pragmatism preferred by Chinese political elites re-
mains in blunt contradiction with messianic motives present in Russian poli-
cies”398; although, naturally, Russia has a lot of pragmatism too, but its sober 
Realpolitik is mixed with its great power syndrome (see the previous chapter). 
The difference in philosophy is reflected in the understanding of the win-win 
situation, too: “The Chinese understand a win-win idea differently from the 
Russians. For them, it’s not a roughly 50/50 deal; it’s any deal ranging from 
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99/1 to 1/99, where the specific ratio depends on the negotiations. The only 
alternative is not to make a deal and make no money at all”; this difference is 
to blame for the fact that unless anything changes, “that ratio will be shifting 
closer to 1/99 in China’s favour.”399 As one Chinese diplomat put it, “win-win 
just means you haven’t negotiated hard enough.”400 
These cultural patterns translate into policy making style. Both Russia and 
China are rising powers, but they act differently. Contrary to Russia’s megalo-
mania, the Chinese attitude differs significantly: whereas Russia raises its 
global status, China lowers it. Beijing has few illusions about its weakness and 
limitations – China has come a long way, but there is still a lot ahead. Although 
the Chinese assume their innate superiority, they remember the “hundred years 
of humiliation” very well. That is why, although the “fifth generation” of Chi-
nese leaders started to “raise their head”, it is still very modest in comparison 
with Russia. The reason comes directly from Chinese political culture, accord-
ing to which a state should rather hide its capabilities than proclaim and an-
nounce its might. 
Until late 2009, there was an “informal division of labour” between Russia 
and China. Russia upgraded its position by positioning itself as a great power 
and thus dominated the global dimension of their relations. China, on the other 
hand, behaved passively and kept a low profile in order not to be entangled in 
global politics. This reflected the nature of policy-making in both Russia and 
China: “the Russian elite felt an inherent need to be involved in every major 
international issue, even if it did not have to offer in terms of potential solutions 
to international problems (…) from Russia’s perspective, participation in 
global decision-making became yet another way for it to increase its prestige 
and to retain its voice”; China on the other hand “took the reverse approach, 
adapting to those norms and rules of the Western liberal order that it regarded 
as conductive to its own goals and focusing its attention specially on economic 
issues.”401  
China acts differently. Although it shares with Moscow a deep dislike for 
American hegemonism402, it does not challenge the liberal world system di-
rectly (Beijing was even able to develop its own positive discourse on interna-
tional relations, equally hypocritical to the Western one, expressed in phrases 
like “fairness and objectivity serve as guiding principles for Beijing when ad-
dressing international affairs.”)403 China simply knows it is too early – the time 
for challenging the system has not yet come. Moreover, it prefers to challenge 
the international system (U.S. hegemony) using others’ hands so that they do 
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not suffer setbacks such as lack of Western investments.404 Thus, China “has 
not attempted to use its friendship with Moscow [as] a bargaining counter in 
dealings with the West (…) Russia is too weak to perform such a role” for 
China “strategic partnership” is “a supplement, not an alternative, to its bur-
geoning ties with the United States and Europe.”405 Beijing would not allow 
that the relations with Russia damaged the most important policy goal: foster 
conditions to facilitate the country’s modernization. China understands per-
fectly well that its key partner is the United States, not Russia. Beijing “does 
not consider the international situation as a zero-sum game; its policy is more 
sophisticated. China strives not so much to limit Russia’s or the US’s actions 
in general, but to limit the possibilities of limitation of the actions by the USA 
or Russia. On the one hand Beijing strives to maximize its own freedom of 
action, on the other, it still hopes that the US and Russia would be able to 
conduct activities that guarantee stability, thus removing responsibility from 
Beijing’s back.”406 That is why for Beijing the relations with Moscow are of 
first and foremost strategic importance – to secure its “strategic rear” in order 
to concentrate on domestic modernization and the South China Sea, to ensure 
the continued flow of energy and other commodity imports (advanced arms); 
beside these, Russia is a useful ally to limit the Western ideological pressure.407 
These differences show the very different nature of policymaking in both 
countries. Russia loves “high politics” and disregards “low politics”, which is 
best visible in the history of its membership in G-8. There it “abstained from 
issues it considered to belong to the sphere of low politics” – it was “a testa-
ment to Moscow’s attachment to a high-profile political presence rather than a 
substantial belief in the effectiveness and indispensability of multilateral 
frameworks”. The same can be said about crisis management; Moscow’s guid-
ing principle in the international sphere has been “to [be] involved, an aspect 
Moscow used instrumentally for prestige purposes (…) the general objective 
was to appear powerful.”408 This resulted in never-ending rhetoric wars on 
words with the Western world that continue until now and are likely to do so 
in the future. This tendency, combined with incurable Russian megalomania, 
causes triumphalism in time of success and tendency to rush, audacious actions 
in policy making. For example, the success in Syria in 2013 strengthened 
Putin’s confidence to such an extent that he started to take action to establish 
an alternative global political-ideological centre. Since then, he has been striv-
ing to become the leader of the anti-Western block, challenging the USA po-
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litically and axiologically (defence of “traditional values” against widely un-
derstood political and social liberalism).409 In doing so, “Moscow is inclined 
to overestimate the extent of Western weakness.”410 
China, on the other hand, although it welcomes the idea of a concert of pow-
ers, does not feel the need to be present at every forum or organization – Bei-
jing has been doing so only when important Chinese interests are at stake. Be-
sides, before the 2010s it tried to find ways that could testify its declared non-
confrontational stance: “Moscow punched above its weight while Beijing con-
tinued to hide its increasing capabilities; with the potential of regional power, 
Russia acted like a global superpower, China for its part, was transforming into 
a serious global actor and yet tended to act as a regional one.”411 
That is why Russia plays a very specific role for China: it is its “strategic 
screen”. China simply loves to “hide behind Russia’s back”. In crisis situa-
tions, Beijing prefers to move into the shade; it calculates that it is better not 
to lean out, not to face criticism and negative consequences and quietly do its 
things. Russia functions here as China’s “strategic screen”. It was clearly seen 
during the Ukrainian crisis: ”Putin, who has been building his position on anti-
Americanism and demonstrational challenging the West in many aspects, suits 
China ideally; thanks to him China ‘hides in the shade’, it discretely supports 
him and thus gets needed time.”412 This strategy works because – what is im-
portant – it suites both sides. Moscow, contrary to Beijing, likes to be in the 
spotlight, to play above its position and potential – this is how it builds its po-
sition of an influential player, whose presence is necessary in solving global 
problems.  
Although from the economic crisis of 2008, China has been steadily more 
and more active on the international stage (believing that being and becoming 
a global great power means global interests and responsibilities), overtaking 
Russia in many aspects, nevertheless, in the style of policymaking China still 
prefers to rather downplay than upgrade its international position. Although 
since 2013 Beijing remains quite assertive in its “Chinese dream” style, this 
assertiveness cannot be matched with Russian bravado413; and Beijing is still 
aware that China cannot afford a confrontation with the US yet.414 The West 
                                                          
409 E.g. V. Putin, A Plea for Caution From Russia, ”The New York Times” 11.09.2013. 
410 B. Lo, Russia and The New World Disorder…, p. xxii. 
411 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, pp. 135-137.  
412 R. Pyffel, Siedem powodów dla których Chiny nie włączą się w wydarzenia na Ukrainie i 
pozostaną w ukryciu [Seven Reasons Why China Will Not Join The Events In Ukraine And 
Will Stay In The Shadow], polska-azja.pl 04.03.2014. 
413 B. Lo, Russia and The New World Disorder…, p. 216.  
414 As Liu Fenghua put it, at present China needs to complete modernisation, not transform the 
existing international order.”, Liu Fenghua, Zhong’e zhanlüe xiezuo moshi : xingcheng, te-
dian yu tisheng [The pattern of China-Russia strategic coordination: formation, features, and 
prospects], 2016, quoted in: M. Duchâtel, op.cit. 
79 
remains the key partner in ending the grand modernization, and this has been 
Beijing’s top priority.  
3. The USA and beyond the USA in Russia-China Relations 
The US role in Russia-China relations is crucial, yet challenging to elaborate. 
Some researchers overestimate it415, other underestimate it.416 Certainly Wash-
ington had been the central point of reference for Russia and China alike in the 
1990s and the 2000s. With time, however, the US factor decreased in its over-
arching importance, though naturally it remains significant.  
It was an “ideological-axiological” opposition against the West and the 
common displeasure of the US-dominated international relations that became 
the engine of the Russia-China relations in the 1990s.417 After initial anxiety 
about the other side joining the Western camp, in the mid 1990s, Russia and 
China “agreed to join together as a minority in the contemporary world” and 
agreed on the message that “the post-Cold War era is best characterized as a 
struggle between two civilizations: theirs and the West.”418 Moscow and Bei-
jing shared a similar perception of global affairs: both opposed the American 
unilateralism and disliked the Western values. For Russian and Chinese advo-
cates of strong state such ideas as “check and balances, and democracy were 
being directed against unity and power”, represent “a smokescreen” for US 
“hegemonic ambitions” and “cultural imperialism.”419 The NATO’s interven-
tion in Kosovo, in particular, had farfetched consequences. It strengthened the 
belief of the two countries in the US hegemonistic attitude. Their opposition 
against the West united them and made their rapprochement in the 90s possi-
ble. It was not, however, an alliance or a bloc. Russia and China simply 
strengthened their own positions against the West. Thus, the dynamics of their 
bilateral relations waxed and waned in accordance with Moscow-Washington 
and Beijing-Washington dynamics.  
Vladimir Putin’s first term of office at first repeated the former decade’s 
scheme. Initial rapprochement with China was soon overshadowed by Putin’s 
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pro-western turn after 11 September 2001. This rapprochement, however, 
ended up in bitter disappointment. Moscow strengthened its position thanks to 
rising oil and gas prices – and turned to Beijing again to balance Washington. 
This time the Sino-Russian rapprochement had stronger fundaments. Their 
partnership became more multidimensional, substantial. Since the late 2000s, 
Russia-China relations stopped only being “the hostage” to US-Russia and US-
China relations: “Russia-China relations has gained enough autonomy and ma-
turity not to be dependent on the evolution of US policies and both states’ re-
lations with Washington (…) one cannot reduce Russia-China collaboration to 
strategic interaction with the US”; Sino-Russian relations “are not a mere re-
action to the United States power and policies.”420 
Nevertheless, the influence of Washington still should not be underesti-
mated. It remained an important factor, if not directly, then relation-wise (the 
Western opposition to Russian reintegration actions push Moscow into the 
hands of China, whereas the US pivot to Asia pushes China into the hands of 
Russia).421 Domestic Chinese debates follow this logic by saying that “U.S. 
containment invites China-Russia counter-containment.”422 This line of think-
ing is reflected in Beijing’s international mouthpiece Global Times blalant dec-
laration, “Beijing and Moscow are fed up with Washington's pursuit of hegem-
ony” and “the US is unable to beat down the Chinese dragon and the Russian 
bear at the same time.”423 Thus, although this “US factor” is less visible than 
during the 1990s and the 2000s, it did not disappeared either. Both countries 
still perceive the West as more important than each other. Geopolitically the 
relations in the US-China-Russia triangle are still working within the follow-
ing, structural rule: the “USA with its policy push or pull Moscow and Beijing 
to one another.”424 Particularly Russia is still prone to use its relations with 
China as “geopolitically driven anti-agenda”425 to which Beijing adhers, albeit 
with reservations and without burning bridges with Washington. “The USA 
factor” forces Moscow and Beijing to curb their mutual resentments, keep calm 
whatever happens and be tolerant to the irritating actions of the ‘strategic part-
ner’. 
Approaches to the USA, however, differ between Russia and China. The 
United States remain the key point of reference for Russian political thinking. 
After 1991, Russia understood that its global position and the revival of the 
Russian economy and its integration with global financial structures controlled 
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by the USA, depended on its relations with the West. Initial enthusiasm and 
acceptance of the Western development model (“shocking therapy”) quickly 
gave way to a deep disappointment and resentment over the Western exploita-
tion of Russian weakness. After 1991, there have been two basic Russian ap-
proaches to the United States. First is bandwagoning, used three times (in 
1991-1996 and 2001-2003), and 2009-2012 (“reset” times). In all cases it 
ended up with deeper disappointment and resentments against the West – this 
in turn influenced relations with China. The alternative approach has been the 
balancing policy based on an attempt to limit US influence (in this policy, 
China has always been the key) – first during Primakov’s Eurasian concept 
(1996-1999), then Putin’s “Bismarckian” manoeuvering (2003-2008), and fi-
nally with the speed up of the reintegration of the post-Soviet era (after 2009), 
and growing contestation of the US global leadership. Having failed in rap-
prochement with the USA, Russia set itself on a rhetorical-ideological collision 
course with the West, portraying itself as the anti-US global leader: the US 
became “Russia’s ‘other.’”426 Moscow still has an “old Americacentric obses-
sion”: asserts that the era of American dominance is over, but continues to take 
the United States as the prime reference point not just for Russian foreign pol-
icy, but for international politics more generally.”427 That is why for Russia its 
relations with China are serving as “an important psychological crutch” – it 
was the “most compelling explanation for the confident face Russia presents 
to the world.”428 That is why each time Russia-US relations deteriorates, Putin 
moves to China to show that he had other option to chose from. Ukrainian 
crisis was illustrative of that.  
China is much different here. Although Sino-American relations are expe-
riencing considerable tension (see below), they are, too, “characterized by a 
high degree of interdependence and cooperation” and are far more important 
for China and that with Russia, “Beijing has few illusions that Russia is a ca-
pable or even willing counterweight to the United States.And it scarcely be-
lieves in a tripolar world; Xi’s ‘new pattern of great power relations’ is an 
openly bipolar concept.”429 For Beijing, Russia in China’s relation with the 
USA is not a counterweight, but serves as the “peace from the North” – its 
strategic backyard that makes it impossible to encircle China by the USA. As 
for the challenging US-dominated system, China for long has not been inter-
ested in changing the global order – it has wanted “restraining the US pri-
macy”, but has not been “eager to bear the cost of such a policy” – it has tried 
to “keep a low profile and avoid unnecessary bargaining.”430 As Clinton Dines 
has commented China’s position: “the Chinese want to sit in the front seat of 
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the car, but they don’t want to drive.”431 Beijing has “envisioned bringing about 
a long period of close cooperation and peaceful competition with Washington, 
hoping to eventually achieve equality with it”432 (and to overtake it later on). 
China still only wants to use the current international system to its own pur-
poses – “today it is ‘the sole ‘revolutionary’ or ‘revisionist’ power in East Asia 
(…) it is most committed to challenging the existing American-led order, even 
though it recognizes that it will be a long time before it is able to contest this 
directly.”433 Although China’s policy is motivated by domestic needs (devel-
opment leads to political stability), it contains tacit (since Xi Jinping less tacit) 
claim that the pro-American order must be changed (with time) and that China 
will return to its “natural” position as an Asia-Pacific, or perhaps global, 
leader; China has already changed the strategic picture of Asia-Pacific region 
and this will only deepen in the future. Beijing in its “Grand strategy” strives 
for dominance in East Asia, though without fight.434 Its rise in the Western-
dominated international system is an interesting phenomenon. Contrary to Ja-
pan, which rose within the system and the USSR, which did it against the sys-
tem, China is both part of the system and wants to overthrow it.435 It wants to 
exploit it to the maximum and then replace it – thus it is China that in the long 
term constitutes the biggest threat to Pax Americana.  
Beijing has been able to hide it for some time; however, in 2011, Washing-
ton realized the danger and responded with “pivot to Asia.”436 The United 
States, so far focused mostly on the Middle East, came to understand that the 
Chinese were beginning to dominate in the key global region of Asia-Pacific. 
This was a possible threat to the US: if the US was pushed out of the region 
and lost its control over maritime routes in Southeast Asia, then the US global 
hegemony would end.437 Thus, after a failed attempt to come to terms with 
China on American terms (G2), Washington decided to block Beijing’s further 
development. The “Pivot to Asia” policy was nothing more than a new con-
tainment policy, targeted this time not at Moscow, but at Beijing and not 
openly, but with all diplomatic pleasantries. To put it in a metaphoric way, the 
Americans wanted to put a “necklace on a Chinese string of pearls”438, but after 
Trump’s withdrawal from the TPP the fate of the pivot remains uncertain.  
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To conclude, since 2011, Sino-American relations have been complicated 
and a clash of interests, if not a conflict, looms in the horizon. Russia, mean-
while, anticipates (if not waits for) a Sino-American conflict, as it, Moscow 
hopes, would give it much more room to maneuver (as a “geopolitical bal-
ancer”) and a chance to regain its great power status: “concern about the asym-
metry of the economic relationship with Beijing is outweighed by America’s 
visible discomfiture with China’s rise, satisfaction with Sino-Russian cooper-
ation, and faith that China will need Russia for a long time to come— as a 
supplier of vital natural resources and as a good neighbor.”439 
4. Russia’s Foreign Policy Goals 
Another important issue that must be described here, are the foreign policy 
goals of Russia and China. The importance of foreign policy in both countries 
is different – in China domestic policy considerations prevail over foreign pol-
icy (the latter fulfils the overarching goal of economic development, a funda-
mental source of legitimization for the party); in Russia the opposite is true, as 
foreign policy is a source of legitimacy for the current regime. In a way Russian 
foreign policy is reactive: “it has a better idea of what it does not want than of 
what it does” – “it opposes a unipolar world dominated by a hegemonic power; 
dislikes Western-led moral interventionism; and is hostile to the ‘encroach-
ment’ of the United States and Europe in the post-Soviet space”, but that means 
it wants simply “to facilitate an external environment that supports the legiti-
macy and stability of the Putin system.”440 
Russia’s two most important foreign policy goals are based on two ele-
ments: regaining the status of a global great power and maintaining the pri-
macy on post-Soviet area.441 The “near abroad” (or the post-Soviet area, 
though “near abroad” is a wider, yet more vague term) is considered the top 
priority (it has become most visible after 2009). Russia uses various instru-
ments – from bilateral to multilateral (CIS) – and wide array of means (from 
diplomatic to military) to control the “near abroad”. This area is considered the 
key one: realistic considerations (an influence zone, the buffer that surrounds 
the Russian core), as well as Russia’s autotelic striving for the great power 
status, making it Russia’s key foreign policy dimension. When researching the 
political thinking of the Russian political elites, it is very difficult to tell where 
rational, realistic thinking ends (that forces Russia to be a great power – Russia 
needs it to feel secure) and when autothelic mania to be a superpower, the need 
to be great, begins. This striving to dominate is based on considering the “near 
abroad” as the Monroe doctrine’s Russian equivalent: no other great power is 
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allowed to interfere in “near abroad countries’” domestic issues without Rus-
sia’s consent.442 It is based on common history and on a claim of alleged supe-
rior rights over all former Ruthenian lands. Russia’s great power ambitions in 
the “near abroad” also compensate Russia’s failures in domestic affairs.443  
Western Europe and the United States (see: above) are other important di-
mensions for Russia. Although politically less relevant than the USA, Western 
Europe – out of strategic, economic and cultural reasons – has been almost 
equally important to Russia. A strong position in Europe strengthens Russia’s 
global position; trade with the EU makes up almost 50% of all Russia’s foreign 
trade and it is where Russia makes the best deals on resources (although re-
cently these deals are not as good as they used to be – due to UE Third Energy 
Package and other European measures to promote competition444 – they are 
still very profitable). Finally, Russians, even those living in the Russian Far 
East, consider themselves culturally Europeans and demand to be recognized 
as such.445 It is Western European countries, such as Germany, France or Italy 
that enjoy best relations with Russia (Moscow prefers bilateral relations rather 
than having to deal with the entire EU).446. Europe, or the West in general, 
remains the benchmark, despite all criticism directed towards it from Moscow. 
Although Russians “are cynical about the morality and intentions of Western 
policymakers, they remain susceptible to Western influence writ large”; it hap-
pens because “Westerncentrism” does not equate to “proWesternism”, exhib-
ited by members of Kremlin elite who operate on ‘a barely concealed double 
standard’: they excoriate the West (…) Yet they send their children to be edu-
cated at European and American universities; buy property in London; invest 
their money in Western banks and hedge funds; and pursue legal redress in 
British courts. In doing so, they act on the tacit— but unmistakable— assump-
tion that ‘the West is best.’”447 As one Polish diplomat methaphorically put 
Kremlin’s elite attachment to the West: “you do not buy Bentleys not to have 
spare parts for them and you do not send your lovers to Cannes not to visit 
them.”448 As for China, a typical Russian high-ranking official “has weak 
knowledge of China”, “sometimes still thinks of it as poor and backwards 
country”449, “goes there once a year, signs some documents, but those he deals 
with on the Chinese side seems absolutely strange for him and their country 
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remains unnoticeable”; even Putin’s friendship with Xi is not necessarily good 
news for this proverbial Russian bureaucrat: “if our top leader is friends with 
the Chinese, then the whole elite need to become champions in friendship with 
China and that is hard to do.”450 The continued dominance of the West is not 
limited to the elites: “Russian scientists work in Western universities and re-
search institutes; IT specialists and programmers go to Silicon Valley; Russian 
companies have sought Western technology and know-how; and middle-class 
Russians see themselves as part of a superior European civilization (…) despite 
the rise of Asia, the brain drain of young, ambitious Russians is to the United 
States and Europe, not to China and India.”451 And what is perhaps the most 
important difference with China is that the Russian brain drain – contrary to 
the Chinese one – does not come back from the West.  
As for China, since 1991, it has been fulfilling an important dual role for 
Russia – psycho-political and real. First and foremost has been the psycho-
political function as the equalizer for the West – a strategic alternative, no mat-
ter if real or virtual (see: the 2014 crisis in Ukraine): having an alternative to 
the West in case the relations deteriorated, China has been Russia’s favorite 
bugbear – in both political and economic spheres (diversification of energy 
supplies). Finally, cultivating good relations with Beijing strengthened the 
self-perception of Russia as a global superpower. Since Beijing respects Rus-
sia’s aspirations (although China’s plans in Central Asia are being watched 
with suspicion by Moscow, the fact that Beijing is careful to not challenge 
Moscow’s special privileges in the post-Soviet area makes it a bearable partner 
and “lesser evil” for Moscow than the West), relations with China reinforce 
the aspiration to great power status – thus “China’s rise is not seen as threaten-
ing to Russia’s status.”452 
The geopolitical perspective must be considered here, too: Russia, whilst 
trying to rebuild a position in the former Soviet area, needs to be secure from 
the east as well, it needs “peace from the East” and China secures it. In other 
words, the success of Putin’s reintegration policy also depends on forging re-
lations with China. The reality of growing confrontation with the West over 
Ukraine since  2014 has meant that Moscow feels that it is the Western, not the 
Chinese, attitude that challenges its interests: it is a mortal threat to the Russian 
integration project. Therefore, Russia chooses to oppose the West and needs 
the help from China453. To sum it up, in the present day Russia needs China, is 
perhaps, sometimes, dependent on it.  
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5. China’s Foreign Policy Goals 
As for China’s foreign policy goals, the “tifa” play an important role. Tifa, or 
indicators for a country’s strategy, are “meta-rules that cover a Middle Coun-
try’s foreign policy goals”, in accordance with “obedience to the party line but 
while maintaining essential flexibility.”454 The most important tifa are: “the 
multi-vector policy” (quanfang wei waijiao), based on multilateral fulfillment 
of Chinese interests, not on ideology; “peace, development and cooperation” 
that should establish a peaceful environment for China; “the harmonious 
world” (respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity), combined with do-
mestic “harmonious society” (Hu Jintao’s leadership slogan) – the latter illus-
trates well the correlation between domestic and foreign policies of the PRC.455 
Since Xi Jinping came to power, new “tifa” have come into existence – “the 
Chinese dream” and, recently, “the One Belt One Road”. China’s most im-
portant foreign policy goals are: promoting economic development, building 
strong, independent international politics, defence of sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity (the last one is quite sensitive in China given its own domestic 
situation in Tibet and Xinjiang, thus Beijing “does not approve of secession-
ism, annexations, or foreign military interventions—unless, of course, Beijing 
feels the need to intervene itself).”456  
Economic development remains the most important goal. China’s foreign 
policy is based on economic logics; its aim is to establish a favourable interna-
tional environment for China’s unstoppable development and modernization 
(domestic development keeps the legitimization of the CCP). In accordance 
with these goals, China strives to minimize threats, particularly in its neigh-
bourhood. Besides, its aim is to gain access to markets, obtain foreign invest-
ments (particularly advanced technologies), build connections within the inter-
national environment that secures permanent development.457 Simply put: 
China must develop to survive (and to become a great power), and to develop 
it needs contact with the world. That is why China uses every opportunity to 
persuade others that the Chinese rise is more am opportunity than a threat to 
the international environment.  
China’s other foreign policy goal is to minimize the potential limitation of 
political actions. Here, “China’s encirclement threat” plays the most important 
role: Beijing is constantly afraid of hostile alliances; recently these fears were 
awoken due to the “US pivot to Asia”. China is trying to counter a possible 
situation where the present hegemon (the USA) would be able to limit China’s 
growth – Beijing does it through multilateral policy. Another issue is the ne-
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cessity of the diversification of resources and supplies – critical for maintain-
ing China’s growth and limiting autonomous actions of ethnic minorities in 
sensitive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang as well as international activity around 
Taiwan.  
Beijing’s international narrative or the emphasis on the uniqueness of 
China’s development model is another important feature. China, contrary to 
other countries, and contrary to the Mao times – does not want to export its 
achievements: it claims that these are results of specific Chinese conditions 
and may be successful only in China.458 It is here where the old Sinocentristic 
approach to the world is revealed. China is so much convinced of its own su-
periority and of the worth of its own values and achievements, that it does not 
feel the need to prove them.  
To fulfill its foreign policy goals, China considers four pillars: relations with 
the great powers are the most important one; the relations with neighbours has 
a priority; the relations with developing countries are fundamental, whereas 
multilaterality is the scene.459 In China’s outlook, the USA, the EU, Russia and 
Japan are considered great powers. Economic cooperation (since 2001 fulfilled 
via the strategy of going out, or zou chu qu) is carried out by means of various 
instruments, such as free trade zones, multilateral organizations or groups such 
as the G20. Chinese foreign policy is based on attracting others and creating 
alliances rather than on open competition/rivalry – “China conducts its foreign 
policy in a much diversified way, with the use of a wide array of possibilities 
offered by the present international order (in general China does not question 
the present international order but tries to exploit it for its own needs).”460 Ad-
ditionally, China has worked out a formula of cooperation with priority states 
or groups of states – so called “strategic partners” (zhanlue huoban guanxi). 
Relations with Russia are, therefore, located in this dual theoretical spectrum 
of Chinese policy. Moscow is an exceptional partner for China: at the same 
time a great power and a “strategic partner”, but far less important than Asian 
neighbours (Japan, India, the ASEAN), the USA or the West in general: China 
is “significantly more committed to engagement with the United States, East 
Asia, and the European Union than it is to Sino-Russian ‘strategic partner-
ship’—energy deals notwithstanding”.461 China’s approach to Russia is, too, 
full of contradictions: “on the one hand, Russia is considered to be China’s 
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major neighbour, its most important partner; on the other hand Russia is de-
clining and has little to offer to China.”462  
That is why Russia’s position in China’s foreign policy may be called: “the 
most important secondary partner”. If properly treated, this partner may be 
quite useful in foreign policy (securing strategic back-up, assuring energy sup-
plies, providing an ideological opposition against the West) and domestic mat-
ters (the necessity for completing modernization). Besides, Russia is an im-
portant example of proof that China indeed is “peaceful”. Russia carries much 
less importance for China than the other way round: Moscow is a useful source 
of supplies deeply needed in the modernizing project, albeit not the only one 
nor the most reliable. It is not however an ally in confrontation with the West 
(it is a convenient smokescreen behind which China can hide and win the in-
terests of the Chinese quietly). Russia is insignificant to the Chinese domestic 
policy and is not central in Beijing’s foreign policy: it is only a complement to 
the general strategy of “returning to the right place.”463  
From the Chinese perspective, Russia is a partner of limited trust and limited 
usefulness. For Beijing, in relations with Russia “the main weakness is the ab-
sence of a substantial economic foundation; there is too much geopolitics and 
too little economy.”464 Nevertheless, geopolitics can be useful, too. Despite the 
limitations of the Russia-China relationship, it can be very useful to China in 
tactical games with the West and so Beijing will push Russia to keep doing so. 
Besides that, in the Chinese policy towards Russia, concrete things matter: se-
curing the strategic rear and the stability of energy supplies from the Russian 
Far East that is important – the rest is of less significance. China needs “peace 
from the North” and Russia guarantees it.  
The new leadership of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, including policy towards 
Russia, has been influenced by the “dreamers” school. Although Xi Jinping’s 
foreign policy is still in statu nascendi465, one may dare to indicate a few most 
important features. Jin Canrong from Renmin University distinguished 4 most 
important concepts of Xi’s foreign policy: maintaining good relations with the 
USA, the EU and Russia and with regional powers; more active policy in re-
solving problems with neighbors, more international engagement (via special 
envoys, modelled on the USA policy).466 To put it in a less diplomatic way: 
Xi’s policy is based on hierarchical principles of building relations with great 
powers first, then with neighbors, then with leading developing countries and 
finally on using multilateral organization as a useful political instrument.467 In 
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practice this means an attempt to establish “the dialogue of equals” with the 
USA without giving ground (see: inclusion to the 18th party congress report 
such phrases as “neointerventionism” together with “hegemonism” and 
“power politics” for the first time)468 and growing assertiveness, if not tough-
ness towards neighbors and geopolitical competitors (Japan, India).  
In these circumstances of new, growing assertiveness, Beijing’s new policy 
towards Russia is being built. Officially China strives to build “a new model 
of major-country relationship”469, based on the “respect for each side’s “core 
interests”470: in this new approach Russia is being considered the “most im-
portant strategic partner”471, while relations with Moscow are a “partner-but-
not-alliance relationship”.472 This rhetoric, naturally, plays on Russian heart-
strings, but it is not true. The United States remains the reference point for 
China473 and these kind of communiqués of strengthening cooperation with 
Russia are being deliberately sent to Washington. As for current Sino-Russian 
relations, both sides do not respect their own “core interests” fully. Neverthe-
less, contradictions do not cross “thin red lines” which cannot be said about 
Russian-US relations (see: Ukraine) or Sino-US relations (see: the US pivot to 
Asia). Xi Jinping in his emerging foreign policy is striving to build: par rela-
tions with the USA; “great power” relations with other important players (the 
UE, India, Russia) based on the Realpolitik model (mutual respect for own 
zones of influence); relations with regional leaders (such as Indonesia in South 
East Asia) based on “big-small brother” model; and politics of subordination 
of smaller neighbors. How, in light of present economic problems, this ambi-
tious policy will be fulfilled remains to be seen.  
6. Russia and China in International Organizations,  
Groups and Forums 
In international multilateral organizations (the UN), groups (the G8, the G20) 
and forums (the BRICS), the asymmetry in favour of China is very clearly 
seen. Only in the UN can Russia can claim a more or less equal position to 
China, though even there it is de facto weaker. In the G20 and the BRICS 
China’s dominance is obvious.  
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China and Russia since the 1990s have been calling for a strengthening of 
the UN role.474 This may appear contradictory, given the UN post-national and 
multilateral agenda and Russia’s and China’s attachment to the 19th century 
diplomacy style. This has, however, nothing to do with the UN’s political 
agenda, but with the very simple fact that Russia and China enjoy a privileged 
position within the UN Security Council and want to keep it. This position 
within the Council, where they can veto Western projects (they usually do it 
together to share the criticism), is much stronger than their international posi-
tion. This particularly concerns Russia for which the UN Security Council is 
important due to image reasons: it is ”the most visible symbol of Russia’s for-
mal equality with the United States” and it “represents the most effective 
means of limiting or counterbalancing American power: exercising the veto, 
or, better still, the implicit threat of its use, is seen as a key guarantee of Rus-
sia’s continuing centrality in global affairs (…) a way of forcing the United 
States to take Russia seriously.”475 For China this is important mean of enhanc-
ing its global importance, yet not the only one. Thus, Moscow and Beijing have 
good reason to support the UNSC (and to block its enlargement). Within the 
organization, however, China’s position is much stronger than Russia’s one, 
particularly in the General Assembly.476  
As for the G8, for long it represented the stronger international position of 
Russia over China despite its lesser economic potential. Despite not  fitting 
economically with the rest of the group, Moscow treated the G8 as a good 
playground for its need for prestige and great power credentials. Certainly, it 
privileged Moscow over Beijing which was absent in this equation. After the 
global economic crisis, however, the G8 position was undermined and Russia 
lost this footing completely when it was removed from the group after the 
Ukrainian crisis. In the meantime, the importance of the G20 grew, with China 
as the central country there, second only to the USA. Thanks to a wise policy 
of mediating between the Western and the developing world (China still con-
siders itself a part of it), “perhaps without intending to, China took over the 
role that Russia had aspired to fulfill”; this in turn led to a decreasing of Rus-
sia’s role, which since the 2008 crisis has kept a low profile in the G20.477 The 
G20 and Russia’s weak position within it is the best illustration of the truth that 
“few countries see Russia as a serious contributor to international public goods; 
they are not so much concerned about the morality of Moscow’s actions as 
dismissive of its ability to make a positive difference (…) there is widespread 
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perception, in the non-West as well as the West, that Russia has little to offer 
beyond naysaying.”478  
The story with the BRIC(S) is a bit different. In the case of this forum, anal-
yses that come from non-member-states often emphasize the limitations along-
side the notion that the BRICS countries “focus on the negative: they agree on 
what they disagree” – on dislike of the Western values and the post-national 
world.479 But this is more than enough. The BRICS is first and foremost a po-
litical forum. It is more important than the Western critics would like it to be 
and less important than the non-Western apologists would hope it could be. 
The BRICS is a useful formula for member-states, a tool to use when needed 
and to ignore when not.  
The BRICS has been very useful for Russia and China alike. If one may 
describe the BRICS’ usefulness for Russia in one sentence, it would be: “it 
enhances its global influence at very little cost.”480 It meets the global needs 
for having an alternative to the West, it places Russia alongside the “rising 
powers” (though this is quite unnatural, since Russia has little in common with 
developing states) and builds its ego. The BRICS is useful for Russia and Rus-
sia is useful for others in the BRICS, so despite the fact that the BRICS could 
exist without Russia, there is no need to remove Russia from this body. Just as 
Western powers accepted Russia in the G7 for a long time (although its pres-
ence there was even more bizarre), the BRICS member-states accept its pres-
ence there now. The BRICS has unequivocally supported Russia, which gave 
Moscow an ephemeral feeling of creating an alternative to the West.481 How-
ever, even if such an alternative would ever materialize, it would be a long 
process. success is uncertain and depends mostly on China – the most im-
portant country of the BRICS that dominates the organization. China was able 
to shape the BRICS in accordance to Beijing’s vision (a non-political bloc that 
functions in accordance with the economic logic)482 rather than an anti-West-
ern political institutional alternative in the global dimension (as Russia 
wanted); thus: “China shapes the overall agenda of the BRICS (…) [and] in its 
current form benefits first and foremost its strongest participant, i.e. China.”483 
Russia may like India or Brazil more, but building any global alternative must 
be based on China. Consequently, the BRICS is yet another aspect of interna-
tional politics where Moscow’s dependence on China increases instead of de-
creasing.  
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7. The Alexander Nevsky Paradigm?  
The dramatic events in Ukraine made Russia turn to China in order to with-
stand subsequent Western pressure and sanctions. After policy consideration 
in Kremlin, it was decided that the only chance to withhold the sanctions was 
to ally with China. Thus “pivot to Asia” was resurrected, or rather “pivot to 
China” born. But the rationale for this policy was chosen very interestingly. 
Russian analysts and policy makers started to refer current policy to the 13th 
century Ruthenian prince Alexander Nevsky. Thus this policy name can infor-
mally be called “Alexander Nevsky paradigm”. 
Alexander Nevsky (1221-1263) ruled as Grand Prince of Vladimir (1252-
1263), at that time the center of Ruthenian political life. He became famous 
because of his military victories over the Swedish at Neva in 1240 and the 
Livonian Brothers of the Sword (Germans) at the Battle on the Ice (on Peipus 
Lake) that saved Ruthenia from the danger from the West. At the same time he 
agreed to pay tribute to the Mongols (who invaded and subjugated Ruthenia 
just a few years earlier) in order to strengthen his personal power over the 
bojars (as the critics say) and/or to be able to defend Ruthenia from the West 
(as the followers say). Nevsky also rejected the offer of the Pope to convert to 
Catholicism, to became a king and to fight together against the Mongols. In-
stead, he remained a vassal to the Mongolian Empire and took part in the Mon-
golian punitive expedition to Novgorod the Great. Nevsky died on his way 
back from Sarai, the capital of the Golden Horde (according to some voices he 
was poisoned, though the strong evidence is lacking). Before death he took 
monastic vows, after death he became canonized by the Orthodox Church.  
In 2011 Putin called Nevsky a “shining example of serving Fatherland”, 
who “did everything to unite everyone who loves Russia around his ideas and 
to make it prosper”; “despite the very difficult situation of Ruthenia’s division, 
he started the momevemt towards unification of Russia.”484 Since then by “ap-
pealing to the legacy of Nevsky (…) Putin links defense of Russia’s distinctive 
civilization, including religion with today’s struggle against multiple threats 
from the West, whether ideas of freedom or programs to develop missile de-
fense (…) existential threat to Russia.”485 In July 2014, in the moment of in-
tensification of the Ukrainian crisis, Dmitri Trenin compared the current atti-
tude of Russia towards China to the policy of Alexander Nevsky, who “suc-
cessfully fought Western invaders while remaining loyal to the Mongol 
                                                          
484 Путин привел Александра Невского как пример патриота [Putin Showed Alexander 
Nevsky as an example of patriot], Gazeta.Ru, 23.05.2011.  
485 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 122. 
93 
khans.486 This reflected the domestic debate in Russia on the changing para-
digms of foreign policy.487 More importantly, however, the person of Nevsky 
was invoked by Russian Foreign Ministry Sergei Lavrov in his article on his-
torical perspective of Russian politics. He wrote that the “Mongolian period 
was extremely important for the assertion of the Russian State’s independent 
role in Eurasia” and “History doesn’t confirm the widespread belief that Russia 
has always camped in Europe’s backyard and has been Europe’s political out-
sider”. According to him, Nevsky “opted to temporarily submit to [the] Golden 
Horde rulers, who were tolerant of Christianity, in order to uphold the Rus-
sians’ right to have a faith of their own and to decide their fate, despite the 
European West’s attempts to put Russian lands under full control and to de-
prive Russians of their identity”. Thanks to Nevsky’s policy, Ruthenia “bent 
under but was not broken by the heavy Mongolian yoke, and managed to 
emerge from this dire trial as a single state, which was later regarded by both 
the West and the East as the successor to the Byzantine Empire that ceased to 
exist in 1453”. Lavrov concluded “I am confident that this wise and forward-
looking policy is in our genes.”488  
The context of this article is very clear. Russia instead of being “an outsider” 
in the West chooses to temporarily accept the dominance of a stronger state in 
the East hoping that thanks to it, Moscow will be able to uphold the pressure 
and wait out better times. Thus this approach may be called “Alexander Nev-
sky’s paradigm”. It remains to be seen whether it will be a long-term political 
shift or a short-term political twist shrugged off once relations with the West 
improve again.  
8. Summary: The Changing International Roles  
The years 1991-2017 have seen China’s continued rise and Russia’s sinusoid 
decline, rise and again decline. Nevertheless, up to until the 2000s, Russia was 
considered a more important player on the global scene. Since then and despite 
China’s (then) attempts to keep low profile, Beijing has been steadily becom-
ing more important globally. After the economic crisis in 2008, the situation 
improved for China and deteriorated even further for Russia: “as China has 
been accumulating more political and economic power, its relevance for the 
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international order has been increasing; in the case of Russia, the economic 
recession stopped its process of resurgence, limiting Russia’s importance (…) 
China has been gradually, and often inadvertently, taking over Russia’s role as 
the West’s major counterpart.”489 At the same time Russia started being viewed 
“by many countries as little better than a spoiler, with neither the capacity nor 
the inclination to solve global problems”.490 Russia is losing to China also in 
another aspect – soft power. Economically and culturally (soft power) Russia 
has little to offer to the world – “Russia’s soft power potential has not reached 
beyond the post-Soviet area and has been seriously tarnished by the Ukrainian 
crisis of 2014.”491 The fact that Russian popular culture is very popular in the 
post-Soviet area “does not mean that their peoples wish to join the Russian 
Federation or to be an appendage of a ‘Russian world’ as envisaged by the 
Kremlin.“492 Beyond the Russian-speaking area, Russia is simply not attrac-
tive. China, on the other hand, is a globally acknowledged actor with an im-
portant role in the world.  
The growing importance of China in the late 2000s and the early 2010s 
made Beijing more assertive – it started engaging more internationally and – 
what is particularly important – it raised its profile. According to some, the 
2008/9 crisis “turned confidence to arrogance in China” and made “Chinese 
leaders prone to triumphalism.”493 Certainly, the rising dispute with Japan over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the growing Chinese assertiveness in the dis-
puted islands of the South China Sea are the best examples of this new ap-
proach. This all testifies that for Xi Jinping China is already a great power, not 
only a “partial power.”494. To paraphrase a well-known Deng Xiaoping’s 
quote, one may say that Xi’s China raised its head.  
Perhaps it did it prematurely – economic turbulences in 2015 made China 
“wake up from the Chinese dream” – “the dreamers” who advocated ambitious 
foreign policy are losing ground for reformers now.495 It remains to be seen to 
what extent China’s economic slowdown and growing USA-China competi-
tion will affect China’s international position and consequently influence 
China-Russia relations.  
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Part One: Geopolitics and Beyond:  
Bilateral Political Relations 1991-2017 
This chapter shows the changing, sinusoidal dynamism of Russia-China bilat-
eral political relations from 1991 utill early 2017. It concentrates on a chrono-
logical presentation of events in order to elaborate the growing asymmetry in 
favour of Beijing. It focuses mostly on bilateral relations; although other as-
pects (such as Central Asia or Asia-Pacific) are mentioned, they are described 
in detail in further chapters. 
1. Before 1991: Overshadowed by Russia 
In the mid 19th century Russia exploited China’s weakness and enforced re-
linquishment of the Amur basin and the Ussiriyiski Krai. Thanks to the activi-
ties of two extraordinary individuals – commander Gennadi Nevelski and East 
Siberia governor count Nikolai Muravyov-Amurski – Russia was able to cut 
the biggest part of the “Chinese cake” without a fight. From a Russian perspec-
tive it was a historical justice. From a Chinese perspective the annexation trea-
ties in Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860) are considered “unequal” – enforced 
on China by colonial powers. Since the mid 19th century, the model of Sino-
Russian relations radically changed in favour of Russia that dominated the re-
lations.  
This advantage was maintained during the subsequent Soviet period. Since 
the very beginning, the USSR controlled and dominated, even created in a way, 
the communist movement in China. The Soviet influences were halted by 
Chiang Kai-shek’s repressions. Chinese communists withdrew to the country-
side where Mao Zedong’s nationalistic faction took lead. Mao, being more na-
tionalist than communist, despite heavy material support from Moscow and 
formal subjectivity to Stalin, was nevertheless able to remain independent. 
Chinese communists took power with a little help from Stalin (until the end of 
the Chinese civil war Stalin played on both sides, by maintaining contacts with 
both communists and the KMT nationalists). That is why from the beginning 
of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (the PRC), Chinese com-
munists, despite de facto submission, strived to achieve maximum autonomy – 
and succeeded after Stalin’s death. China’s position in the communist move-
ment rose steadily to such extent that in the late 1950s Beijing was able to 
challenge the USSR as the communist movement’s leader. Although China 
lost this competition, rivalry led to a Sino-Soviet split that ended with clashes 
over Damansky/Zhenbao Island (won by the USSR). After these events China 
made a spectacular U-turn and joined the West, while Sino-Soviet relations 
almost ceased to exist; their normalization happened no sooner than in 1989. 
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The “Soviet” era of Moscow-Beijing relations was characterized by dominant 
influence of the USSR that permanently interferred with Chinese affairs, and 
by the ambiguous attitude of the Chinese communists who saw the USSR as a 
model for social and political modernization, but at the same time considered 
it a threat to the Chinese sovereignty.  
Normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was fulfilled during Mikhail Gorba-
chev’s visit to Beijing in May 1989 (before, throughout the 1980s, the normal-
ization process was slowly under way). Nevertheless, this was the USSR’s last 
moment of existence: the process of its dissolution already started. The Chi-
nese leadership watched it with horror, remembering Tiananmen and associ-
ated it with domestic chaos and dissolution threat. The Chinese blamed Gor-
bachev for this state of affairs but nonetheless supported him in public – they 
considered Yeltsin’s alternative far worse. They were, however, able to keep 
their criticism to themselves which bore fruits later. This last period of Sino-
Soviet relations (1989-1991), beside the normalization of the relations, was 
marked by the signing of the border agreement in May 1991: it normalized the 
border issue and gave China back most of the disputed islands on Amur and 
Ussuri (including the Damansky/Zhenbao Island) in accordance with interna-
tional legal standards. Several places, however, were excluded from this agree-
ment – their status was finally resolved only in 2008. 
The fall of the USSR and the lowering of Russia’s status on the one hand, 
and market reforms and impressive economic growth of China on the other 
hand, decisively changed the dynamics of the bilateral relations. In conse-
quence, China steadily gained advantage over Russia in the bilateral relations. 
This tendency not only did not slow in time, but even increased and intensified.  
2. From Lack of Interest to Rapprochement 
The year 1991 must be considered the limes (latin: boundary) – the limit point 
in the newest history of Russia. The fall of the USSR and its consequences 
weakened Russia. It remained, however, an important international and re-
gional power. China, on the other hand, was strengthened by successful re-
forms, but weakened by Tiananmen repercussions – Western embargo on sales 
of arms and ideological anathema. In 1991, “Russia was the superpower’s suc-
cessor while China was the emerging power”.496  
Initially, Sino-Russian relations were determined by reserve and caution, a 
political désintéressement, “as if both countries turned their back on each other, 
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and concentrated their foreign policy activities on different dimensions.”497 For 
“Atlantists” that ruled Russia, only the West mattered – it was the political and 
economic pattern of the reforms; China was associated with the Tiananmen 
massacre and possible threats in the future. For them, China was low on the 
agenda even in Asia – it fell behind Japan, India or South Korea. That is why 
relations with China became of secondary importance for Russia in 1992.498  
Obstructed by the West, China concentrated on its neighborhood by devel-
oping and normalizing relations with its neighbors. The Chinese were unsym-
pathetic for Yeltsin and his group of reformers, considering them the culprit of 
the USSR’s fall and – consequently a hypothetical domestic threat for China 
(Yeltsin, on the other hand, also remembered the Chinese affronts to him dur-
ing the last years of the USSR). The Chinese leadership, however, did not de-
part from one of China’s foreign policy priorities: to accept the neighbors as 
they are.499 Beijing quickly understood the benefits of good neighborhood pol-
icy with the new Russia – such as tranquillity in Central Asia, regional balance 
and counterweight for the US and Japanese influences in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. A perspective of Russia’s inclusion into the Western world meant an un-
wanted pressure for China – the last socialist power; finally, the decline of the 
USSR cancelled any threat for China from the North.500 That is why China 
quickly recognized the Russian Federation and first diplomatic encouters soon 
followed.501 In this first, uneasy period of initialization of bilateral contacts, 
overshadowed by mutual suspicions and resentments, it was important that 
both states inherited from the Soviet-China relations the institutional frame-
work that was now reconstructed without major substantial changes.502 
The diplomatic ice on the highest level was broken during Yeltsin’s visit to 
Beijing in 1992.503 It was the first Russian Federation President’s visit to the 
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People’s Republic of China and the first meeting of Yeltsin with Jiang Zemin. 
Yeltsin came to China during a difficult domestic situation: he was under pres-
sure from a part of his team that wanted to lead an alternative foreign policy 
and was criticized by the nationalistic opposition for leaning to the West.504 
This criticism was associated with more general disappointment with the “At-
lantic” foreign policy of Russia: unrealistic expectations of help, investments 
and “equal treatment” from the West gave way to a bitter disappointment. The 
perceived failure of the Western economic model of “the Washington consen-
sus” was “accentuated by conspiracy theories alleging that those were intended 
to weaken, not reform, Russia.”505 In this situation, Yeltsin used this visit to 
demonstrate that Russian politics are not concentrated entirely on the West. On 
the other side, the Chinese leadership, still isolated after Tiananmen and seeing 
itself as the target of the West506, welcomed this visit as an opportunity to 
strengthen the cooperation. During a two-day visit (17-19 December 1992), 
Yeltsin met Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, but not Deng Xiaoping (although he 
wanted to meet him).507 The Russian President initially frightened his hosts: 
“his behaviour was vintage Yeltsin, virtually a paragon of unprofessional and 
indiscrete behaviour”: in a press conference he disclosed that he had previously 
considered China as a country ‘very much in one mold, under the Party’s heel’ 
and that Deng Xiaoping was “not in good health”; subsequently he cut short 
his visit by a day in order to return to Moscow and deal with domestic political 
struggles.508 Soon however, when Yeltsin started praising Chinese successes 
for avoiding revolutionary means and shock methods – he started to be liked 
very much by his Chinese hosts.509 They realized that “Yeltsin’s anticom-
munism is not anti-Chinese.”510 Two sides signed a bombastic “declaration on 
principles of bilateral relations between the RF and the PRC”511 that filled the 
legal gap, existing from 1980 (when the Soviet-Chinese treaty expired) and 
started a tradition of Sino-Russian joint-communiqués full with “eye-catching 
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sloganeering, symbolism and summitry.”512 This led to an adaptation of a “sim-
ilar position on the guiding principles of international relations”513 (see: intro-
duction). Besides these declarations, the two sides signed a few other agree-
ments and documents (most of these, however, remained on paper), the most 
important ones being the reduction of troops on border areas, reduction of of-
fensive arms and creation of the security zone within 200 km from the bor-
der.514 Yeltsin’s visit was a success: he described it as “ushering a new era in 
Russia-China relations” and “for once the hyperbole was appropriate.”515 This 
visit is being considered as Russia’s return to the multidimensional politics 
after the “Western leaning.”516 It was, too, a “triumph of pragmatism and com-
mon sense” for both sides.517  
Following the visit, Russian-Chinese contacts intensified, particularly in the 
economic sphere – China already in 1992 became Russia’s second trade part-
ner (mostly because of the arms sales; soon, however, it fell to the fifth posi-
tion), contacts between peoples of Russia and China intensified (although this 
was limited in 1994 by the introduction of visas to Russia).518 There was a 
continuing sense of realism of both sides, too.519 During Yeltsin’s conflict with 
the parliament, the Chinese stood aside and remained neutral; after Yeltsin 
suppressed his opponents, the Chinese leadership “displayed a distinct respect 
for the survival skills of Yeltsin.”520 In the initial Russian-Chinese relations 
what was important was a specific trend – a top-down “management” of the 
process of development of these relations. Closer relations between Russia and 
China have been built from top to bottom. Since the mid 1990s, the highest 
officials were meeting regularly; ministers and deputy ministers were having 
regular contacts via different commissions and committees. This helped to 
maintain a good atmosphere and prepared ground for long-term development 
of the relations.521 
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The best example of this dynamism was the “constructive partnership” for-
mula, created in September 1994, during Jiang Zemin’s trip to Moscow.522 It 
has been the first trip of the Chairman of the PRC to the Russian capital since 
1957 and the first visit of the head of the Chinese state in Russia. Russians 
celebrated Jiang in the best tzars’ way: he was hosted in the Kremlin Palace 
and was privileged to have a few private meetings with Yeltsin, in an unofficial 
way. Since then the two leaders liked each other.523 It was not the mutual like-
ness, however, that made rapprochement possible, but interests. Both were in-
terested in a stable and secure international environment. For Yeltsin, China’s 
policy was one of the few dimensions where he was wholly supported by the 
political class. Disappointment with “leaning to the West”, the NATO’s en-
largement to the East, the Western infiltration in Central Asia was widespread. 
In these circumstances, rapprochement with China became the logical answer 
for domestic and external weakness of Russia. The Kremlin started treating its 
policy in Asia-Pacific as a counterweight to the potential marginalization of 
Moscow in European affairs as well as a response to the US global influence. 
China’s approach has been similar on this geopolitical level: these two “non-
Western countries with large and unsatisfied great-power egos” seek to “to ac-
celerate the decline of the lone superpower’s preeminence in favour of multi-
polarity, and to block the spread of the Western civilization.”524  
There has been, however, a substantional difference between the anti-West-
ern approach of Russia and China. Although Beijing, since 1982, has pro-
claimed an “independent policy” and expressed worries about American uni-
laterism, has nevertheless been prone to reproaching Moscow only to an extent, 
so that it would not lose political space to maneuver. China was not meant to 
create another alliance, particularly one against the USA – it just wanted to 
strengthen its position. At the same time China agreed to the Russian proposal 
of a “constructive partnership” to secure its own interests in the Russian Far 
East, where strong anti-Chinese resentments appeared. That is why Jiang Ze-
min in Moscow emphasized the bilateral economic cooperation by stressing 
the complementarity of Russian and Chinese economies; he hoped to over-
come existing problems, quoting a Chinese saying: “it is better than to stop 
eating out of fear of choking.”525 
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The Russian intervention in Chechnya marks the appearance of a new im-
portant factor in Sino-Russian relations: joint backing on thorny domestic is-
sues (or the ones considered domestic), such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang 
and Chechnya, against international criticism. That is why in the subsequent 
“joint declarations”, Russia and China emphasized such value as “state sover-
eignty”, “territorial integrity” or “non-interference in domestic affairs”. Russia 
backed the Chinese position on Taiwan and China in return did not say a word 
about the Russian activities in Chechnya. Chechnya was “a turning point in 
Russian-Chinese relations: it put an end to Russia’s tendency to moralize to 
the Chinese about human rights.”526 Chinese prime-minister Li Peng, who vis-
ited Moscow on 25-28 June 1995, said that “we should not allow foreigners to 
rule in our countries.”527 For China, Russia became “the Tiananmen-proof part-
ner, not risking the political, diplomatic, security, or commercial benefits of 
the relationship by criticizing the internal failings of the Chinese regime.”528 
3. “Strategic Partnership” 
The year 1996 was crucial for Russia due to presidential elections and real 
concern of Yeltsin’s failure. For the policy makers in the Kremlin, his reelec-
tion became the most important domestic and foreign policy task. As it turned 
out, it also influenced relations with China, particularly on two aspects – sub-
stitution of Andrei Kozyrev by Yegveni Primakov as Russia’s foreign minister 
and signing a “strategic partnership” with Beijing.  
Primakov, who became foreign minister on 10 January 1996, represented 
an entirely different vision of Russia’s foreign policy: the Euroasianist one. 
Although his nomination might be seen as the culmination of the growing in-
fluence of supporters of euroasianism’s ideas, it was nevertheless Yeltsin’s 
election motivation that played a decisive role: he wanted to gain voters from 
conservative-nationalistic part of the society. It worked well: Kozyrev was per-
sonally blamed for Russia’s decrease of prestige, so his removal helped Yeltsin 
a lot.529 
Primakov’s foreign policy – called “Euroasianist”, “pragmatic” or “realis-
tic” – is considered a breakthrough, a limes (latin: boundary) in Russian foreign 
policy. Primakov decided that Russia’s security depended on Moscow’s influ-
ences and that even weakened Russia may have balanced the US power by 
                                                          
526 J. L. Wilson, Strategic Partners…, p. 29.These attempts, done in early 1990s (by, among 
others, Kozyrev in 1992),were “strange anyway given the fact that Russia is not a ideal in 
this regards”,А.В. Лукин, От нормализации к стратегическому партнерству…, p. 
332. 
527 Ю. М. Галенович, История взаимоотношений…, pp. 92-105. 
528 S. W. Garnett, Limited Partnership, [in:] Rapprochement or Rivarly…, p. 11.  
529 Е. Бажанов, Эволуция внешней политики…, p. 16; S. Bieleń, op. cit., pp. 72-76. 
102 
using the UN and be able to force the West to recognize it as a parallel power, 
with special interests in the “near abroad.”530 Primakov’s policy was consid-
ered a Gaullism-style policy, but the real inspiration for Primakov came from 
the 19th century Russia’s prince Alexander Gorchakov who had orchestred 
Moscow’s foreign policy for 26 years and rebuilt Russia’s position after the 
defeat in the Crimea war.531 Primakov himself “was thoroughly at home with 
Realpolitik calculations” and was, like his Chinese counterparts, a firm adher-
ent of the efforts to develop a multipolar world.”532 Here China was the key – 
Primakov did not even tried to conceal it: “Russia’s Kissinger and architect of 
the Primakov Doctrine espoused a Sino-Russian (…) alliance against Western 
unilaterism.”533 Primakov, too, was highly valued in Beijing, where his nomi-
nation, marking a turn in Russian foreign policy534, was accepted with satis-
faction: “the same qualities in Primakov that aroused suspicion and distrust in 
the West were welcomed by China’s leaders, who looked upon Primakov’s 
career in the Soviet and Russian intelligence services as proof of his compe-
tence and expertise. In the Chinese view, Primakov was a consummate profes-
sional.”535 Nevertheless, Primakov’s influence was not exclusive: Yeltsin’s 
second term saw “dual-track” leaderships: on the one side there were “prag-
matists” around Primakov that strived for global balance; on the other side, 
there was economy apparatus, whether guided by Anatolyi Chubais, Boris 
Nemtsov, or Sergei Kiriyenko, that worked closely with international organi-
zations and looked for Russia’s financial support there.536  
The other key event in 1996, or maybe even in the whole decade of the 
1990s, for Russia and China, was the proclamation of the “strategic partner-
ship”. It happened during the third top-level Russian-Chinese meeting, during 
Yeltsin’s trip to Beijing (24-26 April 1996). It took place during the Russian 
presidential campaign, a few weeks before the first round. Chinese leadership, 
although formally neutral, was anxious about the possible outcome and silently 
hoped for Yeltsin’s victory. Beijing feared that the alternative of Gennady Zi-
uganov or Vladimir Zhirinovski might lead to an increase in Russian national-
ism, particularly in the Russian Far East; the Chinese preferred Yeltsin who 
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guaranteed stability.537 That is why “Jiang welcomed Yeltsin in an unusually 
personal manner in April 1996, helping him to defeat his opponent, Zi-
uganov.”538 The other important factor that influenced this meeting was the 
international situation – a political crisis in Taiwan strait was taking place and 
the USA has just signed a joint declaration on security with Japan.539  
That is why Moscow and Beijing not only traditionally backed each other 
on their political positions, but they also wanted to send a clear signal to Wash-
ington that the USA should take their interests into account. They wanted to 
“make this relationship appear stronger than it is”540 (particularly Russia). This 
is how the “Western factor” since the mid 1990s became “the immanent factor 
in Russian-Chinese rapprochement and deepening of cooperation.”541 Anti-
Western resentments were “fueled by humiliation and redemption and ex-
pressed itself in strident nationalism.”542 All that contributed to the fact that 
during the Yeltsin’s visit, both sides manifested their rapprochement and 
friendly relations and decided to include the term “strategic partnership” in 
their joint declaration in 1996.543 
It was Yeltsin who proposed this term: he tried to present it as a much bigger 
rank that that it was in reality (his was a way to compensate the subsequent PR 
failures on the international scene)544; Yeltsin himself confirmed this almost 
literally by saying: “to be respected from the West, we must cooperate with 
China.”545 “Strategic partnership” was to play an important role in strengthen-
ing Russia’s international position, particularly in light of a visible disappoint-
ment in Western policy. China was supposed to become Russia’s “bargaining 
card.”546 This revealed a wishful thinking characteristic for the Russian elite – 
most of them wanted to see relations with China as more important than they 
actually were. This attitude was typical for Russian culture, with its proneness 
to the extremes: “if it is friendship, then it must be as close as in the 1950s; if 
                                                          
537 E. Wishnick, op. cit., pp. 129-130. 
538 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 245. 
539 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration On Security – Alliance For The 21st Century, Japan MFA, 
17.04.1996. 
540 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 263. 
541 Ю. М. Галенович, История взаимоотношений…, p. 114.  
542 M. L. Levin, op. cit., p. 99. 
543 Совместная декларация Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики 
1996 [Joint Declaration of Russian Federation and China People’s Republic], 25.04.1996, 
[in:] Сборник российско-китайских договоров 1949-1999…, pp. 333-337.  
544 L. Buszynski, Overshadowed by China: The Russia-China Strategic Partnership in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, [in:] The Future of China-Russia…, p. 266; E.Wishnick, op. cit., p. 
130; Ю. М. Галенович, История взаимоотношений…, p. 119. 
545 Е. Бажанов, Актуалные проблемы международных отношений [The Present Problems 
of International Relations], Москва 2002, т. 2, p. 419. 
546 А. Воскресенский, Китай и Россия [China and Russia] p. 494; idem, Russia’s Evolving 
Grand Strategy toward China, [in:] Rapprochement or Rivalry…, p. 124; Y. V. Tsyganov, 
op. cit., p. 304. 
104 
it is hostility, then it must be as dangerous as the old armed conflicts between 
Soviet and Chinese border guards on the Island of Damansky.”547 
The Chinese were clearly and effectively blocking these attempts. The 
PRC’s preferred policy was not to join any alliances or political-military blocs. 
Chinese leadership under Jiang Zemin clearly stated that relations with Russia 
were being built on the rule “neither alliance, nor confrontation” and never 
went beyond this slogan.548 Chen Qimao commented that a strategic partner-
ship “is characterized by three ‘nons’ – non-confrontation, non-alliance and 
non-aiming at any third country.”549 Xi Laiwan added: “being good neigh-
bours, good partners and good friends.”550 Dmitri Trenin commented: “China 
feels no need for alliance, especially with a weak and unpredictable Russia, 
and will never agree to Moscow’s leadership”; the essence of “strategic part-
nership” with Moscow is to strengthen the security interests of Beijing: the 
“partnership will guarantee that Russia will not participate in any potential 
anti-Chinese coalitions (…) the isolation of China will never be complete 
thanks to the Russian ‘safety velvet.’”551 The “strategic partnership” is the best 
example of Beijing’s pragmatic and long-term approach to Moscow: China 
“reconciled itself to the Kremlin’s Westerncentrism (…) what mattered more 
to Beijing was that the ‘strategic partnership’ should serve concrete priorities: 
backing for its position on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang; security building on 
China’s northern and western frontiers; ensuring a steady stream of advanced 
weaponry; and political support for China’s efforts to play a more active role 
in the world; to achieve these aims, the Communist leadership could (and did) 
put up with a lot.”552 Finally, for the Chinese, “strategic partnership” “fits into 
key tenets of Chinese foreign policy.”553 This is simply a comfortable, very 
capacious formula thanks to which China may develop cooperation with its 
bigger neighbor while winning the Chinese interests abroad.  
The signing of the “strategic partnership” is a symbolic moment in Sino-
Russian relations in the 1990s. Although enthusiastic voices about the begin-
ning of a “new era” and uplifting Moscow-Beijing relations into the level un-
seen from the 1950s were exaggerated (during the 1990s the “strategic part-
nership” functioned mainly in rhetoric)554, nevertheless the “strategic partner-
ship” symbolized a new period in Sino-Russian relationship: it became similar 
to typical bilateral relations with its dominant pragmatism and emphasis on 
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economic issues; Russia and China became “simply neighbours”, the normal-
ization of relations fulfilled their most vital interests.555 For Moscow “strategic 
partnership” became one of the very few diplomatic successes in Asia and a 
vital reminder of Russian potential in seeking non-Western partners: “im-
proved relations with China was (…) a major achievement” – Moscow “man-
aged to end its parallel Cold War in the East on what looked like honourable 
terms.”556 For Beijing the “strategic partnership” was one of the very symbols 
of its growing global position, a part of the most important policy goal – to 
become a global power. A normalization of the relationship with Russia was 
an important part of this strategy, though not its core. Moscow was needed 
politically, economically and militarily – and from the Chinese point of view 
it fulfilled its role. However, despite noticeable success in the relations be-
tween the two countries, Russia still remained West-dependent. This turned 
out to be particularly true during Yeltsin’s second term.  
In the second part of the 1990s both sides were hurrying up to use the good 
conjuncture for negotiating and signing the most important documents and ad-
dress the unresolved matters that might have got complicated should the con-
juncture change. Despite what Russian old China hand Igor Rogachev called 
mutual “anti-confrontational immunity” that apparently has been created 
among both elites557, Kremlin and Zhongnanhai were unsure about the future. 
This explains the readiness to create structures to prevent a reversal of bilateral 
dynamics in the future. The Chinese were afraid of the domestic destabilization 
in Russia as the result of Yeltsin’s weakness; the Russians feared power-strug-
gle in China after Deng Xiaoping’s death.558 Examples of this attitude can be 
seen in signing the agreement on reduction of military forces in the border zone 
of post-Soviet republics and China559 – the reduction of the army haa for a long 
time been a thorny issue in Soviet-Chinese relations. Its solution must be con-
sidered a turning point in the Russian-Chinese relations.560  
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Despite the development of this relationship, the Russian-Chinese “strategic 
partnership” in 1997-1998 went through a test of reliability in the changing 
international arena. The improvement of Sino-American relations, Russian-
Japanese relations, nuclear chases in South Asia, financial crisis in Asia – all 
these proved that the Sino-Russian relationship was quite narrow. Particularly 
against the background of the developing Sino-American relations, Beijing’s 
cooperation with Moscow faded. It was best seen during Yeltsin’s subsequent 
visit to Beijing (9-11 November 1997). Despite signing the demarcation of the 
eastern part of the border561 – so controversial in Russia – the summit “made 
lowering of the so-far foregoing dynamics apparent”: the documents signed 
avoided most important bilateral issues and “came across as filling up the dip-
lomatic emptiness.”562 In order to conceal the substantial emptiness of this 
visit, the Chinese side wanted to welcome Yeltsin in the imperial style. This 
showed the difference in China’s relations with the USA, where concrete is-
sues mattered; as Chinese Ambassador to Moscow, Li Fenglin summarized: 
“between China and the USA there is cooperation without sentimentalism; be-
tween China and Russia there is sentimentalism without cooperation.”563  
The improvement of Sino-American relations showed that already then, in 
the late 1990s, China become the main partner of the USA. It happened mainly 
thanks to the different style of policy making after 1991. Russian reactions 
“appeared rooted in short-term calculations and a sense of humiliation (…) 
Russians were flailing after their palpable disappointment at the enormous loss 
in stature resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union (…) they were dis-
pleased with the world order they saw emerging but reacted less with a strategy 
to transform that order over a long period than with sharp gestures to land some 
blows immediately.”564 Against this background China presented a stable and 
long-term policy calculated on gaining time to strengthen domestically. China 
needed Russia as a counterbalance to the growing Western pressure and for 
strengthening its army. Russia was, however, only a part of the bigger, long-
term strategy of China’s return to power status – here the West was the key 
aspect, not Russia. Cooling relations with Moscow turned out to be the una-
voidable consequence of strengthening Sino-Western relations. It was not, 
however, the only reason. The others were: short Russian-Japanese détente; 
sudden nuclear race between India and Pakistan, and financial crisis that made 
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the level of the economic cooperation between Russia and China was very low. 
Russian-Chinese relations in 1998 faced a stagnation.  
All this aspects showed very well that Russia and China did not consider 
bilateral relations as the most important foreign policy vector. Although both 
sides emphasized their partnership playing a central role in their foreign poli-
cies, the facts contradicted this. The years 1997 and 1998 showed that “Russo-
Chinese relations looked superficial” and were “basically limited to traditional 
geopolitical issues.”565 Consequently, the partnership depended “on aspects of 
worldview that are more changeable than national interest, such as the psycho-
logical underpinnings of national identity that guide policy.”566 Their eco-
nomic interests were also located in the West. For China, the USA was much 
more important than Russia because in the 1998 alone trade with the USA 
reached 60 billion USD, whereas with Russia it was only 5.8 billion; that is 
why “Beijing would not risk any rapprochement with Russia that could cost it 
loss of dollars.”567 For Yeltsin’s Russia the West remained the most important 
reference point, it was there where Moscow hoped to receive loans that could 
put Russian economy back on its feet again in 1998. This is how both China 
and Russia could manage to go on without each other, but could not do it with-
out the cooperation with the USA. That is why criticism directed to the West 
and joint backing on international issues were only a way to strengthen their 
relations vis-à-vis the West. The domestic bond of cooperation was even 
weaker: irrelevant or skeptical public opinion, hesitation or resistance in the 
partner’s most important issues, insignificance of group lobbying for coopera-
tion and strong nationalistic factor hampering rapprochement.568 Russia in 
their communication with the Chinese were “content to limit themselves to the 
symbols of ‘high politics’ and do not condescend to the ‘low politics’ of com-
mercial contacts (…) economic ties were too dependent on individual shuttle 
traders and arms dealers.”569  
How Russia-China relations were made an appendix to their relations with 
the West was best indicated by the events in the fall of 1998 and spring of 
1999, when US’s showcase of force in Kosovo drew Russia and China closer 
again. Nevertheless, there was a specific difference in the attitudes: China’s 
engagement in the Kosovo crisis was limited, whereas Russia tried to play 
leading role in solving the conflict. This explains difference in reactions. Rus-
sia reacted rapidly: it refused the NATO any rights to interfere in Yugoslavia’s 
domestic affairs and Prime Minister Primakov cancelled a long-organized trip 
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to Washington by ordering to turn back his flight over the Atlantic.570 Moreo-
ver, Russia, by trying to prove that it would not allow being prevented from 
speaking in Balkan issues, attempted to form an anti-NATO block. China, on 
the other hand, kept the distance as long as its basic interests were not endan-
gered. Prime-minister Zhu Rongji did not follow Primakov’s example: he paid 
a visit to the USA a few days later and received the US backing for China’s 
entry to the WTO.571 Only when China’s embassy became bombarded in Bel-
grade did China react harshly – but it did so to strengthen its global position 
and push the USA to the defence in terms of ideological issues (like human 
rights).572 
The 1990s, the decade of Sino-Russian relations, were concluded by Yelt-
sin’s farewell visit to Beijing on 9-10 December 1999 (and his last visit as the 
head of the Russian state). This visit had a lot of personal accounts – both Yelt-
sin and Jiang tried to emphasize the closeness of the relations. Yeltsin said that 
he had suddenly woken up at night without knowing where he was, but then 
he remembered “with friends, in China.”573 The extent that this “friendship” 
was associated with bad relations with the West574 was revealed by Yeltsin 
when he launched his strongest rant against the USA: “Yesterday, Clinton per-
mitted himself to put pressure on Russia. It seems he has for a minute, for a 
second, for half a minute, forgotten that Russia has a full arsenal of nuclear 
weapons. He has forgotten about that (…) it has never been the case, and will 
not be the case, that he alone dictates to the world how to live, how to work, 
how to rest and so on. No, and again no. Things will be as we have agreed with 
Jiang Zemin. We will be saying how to live, not he alone.”575 In the strained 
international situation this statement reverberated but – as before – turned out 
to be mere words from a helpless Yeltsin. This visit concluded the first part of 
Russia-China political relations. On 31 December 1999, Yeltsin resigned from 
the RF presidency. In Sino-Russian relations it equaled the end of an era. * 
Sino-Russian relations in 1990s went a long way. From initial distance, if 
not dislike, through “constructive” and “strategic” partnership, to close ties in 
the end of the century. Russia and China shared a joint outlook on international 
affairs – a protest against political and ideological dominance of Western pow-
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ers. This was more clearly seen in China – due to the consequences of Tianan-
men, Beijing throughout the 1990s   was in ideological opposition to the West. 
In Russia it had more to do with “wounded pride”: the unfulfilled hopes of the 
first period of the Russian Federation. This opposition against the West united 
Moscow and Beijing and gave dynamics, or even essence, to their détente from 
the 1990s. It was not, however, any alliance nor bloc, but rather a reinforce-
ment of their positions vis-à-vis the West. To Moscow and Beijing the West, 
particularly the United States, remained the fundamental reference point. One 
may even say that Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s were merely an appen-
dix to their relations with the United States and other Western states. 
Nonetheless, Russia and China were able to achieve several successes. The 
most important were the following: demilitarization and arms reduction; bor-
der demarcation; noninterference in domestic affairs; arms sales and establish-
ment of the mechanism of cooperation (for a detailed description of these is-
sues, see further part of this book). The reduction in military calmed down the 
general mood in both countries, first and foremost in China which is always 
vulnerable to threat from the North. Demarcation of the border, although 
stormy, particularly in the Russian Far East, was also in interests of both those 
countries. It was China again which strived for it to a greater extent: Chinese 
leadership followed Deng Xiaoping’s maxim “peace on the border” and 
wanted to close this thorny chapter. For Russia, giving back a few thousand 
square kilometers was a difficult psycho-political task, but again – it was in the 
Russian long-term interest: it postponed the threat of more serious Chinese ter-
ritorial claims, at least for the time being. Although the demarcation process 
was not finished in the 1990s, it was completed later on, which remains Yelt-
sin’s big political win. Noninterference in domestic affairs may seem quite pale 
in comparison to the other achievements, but given 400-years of the history of 
Sino-Russian relations, it must be considered a remarkable success, particu-
larly from Beijing’s position (China hates to be advised and generously re-
wards those who do not do it). Arms sales – as some say the “glue” of their 
relations in the 1990s, was in their interest. Russia had to keep the military-
industrial complex alive, while China needed to modernize the army, by-pass-
ing the Western embargo. Despite anxiety on the Russian side and mutual mis-
understandings, arms sales were an important and definitely positive part of 
their cooperation in the 1990s. Finally, establishing the mechanism of cooper-
ation played an important part in building the fundamentals of permanent de-
velopment of the relations. Thanks to establishing institutional and structural 
base (such as regular meetings on top level), Russia and China created a solid 
ground for their future relations – this would bear fruits in the next decade. 
Finally, the 1990s was a difficult beginning, a lesson of avoiding mistakes 
which enabled a better cooperation in the next decade.  
Remembering successes, one must equally strongly emphasize differences. 
Throughout the 1990s, the Sino-Russian partnership was not “strategic”, but 
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rather utilitarian. Where Moscow and Beijing’s interests converged, there both 
countries supported each other (see: Central Asia). Where these interests were 
divergent or contradictory, Russia and China did not pay attention to one an-
other and were ready to sacrifice the “strategic partnership” for better relations 
with the USA. It was particularly evident in East Asia, where China did not 
become Russia’s “door keeper”. The most important divergence, overshadow-
ing most of the successes, or rather pushing them into background, was Russia 
and China’s main orientation towards the West. It always had priority over the 
“strategic partner’s” reaction: Washington was always most important for both 
Moscow and Beijing. 
Thanks to bilateral relations, Russia and China in the 1990s were (re)build-
ing their power statuses. In 1991, both countries were more or less equal in 
their international status. The 1990s showed clearly how they used their time. 
Russia did not maintain its superpower status, badly experienced the transfor-
mation into a free market, and although it strived at all costs to maintain the 
prestige, it fell to secondary power status. China, with its pragmatism and lack 
of emotions in politics (with the exception of Taiwan issue) steadily and con-
sequently were striving towards its fundamental goal – rebuilding its central 
role in East Asia and beyond. This is why in the late 1990s, China’s position 
was already stronger than the Russia’s one.  
4. Changed Leadership, Continued Policy Agenda 
In the first one and a half years after Putin became the president, Russia’s for-
eign policy was a continuation of the policy from the last period of “Yeltsin’s 
decade”: with Yugoslavia and Kosovo as dominating benchmarks.576 This way 
Putin’s rise to power did not at the beginning have a remarkable influence on 
the Russian-Chinese relations. Only with time, the economic cooperation be-
came more intense and the military cooperation developed to an even greater 
extent while Putin’s policy became much wider in Asia than that of his prede-
cessor.  
The Chinese side reacted to the Russian top power change as usual: recog-
nizing the Russian decision and building relations with new decision-makers. 
Putin, however, did not visit China for a very long time: despite the first dec-
laration from Kremlin that the first visit of president-elect would take place in 
China, Putin visited the United Kingdom first, and Beijing only in July 2000. 
However, although he met the Chinese leaders quite late, he continued to work 
on bringing both countries closer. During the two days of Putin’s visit (17-18 
July 2000) several documents were signed, and above all the “Beijing declara-
tion”, which indicated that both countries would maintain their anti-Western 
                                                          
576 It was best exemplified by national security conception from 2000 r., Концепция нацио-
нальной безопасности Российской Федерации, “Независимая газета”, 14.01.2000. 
111 
course until the end of the decade.577 The “Beijing declaration” was a typical 
example of the Russian-Chinese vision of the international order and high-
lighted the necessity to establish a multipolar order: “this rhetoric conceals the 
need to regain (Russia) or get (China) influences free from interference of other 
powers, particularly the USA.”578 
A novelty that drew attention was a reference to the willingness to sign a 
treaty. The initiative of signing the treaty should definitely be assigned to the 
Chinese side (which was unusual given China’s unwillingness to bind itself to 
treaties)– the aim was to reinforce the international position of China and to 
neutralize the uncertainty with regards to Putin (his deferment to visit China 
and some of his statements; among other, Russia’s consideration of the access 
to the NATO raised China’s fears); they wished to “bind Putin with treaty ob-
ligations.”579 The Chinese initiative composed well with the first attempts 
made by Putin, who wanted to assign a higher meaning to the relations with 
China. The official signing of the Russian-Chinese “Treaty on good neighbor-
liness, friendship and cooperation” took place on 16 July 2001 during Jiang 
Zemin’s visit to Moscow (15-18 July 2001). The treaty, which was composed 
of 25 articles, was signed for 20 years with a possibility of an extension for the 
next 5 years. It emphasized the basic assumptions of Russian-Chinese rela-
tions, which had evolved during the previous decade (like the strategic part-
nership).580 It was rather general, as Russia and China once again published an 
agreement on “everything and nothing”: maximal cooperation in all possible 
spheres and minimal level of responsibility for the results of this coopera-
tion.581 It was perceived in its geopolitical dimension as closing ranks against 
the domination of the United States in the global order. However, this treaty 
was something more than just another element of the game of both countries 
with the United States. Its rhetoric in most important geopolitical matters was 
much milder than in shared communications, which indicated that it had been 
planned for a long time.582 Above all, the treaty was important in bilateral is-
sues: it was a culmination of the process of normalization within Russia-China 
relations583, it was a lawful reinforcement of the “strategic partnership” and it 
created a legal basis for the development of relations (a mechanism of regular 
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meetings on the summit).584 Although the treaty was a success for both sides, 
its signing was primarily China’s success: Beijing was the main initiator of 
signing this document, Chinese leaders were the ones who prepared it, and 
moreover this treaty was the one that summed up achievements of the previous 
decade (such as non-interference in domestic issues) securing the continuation 
of this heritage.585 On the other hand for Russia it was a possibility of compre-
hensive deepening of the cooperation with China and strengthening Russia’s 
position in the region of Asia-Pacific.  
The treaty was concluded with the motto “friends forever and enemies never 
again”,586 which at least in the first part of this sentence was true in 2001. How-
ever, it did not change the fact that, as the near future showed, these relations, 
despite “friendship”, could not move out from their Western-centrism: they 
focused mainly on the West. 
5. 11 September 2001  
Anew international incident – the terrorist attack on WTC on 11 September 
2001 in New York – resulted in a pro-Western turn in Moscow’s politics. Us-
ing the opportunity given by this attack, Putin decided to make a crucial turn 
in foreign policy, acknowledging that joining the United States would be the 
most beneficial move for Russia: it would help regain at least a part of its su-
perpower status, and internally it would give time for modernization and would 
enable it to connect the conflict in Chechnya with the war against terrorism. It 
was a “pragmatic calculation of Russian interests, in which revival of Russian 
economics was dependable on the integration with world’s financial struc-
tures.”587 The new Kremlin leadership considered it a chance to renew their 
position in great powers club and external world recognition of the “Euroasian 
Monroe doctrine” – guaranteeing Russian influence in the countries of “near 
abroad.”588 The basic aim of this new strategy was the resignation from the 
competition with the United States regarding the form of the international or-
der and from conducting global policy (apart from the rhetorics): “Putin, know-
ing that he cannot win with the United States, decided to bandwagon to it.”589 
Russia reacted calmly on the American withdrawal from the ABM and agreed 
upon American conditions of the SORT treaty, moreover it agreed upon the 
Baltic countries’ access to the NATO and redefinition of the relations with the 
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Alliance (NATO-Russia Council, 2002). Odd words from George Bush about 
seeing Putin’s soul became the symbol of this new American-Russian rap-
prochement.590  
Russian bandwagoning must have had brought negative consequences for 
Russian-Chinese relations – one of the most important “glueing elements” col-
lapsed: the anti-Americanism591 – “almost overnight the pretence of geopolitic 
evenhandedness gave way to an overtly pro-Western line”592. The Chinese 
leadership at the beginning also supported the “war against terrorism” because 
of pragmatic reasons, though in a much more reserved manner.593 Good rela-
tions with the West were necessary for the further modernization of the coun-
try, and above all Beijing was eager to use the occasion to interpret the fight 
against Uyghur separatists from Xinjiang as a part of the world antiterrorist 
campaign. However, Beijing did not support Washington to such an extent as 
Moscow did: “China remained more wary and suspicious of the United States 
and less willing to jettison its analysis, rooted in classic Realpolitik assump-
tions.”594 Particularly the US presence in Central Asia was worrisome to China 
as Beijing feared the US Army might stay longer in Aphganistan, coming 
closer to Chinese borders, “surround China” and threaten Xinjiang and Ti-
bet.595 
These facts resulted in a situation, in which China and Russia after “09/11 
de facto found themselves in two different camps, although naturally nobody 
disclosed it in public.”596 For a moment the Chinese felt “betrayed”, particu-
larly when Putin withdrew his objection to the ABM treaty.597 Chinese reac-
tions to Russian politics were traditionally balanced, however they revealed an 
increasingly rising level of anxiety: “Russia has again forgotten to explain to 
Beijing the change in its strategic priorities while continuing to declare its un-
changeability.”598 Officially Moscow moved on to higher diplomacy and rhe-
torical acrobatics, as it tried to prove to China that an rapprochement with the 
United States does not threaten their mutual relations.599 China of course did 
not take in such remarks. The Russian pro-American turn was received in Bei-
jing with a strong feeling of disappointment – especially because it hurt Chi-
nese interests, and it lead to a necessity for a greater acquiescence of Beijing 
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towards Washington. China feared Russia might revert to ill-remembered 
Kozyrev-style diplomacy (“Kozyrevshchina“) and join the US “hegemonic” 
course.600 The negative Chinese position was displayed in bitter comments in 
the Chinese press and in the Chinese leadership concerns over Putin (Jiang was 
to say “We don’t know what kind of a person Putin is, or what he thinks” and 
he ordered a detailed analysis on Putin and his political agenda).601  
Although Russian-Chinese relations after Putin’s turn towards the USA 
weakened, it does not mean they disappeared. Still a mechanism of regular 
meetings on the highest level functioned and was additionally intensified with 
the founding of the SCO, which gave much more possibilities for meetings. 
Wherefore, although the pro-Western turn of Moscow complicated the inter-
national aspect of relations with Beijing, it did not shake the base of Russia-
China relations. Above all, it didn’t damage well developing economic rela-
tions, which were helped by methods and calm of Putin’s administration, 
which was quite the opposite to Yeltsin’s chaos: the new team in Kremlin was 
more pragmatic and found some understanding on the Chinese side.602 For the 
first time the economy and politics started to be set free from the indirect in-
terdependency: trade perpetually rose and embraced wider and wider areas.  
6. Putin’s Policy of Balancing Powers  
Although it is easy to determine the beginning of the Moscow’s pro-Western 
turn, it is more difficult to establish a definitive finishing date. Without doubt 
it was a gradual process and disillusionment over the West and unfulfilled ex-
pectations towards the USA (poor results of approach towards West and espe-
cially lack of American concession for the Russia in the “near abroad”603, after 
11th September resulted in “closely the same disillusionment” as it happened 
in the times of Yeltsin)604, went hand in hand with the growth of possibilities 
and ambitions of the Russian state on the international scene as a result of the 
rise in oil price – Putin started “building diplomacy of raw materials, especially 
gas.”605 Thanks to high prices of raw materials, Putin made an ambitious at-
tempt to lead out Moscow to the geopolitical chessboard of the world powers, 
in order to get the central position between the West and “the axis of evil” 
countries and between the USA and China. The most important element of this 
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vision was an essential reinforcement and intensification of the Asian vector 
in the foreign policy.606 
The revival of relations with China was the key, so Putin chose to visit Bei-
jing on 1-3 December 2002 in order to “revive the lost impetus of relations 
with China.”607 During his visit he met, among others, Jiang Zemin and Hu 
Jintao, the new leader of the Communist Party (Putin was the first politician in 
this rank who met with him after he took the office). Moreover, his perfor-
mance at the Beijing University was great, he arose students’ enthusiasm, 
which “clearly contrasted with the cold welcome, which was given to earlier 
speaking Bush Junior.”608 Putin’s visit meant above all a beginning of the re-
turn towards a more balanced policy of Moscow, which was best proved by 
the phrase about multipolar world included in the “join announcement” after 
the summit609, that lacked in the treaty from 2001. It openly showed the “be-
ginning of an end” of the pro-Western Putin’s turn and return towards tradi-
tional politics of balancing the West by ensuring good relations with China. At 
that time Russia was able to lead balanced politics, get closer to China, and did 
not go too far from the USA. Soon Russia took an evidently anti-American 
position, which once more pushed the country into the Beijing’s arms – mainly 
because of the war in Iraq. 
Since autumn 2002, the USA, supported by the United Kingdom, led a dip-
lomatic offensive which aimed at gaining consent for using power against Sad-
dam Hussein. Meanwhile, Russia and China continued a campaign for a peace-
ful resolution of the conflict. Russia’s and China’s behaviour in the case of Iraq 
were completely different, although they shared the same position. China, who 
was against the war, remained in the second place, often being silent and trying 
not to expose on a confrontation with the USA. Russia was doing quite the 
opposite: adopted a very active role and together with France and Germany led 
a great campaign against war which led to the open break-up with the USA.610 
For Russia, Iraq meant the end of the bandwagoning strategy, as it did not 
bring any kind of practical value, and the disputes between the USA, Germany 
and France gave a possibility of a return to the old Soviet strategy of dividing 
the West and putting Western Europe and the USA in a dispute. Iraq revealed 
some truths: Russia-American cooperation has got its own limitations, but the 
Bush Jr team did not acknowledge any of the post-Soviet countries as the sole 
sphere of the Moscow’s influence. Since 2003, an anti-Western turn in the 
Moscow’s politics started; its roots came from both the internal situation 
(growing autocracy), and the external factors (promoting democracy in the 
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post-Soviet area). Moreover, Iraq added a new impulse to the Russian-Chinese 
relations, took them out of the shadow, and brought back the basic link-protest 
against the global domination of the USA.  
Geopolitical calculations won above Russia’s fears and anxieties connected 
with the change of the Chinese leadership into the hands of the Hu Jintao 
group. Hu himself chose Moscow as a place of his first visit abroad on 26-28 
May 2003, and in this way dispelled apprehension. The visit was very im-
portant, because it sealed the hitherto political line of Russia-Chinese relations. 
Putin as the host showed deep intuition by organizing for Hu – uncertain and 
not knowing the Russian language – an informal meeting 2+2 together with 
wives on 26 March in Putin’s dacha. With time, the relations of Vladimir Putin 
with Hu Jintao started to be good. More importantly, an attitude towards poli-
tics brought them together. Both of them were realists in international relations 
and their aim was above all to strengthen the power of their countries and in-
fluences. Despite all changes in time, the “individual engagement” of Putin in 
building good relations with China did not change.611 Moreover, in Putin’s pol-
itics towards China more things were actually done than in the times of his 
predecessor – visits finished with signing up economic agreements, important 
businessmen took part in delegations to China – all that proved that Russia was 
very serious about this issue. Russian-Chinese relations, above all the eco-
nomic ones, became “mechanized” – the regularity of meetings and institution-
alized mechanization helped much in mutual relations. Institutional frames of 
bilateral relations built slowly over a decade, brought peace and further coop-
eration. During Putin’s rule the “strategic partnership” became a fact – earlier 
it was mainly rhetoric. In this context, the border issue was solved, moreover, 
it was followed by subsequent actions: opening regions close to the border for 
development and cooperation, institutionalizing political dialogue of high and 
middle rank, developing multisided military cooperation and improvement of 
human to human relations.  
The issue of regulating the borders had a special meaning. It occurred during 
the groundbreaking visit of Putin in Beijing on 14-16 October 2014. Its most 
important result and success was the final regulation of the Russian-Chinese 
border issue.612 A compromise consisted in the division of three last debatable 
islands – forty years lasting negotiation battle, closing a very problematic for 
the last decade issue of the demarcation of the borders. Both sides decided to 
give in –after all Putin decided to negotiate giving back the islands (the very 
issue caused serious resentment in the Russia’s Far East). The Chinese leader-
ship hoped for a greater cooperation with China on the regional issues, and on 
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a positive end of the battle for the pipeline from Angars- Daqing.613 Closing 
up this issue must be considered the personal merit of the Russian President, 
who managed to finish a long and strenuous process. The border issue was a 
Pandora’s Box in the Russian-Chinese relations that was closed by Putin614, 
and by that he probably accomplished even the “biggest success in his foreign 
policy.”615 However, apart from this achievement, the summit was typical for 
Russian-Chinese relations: there was a lot of assurance and elevated words 
with little details.616 Thanks to this visit, the last fundamental problem was 
eliminated, but the game on the Asian board was still going on and the closest 
events complicated the relations.  
Soon after the visit, Russian-Chinese relations started to gather black 
clouds. The first one was sentencing physicist Valentine Danilov for spying 
for the Chinese side617, the second was the visit of Dalai Lama in Russia, which 
was badly received in China618, and the third was the decision of the Russian 
government from 31 December 2004 regarding the ESPO pipeline in favour of 
sale on the Japan route to Skorovodkino and at the expense of the Chinese 
branch to Daqing.619 The chosen route, which was the exemplification of the 
Putin’s geopolitical game in Asia, appeared to give to Russia bigger possibili-
ties, and above all helped to free it from too strong dependence from China in 
Asia. That is why it appeared that this decision was taken against the hitherto 
reassurances of Moscow about realizing the section in Daqing, and it could 
have had very bad consequences for the Russian-Chinese relations. However, 
future showed that it did not happen.  
7. Towards Rapprochement with China 
Since 2005, one can notice the next change in the Russian politics: a renewed 
engagement with China, though a limited and half-hearted one. First reason for 
Moscow’s turn were, traditionally, its relations with the United States and the 
vision of the international order related to them. Washington did not even want 
to think of awarding Russia with the status of a “regional superpower” and to 
give it a special part in the CIS and – to use the Russian-Chinese terminology – 
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it was consequently building hegemonic order in the world, breaching the most 
vivid interests of Russia through the activity of the Western institutions in the 
post-Soviet area, which was shown by supporting “colourful revolutions”, 
treated in the Kremlin as a strategic element to encircle Russia.620 The seem-
ingly everlasting wave of colourful revolutions pushed Putin’s Moscow once 
more to China. Beijing was also more and more worried about the “colourful 
revolutions”, especially the one in Kyrgyzstan which could have caused the 
destabilization of the region and of Xinjiang.  
The next factor resulting in the Russian-Chinese rapprochement was the fact 
that Russia started to pay more attention to China. It suppressed anti-Chinese 
behaviour on the political level, as well as on the psychological level, and 
started to cooperate more with China (on common challenges like war with 
terrorism or international criminality) rather than treat China as a threat (mi-
gration, illegal activity of the Chinese in Russia). In the 2000s decade it became 
possible to build a very important framework of Russian-Chinese political in-
teraction: an institutional infrastructure was established, helping to transfer 
most problems regarding bilateral relations from the political level to the bu-
reaucratic one.621 Trade rose in an impressive way (only in 2005 it grew by 
33%) and the “strategic partnership” was an “important psychological support” 
for Russia, especially taking into account the worsening relations with the 
West622, for example on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War, the main guest was Hu Jintao. Several factors brought to-
gether the leaders of these countries: a more common outlook of Moscow and 
Beijing towards the world situation, which was not like before and not how 
they expected it to be, assertive politics of Bush, continuous military rise in 
Japan, nuclear issue in Korea, or the Taiwan issue.623 A deepening convergence 
of the Russian and Chinese outlook resulted in Russia’s greater engagement in 
Asia. The examples of the new Russian-Chinese assertiveness were visible, 
among others, in the following events: the first meeting of ministers of foreign 
affairs from Russia, China and India in Vladivostok624; the SCO summit in 
Astana, where a decision of accepting India, Pakistan and Iran as observers 
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was taken625; in actions of president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov (pacification 
of Andijan in May 2005) which resulted in the crucial change in Uzbekistan’s 
foreign policy course (which was then Moscow’s and Beijing’s big success in 
the region). Precisely the maintenance of the current regimes in Central Asia, 
and the preclusion of Western interference in that region became another 
strong pillar of the Russian-Chinese growing rapprochement.626 The best 
meaningful example was the part of declaration from this SCO summit where 
the organization called the USA to determine the date of troop retreat from 
Afghanistan.627 
An even stronger signal of deepening cooperation between China and Rus-
sia was given by common military maneuvers – “Peace Mission 2005” in Au-
gust 2005. These were first so important maneuvers of this kind in the history 
of both of them.628 Officially these exercises were called “antiterrorist” maneu-
vers, but even the authors of these words probably did not believe in them. The 
kind of exercised actions – sea invasion, parachute invasion, sea blockades and 
shelling boats by submarines, precise bombardment from strategic bombers – 
clearly testified the main aim: to threaten Taiwan. Islanders and their alliances 
also acted: nearly at the same time maneuvers of the US Pacific Fleet, the Ko-
rean Fleet and ”routine” Taiwanese exercises on resisting invasion from the 
continent were started, so that Russian-Chinese maneuvers were in the epicen-
ter of the “war of words” in Eastern Asia.629 However, in contrast to Beijing, 
which has an obsessive attitude towards Taiwan, Moscow wanted rather to 
make a power demonstration than to threaten somebody (that’s why the exer-
cises were taken from the primary localization vis-à-vis Taiwan to the province 
of Shandong) and to use this occasion to sell guns.630 
However, despite the growing Sino-Russian cooperation, some cracks ap-
peared. During Putin’s meetings with the Chinese prime-minister Wen Jiabao 
in October and November 2005, the Russian leader “continued to stress that 
the two sides should optimize trade structures (meaning that China should pur-
chase more Russian high-tech products)”, while Wen “expressed the hope that 
existing agreements would be well implemented” (meaning: let Russia honour 
its obligations regarding the energy deliveries to China).631 Worse still, on 13 
November 2005 some 100 tons of benzene leaked into the Songhua River after 
an explosion at a chemical plant in China’s Jilin Province, 600 km from the 
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Russian border. Water polluted by some 100 tons of benzene was drifting to-
wards Russia which evoked panic and anti-Chinese campaign on the Russian 
side.632 The Russians accused – correctly – the Chinese of providing not 
enough information and of a delayed reaction633; this gave way to accusations 
of the lack of good will and transparency in the trans- border relations. Alt-
hough Chinese central authorities cooperated with their Russian counterparts 
to an unprecedented level to avoid the worst scenario (it was achieved)634, the 
prime minister Wen wrote to Putin “pledging assistance in dealing with the 
aftermath of the toxic spill” and the local Chinese authorities were held respon-
sible for these actions; this event showed the real face of Sino-Russian relations 
“at the bottom.”635 This ecologic catastrophe was a “a painful reminder that 
high-profile diplomacy is not the only priority between the two powers (…) it 
brought to surface the deeply held distrust and suspicions between the two 
sides, particularly among the Russians.”636 This unfortunate pollution event 
took place on the eve of the official opening of Russia’s Year in China that was 
oficially intended to bring closer both nations but in reality remained “artificial 
steps to arouse interest in each other’s culture.”637 This Russia Year was 
opened by Putin himself during his visit to China on 21-22 March 2006, well-
known for his trip to Shaolin temple. Energy issues dominated the summit: 
Beijing, however, was not able to achieve what it wanted. Although two sides 
have signed an agreement on conducting feasibility study on the 70-km ESPO 
branch line to China, and Putin confirmed that the pipeline will be built, he did 
not mention any date.638 This was a purposeful policy of slowing the pace of 
cooperation, keeping the agreements on paper only and moving back the dead-
lines: “Moscow used the very fact of signing initial agreements with China to 
incite competition among potential Asian customers and to threaten the EU 
member states with the redirection of resource flows to the East; Russia was in 
no hurry to conclude a final deal, being satisfied with endless negotiations.”639 
For the Chinese leadership it “became painfully clear (…) that even the heart-
felt sentiments behind China’s Russian Year won’t result in Siberian oil; (…) 
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the Russian president only talked about Russia’s oil, and did not allow it to 
flow to its energy-starved neighbour”; it was a “grand energy-Politicking.“640 
As the frustrated Chinese National Development and Reform Commission 
Deputy Minister Zhang Guobao, stated: “one moment Russia is saying they 
have made a decision, the next saying that no decision has been made. To date, 
there has been no current information. This is regrettable. Currently, the Sino-
Russian pipeline question is one step forward, two steps back. Today is cloudy 
with a chance for sun while tomorrow is sunny with a chance for clouds, just 
like a weather forecast.”641 
This “oil” coin had two sides, however. On one hand, it enabled Russia to 
maneuver, on the other it made China not interested in changing structure of 
trade. Putin himself complained about “trade irrationality”, but the Chinese 
were unwilling to change it: “In the eyes of the Chinese, the Kremlin has over-
played energy politics, focusing on strategic and political calculation at the 
expense of economic rationality.”642 Besides, it was not so much of a political 
issue, but an economic one – Russian products have been uncompetitive on the 
Chinese market. Russians, being aware of that, pushed to obtain the contracts 
to construct more nuclear power generators in China – the nuclear area “means 
billions of dollars and years of employment for hundreds of workers.”643 That 
is why the issue of the ESPO started to look like a bargain – Moscow wanted 
to get the best possible deal for construction of this branch line. 
The 6th SCO summit in Shanghai was the most important event of the sum-
mer of 2006. It took place on the fifth anniversary of this organization and 
showed its strength.644 In that geopolitical situation, the presence of Iranian 
President Mahmud Ahmedinejad evoked many controversies, as Iran was, 
along with North Korea, a problematic ally for Russia and China. During Ira-
nian and Korean crises, the Russian and Chinese diplomacies actively cooper-
ated with one another, with slight difference in the fact that in Iran Russia was 
more active, whereas in Korea – it was China’s role (this pattern changed only 
after 2009, when China became more active in the Iranian issue).645 Aside of 
Korea and Iran, the most important political event of the summer of 2006 took 
place in St. Petersburg – it was the G8 summit on 15-17 July 2006. G8 had 
been becoming a more and more paradox formula for Russia: “Moscow failed 
in its attempt to be recognized by the West as a fellow democracy, which was 
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supposed to be that club’s common characteristic; nor was Russia recognized 
as a major economic power.”646 That is why it was the presence of “rising 
economies” of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa that saved the 
summit for – more and more criticized in the West – Putin647. A “constructive” 
role of China also helped here – Beijing has returned a favour to Russia which 
denied visa to Dalai Lama one month earlier.648 
Mutual pleasantries did not impact the fundamental issue – economic inter-
ests. Two days after the G8 summit, the CNPC bought shares in Rosnieft worth 
USD 500 million (for the first time in history a Chinese company has bought 
shares in Russian oil sector)649; this price, however, was much lower than the 
speculated one (USDD 3 billion). China’s “cautious and limited entrance into 
the Russian market reflected (…) strong sense of uncertainty about working 
with Russia on the energy issue.”650 Kremlin did not intend to lower Rosneft 
price for China, so Beijing – who still waited for the ESPO branch line – has 
bought much less than it could have. It was clearly visible, therefore, that where 
Russian and Chinese interests converged (geopolitics, military cooperation, re-
gional issues) there they cooperated; where, however, these interests were di-
vergent (energy and its price), there came words only, not actions.  
For China, the ESPO’s fate had remained unclear, while Beijing did not hide 
its displeasure on Russia’s “contradictory attitude” on the energy issue”; for 
Hu Jintao’s team the energy was a vital issue, and Russian energy had its own 
importance here – the Chinese leadership in 2003 has accepted the Northeast 
China programme of development basing on assumption of having the Russian 
energy.651 Moscow’s maneuvering, deference and delaying tactics on the 
ESPO proved particularly painful for Beijing – it all equaled to “breaking a 
promise.”652 Nevertheless, despite being frustrated, Beijing decided that it 
needs to accommodate to the existing conditions. 
Lack of the Russian decision resulted not only from the strategic calcula-
tions, but also from the Russian dissatisfaction with the composition of Sino-
Russian trade and its unsuccessful attempts for getting preferential treatment 
of Russian export of machineries (civilian aircraft, nuclear reactions, hydroe-
lectric turbines)653 – in a way Moscow tried to force China to accept a deal: in 
return for the ESPO branch line, it wanted to increase its machinery export to 
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China. Russians considered that good political relations should be transferred 
for economic preferences. This showed that Sino-Russian relations, contrary 
to US-Sino relations, did not depoliticize, the economy was not separated from 
politics.654 China, however, had no intention to strike a deal with Moscow on 
the Russian terms because Russian products have been uncompetitive on the 
Chinese market. Despite growing volume of trade, there still existed an “im-
balance between ‘hot’ political relations and ‘cold’ economic relations.”655 The 
reason was objective: Russian industrial products are “not the best in the world 
or the most attractive to partner country.”656 Even Russians themselves under-
stood it: “If you do not count military equipment (…) and apart from civil air-
craft (…) and power industry equipment it seems that Russia has nothing to 
boast of”; thus Russia hoped for contracts in civilian nuclear power construc-
tion657; but the Chinese once again have chosen the Western capital.658  
The year 2007 was the “China’s Year” in Russia. Politically, 2007 started 
on 12 January when Russia and China, in their first joint veto in the UN Secu-
rity Council, blocked the resolution against the Burmese junta. Since then, they 
have worked together on many occasions to oppose or water down Security 
Council resolutions that included sanction provisions – “China does not like to 
stand alone to oppose a Security Council resolution.”659  
With 2007 Putin’s Munich Speech, the “new assertiveness” of Russian for-
eign policy came to be visible; it illustrated the growing Russian elites convic-
tion that Russia has regained the great power status.660 China automatically 
became once more important: “growing irritation in U.S.-Russia and Europe-
Russia relations has redounded to the benefit of China-Russia relations.”661 It 
was so despite the fact that China did not intend to back Russia on its protest 
against anti-missile shield (except, naturally, the moral and rhetoric support). 
Beijing let alone did not intend to follow Moscow’s anti-Americanism.662 This 
was visible during Hu Jintao’s visit to Moscow (26-28 March 2007), a tradi-
tionally very grandiose one. In the “joint declaration” after the summit, two 
sides included specific dimensions of this partnership, such as “increasing 
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trust” or “enhancing cooperation economic and security areas.”663 These di-
mensions, although proposed by Hu Jintao, showed the lack of trust on the side 
of the Chinese leadership.664 It happened because of contradictory signals sent 
by Russia. On one hand Moscow has established “China’s Year”, but on the 
other on 15 January 2007 it introduced new migration law that aimed at elim-
ination of foreign nationals as salespersons in Russia’s retail market665.That 
was “a serious blow to the businesses of Chinese in Russia” and “runs counter 
to the goal of (…) bringing ordinary Russians and Chinese closer.”666  
At the same time Beijing wasted no time to realize one of its most important 
goals – to diversify energy supplies and it was able to finalize the Central Asian 
gas pipeline in June 2007. China’s Central Asian gas gambit fundamentally 
strengthened Beijing’s position vis-à-vis Moscow. Since then, the Chinese 
were no longer resting on Russians’ sufferance – they simply deprived Mos-
cow of one of its most important arguments – monopoly on gas supplies. In 
return, the Chinese let Russia save face where it cost them little – on the prop-
aganda level. They agreed to publicize the subsequent Sino-Russian joint mil-
itary exercises (this time in Cheberkal) – it was important for Russia, given its 
strained relations with the West.  
Year 2007 ended with announcement of transition of power in both coun-
tries. On 15 October 2007 Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were included to the 
Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Political Bureau of the 
CPC – this meant that they would be successors of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. 
This was, however, overshadowed by Putin’s announcement of 10 December 
2007 of not biding for the third term and “proposing” the candidate: vice prime 
minister Dmitri Medvedev for the post of the president. Already then many 
commentators speculated that Putin would keep the real power and that he 
would be eligible to be “the successor” of Medvedev as the Russian President 
after Medvedev’s term. The Chinese were as surprised as the Westerners, yet, 
“the Chinese analysis of Putin’s plans to have his cake and eat it, too, were was 
far less cynical and/or sinister than that of the West (…) China seemed cau-
tiously optimistic about future relations.”667  
Medvedev’s failed attempt to modernize the country and his rather pro-
Western approach are not part of this book. What is important in the context 
of Russia-China relations is that Medvedev has continued Putin’s political line 
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in dealing with Beijing. Despite being rather Western-oriented, Medvedev 
chose Beijing as the first place to visit after becoming the president: this was 
warmly welcomed in Beijing – the Chinese remembered well how Putin be-
haved in 2000. Medvedev’s debut visit came in during a difficult moment – 
just after Sichuan earthquake (12 May). These unfortunate circumstances, 
however, played to his benefit – Russia helped China which contrasted with 
Western ambiguous stance.668 Medvedev himself – showing a good knowledge 
of the Chinese culture and philosophy – impressed the hosts. Despite signing 
of a few agreements, the most important issues remained unchanged; never-
theless, “the Beijing summit did inject new energy to improve bilateral rela-
tions.”669  
Soon the good mood in Sino-Russian relations was tested by war in Georgia 
and the world crisis. The war annoyed the Chinese: they saw the conflict as 
“highly destabilising for the international system, and a threat to China’s inter-
ests. Beijing’s preference, as far as US-Russian relations are concerned, re-
mains clear: no collusion and no collision between the two.”670 Beijing did not 
want to damage its relations with Russia, but did not want to jeopardize rela-
tions with the USA either. That is why China kept its traditional distanced671 
and ambiguous672 profile and chose to remain neutral.673 This was most clearly 
seen during the SCO summit in Dushanbe on 28 August 2008 when China, 
backed by Central Asian countries did not recognize South Ossetia and Ab-
khazia and blocked the Russian request to include a statement on the Dushanbe 
Declaration on joint action on security and conflict prevention issues. As a re-
sult, the SCO countries in the Dushanbe Declaration only “express[ed] their 
deep concern in connection with the recent tension around the issue of South 
Ossetia.”674 China’s veto to change borders is completely understandable given 
China’s domestic situation and the Taiwan issue. It is well-understandable for 
Central Asian republics with their artificial state borders, too. None of these 
countries had any interest in supporting Russia. China may understood Rus-
sia’s intentions, but understanding is one thing, while supporting is another. If 
China had supported Russia on Georgia issue, it would have – domestically 
and internationally – too much to loose and too little to win. That is why it 
stayed neutral. This neutrality was not a sign of crisis in Sino-Russian relations, 
but showed its limitations.  
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In general, Sino-Russian relations at the eve of the economic crisis were 
good, yet limited. Slowdown in arms trade (arms sales to the PRC stagnated in 
contrary to the sales to India or Vietnam), barriers to more extensive energy 
ties (Moscow was determined to avoid falling into dependence from China, so 
it stalled joint projects and blocked Chinese investments in energy sector), and 
Russia’s anxiety about cross-border co-operation in the Far East (Moscow 
sought there investments from the Asian states other than China); “taken to-
gether, these policies bore testimony to Moscow’s uneasiness about China’s 
rise and the Kremlin’s hedging strategies against possible negative conse-
quences of Beijing’s increase in power.”675 This mood was best caught by the 
famous “axis of convenience” metaphor.676  
8. The Economic Crisis of 2008 and Its Consequences 
for Bilateral Relations 
The world financial crisis in 2008 influenced noticeably the Sino-Russian re-
lations. The crisis hit Russia hard, lowering its GDP and forcing it to use almost 
a half of its reserve fund. China, on the other hand, managed the crisis well and 
strengthened. The crisis deepened the already existent imbalance between Bei-
jing and Moscow: after that date nobody can doubt that China is “in the driver 
seat in this relationship.”677 Moreover, the crisis deprived Moscow of its best 
card: manipulation of the energy supplies. The autumn of 2008 ended the pe-
riod of Putin’s Bismarckian-style balancing policy, and began a clearly-seen 
process of the gradual asymmetry in favour of Beijing; the asymmetry that 
Moscow accepted and to which it adjusted accordingly. In the wake of 2008 
crisis, Russia “substantially changed its approach to how it co-operated with 
China; contracts and agreements regarding oil, gas and electric energy exports 
were concluded and these were accompanied by the completion of the ESPO 
pipeline (…) arms trade revived; co-operation in the Russian Far East was re-
ignited.”678  
The ESPO pipeline, the flagship Russian project in Asia, became the symbol 
of new realities. Due to the crisis, Rosnieft and Transnieft were unable to find 
sources to finance the project in Western banks – this made further investments 
almost impossible. This is when the Chinese came in with a “brotherly” help. 
They offered loans as pre-payment for further oil supplies transported through 
the Daqing branch line. This is how Russia agreed to build the energy supply 
infrastructure passing to China, and the initial plan of this pipeline was reac-
tivated. It was a breakthrough: not only did the “the longest-running soap opera 
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in oil transportation history end”679, but Russia did not receive any political 
concessions from China. This testified the “emergence of a new model of Sino-
Russian relationship where Russia is the weaker state and China sets the 
agenda.”680 The crisis “altered the political logic underpinning Russia-China 
energy relations (…) the Kremlin could no longer afford to wait”.681 Thus, a 
new – this time real, rapprochement took place and Russia decided to bury its 
grievances and initiated a long-term co-operation with China in the energy sec-
tor (see: economic chapter of this book). Forced by crisis, Russia lost hopes of 
balancing the China’s influence and instead decided to bandwagon to Beijing 
in this matter.  
Despite this breakthrough of political rapprochement, Russia-China rela-
tions were in 2009 overshadowed by social incidents. The beginning of 2009 
in Sino-Russian relations was impacted by the “New Star” ship issue. This 
Chinese cargo vessel (officially under the flag of Sierra Leone), due to misun-
derstandings with Russian trade partner left Nachodka port without permission 
from the Russian authorities and did not stop while being chased by the Rus-
sian Coast Guard; as the result they fired at the ship and damaged it – it started 
returning to Nachodka, but sunk during a storm – 7 staff members were miss-
ing, probably died.682 As Yu Bin writes: “While Russian and Chinese diplo-
mats were publicly trading remarks – a situation rarely seen since 1989 – Chi-
nese media erupted with coverage of the incident (…) Although there were 
plenty of sober analyses, anger, disbelief, and criticism dominated the Chinese 
media (…) For many in China, there was too much unpleasant historical bag-
gage regarding Russia’s use of excessive force against an unarmed Chinese 
civilian ship.”683 The Chinese MFA demanded investigation from the Russian 
side684. Russia expressed “regret” over the incident, but insisted that it was the 
ship’s captain fault.685 A diplomatic stalemate followed – nobody wanted to 
make concession. Finally China did, sacrificing this case on altar of more im-
portant issues: Chinese diplomats stopped raising this issue while Beijing’s 
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police removed the family members of ship staff protesting in front of the Rus-
sian Embassy.686 This incident showed very well that Sino-Russian relations 
have been “hot on top and cold at bottom”.  
The political summits dominated the “hot” political relations in the summer 
of 2009 – first came the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg (14-16 June) followed 
by the first, historical summit of the BRIC, again in Yekaterinburg (16-18 
June) and Medvedev-Hu mini-summit (17 June) in Moscow. The choice of 
Yekaterinburg, situated on the geographic border of Europe and Asia, was 
hardly a coincidence. But it was the historical BRIC summit that drew most 
attention – because it proved that an academic concept became reality. The 
world economic crisis, however, effectively undermined plans for geopolitical 
ambitions. Faced by crisis, the BRIC took “within-the-system” approach” and 
multi-polar world slogans could not conceal the fact that “their economic well-
being in the foreseeable future depends more upon their interactions with the 
developed West than with one another.”687 Moscow scored better with the 
Medvedev-Hu mini-summit that took place on on the eve of the 60th anniver-
sary of the Sino-Russian diplomatic ties. Both presidents praised the history 
and overlooked the thorny late 1950s and 1960s. Hu Jintao, however, is his 
speech called for “trusting each other and treating each other in sincerity” 
which was a clear hint to Cherkizovsky market crisis (see: below.)688 Despite 
its reservations, Beijing traditionally sacrificed this minor issue for the sake of 
more important ones. China backed Moscow on political issues. Both sides 
criticized the U.S. plans for an anti-missile shield, China supported Russian 
actions in Caucasus and announced plans for stronger presence of Russian 
companies on Chinese nuclear energy market; besides, China has granted Rus-
sia USD 700 million loan for Russian Vneshtorgbank.689  
The summer of 2009 in Sino-Russian relations was marked by Moscow’s 
city authorities’ unexpected decision of shutting down Cherkizovsky market 
that was selling smuggled goods; this decision made 60 thousand Chinese 
working there redundant.690 Corruption and lack of observation of the sanitary 
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norms were declared the official reasons, as certainly there was some ground 
for it, if according to approximate estimations, illegal Sino-Russian trade with 
fake Chinese goods was worth a few USD billions per year.691 This, however, 
was only a pretext: Cherkizovski closure was “essentially a clash between rival 
Russian clans, with the Chinese caught in the crossfire.”692 This decision met 
with resonance from China – the Chinese MFA protested while Beijing sent a 
special commission to Moscow that secured Russian consent for returning part 
of the goods to the merchants and declaration for finding a new place for the 
market.693 Although “the actual damage to bilateral economic relations may 
not be significant (…) the psychological and emotional damage and the credi-
bility and reputation of the Russian economic climate, were enormous.”694 So, 
it was again “cold” at bottom in Sino-Russian relations. And “hot” on the top – 
at the same time another “Peace Mission” joint exercise took place. Both Mos-
cow and Beijing simply stopped paying attention to Cherkizovsky market is-
sue – they had more important matters, such as Putin’s visit to Beijing (12-15 
October 2009) during which two sides signed the interim agreement between 
Gazprom and the CNPC; signing this document without indicating gas price 
suggested Moscow’s another round of strategic maneuvering to use its China 
policy as a leverage against Europe.695  
2010 started with Kyrgyzstan crisis, affecting Sino-Russian relations. On 7 
April, a revolt broke up against Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Russia quickly came to 
terms with the new Kyrgyz authorities by granting them loan and sending Rus-
sian troops to Kyrgyzstan; it demonstrated Russian dominant position in Kyr-
gyzstan.696 Against this background, China’s involvement was weak if none. 
Beijing adopted a “wait and see” approach born out of awareness of its limita-
tions. This cost Kyrgyzstan-based Chinese loss of their goods (Chinese shops 
were looted) and Beijing – marginalization in Central Asian affairs.697  
Kyrgyzstan, however, was soon overshadowed by US-Russia “reset”, or 
softer approach to Moscow by Washington’s new administration of Obama, in 
return for concessions on anti-missile shield and cooperation on Iran.698 Russia 
accepted the reset hoping to strengthen its ties with the West in return for help 
in modernization and out of fears of China’s permanent rise and Moscow’s 
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lowered status in the “strategic partnership.”699 Kremlin, too, wrongly assumed 
that Obama made the reset out of weakness; that backfired later on, when mu-
tual misunderstanding caused “reset” to end with a bitterness on both sides.700  
For a while, however, it seemed that US-Russia relations are going to 
change for good. Naturally, revival on Moscow-Washington line threatened to 
weaken Moscow-Beijing ties: “a cloud hung over Sino-Russian relations”.701 
On 13 May 2010, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov declared that “Rus-
sia is ready to assist in resolving the conflict between China and Dalai Lama 
and is interested in normalizing their ties.”702 Dalai Lama issue was sympto-
matic here. It showed Moscow’s sense of strength – in normal circumstances 
the Kremlin is very cautious about not irritating China on Dalai Lama or human 
rights.703 The impact of US-Russia relations was felt on “Yeonpyeong inci-
dent” as well (North Korean bombing of a South Korean island). Russia and 
China approaches were different. Beijing expressed “concern”, but did not 
condemn North Korea704, while Russia warned of “colossal danger” and said 
those behind the attack carried “a huge responsibility.”705 Different Russia’s 
and China’s approaches to the Korean crisis were logical given Korea’s pri-
mary importance for China and only secondary for Russia706. Besides, Moscow 
under the “reset” with the USA softened its stance on anti-Iranian sanctions, 
too, “clearly squeezing China’s strategic space.”707  
Nevertheless, despite its pro-Western leaning, Russia did not harm relations 
with China considerably, this time there was no return to the 2001 situation. 
Moscow did not play the US card in its relationship with China and avoided 
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making a choice in growing US-China competition in East Asia. The US-Rus-
sia reset did not become a “game changer” – “Moscow’s closer relations with 
the US have not contributed to a slowdown in co-operation with China (…) the 
peak of the reset (2009-2011) was accompanied by Russia increasing its ties 
with China (it embraced new areas at the height of the reset), the importance 
of the US factor in Russia-China relations turned out to be decreasing.”708 Rus-
sia-China cooperation continued on a standard basis. In 2010, “Peace Mission” 
took place; Putin himself opened the ESPO branch to Daqing in August, 
Medvedev, while visiting China, supported Beijing in its anti-Japanese histor-
ical policy and opened the Russian pavilion on the Shanghai EXPO; finally, in 
2010 China became Russia’s largest trade partner in 2010.709  
2011 started with the “Arab Spring” and its implications. Here, good Sino-
Russian ties were overshadowed by Russia’s turn on Libya. At the beginning 
of Libyan conflict both Moscow and Beijing had similar stance – they did not 
vetoed the UN resolution No. 1973.710 What they differed in, were political 
goals: Moscow hoped to become an arbitrator in this conflict and could not 
allow itself to veto the resolution and antagonize Western countries.711 Beijing 
since the very beginning was much more skeptical about Western plans; when 
it was abandoned by Russia, however, it chose the “lesser evil” scenario: to 
resign from vetoing and thanks to it not being criticized in the West (and in the 
Arab world). Russia’s stance raised Chinese resentments: from Chinese elites’ 
perspective “Moscow did not inform Beijing of its decision to change course” 
which, combined with Russia’s mounting arms sales to Vietnam led to growing 
criticism of Russia by the Chinese in the internet under the label “Russia has 
never been reliable.”712 When it became clear that Western air-strikes are in 
fact a partial involvement in the crisis, and when Russian proposal for arbitrage 
was rejected (the West chose “regime change” instead of striking deals with 
Gaddafi), Moscow changed its position once again. Russia joined China, to-
gether opposing further air-strikes and accusing the West of manipulation and 
misinterpretation of the resolution No. 1973.713 Naturally, Russian reaction had 
nothing to do with care for international community – it was simply a revenge 
for being put aside of designating Libya’s future. Libyan conflict aftermath 
became clearly visible after two years, in 2013, when during Syrian conflict 
Moscow and Beijing, remembering bad experiences with Libya, presented a 
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much more firm stance in support for President Assad.714 On more conceptual 
basis, after the Western intervention, “Russia and China embraced a consistent 
policy gearing towards preventing any form of Western interference in the 
Arab Revolutions; the international community, according to Russia and 
China, should offer ‘constructive assistance’ to states undergoing revolution-
ary turmoil.”715 
Russia could not agree with China on the gas issue – two sides were not able 
to fix the price during Hu Jintao’s visit to Moscow in June 2011, nor during 
Putin’s re-visit to Beijing in October 2011 (it was his only foreign visit during 
the election campaign). The price remained the most important obstacle. Gaz-
prom demanded the EU-style price, Beijing wanted it much cheaper. China’s 
position was hardened by opening of the Central Asian gas pipeline. Russia 
and China could not agree on Daqing branch line oil price, either. On the other 
hand, during Putin’s visit the first ever memorandum of the “economic mod-
ernization” was signed.716 Moscow indicated desire “to acquire technology 
from China in areas such as high-speed rail transport, the shipbuilding industry 
and alternative energy sources”; The question whether “Russia’s efforts to in-
volve China in its modernisation process” meant genuine recognition of Chi-
nese success or whether it was “a signal to the West that Western countries 
need not be the sole source of technology and capital” remained open.717 2011 
ended up with parliamentary elections to Russian Duma (4 December) and 
protests which did not threaten Putin’s power (yet). Chinese reaction was tra-
ditionally a calm one: Beijing simply congratulated Putin upon his victory.718  
9. The US Pivot to Asia and Its Impact on Sino-Russian Relations 
China, threatened by the US pivot to Asia in 2011, vigorously started to prevent 
it – this is particularly true in case of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders.719 
For Sino-Russian the US pivot meant one important thing: it influenced, inten-
sified and warmed political relations between Moscow and Beijing. This was 
possible thanks to cooling Russia-USA relations, too. For Russia “once the 
reset began to lose momentum from 2011, old habits of geopolitical balancing 
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returned; the traditional nexus of difficulties with Washington equating to en-
hanced engagement with Beijing reemerged.”720 Thus, “the inconspicuous fad-
ing away of the rest coincided with gradual deterioration of China-US relation 
(…) effectively Russia and China have found themselves on the same side vis-
à-vis USA”, thus China and Russia became “’united in assertiveness.’”721  
This time it was China which initiated this rapprochement – endangered by 
Washington from the south and the east, China wanted to secure itself from the 
north. So, the American factor again influenced Sino-Russian relations. Mos-
cow and Beijing united in opposition against Washington’s policy: “they have 
been able to count on each other’s ‘positive neutrality’; Russia and China have 
refrained from criticizing each other in international forums and from support-
ing Washington’s position.”722 What is important, however, is that political 
rapprochement did not translate into Chinese economic concessions. Finally, 
the results of this new rapprochement began to be clearly visible not at once. 
Before they materialized, two sides had to deal with domestic political prob-
lems.  
2012 was a difficult year for Russian and Chinese leadership alike. Putin, 
victorious after the elections of 4 March 2012, had to deal with mass protests 
(under the leadership of Alexey Navalny who became popular after an anti-
corruption campaign against the ESPO maladministration). Chinese leader-
ship, on its turn, was shaken by the Bo Xilai case – a political and criminal 
scandal.  
These political storms did not influence the bilateral relations. Year 2012 
politically started for Russia and China on 4 February, when Moscow and Bei-
jing jointly vetoed the UN Security Council resolution calling for Syrian Pres-
ident Bashar al-Assad to step down.723 At the same time, Russia and China sent 
their special envoys to Syria breaking the diplomatic isolation of Damascus. 
Russian and Chinese stance on Syria showed how these countries learned the 
“Arab Spring” lesson: these policies by Moscow and Beijing “were directly 
shaped by the Libyan experience where Russia and China registered huge 
losses due to their too conciliatory approach toward the West.”724  
During Putin’s reelection in March 2012, Beijing as usually accepted the 
reality: Hu Jintao congratulated Putin and emphasized that China “firmly sup-
ports Russia’s choice of its own development path according to its national 
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conditions”725 which was a clear hint to the Western protests. Even a better 
proof of Chinese recognition came with deputy prime minister Li Keqiang’s 
visit to Moscow (26-30 April 2012); Li was the first foreign dignitary to visit 
Putin after his re-election. This meeting must have been very interesting: 
“Putin was described as looking into Li’s eyes and taking careful notes while 
listening to Li’s remarks, something that Putin never did before in his meetings 
with other dignitaries. The Li-Putin talks were stretched from one hour to al-
most two hours; Li reportedly quoted Confucius words, ‘Promises must be kept 
and actions must be executed.’”726 Li Keqiang’s visit took place during joint 
maritime exercises on the Yellow Sea (22-27 April 2012) – the largest bilateral 
exercises and – for China – the largest with any foreign navy.727 The message 
they conveyed was strictly a political one, let alone that those were only Sino-
Russian state exercises; these implications strengthened after Putin’s visit to 
China in June 2012 (Putin in his third presidential term visited China quite late, 
as the forth country only) – in the joint declaration both sides emphasized the 
military cooperation.728  
On 16 July 2012, an incident occurred on the Japan Sea – the Russian Bor-
der Guard vessel “Dzerzhinsky” has seized the Chinese ship under the accusa-
tion of poaching on Russian territorial waters. The Chinese MFA expressed 
“deep dissatisfaction” due to this fact729, but two sides were able to cover this 
incident up so that it did not follow the 2009 New Star example and did not 
deteriorate the mood of Sino-Russian relations.  
The summer of 2012 was marked by Sino-Japanese disputes over Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands that led to an outburst of nationalism and mass protests in 
China. Similar story, though on lesser scale, happened with Japan-South Ko-
rean disputes over Takeshima-Dokdo. The island issue – being number 1 in 
2012 in Asia – did not influence Sino-Russian relations yet. However, another 
event impacted them, a bit overshadowed globally, but noticed in Russia – a 
Chinese vessel “Xuelong” (Snow Dragon) crossing the Arctic Ocean. “Xue-
long” was the first Chinese ship that made it – it symbolized China’s growing 
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interest in the Arctic (because of the need to exploit the natural resources and 
use the new transportation route – the Northern Sea Route)730; that is why 
China called itself a “near-Arctic state.”731 China’s actions were quickly noted 
in Moscow for which the Arctic, with its resources and sea transport has been 
becoming one of the most important fields of political activity732. Russia did 
not like the Chinese attempts to enter the “great game on the Arctic.”733 When 
Xuelong crossed the Northern Sea Route, Russia started maritime exercises in 
this region. Quite coincidently, exactly when the Chinese icebreaker crossed 
the straits near Sakhalin, Russia decided to test whether its anti-ship missiles 
worked….734  
The most publicized event in Sino-Russian relations in the second part of 
2012 was the APEC summit in Vladivostok. Putin made Hu Jintao, who was 
about to leave the post of the PRC Chairman, the first speaker at the APEC 
summit and the first leader to meet Putin on a separate meeting. Hu in his turn 
has called Putin his “respected old friend”735 and summarized Sino-Russian 
relations by outlining such tasks as “deepen strategic mutual trust”, or “coop-
erate in investment to elevate both the quantity and quality of bilateral eco-
nomic relations” which may be interpreted as a lack of satisfaction from Sino-
Russian relations and a call for its improvement.736 Also prime minister Wen 
Jiabao said goodbye to Russia with his last trip to Moscow (6-7 December 
2012). Again, he stressed the need to develop economic relations which meant 
that the Chinese side was not fully satisfied with them.737  
10. Xi Jinping and the Intensification of Sino-Russian Relations 
Changes in the Chinese leadership did not lead to a substantial evolution of 
Chinese policy towards Russia. Xi Jinping with his assertive foreign policy 
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under the banner of the “Chinese dream” de facto continued the previous pol-
icy towards Moscow, though he intensified the political relations and was more 
eager to “grant Moscow face” in public. This, however, did not transfer to eco-
nomic concessions. 
During Xi’ first foreign visit to Moscow (made on the way to Africa) on 22 
March 2013 both sides emphasized their close ties. The Russians appreciated 
this gesture: there were a lot of fanfares and solemn voices emphasizing Rus-
sia’s great power status.738 All this served to cover up the basic fact that Xi’s 
trip was nothing but the Chinese protocol’s response to Putin’s last year trip. 
More importantly, Xi went to Russia on the way to Africa – his most important 
destination.739 This is how the Chinese showed the skill of their diplomacy – 
they covered up Xi’s visit to Africa by his trip to Russia; they gei mianzi – 
“granted face” – to Moscow and sent signal to the West.  
Nevertheless, of course, the visit was very important. His visit was packed 
with 20 meetings covering a wide range of topics, mostly on political and eco-
nomic issues – the parties were debating on how to develop economic sphere; 
this was reflected in the “joint statement” which strikingly stated “a strategic 
task of translating high level political relationship into more tangible benefits 
for both sides.”740 Russia, who has long “been seeking to create a more solid 
economic foundation for its relationship with Beijing” still could not find “any 
real cause for satisfaction in this area” – “although the volume of trade has 
increased (…) its structure is still unfavorable to Russia, which exports almost 
exclusively raw materials to China, and in return imports manufactured 
goods.”741 The summit saw signing of 35 agreements and memoranda – some 
important (on banking and energy, including the documents that would smooth 
the supplies of energy to Russia; most of the memoranda were financed by 
Chinese banks which meant that China agreed for prepayment of Russian oil 
and gas); some less important, if not almost humoristic (on protecting migrat-
ing birds or cooperation in rabbit breading).742 Despite impressive number of 
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agreements, “most of them were just framework agreements or non-binding 
memoranda of cooperation.”743 
Another focus of the Sino-Russian summit were global affairs. For China, 
the “world order is marked by interdependence and instability (…) many 
alarming signs: the US pivot to Asia, crises in Korea, tensions in the East and 
South China Seas, uncertainties surrounding the situation in Afghanistan, and 
disagreement over the Iranian nuclear program, as well as the deepening civil 
war in Syria (…) Normalcy in relations with Russia is an island of stability in 
an increasingly chaotic situation.”744 That is why in the joint-statement both 
sides emphasized a “new type of great-power relationship” based on “princi-
ples of equality” or “mutual trust.”745 The goal of phrases like this was quite 
clear: “to demonstrate complete political harmony on global and regional is-
sues between Russia and China, in order to strengthen the two countries’ posi-
tion towards the United States, and in the case of Russia, towards Europe 
also.”746  
The return of this kind of assertive rhetoric, so characteristic for Sino-Rus-
sian relations in the 1990s and the early 2000s was associated with the US 
pivot to Asia. Faced by this challenge, China arranged a public rapprochement 
with Russia which Xi’ visit best demonstrated: “China feels that a clash with 
the United States in inevitable, so through rapprochement with Russia they 
formalize an ally.”747 Russian and Chinese commentators emphasized the per-
sonal relations factor – Xi and Putin were supposed to find a common lan-
guage, while Putin made some remarkable gestures towards Xi (Putin was said 
to accompany Xi for eight consecutive hours in Moscow, which was unprece-
dented in Russian protocol, and invited Xi, as the first foreign head of state to 
visit the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Command Center of the Russian 
Armed Forces). Xi knew how to win Russian hearts – before the visit he orga-
nized leaks to the press that he has been brushing up on his Russian and even 
has been practising a recital of Russian poetry in front of confidantes while 
during the visit he quoted 19th century Russian philosopher and revolutionary 
Nikolay Chernyshevsky.748 
The summit was quickly covered up by information about another North 
Korean crisis – Pyongyang again made nuclear test. During the summit, Russia 
and China have condemned the test and supported the UN resolution of 7 
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March, condemning this move.749 Nevertheles, they both protested against fur-
ther sanctions on Pyongyang. North Korean actions put Russia and China in “a 
diplomatic and strategic dilemma”; they had to admit that “nobody can influ-
ence the North Korean, not even China (it is a) brave new game of 21st century 
geopolitics, in which the ‘shrimp’ teases the ‘whales’”; from Moscow and es-
pecially Beijing’s perspective the worst was that “Korean crisis is being ex-
ploited by Japan to shake off the decades - long constitutional constraints im-
posed by the US.”750 
In the summer 2013, Sino-Russian relations were unexpectedly tested by 
the Edward Snowden story. China must have consulted Russia before agreeing 
for Snowden’s flight from Hong Kong to Moscow751. The Russians played this 
game brilliantly. In public they showed how dissatisfied they were with having 
this problem (Putin called him in public “an unwanted Christmas present”752), 
in private they must have been delighted for getting such an useful idiot that 
was a PR catastrophe for the United States. The Chinese appreciated Russian 
skillfulness: they “seemed thrilled and amused at Russia’s handling of the dif-
ficult, outsourced issue (…) described Russia’s handling of the Snowden case 
(…) as highly skillful, extremely graceful and sophisticated (…) almost flaw-
less allowing Putin to turn this troublesome issue into a bargaining chip with 
the US – a burden into an opportunity for strengthening Russian national in-
terests (…) For all of this (…) Russia is China’s strategic partner and deserves 
China’s respect, and that China had a lot more to learn from Russia.”753  
The Chinese were certainly learning from Russians in what the latter are the 
best – fighting.Two mass joint exercises took place in the summer of 2013: 
“Joint Sea” drills and another “Peace Mission”. These exercises were under-
stood in the context of growing tensions between China and its neighbours on 
disputed island and Sino-Japanese rivalry: as one Chinese commentator put it: 
“it would help China break through the encirclement by Japan and the United 
States in the region.”754 The Chinese even heated up the atmosphere when their 
five ships, after returning from joint drill with Russians, sailed through Soya 
(La Perouse) Strait, east of Sakhalin and west of Japan Japan and the USA 
responded by conducting joint maritime exercises on Hokkaido, on a much 
bigger scale (the US and Japanese capabilities are far ahead of the Chinese 
ones).755 As for Russia, these exercises were seen “as a stabilizing influence in 
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addition to strengthening the relationship; Moscow was (…) essentially taking 
a time-out when problems are more prevalent in Russian-American relations 
than their isolated points of cooperation in different regions of the world.”756  
Public attention concentrated on the joint exercises, was supposed to turn 
attention from another important fact – the unexpected and last-minute Russian 
own exercises in the Eastern Military District on the borderline with China (12-
20 July); the largest drills after the USSR’s fall.757 This unexpected event must 
have had something to do with the Chinese demonstration on La Perouse 
Strait – although the Chinese ships were sailing on international waters, this 
Chinese show of strength for the Russians was like a red rag to a bull.758 They 
immediately started exercises, probably to show the Chinese their place. Bei-
jing was informed about the drills only hours before it started and through nor-
mal channels, although “according to an agreement with China of 1996 
(Shanghai Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Border Re-
gion), Russia is obliged to notify China prior (in certain instances, 30 days) to 
the start of exercises within the 100-km zone of the Russian-Chinese border”; 
although Beijing was irritated, it swallowed this bitter pill, hoping for arms 
contracts to be finalized.759 
The second half of 2013 was dominated by the Syrian issue. Bashar al-As-
sad regime has used chemical weapons on 21 August, while Obama, unwilling 
to make an intervention, tried to secure international backing first and – when 
it failed – used a trick: although he did not have to, he asked the Congress to 
authorize an attack on Syria; Congress on its turn did not put this issue on 
agenda. Throughout the crisis, the United States and other Western states found 
themselves on the other side of the barricade than Russia and China. Moscow 
and Beijing have many times blocked anti-Assad resolutions in the UN, while 
Xi Jinping supported Putin during the G20 summit in Petersburg. It was Mos-
cow, however, which took the lead as the global protector of Assad regime – 
it was Putin who prevented the American intervention and overthrow of Assad. 
China appreciated again Putin’s actions by calling them an “outstanding per-
formance” and saying that Syrian crises show than Russia is “an important 
balancer for the world today.”760 It’s hard to be surprised by Chinese enthusi-
asm: using another country to question American global leadership remains 
the dreamed scenario for Beijing. But the Chinese elites were delighted by 
something more: “Putin’s Russia did not exercise its power but simply reacted 
to a grave situation with its geostrategic instinct when facing a brief window 
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of opportunity”761. This appraisal was unsurprising, given the fact that the Chi-
nese always admired professionalism, efficiency and mastery.  
Putin celebrated his successes on his sixtieth birthday (7 October) on the 
APEC summit in Bali. The host, Indonesian President Yudhoyono played a 
guitar while signing Happy Birthday to Putin762. The atmosphere must have 
been even more cozy during celebration with Chairman Xi – this is where their 
amity is supposed to have started. The leaders discussed military-technical co-
operation, arms sales and joint exercises, while President Xi called 2013 “a 
year of a rich harvest in our relations.”763  
Rich harvest did not mean that Russians lost their hopes for intensifying 
their activity in Asia. Moscow, knowing that the ultimate fate of the “Russian 
pivot” depends on making Russia independent from China in Asian policy, put 
on three cards: Japan, Vietnam and South Korea. With Japan, everything 
seemed to be going into the direction of a political thaw, but the Ukrainian 
crisis made it impossible. With Vietnam it ended as always – arms sales only 
(Hanoi still objects returning of the Russian navy). As for South Korea, its 
President Park Guen-Hye (now impeached) did not accept Russian proposals 
for trans-Korean investments.764 Although Russia tried to distance itself from 
China, so far it failed. Russia’s position is Asia remains weak. Even such ben-
eficial opportunity as the US pivot to Asia did not help Moscow – it even de-
creased its place for maneuver: “So far, Moscow has not built lasting political 
or economic ties with any other countries in the region, and so its plans to 
redress the current imbalance have been little more than a series of empty po-
litical declarations (…) Russia’s economic ties with China are not balanced by 
similar trade deals with other regional partners”; moreover “Moscow’s ambi-
tions to take on a more significant international role in the region are being 
hampered by the country’s internal problems, particularly the economic under-
development which is endemic across Russia’s Far East” – this all lead to a 
conclusion that “Russia remains a minor actor in the region’s political and eco-
nomic order, and the likelihood of significant changes in Moscow’s favour re-
mains low.”765 Therefore, it is rather China which uses Russia in Chinese 
games with the USA rather than Moscow playing the US pivot off against 
China.  
A hidden competition with China was emerging in a much more important 
region for Russia – in Central Asia. Moscow was initially skeptical about Xi 
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Jinping’s New Silk Road Economic Belt, announced during his visit to Ka-
zakhstan.766 Although China has proclaimed “rejecting imperialist mentality”, 
regarding its Central Asia policy and “seeking normal, win-win exchange” 
with others”, it wasn’t convincing, let alone for Moscow. Its reaction came at 
once: Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov said that “Russia and China are 
not competing for influence in Central Asia” and added that “our Chinese 
friends recognize the traditional role our country continues to play in this re-
gion, so we do not see any regional rivalry problems.”767 This announcement 
must be interpreted by the classical Soviet way – a rebours – the more official 
statement rejects rivalry, the more it proves that this rivalry is well and alive. 
Actions followed words: after Russian pressure, Kyrgyzstan rejected the idea 
of Chinese railway which meant that “having lost its monopoly over Central 
Asia’s gas export, Moscow apparently drew the red line in Central Asia to avert 
China’s railroad projects.”768  
Hidden competition in Central Asia did not influence the bilateral rela-
tions – the beginning of 2014 was very good for Sino-Russian relations. It 
started from announcement that Xi Jinping – as the first ever Chinese presi-
dent – would take part in the Sochi Olympics opening ceremony. His presence, 
along with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, politically saved the summit 
for Russia – the absence of Western leaders made the Sochi Olympics “the 
more politicized than any other Games in recent history.”769  
From the Chinese perspective, Western criticism on Russia “when there had 
been no major problems” showed that “the West was selfish, narrow-minded, 
and with little tolerance of others” (…) Perhaps “this was the way the West has 
sought to settle the ‘final account’ with Putin for his unhelpful behaviour re-
garding Syria and the Snowden affair.”770 Western diplomatic “quasi-boycott” 
made Chinese and Japanese presence even more important.771 Xi’s visit to So-
chi was his second after becoming president – this time Xi did this to “save 
Putin’s face”. During their meeting, the leaders agreed on joint celebration of 
the end of the WWII anniversary (a hint on Japan), while Xi “invited” Putin to 
join the “New Silk Road Economic Belt”. This was a clear message: public 
support for Russia (Xi’s arrival to Sochi) in return for accepting the Chinese 
policy in Central Asia and Beijing’s anti-Japanese political history. It is hard 
to tell whether the offer was accepted, because it was soon overshadowed by 
the Ukrainian crisis.  
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11. Ukrainian Crisis and China-Russia Relations  
Dramatic events in Ukraine were another factor in the China-Russia Relations. 
In the crisis, the position of China was essential for Russia. China kept “kind 
(or benign, or sympathetic, or friendly) neutrality” towards Moscow. In order 
to maintain Beijing’s favour and above all “secure strategic rear”, Vladimir 
Putin concluded a huge gas contract with China in May 2014. 
Since the beginning of the protests, China kept distance and even treated the 
whole situation as a potential opportunity for itself. However, the dramatic de-
terioration of the situation in February 2014 brought China into an uncomfort-
able situation – for Beijing both relations with the West and with Russia are 
very important. From the Chinese perspective, one should not stand for any 
side and remain neutral as long as possible. The Russian annexation of Crimea 
was to surprise Beijing – this Russian action resulted in Beijing falling into an 
“Ukrainian trap”. The way in which Beijing got out of the trap once again 
proved Chinese diplomatic capabilities. In the surrounding conflict, Beijing 
decided to maneuver, not to take a stand and hide behind Russia. From the 
Chinese point of view, the best solution from the “Ukrainian dilemma” was a 
“studied ambivalence”, or even “strategic ambivalence.”772 
 A tangible proof for Chinese neutrality was that Beijing abstained from 
voting during the ballot on condemnation of Crimea referendum at the Security 
Council of the United Nations (it was blocked by Russia). According to its 
strategy, China in the beginning phase of the crisis assumed a position of a 
player standing on the side and observing the ongoing conflict – as the Chinese 
rule tells: zuo shan guan hu dou, which means “Sitting on a hill watching two 
tigers fight”. It was possible because of an impression of chaos: the following 
Chinese communicates instead of clarifying, brought less light to the Chinese 
position, which was consentient with the Beijing’s intention.773 However, 
along with the development of the Ukrainian crisis, and above all with the im-
position of Western sanctions, the Chinese neutrality changed into a “kind neu-
trality” towards Russia. 
It happened because of a couple of reasons. First of all, the Chinese imple-
mented their other maxim, which is a Chinese equivalent to ours “divide and 
rule”- yi yi zhi yi which roughly means: “fight off one barbarian by another”. 
In this specific case it meant to support the weaker – thus Russia, but not as 
much as to antagonize the West. From the Beijing’s perspective, the Russian 
action was not praiseworthy, but less damaging than the American backup for 
Maidan (considered as a a Western-led conspiracy which overthrew the legal 
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government, similarly to “color revolutions.”)774 The Russian annexation of 
Crimea, thus a violation of the territorial inviolability, was after all the lesser 
evil than the seizure of power by Maidan, as a result of overthrow of a legal 
government. China supported Russia, but in a way noticeable to win Russia’s 
“gratitude” (and to empower itself vis-à-vis Moscow) and not significantly, as 
not to spoil the relations with the West. China called for “Ukraine’s stability, 
economic development, and social harmony”; a key missing word in this state-
ment was “sovereignty.”775 It was characteristic, because China usually stands 
its ground in the terms of sovereignty defence, however at that moment per-
sisting in “sovereignty” would place China on the Western side of the barri-
cade, and as a matter of fact on the side against Russia, which stocked to the 
“law of nation self-determination”. Next reason for this slight lean towards 
Russia was of an internal nature. The situation in Ukraine influenced the Chi-
nese imagination: vision of chaos, irrationality and extreme emotions leading 
to downfall and break-up776 inscribed perfectly into the most negative arche-
type of chaos (luan) in the Chinese political culture – the absolute worst pos-
sible scenario, which can only be withheld by a strong power. When they ob-
served Ukraine, the Chinese political elites saw in their mind’s eye this sce-
nario in their own country, if the power of the CPC fell. In such a situation, a 
natural reaction of the Chinese elites was to support the party who offered a 
hope for calming the situation down and bringing peace with arbitrary methods 
(in such situation everything is allowed). For the Chinese elites this was mainly 
Russia. 
 The “kind neutrality” of Beijing met with Russian gratitude, if not to say 
with enthusiasm. Putin thanked China for support in an emotional way.777 It 
seems that Russian reaction was on one hand a political calculation (showing 
the Chinese support as something more important than it was in the reality), 
and on the other hand a proof of the importance of psychological factor in the 
Russian politics: Russians, who often operate with the extremes, felt that in the 
groundbreaking moment the Chinese supported them. However, the Chinese 
position primary resulted from reserved calculation of its own interest. Limited 
conflict between the West and Russia was and still is beneficial for Beijing. 
Crisis tied the USA to Europe, and at the same time diverted (at least partially) 
their attention from the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, according to reasoning 
in Taoism, in which even in the worst possible situation one can find positive 
accents, China saw advantage in the Russian annexation of Crimea. Smart sei-
zure of the peninsula created an interesting, and possible casus for the future 
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game for Taiwan and in disputes on the South China Sea.778 Above all, the 
crisis strengthened the Chinese position, quite the opposite as happened in case 
of Russia – it narrowed down strategic field of Russia (“it guaranteed, that for 
a long time Russia will be China’s safe and strategic backside”).779 Moreover, 
the Western sanctions led to a situation in which from the Russian perspective, 
China’s relevance rose, as it is the only one important world’s economy, that 
did not join sanctions. That caused a greater dependence of Russia from China 
as a source of independent funding: “A Chinese phrase for this is xingzai lehuo, 
or to take delight in other’s misfortunes (sometimes translated into German as 
Schadenfreude). Despite the sympathies it has expressed, it is likely China 
feels itself better off for the suffering in Ukraine.”780. 
Certainly the repercussions of crisis strengthened China vis-à-vis Russia, 
which became perfectly apparent during the visit of Vladimir Putin between 
19-20th of May in 2014 in Shanghai. Although the visit was prepared earlier, 
its time coincided with the Ukrainian crisis, which resulted in the fact that ge-
opolitics casted a complete shadow over this meeting – for Moscow it was im-
portant to display this meeting as a turning point in the relations, and as a true 
beginning of “Russian turn towards Asia”. A symbol of this turn and the most 
important moment of the visit was of course signing up of the gas contract. 
Putin arrived to the summit politically weakened due to a couple of reasons. 
Mainly, it was because of Ukraine – after the Western sanctions Putin wanted 
to demonstrate that “Russia is not alone” and that it has a couple of important 
partners somewhere else: “what mattered most to Putin was signaling to the 
United States and Europe that Russia was strategically independent, would not 
be intimidated by the imposition of sanctions, and possessed powerful 
friends.”781 Thus, Russia wanted this deal much more than China did. How-
ever, Russian position was also weaker due to long-term economic causes – 
shale gas revolution, increasing significance of the LNG in the world, as well 
as vivification of the European plans on lowering the dependence from Russia. 
All these features changed the balance of power in energy suppliers (Russia) 
and consumers to the benefit of the latter.782 
Beijing made use of their supremacy. First it “waited out” Putin: first day it 
did not agree upon Russia’s conditions and send controlled leaks to newspa-
pers, that the contract will not be concluded. Putin was so desperate he was 
even going to ask Jiang Zemin for support. The Chinese side laid down hard 
bargain and held on to it: low price (around 350-380 USD for 1000m3 vis-à-
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vis Russian proposition 400 USD), and above all, the energetic investments on 
Siberia and the Russian Far East783. Gas pipeline is to be built on the Chinese 
debt – the price and fee mechanism is constructed in such a way that the Chi-
nese de facto pay for the infrastructure – and will be responsible for it. This 
gives China huge possibilities of influence on Siberia – a transformation it into 
raw material base for China’s development. 
The summit full of fanfares lasted two days and was a huge political demon-
stration. It was connected with the Chinese-Russian maneuvers ongoing 
nearby. The summit finished with signing up forty-six agreements and memo-
randa784. However, “most of them are non-binding memoranda, letters of in-
tent, or framework contracts”785: “In normal circumstances these documents 
wouldn’t have reached the leaders’ desks. This stack may have been meant to 
impress others.”786 That is why, gas contract aside, “economic results of the 
summit are at best modest”. The summit’s economic results well reflect “the 
structural problems in the economic relations between China and Russia (…) 
the two states’ economic cooperation is based on a ‘semi-colonial’ model of 
simple trade exchange, under which Russia nearly exclusively sells China raw 
materials and imports mainly industrial products from China.”787 Signing up a 
contract had above all a political meaning. Political facade of the summit was 
also emphasized by the “joint statement”, which was similar to the summit – 
only a relative Russia’s success and an evident success of China.788  
Russia obtained only a partial support from China (in the case of sanctions 
and the Russian critique of the Western actions in Ukraine), but not in the key 
issues for Russia, like federalization of Ukraine and neutrality, or condemna-
tion of the Kiev government. “Putin did not obtain a full and explicit support 
from the side of «strategic partner»”; in the case of central Asia declaration 
was a compromise – Moscow managed to get Beijing’s support for the idea of 
the Eurasian Union and assurance of respectfulness towards Russian business, 
but it had to acknowledge the Chinese “Silk Road.”789 To sum up these con-
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siderations, one can add that China supported Russia there, where it was com-
fortable and beneficial from the perspective of their own business, and there, 
where it cost little – and nowhere else. 
Generally the summit finished with the real success of China and relative, 
above all image-building success of Russia. This success was absolutely nec-
essary for Russia, which was ready to pay a high price for signing up the gas 
deal. This is indicated by the words of Putin himself, who told that “Chinese 
are very serious negotiators”, who “drank quite a bit of our blood during the 
negotiations.”790 On the other hand, the fact that gas prices soon fall down 
might indicate that it wasn’t completely a bad deal for Russia.  
Although Russian commentators announced programmatic optimism and 
highlighted the summit success and “equal conditions”791, some of them like 
Dmitri Trenin admitted that China was the one who benefited mostly: “it will 
reshape and rebalance Eurasia, whose center of gravity will now move from 
Moscow to Beijing (…) such an outcome would certainly benefit China, but it 
will give Russia a chance to withstand U.S. geopolitical pressure, compensate 
for the EU’s coming energy re-orientation, develop Siberia and the Far East, 
and link itself to the Asia-Pacific region.”792 Thus, its importance can only be 
compared to “Moscow’s opening to Western Europe in the late 1960s.”793 One 
does not need to add that China is the biggest winner of this situation: “Putin, 
like a gambler, leaves his ancestral silver in a Chinese pawnshop to play for 
higher stakes with the West.”794 
12. Embracing One Belt One Road:  
The Recent Sino-Russian Relations 
Events that took part after mid 2014, strengthened Russia’s isolation in the 
West and enhanced Russia’s turn to the East or to be precise to China. The 
shooting down of the Malaysian plane, the intensification of Russian activity 
in Ukraine and the following Western sanctions (which strongly hit the Rus-
sian financial sector, which soughed help in China or Singapore) hindered or 
even deprived for some time Moscow of the pro-Western option. This resulted 
in further weakening of Russia vis-à-vis China – Moscow “had fallen into the 
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arms of Beijing” and starting becoming a raw material addition for China.795 
Nevertheless, Russia decided to bandwagon to China and embrace its flagship 
project: One Belt One Road. 
Russian analysts see Sino-Russian asymmetry similarly, yet in a different 
light. Although they acknowledge limited place of maneuver and feel the rap-
prochement with China forced by the Western actions, they put it in the longer 
perspective. According to Dmitri Trenin, “the epoch of post-communist Rus-
sia’s integration with the West is over (…) Putin’s vision of a ‘greater Europe’ 
from Lisbon to Vladivostok, made up of the European Union and the Russian-
led Eurasian Economic Union, is being replaced by a ‘greater Asia’ from 
Shanghai to St. Petersburg”. Therefore, the relations with China are something 
closer than the strategic partnership and “Russia’s foreign policy has begun to 
prioritize China more than it did in the last half century”, thus the relations 
between Russia and China can be called a new “entente.”796 Alexander Gabuev 
wrote that Moscow “turned fears into hopes” in its relations with Beijing: Rus-
sia has “reoriented its economy toward China” and eased informal barriers to 
Chinese investment in selling advanced weaponry and in Chinese participation 
in large infrastructure (roads, railways) and natural-resource projects: “it was 
hoped that China would become a major buyer of Siberian hydrocarbons, 
Shanghai and Hong Kong would become the new London and New York for 
Russian companies seeking capital, and Chinese investors would flock to buy 
Russian assets, providing badly needed cash, upgrading the country’s aging 
infrastructure, and sharing technology.”797  
Therefore, the Western sanction played decisive role in Moscow’s political 
choices in 2014. Western sanctions against Russia were naturally beneficial for 
China, but Beijing restrained from sanctioning Russia because of strategic, ge-
opolitical and cultural reasons. Firstly, China interpreted pressure on Moscow 
as an attempt to “break Russia’s will and make it obey U.S. rules” but also “as 
a warning to other non-Western competitors, above all China. Exemplary pun-
ishment of Russia, in that view, is to serve as a means to deter China.”798 Sec-
ondly, because the feeling of sympathy: the Chinese elites and the Chinese 
society which believe that the West is trying to curb China’s further develop-
ment feel that “for various reasons, China is still being sanctioned by the 
West” – thus, when the West did the same to Russia they reacted with sympa-
thy.799 The last reason why China did not bandwagon was the conviction that 
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Russia can withhold the sanctions (“Russia has experienced many ups and 
downs, and it has the tenacity to withstand risks and dangers.”)800 
These two motives notwithstanding, China used its leverage over Russia 
during prime minister Li Keqiang’s visit to Moscow in October 2014. During 
the meeting nearly 40 documents were signed– thus the unholy tradition of 
signing the bunch of papers during each top-level meeting was kept (this time, 
however, contrary to Putin’s visit to Shanghai, there was no breakthrough).801 
As many times before, “the plethora of framework agreements and memoran-
dums of understanding (MOUs)” acted as “a placebo, masking the inability— 
and sometimes lack of commitment— to achieve substantive deal”.802 And 
these MoUs usually take years to realize, if ever.803  
The main aim of this meeting from the Russian perspective was to build 
closer ties with China “in order to reduce the Russian economy’s financial and 
technological dependence on the West, and of diversifying Russia’s energy 
markets.”804 The good example of that was signing the memorandum on the 
Chinese construction of a high-speed railway line from Moscow to Kazan 
which main intention was to undermine the position of the Western businesses 
interested in investing in the project, such as Siemens and Alstom (which 
would then lobby against the sanctions in Germany and France). This memo-
randum, however, has remained since then unfulfilled. This is due to the fact 
that Beijing demands “that the lion’s share of equipment be produced in 
China.”805 
This meeting showed that China, by taking advantage of the weakness of 
Russian banks and companies (denied access to Western capital markets by 
sanctions), was interested in further access to Russian energy, in constructing 
infrastructure that helps to fulfill this purpose and in selling machines and tech-
nology; the Kremlin which was determined to reduce Russia’s dependence on 
economic ties with the West, was “willing to pay a high economic price by 
accepting cooperation with China on conditions which are being increasingly 
dictated by Beijing.”806  
Internationally, the APEC summit in Beijing on 10-12 November 2014, saw 
Putin committing a faux pas by putting a coat on Xi Jinping’s wife Peng Liyuan 
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during outdoor meeting of the leaders that took place in the very cold Novem-
ber night in Beijing (this Putin’s gesture might have been considered a tender 
one by the traditional Eastern European etiquette, though certainly unaccepta-
ble by the Western standards, let alone Chinese ones). Chinese media censored 
this scene, while Western ones had a lot of joy with producing with comments 
as “Russia’s Don Juan-in-chief just got a little too friendly with Xi Jinping’s 
wife” or “the first unspoken rule of diplomacy might be ‘Don’t hit on the pres-
ident’s wife.’”807 Despite becoming a global viral scene, this incident neither 
influenced the Xi-Putin relations nor was particularly important politically. 
During the event, China-US deal on climate was much more important, as well 
as the fact that Xi Jinping put himself in a central position between the USA 
and Russia – it was “a visual coup” to the US hegemony.808  
The beginning of 2015 was quite uneventful for Russia-China relations. 
Russia was concentrated on Ukraine and Iran, while China on its AIIB bank 
that challenges the Western financial-institutional underpinning of the global 
order. What was surprising in relation to the AIIB was that Russia joined this 
bank on the last moment, on 28 March 2015 (the deadline was 31 March) 
which unpleasantly surprised China. The same can be said about slow (or lack 
of) implementation of bilateral agreements and memoranda. The mood in Bei-
jing, however, must have changed in April, when China became the first coun-
try to purchase Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system (about $3 billion for 
at least 6 battalions of S-400 which China will likely receive in 2017.)809 Rus-
sia, formerly unwilling to sell most advanced weapons, was forced to modify 
its stance due to dire economic situation.  
In spring of 2015, Russia and China have traditionally staged another polit-
ical show – this time the 70th anniversary of the end of the WWII’s on 9 May 
2015. Russia tried to present itself as a country that cannot be isolated and a 
one that keeps the history of victory over fascism. China, on the other hand, 
joined these celebrations because it helped Beijing to indirectly weaken Japan 
(Putin in his speech mentioned both German Nazism and Japanese militarism 
which he did for the first time.)810 
During the Sino-Russian summit again the tradition was kept: 32 agree-
ments worth $25 billion were signed (mainly framework agreement or memo-
randa, including… a memorandum on the construction of a high-speed railway 
line from Moscow to Kazan again.)811 These documents were “quite vague, 
                                                          
807 Putin Hits on China’s First Lady, Censors Go Wild, “Foreign Policy”, 10.11.2014.  
808 D. Trenin, From Greater Europe… 
809 Yu Bin, China-Russia, All Still Quiet in the East, “Comparative Connections” vol.17 no.1. 
810 Выступление Президента России на параде, посвящённом 70-летию Победы 
в Великой Отечественной войне [President Putin’s Speech During 70th Anniversary of 
Victory in the Great Patriotic War], Kremlin Ru. 09.05.2015. 
811 Документы, подписанные по итогам российско-китайских переговоров [Documents 
Signed During Russian-Sino Talks], Kremlin Ru. 08.05.2015. 
150 
and suggest that Beijing is only interested in developing cooperation with Rus-
sia in selected areas, such as energy, infrastructure and high-speed railways, 
and on conditions laid down by China” and consequently did not produce a 
breakthrough (there was no progress on energy cooperation).812 What was im-
portant in the summit was a joint declaration813 (about 70% of which was about 
foreign policy)814 and another one, where both sides pleaded to cooperate in 
the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) and the Chinese New Silk Road pro-
jects.815 This signifies a strive to avoid a clash of interests in Central Asia and 
was one of the first moves of making Central Asia a Russian-Chinese “condo-
minium” (see: chapter on Central Asia). In a way Moscow made a virtue out 
of necessity here: “Moscow’s previous efforts to block Chinese initiatives in 
the region proved to be ineffective, which may have increased its readiness to 
take China into account, rather than shut Beijing out.”816 This document signi-
fied growing shift in Russian policy makers towards accepting, instead of re-
jecting the Chinese idea of the New Silk Road (One Belt One Road). The West-
ern sanctions are probably to blame for that: “It was obvious that Moscow was 
in a much weaker position to resist China’s westward move, let alone to keep 
its Central Asian partners in line; the best alternative was to work with Beijing 
and benefit from China’s investment spree.”817 
Good atmosphere of relations was followed by joint military drills with ge-
opolitical hints. The same geopolitical reasons stood behind the BRICS sum-
mit in Ufa (7 July 2015) with its grandiose 13,000-word, 77-clause Ufa Dec-
laration818 and behind the SCO summit (15 July 2015) that officially started 
the procedures for granting India and Pakistan full membership as well as 
granting Belarus the status of observer (improved from dialogue partner), and 
taking Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, and Nepal as new dialogue partners.  
                                                          
812 M. Kaczmarski, Szymon Kardaś, Russia-China. Ritual Demonstration Against the West, 
OSW, Warsaw, 13.05.2015. 
813 Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики об 
углублении всеобъемлющего партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия и о 
продвижении взаимовыгодного сотрудничества [Joint Declaration of RF and PRC on 
Deepening of All-Encompassing Partnership and Strategic Colaboration and Moving To-
wards Mutually Beneficial Cooperation], Kremlin.Ru, 08.05.2016. 
814 “The document was by far the most foreign policy-focused document by top leaders of the 
two countries”, Yu Bin, Tales of Two Parades, Two Drills, and Two Summits, “Comparative 
Connections”, vol. 17, no.2. 
815 Совместное заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики 
о сотрудничестве по сопряжению строительства Евразийского экономического 
союза и Экономического пояса Шелкового пути ([oint Declaration of RF and PRC on 
Cooperation in Connecting Eurasian Union and Silk Road Economic Belt] , Kremlin.Ru, 
08.05.2016. 
816 M. Kaczmarski, S. Kardaś, Russia-China. Ritual Demonstration… 
817 Yu Bin, H-Bomb Plus THAAD…. 
818 VII BRICS Summit: 2015 Ufa Declaration, BRICS Information Center, Toronto, 
09.07.2015. 
151 
Geopolitics followed on China’s first Victory Parade for the 70th anniver-
sary of Sino-Japanese War on 3 September. Putin was the most important for-
eign guest who appeared on this celebration (most of the Western leaders did 
not show up), while Russian military contingent took part in the parade – for 
the first time in the bilateral relations. Despite high symbolism, however, the 
economic momentum of Sino-Russian cooperation was weakening: in the first 
six months of 2015, the value of bilateral trade fell 31.4 percent compared to 
the previous year due to the fall of energy prices that hit Russia hard; out of 
structural reasons (Russia’s heavy dependence on energy exports to China), 
Russia’s imports also declined significantly due to the ruble’s devaluation. To 
make matters worse, China experienced economic slowdown and stock market 
crash, which challenged the overarching optimism concerning China’s further 
rise. For Russia-China relations it meant that China’s energy demand would 
not be as strong as in the past decade and thus it is unlikely that China would 
pay an excessively high amount for the Russian gas.819  
On the other hand, China could pay for something it had been wanting for 
long: Su-35. After 8 years of negotiations, in November 2015, a $2-billion sale 
of 24 Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter-bombers to China was sealed820, signifying 
Moscow’s major departure from its previous policy of not selling to China the 
most sophisticated weaponry.  
Finally, internationally the last quarter of 2015 was marked by Russia’s en-
try to war in Syria. China has remained on the sidelines of the Syrian drama – 
this was done for an obvious reason: “China does not have as strong an influ-
ence in the Middle East as the other UN Security Council permanent mem-
bers”, and thus opted for “caution and impartiality” in this conflict.821 Never-
theless, Beijing’s favour to Moscow was clearly seen – the Chinese commen-
tators emphasized Russia’s political gains (the end of Moscow’s global isola-
tion) and the failure of the Western policy in the Middle East. China reacted 
positively to the Russian intervention, because thanks to it Beijing could do 
what it loves best: fulfill its goals with somebody else’s hands. Thus, Russia 
has diverted the US attention from competition with China in Asia-Pacific and 
yet again has “shouldered the burden of open rivalry with the United States” 
and allowed China to link cracking of Uyghur separatists group with global 
war on terror; finally it could present itself again as a peaceful and neutral 
power in the conflict.822 
2016 started for Russia and China – as well as for other great powers – with 
a big beat. North Korea conducted its forth nuclear test on 6 January. The USA 
and South Korea reacted strongly by announcing a possibility of deploying the 
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THAAD missile defence system on the Peninsula (formerly Seoul disagreed 
to locate this system in the Peninsula, now for the first time it started reconsid-
ering its position). This alarmed Moscow and Beijing, since the THAAD’s ra-
dars could monitor any missile test and firing thousands of kilometers inside 
China and Russia – that is why Russia and China hardened their positions on 
both the North Korean nuclear test and the possibility of the deployment of the 
THAAD in Korea. For them both the Korean provocations and the Western 
reaction to it was bad news. But the latter was worse. Fyodor Lukyanov aptly 
summarized Russian and Chinese perception: “the North Korean threat is a 
wonderful pretext for strengthening the U.S. military and political presence on 
the Korean Peninsula in Japan and in the whole region. And it is undoubtedly 
projected on China.”823 Although eventually deployment of the THAAD did 
not materialize in the first half of 2016 (it did in early 2017, though its fate is 
uncertain given Trump’s position on it), Russia and China announced its first-
ever joint anti-missile drills in Russia. Moscow further supported Beijing by 
emphasizing the need to “stop internationalizing the dispute on South China 
Sea”824 – so far Moscow has been trying to refrain from engaging in this issue 
and stay neutral.  
While Korean Peninsula made Russia and China move closer, the Chinese 
activity in Central Asia distanced Moscow and Beijing for a while. China’s 
close cooperation in security sphere with Pakistan and (particularly) Afghani-
stan that may include Tajikistan, also evoked alarm bells in Moscow. Moscow 
responded in its traditional way – by staging a show of force. Russia has con-
ducted large-scale joint drill with Tajikistan in 15-20 March 2016 and an-
nounced in April that it will not deliver rocket engines to China.825 These petty 
disagreements were not, however, particularly important. In late May two sides 
had their first joint headquarters missile defense exercise in Moscow while on 
9th June during they joint naval excersises both countries’ navies entered the 
waters “in a contiguous zone” near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands which showed 
Russia’s first real step in siding with China over South China Sea’s dispute.826  
Very good mood continued during Putin’s quick (24 hours) visit to China 
on 23 June 2016. The meeting traditionally ended with signing a bunch o pa-
pers – 37 agreements; most important included sale of stakes in a number of 
Russian projects to Chinese firms, an oil supply contract, joint investments in 
petrochemical projects in Russia, purchase of heavy helicopters, and the sale 
of Russia’s advanced space rocket (RD-180) engine to China; there were, tra-
ditionally, almost humoresque aspects, too – two documents signed by those 
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leaders of great powers mentioned cooperation in… hockey.827 What was not 
signed, however, was the long awaited contract on financing the high-speed 
Moscow-Kazan railway. At the time of writing, this project still remains aspi-
rational; only small part of the route is being developed and participation of 
Chinese companies, although probable, is still uncertain828 (Moscow asks 
China for more money while at the same time luring Western companies to get 
involved despite sanctions.)829 The signed contracts were clearly advantageous 
to China.830 Even more so was the very long joint communiqué on the global 
strategic stability, where Russia and China expressed concerns over THAAD 
and where Putin moved closer to Beijing’s stance in the dispute on South China 
Sea.831  
This visit, as many other facts, has proved that despite all these traditional, 
grandiose words, after two years of Russia’s “turn to China” the results were 
still poor. Russian hopes “are going through a painful reality check.”832 Rus-
sia’s pivot has “stalled”: given the fall in commodity prices in 2015 (and its 
consequences: decline of Russian economy and devaluation of the ruble) and 
China’s economic problems, the Chinese companies are reluctant to invest in 
Russia – this in turn “has led to growing disillusionment among the Russian 
elite who had hoped that China might replace Europe as its top energy cus-
tomer, leaving the Kremlin’s turn to Asia hanging in the balance.”833 Economic 
data support this claim. Russian-Chinese bilateral trade fell from $95.3 billion 
in 2014 by 28.6 percent to $63.6 billion in 2015 (it makes just 1.5 percent of 
China’s international trade that year) and despite that volumes of crude oil de-
liveries from Russia to China increased by 33.7 percent, Russia has only man-
aged to attract $560 million in foreign direct investment from China (that is 
less than 0.5 percent of China’s total outbound direct investment in 2015 and 
much less than the $4 billion in Chinese investment that Russia received in 
2013, before the Ukraine crisis) and $18 billion of Chinese loans in 2015 (that 
made China the largest source of the external financing that year) – to put that 
                                                          
827 Совместные документы, подписанные в ходе официального визита Президента 
Российской Федерации В.В.Путина в Китай [Documents Signed During President 
Putin’s trip to China], Kremlin Ru, 26.06.2016. 
828 M. Makocki, The Silk Road goes north: Sino-Russian economic cooperation and competi-
tion, [in]: China and Russia. Gaming… 
829 Russia asks China to boost Moscow-Kazan fast-speed rail project financing, Tass, 
18.05.2017. 
830 Minxin Pei, Vladimir Putin’s China Visit Put His Weakness on Full Display, “Fortune” 
29.06.2016. 
831 Совместное заявление Президента Российской Федерации и Председателя Китайс-
кой Народной Республики об укреплении глобальной стратегической стабильности 
[Joint Declaration of RF President and PRC Chairmant on Deepening Global Strategic Sta-
bility], Kremlin Ru, 26.06.2016. 
832 A.Gabuev, Friends with Benefits?…. 
833 Idem, China’s Pivot to Putin’s Friends….  
154 
number in perspective, in 2013 Russia was able to attract $261 billion from the 
European Union and the United States.834  
In late 2015 Russian elite seemed to be deeply disappointed with the lack of 
results of its turn to the East. Putin rejected meeting with major Asian busi-
nessmen during Vladivostok’s first Eastern summit preferring instead to have 
a good time with American actor Steven Segal. Moreover, in November 2015 
he skipped the East Asian Summit and the APEC Summit, for the first time 
since 2002 – “probably he yielded to a general atmosphere among the elites 
that in autumn 2015 stopped considering the ‘turn to the East’ as something 
important to prioritize” (deputy prime minister Shuvalev said “there is no turn 
to the East”) consequently “Russia turned its backs on Asia and its face to 
Syria.”835  
Since mid 2016, however, despite Russian “frustration” with the result of 
its “turn to the East”, Moscow out of political reasons (prolonged stalemate 
with the West) decided to continue going down this path. This has created the 
basic trend of “a deeper asymmetrical interdependence” that Moscow “without 
viable alternatives” may be “willing to accept the imbalance”; therefore “Mos-
cow may end up providing crucial resources that Beijing needs to boost the 
latter’s ambition to be the next global superpower in exchange for an economic 
and financial lifeline (…) The bitter pill of Russia’s continued decline will be 
less painful amid Beijing’s efforts to show symbolic deference to Russia’s sta-
tus as a great power.”836  
Thoroughout 2016 Russia has followed the way of moving closer to China. 
This has been evident in abandoning former Moscow’s balanced position on 
South China Sea and embracing the China’s view. It started from Foreign Min-
ister Lavrov’s remarks to East Asian press in April837, and was followed by 
Putin adherence to China’s stance during June 2016 summit in Beijing838, the 
SCO 15th anniversary declaration in Tashkent,839 Putin’s remarks during the 
G20 summit in Hangzhou840 and joint Russian-Chinese drills at South China 
Sea.841 The Chinese side was visibly pleased by this Russian move (Chinese 
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MFA Spokesman called it “the voice of justice from the international commu-
nity”)842; Moscow’s turn on South China Sea’s issue has been interpreted as a 
returning favor for China’s “sympathetic neutrality” regarding Ukraine and 
Crimea.843 Nothing testifies better to growing Sinocentrism in Russia’s Asian 
policy than Kremlin’s bandwagoning to China’s position on South China Sea: 
“Moscow has become more pro-Chinese on important regional issues (…) 
whereas it was once content to do the bare minimum— subscribing to the ‘one 
China’ policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and Tibet— it now leans toward Beijing in ar-
eas where it was previously neutral, such as maritime sovereignty in the South 
China Sea.”844 
Despite very good state of Sino-Russian relations seen at the 2016 G20 
Hangzhou summit (China’s red carpet treatment of Putin helped him partially 
escape Western ostracism), late 2016 brought unexpected clouds over Sino-
Russian relations. A small cloud was China’s abstention from joining Russia 
to veto another Western resolution on Syria at the UN on 8th October 2016845; 
while a big cloud was the victory of the US presidential race by Donald Trump. 
The Republican candidate opposed the mainstream of his party (and almost all 
American establishment) in his approach to Russia. His warm words about 
Moscow in general and Putin in particular, combined with unclear “Russian 
connections” within Trump’s team and visible support of this candidate by 
Russia by its “cyber warfare” (internet trolls, leaks, attacks on Democrats’ sites 
and computer systems of electoral commissions)846 as well as anti-Chinese 
rhetoric by Trump: this all created a new background for USA-Russia-China 
triangle.  
Trump’s victory was welcomed with hope in Moscow. Russians dreamed 
of a new “reset” that would herald the dawn of the “concert of powers” logic, 
where Russia would be given free hand in the post-Soviet area. At the same 
time Trump’s victory evoked anxiety in Beijing. First actions of the president 
elect, such as telephone call to Taiwan’s president and his comments on China 
seemed to challenge the very foundations of Sino-US relations laid in the 
1970s. The possibility of US-Russia rapprochement made Chinese, remember-
ing Putin’s past actions, uneasy.847 International speculations about Trump and 
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Putin “reversing Nixon’s strategy”848 raised the level of anxiety among Chi-
nese elites even further.  
However, nothing spectacular materialized. Geopolitics proved to be insuf-
ficient in explaining US-Sino-Russian dynamics. Judging by the perspective 
of May 2017, the new US president is losing his battle with US establishment 
that successfully blocks his revolutionary ideas and cuts Trump’s people such 
as Michael Flynn. Politically speaking, Donald Trump may be the USA’s 
equivalent of… Mao Zedong849, but Trump’s chances to stage another Cultural 
Revolution to get rid of his opponents within the party and beyond are much 
more slim. So far, the environment does not help Trump and makes it very 
difficult, if not impossible (for now) to seek rapprochement with Russia. Wide-
spread accusations for Russian involvement in the US elections, general anti-
Russian mood in the USA (perhaps historically a third “red scare”) and 
Trump’s understanding that he has too many fronts open, led the new US pres-
ident to bury hopes for new deal with Russia, which means that perspectives 
for new US-Russia reset have moved away, at least for the time being.  
What was important in case of Sino-Russian relations, was the fact that this 
time Russians learned the mistakes from the past and did not sacrifice their 
relations just for Western promises. In October 2016, during Valdai Internation 
Club, Putin has spoken highly of Sino-Russian relations.850 This pattern re-
peated on other occasions: Russian president “had been extraordinarily careful 
and cautious not to undermine the bilateral relationship with China.”851 To put 
it simply, Russia waited and waited for Trump to make another reset without 
doing any sudden moves, so when it never materialized, Moscow lost little.  
The same applies to China. In on April 6-7 in Mar-a-Lago, Florida Trump 
met with Xi Jinping in what was a (at least temporarily) breakthrough in cool-
ing US-China relations. Trump, who ordered bombardment of Syria while en-
joying a chocolate cake with his guest, clearly managed to find a common lan-
guage with Chinese leader. After the summit Sino-American relations im-
proved: American president ceased to criticise China (Beijing breathed a sigh 
of relief), while the latter in return abstained from the UN Security Council 
draft resoulation condemning Assad regime on April 12 (Russia blocked it.)852 
US-China normalization didn’t come at the expense of Sino-Russian relations. 
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Although Beijing abstained in the UNSC, it signed BRICS’s anti-Western dec-
laration on Syria at the same time.853 And after the Mar-a-Lago 2017 summit 
with Trump, Beijing was very careful not to upset Russia. April 2017 saw “a 
flurry of China’s diplomatic overtures to Russia”: three top Chinese officials 
visited Russia, all of them met President Putin and all emphesized importance 
of Sino-Russian relations; thanks to it, despite (alleged) Washington’s hidden 
agenda of Trump-Xi meeting (“creating distrust between China and Russia”), 
this summit has not challenged “normal procedures of Sino-Russian interac-
tions (…) two bureaucracies that have been in place for the past three dec-
ades.”854 Thus, despite Mar-a-Lago summit, Russia and China continued mov-
ing closer to one another. This has been best seen at the even that concludes 
the scope of this book: Silk Road Forum in Beijing.  
Belt and Road Forum in Beijing (14-16th May 2017) was a showcase of 
China’s power, ambitions and a new (vague) vision for international order. Xi 
Jinping gathered leaders from 28 countries, with Vladimir Putin being the most 
important guest (no. two in forum’s hierarchy, after Xi but before Turkish Pres-
ident Erdogan). Russian president emphasized it by catching world’s attention 
thanks to playing piano while waiting for bilateral meeting with Xi on the first 
day and by coming late for the official inauguration of the Forum on the sec-
ond. Putin was also the most vocal enthusiast of the OBOR project after Xi, 
surpassing even his host in details disclosed to the public (contrary to Xi, Putin 
announced the route of the “new Silk Road” – via Kazakhstan and Russia – 
most probably against the wishes of the Chinese who prefer to keep the route, 
or routes, undecided to have more political options open).  
Although there are voices in Russia which reveal uneasy facts about Mos-
cow undergoing “severe reality check” about “deliberately vague” OBOR ini-
tiative (so far only two companies owned by Timchenko benefited from pro-
jects, with little else for Russia) which leads “to nowhere”855, the official Mos-
cow keeps the line by praising and embrasing Belt and Road. Nothing illus-
trates better Russia’s change of mind about China than this: Moscow was ini-
tially reserved about OBOR project, but later, given geopolitical environment, 
decided to bandwagon to it by hoping to achieve as much as possible from 
cooperation with China on Chinese terms.  
*** 
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China-Russia relations in the first decade of the 21st century are characterized 
by impressive changeability, a real sinusoid. At the beginning, these relations 
were an extension of the model from the late 1990s, and as a matter of fact a 
supplement to relation of Russia and China with the West. Putin’s political 
about-turn after 11 September 2011 testified to that, as well as later Russian 
disillusionment and renewed approach to China. The rise of raw material prices 
allowed Russia to play a more ambitious role in the world, which in the case 
of China-Russian relations had consequences on the politics of Putin with bal-
ancing in Asia. Its aim was to play off China, Japan and Korea against each 
other. Nonetheless, in the late 2000s, Moscow understood that it was impossi-
ble to do this, and decided to deepen the relation with China, making “a virtue 
out of necessity”. From that moment China became the most important partner 
of Russia in Asia and the second most important in the world after the United 
States – the buildup of China’s significance in Moscow was treated more as a 
“chance” rather than as a “threat”. On the other hand, the “growing asym-
metry” of mutual relations was treated as a necessity with which one needs to 
agree, albeit unwillingly. The reason for that was on one side the suppressed 
position of Russia – especially after the economic crisis in 2008, and on the 
other hand, psychopolitical matters: directing attention on different vectors of 
foreign policy (“close abroad”, the West). Russia decided that in the Asian, 
secondary field of its foreign policy, if it does not have what it likes, it will like 
what it has – and it will benefit from the cooperation with China, whatever it 
will be. This resulted in the fact that the biggest winner of the mutual relations 
was Beijing. China-Russia relations can be described by paraphrasing a known 
Chinese diplomacy phrase – the “asymmetric win-win” for the Chinese bene-
fit.  
China-Russia relations regained intensification after Xi Jinping took office 
in 2013. Answering the threat from the United States and its “Pivot to Asia” in 
2011, China stepped up to political relations with Moscow – once more the 
American factor influenced the Moscow-Beijing relations, though rather inten-
sifying the existing cooperation than turning its direction. This political bring-
ing together, however, did not mean Chinese economic concession – quite the 
opposite: Beijing maintains asymmetrical model of these relations. The Rus-
sian elites, who were conscious of the consequences of Russia’s marginaliza-
tion in Asia (which in the long term means global marginalization), announced 
an ambitious motto of the Russian “turn towards Asia”. They know that the 
future of Russia as a world power depends on the position in the Asia-Pacific 
region, which slowly becomes the political and economic center of the globe. 
The “Russian turn” was to free Russia from overabundant domination of 
China, which caused the marginalization of Russia in the region, making it a 
raw material base for China. Despite resounding declarations, the “Asian turn” 
ended in the middle of 2016 as a “Chinese turn”: with the signing up of the gas 
contract in May 2014, Russia – busy with the Ukrainian case – yet again put 
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“close abroad” ahead of the Asian politics. Consequently, instead of diminish-
ing dependence from China, it increased it. Thanks to the gas contract China 
made its first step to make Siberia a shelter for its own economy. This contract, 
as well as Moscow’s recent embrace of OBOR initiative, means deepening 
asymmetrical model of Russia-China relation and everything indicates that this 
trend will remain – Russia is concentrated on the most important vector of its 
foreign policy, which is consolidation and reintegration of Post-Soviet territory 
and withstanding of Western pressure, it needs “peace for the East”. It buys 
China’s support, which brings deepening the asymmetrical model.   
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Part Two: Pipelines and Arms:  
Economic and Military Relations 
Economic and military cooperation between Russia and China in the period of 
1991-2017 has gone two different ways. Economic relations since the begin-
ning were the “weakest point”, a major obstacle that was overcome only in the 
late 2000s with cooperation in the energy sector (though the structure of trade 
remains structurally unfavourable for Russia). The military relations, on the 
other hand, experienced a sinusoid. They were very much intensified in the 
1990s, then weakened in the mid 2000s and finally reappeared as one of the 
pillars of Russia-China relations in the 2010s.  
I. Economic Relations 
1. Economic Cooperation in the 1990s 
Economic relations in the 1990s “developed slowly and chaotically”856 and 
“remained largely stagnant”857 (with the exception of arms sales that are de-
scribed here separately). The reasons for this state of affairs lay mostly on the 
Russian side. Unsuccessful economic transformation, incompatibility of the 
economy with the free market needs, remnants of Soviet-style economic think-
ing and an out of date perception of China as a backward, developing country – 
these were the most important reasons. Moreover, geography also played 
against success. China is remote from most important Russian economic and 
political centers and weakly communicated with the Russian Far East. Finally, 
in economic relations, as in political ones, both countries are orientated to the 
West mostly. This all contributed to the fact that the volume of trade between 
Russia and China in 1999 was lower than that in 1992. It has remained quite 
low throughout the 1990s. Russia ranked 8th among China’s trade partners, 
with volume of trade USD 11,927 billion, which paled into insignificance 
when compared to China’s two other trade partners: Japan (USD 101,905 bil-
lion) and the USA (USD 97,181 billion.)858 Nevertheless, the actual level of 
trade, for several reasons, was higher than the one indicated in the statistics. 
Most of the statistics did not cover the petty, “unorganized” shuttle/border 
trade (done by shuttle traders), barter exchange and illegal contraband (mostly 
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timber from Russia and consumption goods from China.)859 According to cau-
tious estimation, in 1997-1998 alone the volume of illegal trade from China 
reached at least USD 3.6 billion per year.860 According to some opinions, “Rus-
sian trade imbalance with China would virtually disappear if the shuttle trade 
was included.”861 Moreover, part of the trade volume (in such areas as aviation 
and space industry) was not covered, or was lowered in statistics. Finally, both 
sides purposely did not include arms sales which constituted the basis of bilat-
eral economic relations in the 1990s.  
The volume of trade between Russia and China in the 1990s remained a 
sinusoid. The time from 1991 to 1995 may be divided into 3 periods: 1) fast 
growth (1991-1993), 2) slowing down (1994), 3) regulation and return to 
growth (1995). The years 1995-1996 indicated another growth, while the years 
1997-1998 – another decline. Finally, since 1999, a new upward tendency 
started. One must, however, divide between the two aspects of Russian trade 
with China: the central planned exchange (such as arms sales) and the decen-
tralized (barter) one. Although the latter one consisted of only 17% of all trade, 
it initially contributed to the growth and later fall of trade.862 The noticeable 
growth of trade at the beginning of the 1990s happened thanks to the opening 
of the borders, uncontrolled border trade and Chinese arms purchases. The fol-
lowing slowing down in 1994 was connected with the wider “China disap-
pointment” in the Russian Far East (anti-Chinese resentments), introduction of 
import customs and visas as well as an entrance of Western companies to the 
Russian market. Another growth in volume of trade was possible thanks to “top 
to down” support from both governments.863 The years 1995-1996 saw fre-
quent visits of decision-makers from economic resorts that led to many agree-
ments (in such spheres as atomic energy, chemical industry, heavy industry but 
first and foremost arms sales) – this centralistic aspect contributed to growth 
of the volume of trade. The Subsequent fall (1997-1998) and later growth 
(1999) are connected with the “politicization of economic relations”. In 1997-
1998, both countries politically averted from each other, so there was not any 
backing of the economic projects by the state (see: Three Gorges), volume of 
trade slowed again (there were also strict economic reasons: economic crisis, 
incompatibility of Russian products in China etc.). The impulse towards an-
other growth was given by Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, during his visit 
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to Moscow in February 1999. Finally, in the late 1990s trade grew thanks to 
the cooperation in the energy sector. This would become the leitmotiv of Sino-
Russian economic cooperation in the 2000s.  
The decade of the 1990s, from the economic point of view was character-
ized by an export of Russian resources and semi-finished product (fertilizers, 
iron, timber) and by an import of Chinese textiles, cloths, shoes and leather 
products. Russian consumer was not able to buy more technologically ad-
vanced Chinese products (TV sets, electronics, video equipment) or – more 
often – was not willing to and chose to buy products made in other countries. 
Russian economic strategy towards China in the 1990s focused on promotion 
of the export of high tech products (the export of much of the Russian indus-
tries remained the only option to survive). Although this was based on reason-
able grounds (both economies were complementary), it did not end up as a 
success – Russian products were simply uncompetitive on the Chinese market. 
Without considering military cooperation, they were able to succeed in two 
sectors only – the atomic sector and space industry.864  
Except for arms, Russia in the 1990s was selling mostly products connected 
to transport, metals (iron and steel), chemicals, paper products and resources 
to China. The only consumer goods that Russians delivered to China were 
fish.865 Finally, Russia provided China with atomic technology and technical 
assistance with building an atomic power plant – in return it received consumer 
goods, which were not listed in the statistics866. As for resources, its share in 
Russian-Chinese trade in the 1990s was low. Russia certainly succeeded in 
providing China machines and equipment, mostly in atomic, aviation and 
space sectors.867  
During this decade, China exported mainly consumer goods: clothes, tex-
tiles, groceries, tools. Throughout the 1990s, Russia remained a sales market 
for China’s consumption goods’ surplus. Chinese products solved problems of 
the lack of everyday products, so severe in the first years of the Russian trans-
formation.868 In the mid 1990s, China imported mainly metals and chemicals 
(including fertilizers) that valued more than 50% of all import; export consisted 
of leather, wool products, animals and animal products, huts, umbrellas and 
shoes.869 To sum it up, Chinese export to Russia concentrated on everyday 
items and lacked technologically advanced products sold to the West.  
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Russian-Chinese economic relations were the continuation of the Soviet pe-
riod and initially functioned within structures and mechanisms created during 
the last years of the USSR.870 Despite that both sides recognized one another 
as a “most favoured nation” in March 1992871, Russian activities in China were 
weak, chaotic and often characterized by underestimation of the neighbor.872 
The Russian minister of foreign trade Piotr Aven, for example, offered the Chi-
nese Russian electronics which – due to their bad quality – were not being 
bought even in Russia.873 Later on, institutional initiatives ceased to exist at 
all. Russian domestic situation was to blame: the Kremlin was paralyzed by 
decision-making chaos and a lack of agreement on the direction of invest-
ments.874 Consequently, most of the economic projects formalized during Yelt-
sin’s 1992 visit remained unfulfilled.875 Li Peng’s visit to Moscow in Decem-
ber 1996 and his meeting with Russian prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin 
raised hopes of stimulating the economic cooperation – Moscow and Beijing 
pushed to achieve a trade volume of USD 20 billion by the year 2000.876 It 
turned out to be only a dream. It took Yeltsin four months to appoint a chair 
for the Russian side of the Commission to Prepare Regular Meetings of the 
Russian and Chinese Prime Ministers; its work was further impeded by eco-
nomic crisis and never-ending replacements of Russian prime ministers (five 
between 1998 and 1999.)877 As for the volume of trade, out of the declared 
USD 20 billion by 2001, Russia and China were able to achieve only half.878  
Several factors contributed to the relative low volume of trade and back-
wardness of economic relations in the 1990s. Most of them had something to 
do with communist heritage.879 First, the negative outcomes of Sino-Soviet 
split not only had negative consequences for the economic relations between 
the USSR and the PRC; . it, furthermore, led to shaping the Russian Far East 
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into “besieged fortress”880, which effectively cancelled possibility of normal 
economic transactions for decades (for instance, the only telephone line from 
Vladivostok to China went via Moscow). Add objective factors: transportation 
infrastructure was completely unprepared to the new situation (no border 
crossings, bad roads, only two railways, bad communications between the Rus-
sian Far East and the distorted structure of costs, production and transporta-
tion).881 Even 25-30% of all signed contracts between Russian and Chinese 
participants went unfulfilled because of transportation problems.882 On the 
Chinese side, the consequences of the split were basically structural. In the 
1950s, all industry and technology was modelled on Soviet patterns, with com-
mercial, cultural and personal contacts that supplemented it. After the split, 
China turned its back on Russia by preferring Western goods and services; 
Beijing simply re-orientated its economy towards the West.883 That is why for 
China Russia in the 1990s became a secondary direction, important only for 
border provinces. The second most negative factor was the influence of former 
communist policy on Russian-Chinese trade. During Soviet times trade was 
executed mostly in products exchange, or barter. Attempts to reform this sys-
tem in the RF in the 1990s failed – barter remained the main form of trade 
exchange of Russia: in 1997 alone 73% of all Russian trade transactions were 
made in barter and other non-currency way.884 When the USSR fell, Russian-
Chinese trade became chaotic and uncontrollably symbolized by petty shuttle 
traders. Exchange remained, in the old Soviet way, by barter mostly. Theoret-
ically, from 1995 Russian-Chinese trade was supposed to be made in hard cur-
rency only (initially in Swiss franc, then in USD), however, the absence of an 
institutionalized banking reform, the inconvertibility of Chinese yuan, the vol-
atility of the ruble, and the lack of regularized settlement agreements between 
banks of the two states “all served to restrict the use of cash transactions as 
well as to impede the overall growth of trade volume.”885 Barter remained pre-
dominant in border trade as well as in contraband: Chinese consumption foods 
were exchanged for Russian resources (timber) and arms – it was the exchange 
of “rockets for coats.”886 Barter, except for its obvious disadvantages, had, 
however, some positive aspects – thanks to it Russia was being competitive on 
Chinese market.887 Nevertheless, the economic crisis in 1998 was a severe hit 
on attempts to replace barter – it remained until the next decade. Finally, the 
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third negative factor was the remnants of communist thinking on economy. 
Russian elites still tended to perceive Russia as a technologically advanced 
industrial economy, while China as a backward rural and assistance-needing 
country. That is why they believed economic relations could be built on provid-
ing Russian technology, products and services in return for Chinese consumer 
goods. China, however, did not need Russian technology, because it had a bet-
ter one – the Western one. Beijing was buying from Moscow what it wanted – 
limited amounts of high tech arms and military technology, skilled labor for 
development of the Chinese technological base (particularly military poten-
tial), resources – and nothing more.888 The other remnant of Soviet-style think-
ing on the Russian side was emphasis on establishing cooperative economic 
arrangements based on large-scale bilateral government-supervised contracts 
and unease, if not holstility towards shuttle trade: many in ghd Russian leader-
ship viewed the extensive shuttle trade as “anarchic, uncivilized, and reflective 
of the worst aspects of petty bourgeois commodity exchange”; consequently 
they did a lot to limit this.889 Development of trade was thus hampered by sus-
picions or open hostility manifested in believing that China constituted a threat 
to Russian economic sovereignty: “economic negotiations between the two 
states were infused with a considerable irony in that the Chinese side, ostensi-
bly still socialist, was an unapologetic defender of market norms and values; 
over time, the Chinese leadership became outspoken in its support of the shut-
tle trade and other forms of small-scale commercial activity that were often the 
object of derision in Russia.”890 The Chinese market-oriented approach had 
one significant implication for bilateral relations: China was unwilling to grant 
Russia a special status – “strategic partnership” did not cover economic issues. 
The 1990s decade of Sino-Russian economic relations stands clear as an ex-
ample of unfulfilled agreements and unfinished projects891. The clearest exam-
ple of Russian failure in China in the economic sphere turned out to be its lost 
bid for the construction of turbines to the Three Gorges Dam in 1997.892 The 
Chinese subordination of politics to economics “came as a shock to a Russian 
leadership that bore the ideological heritage of a system in which profit was 
largely a meaningless category in the courting of friendship.”893 The Chinese 
saw it differently: one of the PRC’s ministries of trade summarized it as follow: 
“between Chinese and Americans there is cooperation without friendship while 
between Russian and Chinese there is friendship without cooperation.”894 
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With the (significant) exception of the military industry, where Russia was 
privileged, due to a Western embargo on China, Russian companies were hav-
ing serious difficulties while entering the Chinese market – against Western 
competition they were almost helpless. China chose the West, not Russia, for 
its modernization: “China wants airplanes from Boeing or Airbus, not Tupo-
lev; it has sought joint ventures with Audi and General Motors, not Lada.”895 
Russian attempts to sell planes ended up in failure due to the reasons promptly 
summarized by the Chinese Ambassador to Russia, Li Fenglin: “The Russians 
want to sell us civilian airlines like the Ilyushin-96 and the Tupolev-204; but 
even Aeroflot doesn’t want them, so there must be something wrong.”896  
This example illustrates a wider tendency: that of Western dominance in 
economic relations with both China and Russia. As in politics, also in eco-
nomic relations, Beijing and Moscow orientated first and foremost to the West. 
Bilateral investments took place mostly there, where Western companies did 
not compete (arms sales to China or Chinese consumer goods to Russia) – “fi-
nancially, economically, and technologically, both countries still depend more 
on the West than on each other.”897 Contrary to the USA, Russia did not have 
such investment possibilities to ensure the pace of Chinese modernization – it 
desperately needed investments for itself. China, on the other hand, was un-
willing to invest in Russia – Beijing exported only cheap consumer goods, food 
and unqualified labor there, it reserved export of more sophisticated goods to 
the West. China was Russia’s third trade partner in 1992, but only the fifth in 
2000 (much more important was Germany, then the USA); for China, mostly 
the USA and Asian partners (Japan, South Korea) mattered. Moreover, in a 
sense, China was more important to Russia than the other way round. Since 
1992, China has always been in the first five of the most important Russian 
export destinations, but for China Russia in the 1990s mattered only for three 
Dongbei (Northeastern) provinces and its heavy industry (in 1995 alone Dong-
bei’s share in all Chinese to Russia export was 71%).898  
2. Economic Cooperation in 2000-2017:  
The Geopolitics of Energy and Beyond 
In the 2000s and the 2010s, the Sino-Russian volume of trade has increased, 
but it has mostly happened thanks to energy cooperation. What characterized 
it was the emphasis on resources and “the geopolitics of energy” as well as an 
unbalanced trade. The character of the emerged economic relations started to 
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benefit China mostly – Beijing is gradually turning Russia into a “resource ap-
pendix” to the Chinese economy. Consequently, the disproportion deepens: 
China is Russia’s second trade partner (after the EU), while Russia is China’s 
sixteenth partner (it was the ninth before 2015).  
Russia and China seem to be perfect energy partners that should share com-
mon interests. Russia is one of world’s biggest exporters of energy, whereas 
China is the second biggest receiver. Add to this the public image of Sino-
Russian friendship, “the strategic partnership” and joint statements about the 
will to cooperate on energy. This all should make the cooperation smooth. This 
was not so, however, due to geopolitical factors.  
In the world of shrinking resources, “energy has come to symbolize the new 
geopolitics of the twenty-first century”; therefore, energy is essential for both 
re-emerging powers of Russia and China, but in very different ways: for Russia 
it is “the power-equivalent of nuclear weapons in the Soviet era.”899 A boom 
on oil prices after 1999 enabled Russia to come back as a global power. Russia, 
then, used energy as a power-projection in both Europe and Asia. In reaching 
towards Asia, Moscow “was striving to avoid dependence on any single cus-
tomer who would be able to dictate the terms of cooperation.”900 
Using energy as a power-projection, however, cuts two ways. The more 
Russia wants to present itself as a reliable partner, the more it must strengthen 
its relations with Beijing and present it as problem-free (so it is vulnerable to 
the Chinese pressure). Russia conducts a policy of “creative doubt” to “foster 
in customers a measure of ‘controllable uncertainty’ of neither complacency 
nor panic (…)  the China card is useful in neutralizing the pressure of Brussels 
(…)for Russian policymakers do not wish to ‘abandon’ the West so much as 
to modify its behavior in line with Russian interests.”901 Therefore, Beijing 
plays a critical role in Moscow’s mood: it enables Russia to have the illusion 
of conducting independent policy from the West.  
Energy is no less important to China than to Russia, but for different rea-
sons: “China is growing like America was growing in the last century, but 
without the indigenous [oil and gas] reserves.”902 Without energy, China’s rise 
as an emerging power would be stopped and the legitimization of the CPP 
would be severely undermined. China responded to these challenges by mak-
ing the search for energy its top foreign policy priority and creating “resource 
diplomacy”. These domestic imperatives underline the most important differ-
ence on approach to energy between Russia and China: “energy and geopolitics 
are as closely intertwined in China’s case as they are for Russia – with one 
notable difference (…) Comparing with the complex motivations shaping Rus-
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sian energy policy, China’s aims are straightforward. It seeks to maximize im-
ports in order to sustain the process of domestic transformation”903. This dif-
ference is decisive. Without it, the energy cooperation would be complemen-
tary, with one of biggest world’s exporter of oil and gas on one side and the 
globe’s second larger consumer of energy on the other. It was, however, for 
long considered as the “unfulfilled partnership.”904  
Energy started to play an important role in Sino-Russian relations in the mid 
1990s. Then, however, it ended on official declarations only: Russian oligarchs 
and state-owned Gazprom instead of focusing on Asia, were more interested 
in making quick money elsewhere. Because of China’s “energy hunger” this 
began to change in 1999 and was intensified when Putin took office. Although 
in joint statements the importance of energy cooperation was regularly empha-
sized, the cooperation was overshadowed by problems, the main one being a 
different understanding of energy security. For Moscow, it means security of 
demand (oil and gas accounts for 60% of Russia exports and over a half of its 
budget revenue) – a loss of overseas markets would be catastrophic for pros-
perity and political stability; for China, on the other hand, it means security of 
supply – “reliable, long-term access is indispensable to its ability to meet the 
enormous challenges of (…) modernization.”905 Add to it objective reasons, 
such as lack of infrastructure of pipelines and the costly necessity of building 
it and subjective ones: mismanagement, corruption and “the Byzantine nature 
of business interactions within Russian energy sector.”906 Finally, Moscow was 
more interested in selling gas, whereas Beijing was much keener on buying 
Russian oil. That is why China wanted to build the ESPO pipeline, but the 
serious complications with it made Beijing understand that business contracts, 
governmental agreements and public statements mean next to nothing if they 
are not supported by political will. Beijing started viewing Russia as “a ‘lim-
ited-use’ partner, of far less importance than its main sources on the Persian 
Gulf and Africa.”907 
3. The ESPO Oil Pipeline and the “Power of Siberia” Gas Pipeline 
The ESPO pipeline symbolizes the sinusoid nature of Sino-Russian relations. 
Although the first plans were made in Soviet times, it was only when Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky decided to build a pipeline to China (Angarsk-Daqing), that this 
project started to become real. In December 1999, Khodorkovsky came to 
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terms with the Chinese, who backed his project.908 In 2002, however, a longer 
alternative appeared, proposed by Yukos’ rival – Transneft and backed by Ja-
pan: to build a pipeline from Angarsk to Nakhodka in the Pacific Ocean. After 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest in 2003 and Japan’s financial package to build the 
longer pipeline909, Moscow – hoping to play Tokyo and Beijing off one another 
(if the ESPO was built to Nakhodka Russia could export the oil to all regions; 
if to Daqing only, China would become the monopolist that could exhort pres-
sure) – started to play for time. Russia’s strategic plan was based on a hope of 
attracting not only Chinese, but also Japanese and Korean investments to the 
Russian Far East, so that they would balance one another and allow the Russian 
Far East to advance economically, which in turn would strengthen Russia’s 
position in Asia. The ESPO was the key in this play: thanks to its longer route, 
the oil could be exported to many Asian markets. That would give Russia lev-
erage over price (impossible if the route was made to China only). Moscow 
would probably skillfully use the price of energy as well as other non-business 
tools to conduct its Asian policy along the lines of its European policy. That is 
why the Kremlin on 31 December 2004 announced that Russia had chosen the 
longer option – now leading to Skorovodino and called the WSTO (Wosto-
chniy Sibir, Tikhiy Okiean) or the ESPO (East Siberia Pacific Ocean) pipeline. 
That was China’s failure in the first round of the struggle for the pipeline. To 
console China, Moscow agreed to build a separate ESPO branch line to 
China910 – this was intended to neutralize the negative consequences of China 
ESPO’s failure and Japan’s victory. The details were, however, “deliberately 
left unresolved” and the construction was regularly postponed; this left China 
with only an export of 48 million tons of oil to China by rail from a 2004 con-
tract.911 
With time, however, the situation with the ESPO turned to China’s favour. 
The construction of this pipeline became associated with the private interests 
of the Kremlin’s key figures. For them, the project to Daqing was shorter, 
cheaper and easier to build.912 In the meantime, relations with Japan deterio-
rated – Tokyo pulled back on several aspects of its financial package and in-
sisted on ruling out the construction of the Daqing route: “against this backdrop 
strategic diversity as a core principle of Russia’s Asian policy was founded on 
the reality that China was far better disposed towards Russia than a disgruntled 
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Japan.”913 In these circumstances, the best option available for Russia started 
to be to get as good a Chinese offer to finance Daqing route as possible. To 
make matters worse, in 2008 Russia was severely hit by economic crisis. The 
crisis “triggered a shift in Russia’s policy in the oil sector (…) [and] modified 
the calculations on both the Kremlin and the key energy companies.”914 China 
used Russia’s dire situation to fulfill the pipeline agreement. Chinese loans and 
credit (10 billion USD and 15 bln USD), given as a prepayment for future de-
liveries of oil (15 billion tons of oil per year for 20 years, total 300 million tons 
of oil)915 enabled the completion of the Daqing branch construction (the oil 
started to flow to China in January 2011). This meant the return to the initial 
ESPO project (to Daqing) –one that goes directly to China (although Russia 
has since built the second branch, the ESPO transports resources to China 
mostly). The pipeline to Daqing “constituted a breakthrough in Russia-China 
energy cooperation, binding both states to a long-term commitment; Moscow 
agreed to supply Beijing with oil in return for loans, enduring security of de-
mand and the prospect of entering a promising downstream market.”916 Eco-
nomically, China benefited from this pipeline: the price was preferential (low 
compared to market prices; the Russian government forced Transneft to apply 
lower transportation tariffs and lifted the export duty on oil), Beijing achieved 
diversification of oil imports, provided a secure overland route and bound Rus-
sian energy state-owned companies to China (this has converted them to sup-
porters of the collaboration with China) – in short, “the 20-year contract of-
fered Beijing long-term security of supply at a highly advantageous price.”917  
Moreover, once China secured the pipeline, it started pushing for more fa-
vourable conditions. In turned out that “signing the contract is only the first 
stage in an often protracted and difficult process.”918 The CNPC wanted much 
more oil – increasing the volume of the planned import - in return for the con-
struction the Tianjin refinery by the Russians. Faced by this precondition, a 
kind of blackmail, the Russians finally, in September 2010, gave in and agreed 
to send an additional 9 million tons of oil per year. Once they did this, the 
Chinese, in late 2010, demanded the price be lowered and, when deliveries 
started, refused to pay the price earlier agreed. This time the Russians were 
more firm (they made it public, threatened to sue the CNPC in the international 
court and started negotiating with Japanese companies on the exploitation of 
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oil and gas). Finally, the Chinese paid the money, though they received a dis-
count – “Beijing turned out to be a difficult negotiating partner, Russia re-
ceived practically no concessions and had to give in to China’s vision of co-
operation.”919  
Russia yielded to these conditions due to the difficult economic situation 
and out of geopolitical considerations (even Putin himself has admitted that the 
ESPO is “not just a pipeline”, but also “a geopolitical project”).920 Moscow’s 
chosen strategy has been “to keep its share of the very profitable European 
market, while using its contacts with the Chinese as a tool to pressure the Eu-
ropeans.”921 Moscow followed this logic and in 2013 concluded further agree-
ments with Beijing. In 2013, Russia and China signed a series of new giant 
contracts on oil deliveries to China (to send 10 millions tons of oil via the Ka-
zakhstani pipeline; to double the amount of oil sent to China via the ESPO – 
15 million tons for 25 years, worth USD270 billion; to deliver another 10 mil-
lion of tons for ten years), “taken together the series of contracts to which the 
Russian company agreed tripled the amount of oil to be sent to China (…) by 
2020 Russia maybe expected to supply 56 million tons of oil”, which would 
be around 20% of the total Russian oil exports and Russia would become the 
largest supplier of China, providing “up to one fifth of imports” – this all equals 
to the “second breakthrough in oil trade.”922  
So, China benefited most from the ESPO pipeline and its aftermath; Russia 
ended up “as the victim of the China card rather than its master.”923 It was 
supposed to be completely different: “when constructing the ESPO pipeline as 
the cornerstone of its energy policy in Asia, the Kremlin avoided favoring 
China and maintained room for maneuver, without falling into dependency on 
a single customer; later practice (…) [has] undermined the feasibility of such 
an approach, effectively contradicting Moscow’s strategy (…) the pattern 
Moscow rejected in its policy towards the West was, in a modified version, 
accepted in relations with China.”924 Now, in 2017, Russia became China’s 
biggest oil supplier, overtaking Saudi Arabia (Russia delivers 50 million tons 
of crude oil, or 1.05 million barrels per day), in addition to the oil sent via 
ESPO, China purchased 70 percent from the ESPO Pacific coast terminal, “ef-
fectively dominating Russian oil sales to the Asian market”; the existing infra-
structure is mostly bound for China, too.925 Therefore, the ambitious plans of 
the Russian great play on the Asian chessboard ended up with dependency on 
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China. The situation with the ESPO repeated itself in a paradoxical way with 
another Russian project in Asia – the Power of Siberia gas pipeline.  
On 21 March 2014, the second after the epic ESPO pipelineproject in Sino-
Russian relations was concluded – the two sides signed a gas contract for the 
pipeline “the Power of Siberia”.926 According to some, this contract, that had 
been negotiated for more than tens years, symbolizes the “Russian turn to the 
East”; others say it is a political consequence of the Ukrainian crisis and that it 
is China that benefits most from it.  
The first talks about gas contracts started already in the 1990s, but nothing 
materialized. The idea reappeared during Putin’s first years of reign. Despite 
signing a few memoranda and framework agreements (the first one in October 
2004, the second in 2006, which planned 68 billion cubic metres per year)927, 
the two sides were unable to come to a conclusion on the most important issue: 
the price of the gas. That is why “many of the documents signed later reiterated 
provisions which had already been agreed upon, and thus created the pretence 
of progress in negotiations that was necessary for image-building purposes.”928 
This was due to two facts. First – the economic factor: the gas sector, unlike 
oil, was a place where Russia and China’s interests diverged, because their 
needs were not complementary (since gas is more dependent of infrastructure, 
and Russia lacked an eastern gas infrastructure, this hinted at Russia’s possible 
role as a gas provider to China); second – the political factor: Gazprom wanted 
to put pressure on Europe to renew long-term contracts (Moscow planned to 
supply gas to China from Western Siberian gas fields, the source of deliveries 
to Europe, and it conducted  negotiations with China “in bad faith” – “the talks 
were only a façade that was supposed to help Gazprom gain concessions in the 
European market”), China on the other hand was in no hurry to strike a deal 
either – especially once Beijing constructed a gas pipeline to Turkmenistan in 
2006.929  
It was the economic crisis, again, that altered Moscow’s calculations: “Gaz-
prom, faced with waning European demand and the disadvantageous EU law, 
appeared to be much more interested in striking a deal with China”; at first 
Russia still hoped to convince China to use Western Siberian fields (a series of 
agreements between 2009 and 2011), but Beijing, already having a pipeline to 
Turkmenistan (as well as another one to Burma/Myanmar and LNG), wanted 
to get access to Eastern, not Western Siberian fields, as this would not require 
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additional investments in China’s domestic gas infrastructure.930 That is why 
China was in no hurry to conclude the agreement.  
Finally Moscow yielded and gave in to the idea of using Western Siberian 
fields. This led to reopening the negotiations, that were, however, uneasy. In 
May 2014, during Putin’s visit to Shanghai, Gazprom and the CNPC signed a 
30-year contract on 38 billion m³ of gas annually – Gazprom was supposed to 
be obliged to supply a total of around 82 billion m³ of gas during the first five 
years, i.e. around 16.4 billion m³ annually.931 It is less than it was earlier con-
sidered– it is a modification of the original plan of using the Kovyktinskoe gas 
field; instead of the Western Siberia Chayandinskoe field in Yakutia as was 
originally indicated.932 To fulfill this goal, a new pipeline – the Power of Sibe-
ria – will be built, approximately 4000 km long with a planned capacity of 61 
billion m³ annually;933 the beginning of exploitation was planned for 
2019/2020 (it is already now delayed) and should achieve full capacity 2-3 
years later.934 According to the initial estimates, the pipeline’s construction 
cost will reach USD25 billion, i.e. almost half of the expenses planned as part 
of the Eastern Gas Programme (USD60 billion).935 Finding funds may be an 
additional challenge, like exploitation of Chayandinskoe; according to some 
rumours, the cost may be financed by a Chinese loan.936 China agreed to make 
a USD25 billion prepayment accompanied by direct investments that may 
amount to USD20 billion (nevertheless, the final scope of China’s financial 
participation remains unknown).937 This all means that “Given the unknown—
and therefore questionable—rate of return on these investments, the gas mo-
nopoly will remain a big spender rather than earner for at least a couple of 
decades.”938 Building the pipeline, exploiting gas fields and other expenses 
mean significant costs for Gazprom which – even if the Chinese loan is a pos-
sible option – may not bring payback if the oil prices remain low.  
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The price issue made this epic project last only so long. China, having pain-
fully learned how Russia uses energy in politics, was aware that it cannot af-
ford to be dependent on Russia – Moscow would mercilessly use it. That is 
why China pursued a dual strategy: it used imported LNG gas and broke the 
Russian pipeline monopoly in Central Asia. China benefitted from another un-
expected factor: the “shale gas revolution” that led to a lowering of global gas 
prices. That is why Beijing wanted the contract price to be based on the price 
applicable at the US Henry Hub (in 2013 it was USD135 per 1000 m³ as com-
pared to USD390 per 1000 m³ on European spot markets); the Russians, in turn 
insisted on adopting a formula based on the JCC (Japanese Crude Cocktail) 
index, where the average gas price in 2013 ranged between USD524 and 
USD582 per 1000 m³; finally the two sides announced that they would adopt 
an ‘innovative’ formula based on LNG prices, which are linked to oil prices, 
and in effect a final gas price has been set at around USD346 per 1000 m³.939 
The “secretive nature of the gas agreement” may show that “the contract con-
tains something the Russian negotiators could not be proud of in the limelight 
of Russian public opinion.”940  
Considering the available information and the context of the negotiation 
process, it can be concluded that “the price formula adopted will bring more 
economic benefits to the Chinese side”: prices ranging between USD350 and 
USD390 per 1000 m³ “would be, given the present situation on the Asian gas 
market, nearly 50% lower than the price of gas imported by China from Qatar 
(around USD680 per 1000 m3 in 2013)” but would be similar to the prices set 
in Gazprom’s contracts with European customers (the average price in 2013 
was USD380 per 1000 m³) and in the CNPC’s contracts with Turkmenistan 
(around USD360 per 1000 m³) – “a gas price at this level could mean that Gaz-
prom would have to carry out supplies to China below the break-even point”; 
moreover, “considering the expected fiscal preferences promised by the Rus-
sian side the implementation of this project could be barely profitable to Gaz-
prom (…) “the cost-effectiveness of this project became even more dubious” 
after Putin’s statement that Gazprom needs to be recapitalized.941  
Another interesting aspect has been the fact revealed by Putin in his letter 
to European leaders that Russia, through lowering the gas price, had subsidized 
he Ukrainian economy for USD 35,4 billion.942 So, considering USD350-390 
for a similar volume of deliveries to Ukraine (the Ukrainian price was between 
USD410-430 for 1000m³), one may come to a conclusion that “Russia has de-
cided to subsidize the Chinese economy for 100 billions of dollars.”943 On the 
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other hand, within a few months following signing the deal, the global gas 
prices, tied to oil prices, collapsed. Thus, this price perhaps was not as bad for 
Russia as many tend to think.944 
What is certain, rather, is that Gazprom’s investments would not be com-
pensated by a mirage of entering the Chinese gas market945, a part of the “Rus-
sian pivot to Asia”. Data and facts contradict these claims. China has enough 
gas – its own (shale gas), Central Asian (Turkmenistani), Burmese and LNG, 
so that Russia cannot dream of making it a second Europe. Besides, the volume 
of contract is much lower than that with Europe.946 And Chinese interests are 
contradictory with Russia’s: “the Chinese have no interest in assisting Russia 
to become a primary supplier across the Asia-Pacific; they do not just want the 
gas but also to control the regional gas market.”947 Moreover, in exporting gas 
to China alone, Russia “will have to fight for its expected status and face bitter 
competition with such major liquefied gas exporters as Qatar, Australia, Ma-
laysia and Indonesia, and probably also with the USA in the next few years.”948 
Russia is disadvantaged here by the heritage of previous political-business 
deals from the last two decades. All these factors show that signing the contract 
has first and foremost a political importance.949 A diversification threat is in-
tended to strengthen the Russian political position: “its aim is to suggest to 
Europe a possibility of reorienting gas deliveries to Asia; this in turn should 
make the European countries, already dependent on Russian gas, more prone 
to overlook Russian expansionism.”950 Nevertheless, the data once more 
proves to go against Moscow’s plans: in 2015 Russia sold as much as four 
times the oil to EU than to China; and about 800 times as much gas and that in 
2015 China “imported more natural gas from America than it did from Rus-
sia.”951 The low price of the gas and the impossibility of redirecting gas sup-
plies from Europe to Asia (lack of pipelines) make the Russian threats hollow – 
or rather a PR tool only.  
To conclude this agreement, this contract “is another breakthrough in Rus-
sia-China energy co-operation, but makes it more asymmetrical” for China 
“the deal with Russia broadens its import portfolio”, “provides additional safe 
overland route” and is cheaper (it also diminished potential tensions over 
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China’s Central Asian gas deliveries); for Russia “the balance sheet is more 
mixed” – it is built exclusively for China and makes it more dependent on the 
Chinese market, especially now, when Gazprom abandoned plans of building 
a LNG terminal in Vladivostok, it has a high investing cost, therefore: “the 
profitability of the project is questioned, and is assessed as political rather than 
commercial”.952 That all makes the results of the gas contract “groundbreak-
ing”: it makes “China the only target for Russian gas in the East and binds 
Gazprom in the long term to the Chinese market; Gazprom will be developing 
new gas fields for the eastern pipeline which means that it cannot use the con-
tract with China to divert gas supplies destined for Europe”, moreover once 
“all gas-export projects are complete, in the early 2020s, Russia’s exports to 
China may be expected to account for up to 25% of its total exports.”953 There-
fore, this gas contract “does in practice accentuate the asymmetric nature of 
this co-operation, consistently turning the Russian ‘partner’ into an ‘energy 
vassal’ of China.”954  
Judging by the perspective of 2017, “the situation is still far from rosy” – 
the project is facing major challenges: “Beijing has refused to provide a 
planned $25 billion loan needed for pipeline construction, and Russian officials 
have complained that the conditions on offer from Beijing—requiring the par-
ticipation of Chinese companies in the construction phase—are unacceptable”; 
to make matters worse, the gas pipeline “may remain unprofitable if the oil 
price does not increase significantly in the next fifteen years”; nevertheless, 
“officials on both sides remain confident that the pipeline will be built, though 
perhaps with delays.”955 In 2015 construction had begun on both Russian and 
Chinese territory.956 However, the Chinese loan is still unknown while other 
prospects for other Gazprom projects (such as Western Route, or Power of Si-
beria II from Altai to Xinjiang) targeted at the Chinese market “remain bleak” 
due to disagreements over price: “the western route now appears to be a non-
starter, as do Gazprom’s plans to build a third pipeline for Sakhalin gas to 
China via Vladivostok.”957  
The Russia-China energy cooperation, with its two symbols, oil and gas, 
thus witnessed a considerable transformation. From very promising, yet unful-
filled prospects in the 2000s to finalized, though asymmetric, ones in the 
2010s. In the 2000s, Russia has tried to repeat its energy divide and conquer 
strategy in Asia, and avoid dependence on China. Kremlin had “pursued a de 
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facto policy of ‘anyone but the Chinese’ in energy exploration and develop-
ment.”958 Despite its initial reservations, Russia after 2008 due to the economic 
realities of the crisis hS reversed its strategy and priotitised cooperation with 
China which strengthened their relations. Moscow became an important part 
of China’s resource strategy, but at the same time the “energy realm has ex-
posed Russia’s increasing dependence on China”, Moscow’s policy “has been 
growing even more Sinocentric (…), while Russia’s energy assumes that about 
one third of oil and gas will be directed to Asia, in fact it will be for China, not 
Asia.”959 
4. Trade Volume  
Although Sino-Russian economic relations in the 2000s and 2010s intensified, 
this is nothing special: this example follows the global pattern of deepened 
integration in the global world. Sino-Russian economic relationship has also 
become much more unbalanced in comparison with the 1990s: resources 
started to dominate the picture.960 Moscow, afraid that it would become 
China’s “energy appendix” (almost 80% of the Russian export to China con-
sists of energy and raw materials; machinery export is less than 5%); has been 
lobbying for increased export of machinery and technology, but Beijing has 
been unwilling to do so – China has  mostly wanted to develop energy cooper-
ation.961 After the economic crisis, Moscow came to realize that besides re-
sources, “it has nothing to sell to China.”962 In other words, the Kremlin de-
cided to make a virtue out of necessity and intensified the economic relations 
with China, on Chinese terms. For these and other reasons, China remains the 
dominant Russian economic partner in Asia, with around $65 billion trade vol-
ume, whereas Russia’s trade with Japan in 2015 was ($20 billion) while with 
South Korea  $16 billion.963 
Putin’s approach to economy is in many ways similar to the Chinese one: 
strict political control combined with building on market mechanisms, as well 
as significant share of state in strategic sectors and regaining central control 
over Siberian natural resources. Nevertheless, despite a common approach to 
economy, “both governments generally treat each other in an objectively com-
mercial fashion.”964 From an economical point of view, the Russians have for 
a long time viewed “China less as a primary market than a leverage against the 
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West”; there was little sense that “it represents ‘one billion costumers’ a po-
tential El Dorado for the Russian corporate sector”. 965 Only recently has it 
changed, as Russians are increasingly turning to China, hoping to secure deals 
in food and agriculture sector (resulting in “China’s euphoria”), but the “going 
has been slow” due to the competition and barriers; Despite strategic partner-
ship Bejing has been protecting its market by administration measures for two 
decades now.966 
Although the volume of trade has increased eightfold during Putin’s term, 
it started from a very low basis – it materialized thanks to political aspects: 
high oil prices, China’s energy hunger, and intensified export of Chinese man-
ufactured and commercial goods; one may compare Russia’s volume of trade 
with China (around 10%) with the Russia-EU one (around 45%) to see the 
difference.967 Thus, even from the perspective of the mid 2010s, the Sino-Rus-
sian trade volume “scarcely reflects the size and proximity of the two econo-
mies” and among China’s trade partners Russia is ranked below such countries 
as South Korea, Malaysia, Australia, Brazil (not to mention the EU, the USA 
or Japan) and “resembles that of developing countries in Africa and Latin 
America with Beijing—export of natural resources in return for the import of 
manufactured goods”.968 
Despite official rhetoric of “economic complementarity”, in Sino-Russian 
context “this means imbalance and inequality” – “while Moscow hopes that 
China will become an economic, as well as political and strategic counter-
weight to the West, Beijing (with the exception of a few niches, such as space 
and military design) sees Russia as little more than a resource-cow (…) a sec-
ond-rate economy.”969 Patterns of trade confirm the Chinese outlook: Russia is 
not an important target for the Chinese export. For example, in 2011 China 
invested “US$300 million into the Russian economy— 0.5 percent of its total 
overseas amount that year (…)” and the investment was “focused mainly on 
natural resources extraction rather than value-added industries.”970 On the 
other hand, China is an important destination for Russian export: raw materials 
(energy, wood) and semi-finished industrial goods (chemicals and metals): en-
ergy compromises 68% of 2015 exports, while timber – another 13%.971 Be-
sides exporting resources, recent Russian exports to China of agriculture goods 
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(fish, meat, chocolate, sunflower oil, beer, honey and ice cream), as well as 
amber, have intensified, comprising around 10% of all its export.972 Russia in-
vests in China mostly in the following sectors: chemicals, agricultural machin-
ery, automobiles, construction, nuclear power and construction materials, river 
transportation, as well as primary sectors (agriculture, forestry and fishing).973 
Its biggest investement (beside energy) is joint construction of a titanium fac-
tory in Jiamusi in Heilongjiang; yet, Russian investements in China are very 
thin (“extremely insignificant” for the Chinese economy) and much smaller 
even than the Chinese investments in Russia.974 Aside from energy, the Chi-
nese are investing in the following sectors: wood processing, telecommunica-
tions equipment, textile industry, microelectronics, consumer appliances, ser-
vices and agriculture.975 The most important Chinese investments in Russia are 
the “Baltic Pearl” complex in Saint Petersburg, Park Huamin business-centre 
in Moscow (not finished yet) and the international trade centre “Greenwood” 
in Moscow capital district (Podmoskove); all of them have been constructed 
for more than a decade now (since the early 2000s) with much delays and prob-
lems on the way.976 To make matters worse, in general Chinese investments in 
Russia are far behind in numbers than those to other destinations, such as Lux-
embourg, South Africa, Singapore, Thailand, Burma/Myanmar, Canada, Paki-
stan, Brasil, or Iran: “all those places seem to be more attractive for Chinese 
investors than Russia”.977  
In general, the trends of bilateral trade show a reversal of history. According 
to Dmitri Trenin, “In the past, much of this trade consisted of Russian machin-
ery exports to, and raw material imports from China. Today, the roles have 
been reversed: Russia imports Chinese manufactured goods, including grow-
ing quantities of machinery, and exports raw materials – energy, metals and 
timber – alongside a few high-tech items.”978 Alexander Lukin echoes his 
words: “Russia and China exchanged their places: Russia became a provider 
of resources to Chinese industry, while China a supplier of ready-made pro-
duction for Russian consumers (…) Russia is interested in China as a supplier 
of resources and in its market for its goods.”979 Bobo Lo has put it more dras-
tically: “the economic relationship is so asymmetrical that it is beginning to 
acquire a neo-colonial tinge: a modernizing China exploiting a backward Rus-
sia for its energy and timber resources and as a market for low-grade foods 
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unsalable in the more discriminating West. Commercially, Beijing appears to 
rate Russia more or less on a par with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Angola 
or Sudan.”980  
Imbalance of bilateral trade relations started to worry the Kremlin around 
the mid 2000s. Even arms sales, so far the “pearl in the crown” of bilateral 
relations, consists only little more than 10% of all trade volume.981 To make 
matters worse for Russia, the trade balance year by year has become more and 
more imbalanced. China’s importance in Russian foreign trade annually in-
creases: in 2010 China surpassed Germany and became Russia’s first trade 
partner (the first partner if we exclude the EU and estimate the EU countries 
separately, if EU countries are considered combined, then the EU is the first 
partner); the Russia-China trade volume was USD 55 billion then (10% of all 
Russian trade).982 To compare – in 2015 Russia was China’s sixteenth trade 
partner983: “Russia is a less important trading partner to China than China is to 
Russia; Russian trade is a significant factor primarily for the northeast China, 
abutting Siberia. For the Chinese government officials dealing with econom-
ics, trade and finance, Russia is a non-factor.”984 This happens because of six 
reasons. First, China’s imports are more strongly oriented to primary products; 
second, China relies much more on the EU and the USA than on Russia for 
imports that are technologically sophisticated; third, the composition of the 
Chinese exports to Russia follows the pattern in exports to other developed 
economies; the composition of China’s trade with Russia is much more dy-
namic and prone to changes than the relatively stable compositions in China-
EU or China-US trade relations.985 Forth, geography restricts enhanced coop-
eration, as the most important Russian centres are located far away and those 
on the Russian Far East suffer from a lack of transport infrastructure; fifth, the 
size of the Russian market (a population of 146 million and the GDP per capita 
of $9,100) cannot consume as much of China’s output as the West; sixth, the 
investment climate in Russia is bad (corruption, legal unpredictability, ineffec-
tivness of governmental agencies) which makes investement risks too high for 
many (particularly for SME); all these contributed to the fact that Chinese in-
vestments in Russia were “anaemic: $3.8 billion from 2007 to 2016, compared 
with $24 billion from Germany.”986 In these circumstances, there is little be-
yond resources and cheap commercial goods to be traded.  
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Russian attempts to deepen economic cooperation have been unsuccessful 
so far: “Russia’s appeal for a balance in industrial development based on Chi-
nese commitments to buying more than natural resources from Russia falls on 
deaf ears.”987 Russia has been losing its position even in its traditional areas to 
the Western competition (advantaged by the virtue of having better technol-
ogy). In energy Russia hoped for much, but in the end the Chinese set the 
agenda. In arms sales and space technology, China has been pushing strongly – 
against Moscow’s will – for license purchase and recently achieved it with Su-
35. Growing Chinese export and decreasing import of Russian industrial goods 
contributed to the fact that Russia lost the positive trade balance.988 Despite 
Russia and China’s “proximity and complementary resource base, bilateral in-
tegration has not proceeded more rapidly or deeply than their separate integra-
tion with the rest of the world; the reasons for this are related to geography, 
social features and politics.”989  
It the last few years this gloomy picture has been changing a bit. Russia is 
striving to change the unbeneficial model of economic cooperation by trying 
to attract Chinese investments in return for sales of the most advanced technol-
ogy. There is a potential in increasing Chinese direct foreign investments (but 
not the other way round) in the following areas: Far East/Siberia economic 
projects, cross-border transportation infrastructure, high–technology coopera-
tion from commercialization to research and development, aerospace, environ-
mental protection, agriculture, forestry, railways, ship-building, and alternative 
energy. In return Russia has been hoping for contracts in atomic energy, space 
industry (RD-18 rocket engines), aviation and helicopter building.990 However, 
so far, these hopes ended up like the grandiose declarations on reaching 100 
billion USD volume of trade until 2015991 – on paper mostly. The same can be 
said about nuclear technology. Despite promising prospects in the mid 2000s, 
and Russian success in building two blocks of nuclear power plant Tianwan in 
Lianyungang (the contract was signed in 1997, but the power plan became full 
operational only in 2009)992, the cooperation stalled: the implementation of 
several memoranda (including that of the construction of the third and forth 
block of the Tianwan nuclear power plant) have not followed, probably due to 
security issues after the Fukushima catastrophe in 2011.993  
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Cooperation in electric energy and coal works a bit better. Russia is already, 
since 2012, selling around 4 billion KWh of electric energy to China, and 
should this sector of cooperation grow, the Russian Far East may become “a 
powerhouse supplying northeastern China”; Russian export of coal to China 
intensified after 2009: after the contract of August 2010, Moscow agreed to 
export 15 million tons of coal annually, although it is only a small share in 
China’s market (imports equate to 1% of China’s consumption), even this is 
an opportunity given the size of this market.994  
Potential Chinese investments in Russia are important for the Russian Far 
East mostly. Already in 2004, Chinese officials “promised $800 million worth 
of investments for Russia’s far eastern territories”; however, “imports of Chi-
nese capital have been slow to arrive – in 2008, the inflow was under $30 mil-
lion, which rose to $45 million in 2009 – still a puny 0.5 per cent of all foreign 
direct investment in Russia’s far eastern region.”995 According to the Russian 
TASS agency, recently (in 2017) Chinese investments in the Russian Far East 
are rising and account for about 22% of the total foreign investment volume996, 
if it is indeed so, then perhaps this is the first good news for years for the Rus-
sian Far East.  
In 2009, Moscow, finally liberating itself from anti-Chinese fear, accepted 
a plan of Chinese investments in the Russian Far East. This plan targets the 
following sectors: trade, forestry, energy, transportation, manufacture, and ag-
riculture.997 Needles to say, this program, if implemented, would make the 
Russian Far East even more dependent on China. The Russians “see the danger 
of becoming a simple ‘raw materials appendix’ to their neighbour but hope to 
be able to rebalance the relationship later, by producing semi-finished goods 
on their territory.”998 It remains to be seen whether they would be able to 
achieve it.  
The 2015 fall of energy prices (particularly oil) and China’s economic slow-
down all seriously and negatively affected Russia-China economic relations. 
Russia dropped from being China’s ninth partner to sixteenth place. In 2014, 
trade grew by 6.8 percent and reached a total of $95.3 billion; in 2015, how-
ever, it collapsed by 28.6 percent, to just total $68 billion ($64 billion by other 
estimations). It was not only because of the drop in commodity prices; Russian 
economic decline was more important: GDP decreased by 3.4 percent, and the 
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subsequent low purchasing power of Russian companies and households con-
tributed to the sharp drop in Russian imports from China.999 Nevertheless, both 
sides continued to cooperate, and – judging by early 2017 – trade is showing 
signs of increasing: it rose by 30% in April. By the end of 2016 Chinese com-
panies had invested US$40 billion of cumulative investment in Russia, with 
about a quarter coming after the Ukrainian crisis; Chinese banks, despite being 
compliant with Western sanctions, have helped Putin’s friend’s companies, 
China offered Russia “critical technologies” such as an “electrical cable going 
from mainland Russia to Crimea, which helped Moscow withstand the Ukrain-
ian economic blockade of the occupied peninsula”; on the other hand, Chinese 
companies are steadily taking over the Russian market from Western compa-
nies (“particularly in the IT and telecommunications sector where Russian 
SOEs and ministries are busy replacing Western equipment with products 
made by Chinese competitors”).1000 Russia still hopes to move beyond re-
sources by selling machines, equipment and food to China; it remains to be 
seen whether Moscow will be able to achive that: “though there has been plenty 
of talk about Chinese investment in Russia and (to a lesser extent) Russian 
investment in China, the reality has yet to match up.”1001 
5. Summary 
The growing asymmetry in favour of Beijing in Sino-Russian relations is best 
seen in their economic relations. Moscow and Beijing are still not the most 
important partners to one another. Moscow is China’s sixteenth trade partner; 
whereas Beijing is Russia’s second – but far behind the European Union. De-
spite decreasing it comprises almost 45% of Russian trade, compared to little 
more than 10% with China; over 90% of FDI to Russia comes from the West, 
which is also the biggest source of capital and advanced technologies; also 
90% of all energy export goes westwards; “it will take two decades (at least) 
for Asia to become the primary destination of Russian oil and gas.”1002 Fur-
thermore, the structure of trade shows China’s advantage. China mostly buys 
resources and raw materials and sells consumption goods and food. The struc-
ture of trade follows almost a colonial pattern. Russia is aware of this fact and 
tries to change it; so far in vain. Two Russian attempts to engage actively with 
Asia through grand energy projects – the oil pipeline ESPO and gas pipeline 
The Power of Siberia – instead of decreasing Russia’s dependence from China, 
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increased it. Russia has no good idea of how to decrease its dependence on 
China and escape the fate of being a permanent “raw material appendix” to the 
Chinese economy. Moscow, however, after 2008 decided that “what is real is 
rational”: instead of balancing China and trying to steer away from its depend-
ence from China, Russia decided to bandwagon and get as much as possible 
from economic cooperation on Chinese terms.  
II. Military Relations  
Russian-Chinese military relations played a very special role. In the 1990s, the 
military cooperation was the most visible aspect of the “strategic partnership”: 
“the glue of the bilateral relationship”, “the hallmark of relationship”, the key 
aspect of improving of relations and the only stable sector of trade and certainly 
an important reason for maintaining friendly relations between Moscow and 
Beijing.1003 The level of Russia-China military cooperation decreased in the 
2000s to increase again in the 2010s. However, researching this aspect is par-
ticularly hard, due to the inaccessibility of sources and difficulties with verifi-
cation of data; this adds an aura of secrecy around this matter.1004  
In the military sphere of Sino-Russian relations two questions are crucial. 
The first one: is the PLA, long considered technologically backward, overtak-
ing its Russian counterpart? And the second: do China’s enhanced military ca-
pabilities threaten Russia’s security interests?1005 
The People’s Liberation Army has made remarkable progress in the last two 
decades, even more remarkable when compared to the demise of the Russian 
army. The difference in Chinese progress and Russian regress was so visible 
that some may come to the conclusion that Chinese military potential exceeds 
the Russian one – or will do shortly. It is a wrong conclusion: “despite the 
decline of the Russian army, they nevertheless still enjoy several critical ad-
vantages, including nuclear warheads and around a million of conventional 
forces.”1006 Moreover, modernization of the PLA is focused on navy and air 
force – this illustrates China’s most important military and political goals – 
Taiwan and the South China Sea, not Russia.1007 Finally, “the modernization 
of the Chinese military is far from complete – it still has a long way to go 
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before it develops modern armed forces, let alone defeating such a strong ad-
versary as Russia that enjoys the advantage of strategic depth”; nor is China 
planning to invade the Russian Far East in the predictable future: “compared 
to Chinese strategic objectives, the Russian Far East is a provincial side-show, 
hardly worth risking war with the world’s second nuclear weapon state.”1008 
The understanding of this fact led to growing cooperation, particularly in arms 
sales (from the 1990s) and in joint exercises (from the mid 2000s).  
1. Arms Sales 
Arms sales constituted the most important part of Russian-Chinese military 
cooperation in the 1990s. One may even say that it was the essence of this 
cooperation; beyond it not much happened. Here interests of China and Russia 
met perfectly. On the Russian side it was the military industrial sector that ad-
vocated intensification of contacts with China. The hard conditions of the Gai-
dar reforms, giant debts and a lack of new orders made acquiring financial 
means an absolute necessity. In these circumstances, “export became the only 
possible option of financing military sector”, while trade with China was 
“manna from heaven for the Russian military-industrial complex.”1009 Between 
1992 and 1999, defence enterprises produced 2 ships for domestic procurement 
and 11 for export sales, 31 tanks for domestic use and 433 for export, and 7 
aircraft for the domestic sector and 278 for export; in 1996 military-technical 
cooperation with foreign countries provided work for over 400,000 employees 
of defence enterprises, while up to two-thirds of the working assets of enter-
prises of the military-industrial complex were produced by arms exports.1010 
Director of Rosvoomzheniye, the main export agency, A. I. Kotiolkin, admit-
ted that 50% of factory units were financed by export; a significant part from 
selling to China alone (China was the most interested country in acquiring Rus-
sian arms).1011 Reliance on export “gave rise to certain understandable but dys-
functional behavior (…) born out of financial desperation”; Chinese delega-
tions to Russia reminded of shopping trips, while once symbols of Russian 
national pride such as Su-27, “representing the highest technological achieve-
ment of Soviet military prowess, became reduced to the status of a commodity 
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on the marketplace.”1012 China became so attractive that the Russian military-
industrial base developed its own “China policy”: “to sell anything to any-
body.”1013 The first years of Yeltsin’s era favored uncontrollable trade. Alt-
hough formally there were control of exports and Russia vowed to honor its 
international obligations to sell only defensive weapons, “neither the Foreign 
Ministry nor even the secret service were able to estimate exactly what was 
exported, particularly in 1992, popularly known as the year of no control.”1014 
Enterprises had good reason to deal directly with the Chinese clients, bypass-
ing official channels – it guaranteed that money actually ended up in their ac-
counts, not in the “notoriously corrupted” state arms sales agency.1015  
That is why the military-industrial complex remained the vocal and perma-
nent lobbyist for cooperation with China, against the pro-Western policy of 
Kozyrev. With time their task got easier, for two reasons. Firstly, it was already 
the late Soviet times when the institutional framework for cooperation was cre-
ated. Secondly, with time, the role of this complex in Russian policy making 
grew – since Gaidar’s deposition,  there was a military complex representative 
in every Russian government. The clear, visible sign of the complex’s im-
portance became the nomination of Arkadiy Volsky, a well-known lobbyist for 
cooperation with China, for the Russian-side chairmanship in Peace, Friend-
ship and Development Committee, established in 1997.1016 The lobbyists did 
not have to strive very hard to convince the political elites anyway – already 
in January 1992, Boris Yeltsin said that “arms sales are necessary for us to get 
foreign currency, urgently needed, as well as to keep the military-industrial 
complex alive.”1017 Arms sales, not included in Russian custom statistics, be-
came niches in Russian export. Arms were one of the very few technologically 
advanced products which Russia was able to offer on the competitive global 
market. According to Pavel Felgenhauer, Russian policy towards China in 
arms sales was simple in its nature: “first, it’s money; second, it’s money; and 
third, it’s also money.”1018  
For China, arms purchases from Russia became vital after the Western em-
bargo on arms and military technology sales introduced on China after Tianan-
men. The USSR’s fall cancelled a military threat from the north, while change 
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in military doctrine (to the so called “peripheral defence”) as well as reorien-
tation towards Taiwan and the South China Sea meant growing need for mod-
ern military equipment, particularly in aviation and fleet. Moreover, Beijing 
understood the need of acquiring advanced military technology. The Western 
embargo made it a necessity to find a place to get it. In the early 1990s it could 
only have been Russia. Moscow had other advantages – the Chinese military 
industry was built by Soviet specialists in the 1950s, while Chinese army was 
equipped with modified Russian arms along Soviet patterns. Moreover, Russia 
had no reservations about selling weapons and arms sales created no political 
problems in bilateral relations. Finally, Russian arms were relatively cheap and 
Moscow was prone to accept flexible prices, including barter. For example, 
75% of the first contract to supply Su-27 and Kilo submarines was paid in 
barter.1019 This provoked “considerable chagrin, if not outright despair, among 
Russian observers who were compelled to watch their sophisticated weaponry 
being exchanged for low-quality consumers items and foodstuffs from 
China.”1020 With time, however, Russia was able to increase cash transac-
tions – in the late 1990s, all Russian-Chinese contracts on advanced military 
technology were signed in hard currency.  
All these factors made Russia the most logical and most adequate arms sup-
plier to China. Unsurprisingly, Russia became China’s top arms supplier in the 
1990s. Nevertheless, a proper estimation of volume of this trade remains diffi-
cult, because only a portion of information has been made accessible to the 
public. For sure, Russia remained China’s unrivaled supplier of arms (around 
90% of all arms delivered to China in the 1900s were made in Russia). As for 
Russia, China also remained critical, though for different reasons. After the 
USSR’s fall, Russia lost some of its traditional markets in arms sales (Afghan-
istan, Syria), whereas others were limited by free market realities (Vietnam, 
Angola). Although in the early 1990s India was Russia’s main receiver of 
arms, it changed quickly and China took the lead.1021 
Signed in the late Soviet years, the contract for the delivery of the Su-27 
became the historical first purchase of Russian arms by the Chinese (the Su 
arrived in China in 1992).1022 Soon cooperation in arms sales developed so 
rapidly that it evoked neighbors’ fears. It also contributed to a substantional 
increase in Russian-Chinese volume of trade to the level of 5.6 billion USD, 
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that contrasted with its noticeable fall during last years of the USSR.1023 During 
Yeltsin’s trip to Beijing in December 1992, both sides signed a memorandum 
on the basis of military-technical cooperation (and confirmed sale of the Su-
27 and an anti-aircraft S-300).1024 Moreover, both sides set up a join govern-
mental commission on cooperation in military technology. During his 1992 
visit Yeltsin disclosed – “to the consternation of those who had labored to keep 
such figures secret” that Russian arms supplies to China had totalled 1.8 billion 
dollars for 1992.1025 In 1992 alone, Russia and China signed many agreements 
on training, training programmes, Russian instructors and technician visits to 
China and of training Chinese military staff in Russian institutes. Soon this 
cooperation developed further. The importance of trade contacts and exports 
for Russia can be clearly seen in 1993 military doctrine, where military-tech-
nical goals and the key role of military cooperation in rebuilding military-in-
dustrial base is emphasized.1026 During the trip to China of the RF minister of 
defence, Pavel Grachov, the two sides signed a memorandum on military-tech-
nical cooperation. The details remain undisclosed but clearly created ground 
for a series of transactions, technology transfers and technical courses for the 
Chinese (the license for the Su-27 was supposed to be the most important part 
of this deal).1027 Moscow was less willing to admit cooperation in this area, but 
in February 1996 Russians revealed that Moscow sold the license for produc-
tion of the Su-27 (the leaks revealed that it was the purchase of 48 Su-27s, 
including 6 already contracted; China was given the right to produce 200 Su-
27s within 15 years without the possibility of reselling it to third countries; 
Beijing was supposed to pay 2.5 billion USD.1028 The transfer of technology 
issue pushed by the Chinese since the mid 1990s split into two sides. The Rus-
sians “sought to preserve a 70 to 30 ratio of arms deliveries to technology 
transfers.”1029 From the geostrategic point of view, transfer of technology was 
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not the most rational behaviour – it could have meant arming a potential enemy 
in the future. High ranking Russian commanders raised this kind of concern 
with their “unordinary statements”: Defence minister Pavel Grachov an-
nounced in 1995 that: “the Chinese want to peacefully conquer the Russian Far 
East”, while his successor, Igor Rodionov included China in the “potentially 
main enemies of Russia.”1030 Rodionov’s words “obviously recited the collec-
tive apprehensions of the General Staff (…) nothing illustrates the prevailing 
ambiguity among the Russian elites than the predicament of the military estab-
lishment: it has to approve massive Russian arms sales to China in order to 
salvage something from the crumbling national defence industrial base, while 
at the same time counting China among Russia’s potential adversaries for the 
future.”1031 Besides, the elites themselves were divided over arms sales: mili-
tary-industrial complex representatives lobbied for further sales, whereas se-
curity ministries blocked the transfer of the newest technology. Arms sales to 
China were also advocated by some specialists, who saw it “not only as a pri-
vate interest of producers, but also rational calculations of strategic and na-
tional interests.”1032 In this approach arms sales were supposed to be the engine 
of long-term strategic partnership that would lead to new balance of power in 
East Asia. China, then, was not considered a rival, because Russia still had at 
least 15 years technological advantage. Except for this advantage, there was 
another reason why Russian experts did not consider China as a threat – Bei-
jing’s orientation towards Taiwan and the South China Sea. The most im-
portant reason, however, why Russia, despite reservations was selling weap-
ons, was money. As Georgi Arbatov commented – “we made it easier for them 
because of the absolute failure of our economic reforms; for us the weakest 
point is the state of our economy”; “ultimately Russia, beset by increasingly 
severe economic problems with the August 1998 collapse of the ruble, yielded 
to China, jettisoning the 70 to 30 ratio.”1033  
To summarize: the most important Chinese achievement in arms sales in the 
1990s must be the contract in 1992 for the delivery of the Su-27 multirole com-
bat aircraft. This contract covered 26 Su-27s and Su-27 UBs with arms and the 
training of Chinese pilots. In 1995-1996 ota furtherher 22-42 planes were or-
dered and the license for production of 200 Su-27s in Shenyang was bought; 
besides this the PRC purchased air-to-air missiles, cargo aircrafts Il-27, Mi-17 
and Ka-27 helicopters, aircraft engines RD-33 and potential rocket engines for 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, radars for circular observation, fire control 
and warcraft radars, a rocket air-defence system – around one hundred strate-
gic S-300 PMU-1s (SA-10) and Tor-M1s (SA-15), rocket anti-tank systems, 
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T-80U and T-72 tanks, infantry fighting vehicle MMP-3s, self-propelled artil-
lery, multiple rocket launchers, 4 Kilo class submarines, 2 Sowriemiennyi type 
rocket destroyers with equipment and armament, system for aerial refueling, 
and special technologies to produce titanium used for building aircrafts.1034  
Sino-Russian military relationship has been deepened during Vladimir 
Putin’s first two presidential terms. Normalization and recentralization of trade 
and resigning from barter, marked the most important differences in compari-
son to the 1990s. The anxiety over selling modern weapons to China started 
eroding, with strategic calculations being replaced by commercial ones. Bei-
jing remained the biggest receiver of Russian arms. In the early 2000s what 
differed from the 1990s was Russia’s growing security and claim that China is 
not a threat. This led to increase in arms sales to China, even the most sophis-
ticated ones. The fear over Chinese future aggressive moves disappeared: Rus-
sian generals mostly stopped being afraid of the Chinese military moderniza-
tion.1035 As a result, Moscow agreed on selling Beijing highly advanced mili-
tary technology, such as: Kilo submarines, Sovremennyi-2 destroyers and SU-
30MKK helicopters. During the 2000s and the 2010s, Russia has provided the 
majority of Chinese-bought weapons, and remains the leader of arms sales to 
the PRC.1036  
While in the past arms sales was intended to save the military-industrial 
complex, now this complex is revived thanks to the enlarged spectrum of cli-
ents. Nevertheless, Beijing remained the main receiver of Russian arms (over 
40%).1037 Partly it was because of the size of the market, but more important 
was Moscow’s conviction that selling weapons to China does not threaten na-
tional security: “Russian security elites might prefer today to be more cautious 
of Chinese military cooperation, but seeing few alternatives, they appear to 
have shelved their concerns.”1038 Naturally, the fact that such units as Kilo sub-
marines or Sovremennyi destroyers cannot be used against Russia also played 
its role. Either way, “the traditional fear that Russian arms may be used one 
day against Russia’s armed forces has become discredited.”1039  
That is why the beginning of the 2000s brought an increase of cooperation 
in arms sales. Putin’s administration simply continued or even deepened the 
military cooperation with China. The new element was the fact that the state 
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regained control over arms sales. Since 2001, the Kremlin has started intensive 
“recentralization” of arms sales: since then, none of the “strategic materials” 
could have been sold without government knowledge and consent. This rein-
stated Moscow’s control over its own military-industrial units. Putin’s admin-
istration focused on the revival of the military-industrial complex considering 
it a means to bring Russia back to its great power status. This sector was heav-
ily subsidized by central funds when the Kremlin decided that this would help 
to revive the Russian economy. China was very important here, because Bei-
jing imported the biggest amount of arms. Unsurprisingly, cooperation has 
flourished. Beijing, among other weapons, has purchased thirty eight Su-27 
MKK fighter jets, four S-300PMU-4 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, 
eight Kilo-class (project 363) submarines and two 956EM destroyers; this was 
followed by twenty-four Su-30 MK2 fighter jets equipped with Kh-31 A anti-
warship missiles for the Chinese navy.1040 The level of Chinese purchases be-
gun to drop at the end of the 2000s when further development was blocked by 
concerns over the transfer of the most advanced military technology.  
In the 2000s, Russian concerns about selling China highly advanced weap-
ons changed to a commercial, rather than security, nature. Beijing has since 
preferred purchasing technology instead of military equipment – theoretically 
good news for Moscow (Russia is an ideal provider, given the ties between the 
two countries in the defence industrial sector – China’s defence industry was 
built in the 1950s with Soviet assistance) which reacted to it by selling more 
equipment, weapons system and licenses “that only a few years ago it would 
have declined even to discuss, let alone sell, including a Klub-S (SS-N 27) 
antiship and land-attack cruise missile, an improved version of the Moskit SS-
N-22 antiship missile, and the Su-30MMK2 and Su-30MKK3 combat aircrafts 
that even Russian military is not equipped with.”1041 Nevertheless, Moscow 
was unwilling to sell high advanced technology due to one reason: Beijing 
purchases it and then resells it to third countries.1042 In recent years China has 
become one of the most important exporters of arms. That is why Moscow 
preferred not to sell the newest licenses to China, choosing India and Vietnam 
instead1043. To make matters worse, Beijing attracted Russian military special-
ists – at least two thousand Russian technicians have been employed, legally 
or not, by China to work on laser technology, nuclear weapons miniaturization, 
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cruise missiles, space-based weaponry and nuclear submarines.1044 All this has 
continued to annoy Moscow: which is why obstacles on the development of 
trade in military relationship were of a commercial, rather than security, nature. 
The Chinese pace to modernize its military capabilities and purchase new tech-
nologies leads to the question as to how long Moscow will be competitive. So 
far Russian equipment has served to enhance the Chinese army’s capabilities 
in the area of potential confrontation with Taiwan (navy, air force). Russian 
dominance, however, was also based on the fact that the other three most im-
portant world exporters – the USA, the United Kingdom and France kept the 
post-Tiananmen’s arms sales embargo. Should it be lifted, Moscow would face 
strong competition and might even lose this attractive market. Fortunately for 
Moscow, this scenario seems unlikely.  
Nevertheless, despite intensive cooperation in the early 2000s, this changed 
in the mid 2000s. Russia had problems with the fulfillment of existing arrange-
ments, and clearly was losing heart for selling weapons to Beijing. China’s 
share in Russia’s arms trade fell from around 40% to a mere 10%.1045 The rea-
sons were that the Russian military-industrial complex revived and there was 
no longer a dire need to sell weapons to China – Moscow thus was no longer 
forced to sell the most sophisticated weapons to Beijing (they sold them instead 
to India and Vietnam), keeping in mind the fact of the Su-27 having been cop-
ied by China; add geopolitical considerations (fear that did not ceased to exist 
on the part of Russian military establishment) and the fact that the Chinese 
military industry believed it had achieved “saturation level” and was not forced 
to buy Russian arms any longer.1046  
Nevertheless, in the late 2000s the trends reversed again. After 2009 active 
cooperation was restarted and – particularly after 2011 –intensified.1047 Russia 
sold thirty-two Mi-171 transport helicopters (in 2009), 500 jet engines (in 
2010), ten Il-76 transport aircraft (2011), fifty-five Mi-171 helicopters; to-
gether since the early 2010s, Russia’s arms sales to China “have stabilized at 
a level of USD2 billion per annum, accounting for up to 15% of Russia’s rising 
profits from arms exports.”1048 What differentiated these purchases from the 
earlier periods (the 1990s and the early 2000s), was that the structure of arms 
exports “changed significantly: deliveries of complete weapon system de-
creased, replaced by sales of high-tech components, training for the Chinese 
military and the servicing of equipment already in operation.”1049 
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In accordance with the renewed trend, since the late 2009s new negotiations 
started on Chinese purchases of twenty-four Su-35 jet fighters, S-400 anti-air-
craft missile system as well as USD2 billion contract on four Amur 1650 sub-
marines.1050 The Su case in particular is symptomatic here. So far Russia de-
clined to sell the most advanced jet fighters to China (it did not want to see 
their copies being resold). Several reasons, however, made Moscow change its 
mind: diversification of supply sources by traditional Russian allies (India, 
Central Asian countries); the conviction that China was technologically devel-
oping so rapidly that it may soon not be interested in purchasing Russian equip-
ment; the traditional argument – that is, financial benefits (contract worth 
around USD1.5 billion); and finally, the fact that Su-35 production is supposed 
to terminate soon (it will be replaced by a new model), which means that Rus-
sia would keep its technological advantage in jet-fighters.1051 Moreover, Rus-
sian relations with India deteriorated with the delay of several contracts and 
Russia wanted to use China as leverage for India; as for Beijing’s rationale for 
renewing interest in Russian weaponry, the reason was that the “technological 
gap on the Chinese side turned out to be a much more serious obstacle than 
had previously been thought”.1052 That is why China considered the Su as a 
way of fundamental strengthening its military position vis-à-vis Japan, Vi-
etnam and other South China Sea partners as well as maintaining an advantage 
over India.  
Since 2012, intensive negotiations over the Su-35 took place, but the final 
impetus to sign this deal was the Ukrainian crisis – the negotiations ended with 
the signing of the USD2 billion contract on twenty-four Su-35s in November 
2015.1053 Even earlier, in April 2015 Moscow sold 6 battalions of S-400 anti-
missile systems to China1054; this transfer is “a game changer” in China-Taiwan 
relations “since the PLA would be able to shoot down Taiwanese fighter planes 
as soon as they take off.”1055 
This all means that Moscow has departed from its former policy of not sell-
ing the most advanced weaponry to Beijing. Most probably economic factors 
(low oil prices, Western sanctions) made the Kremlin modify its stance. This 
contract qualitatively transforms Russia-China military relations as Russia “re-
versed its usual pattern of arms sales in Asia, according to which India always 
obtained slightly better equipment than China. Now, Russia will provide the 
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same class of arms to the two strategic rivals, as India became the second cus-
tomer for the Su-35 and S-400”1056; selling of the Su-35 symbolically marks 
“the diminishing mistrust on the part of Russia towards China (…) and reaf-
firms the Sinocentric orientation of Russia’s foreign policy in Asia”.1057 
2. Military Cooperation, Joint Exercises  
In the 1990s formal contacts between the Russian and Chinese armies, except 
for the financial sphere, were quite limited.1058 Although top level visits were 
carried out regularly, very rarely were they concerned about anything other 
than arms sales. Both sides have signed a few agreements not connected to 
arms sales, both armies started visiting each other, but there was no intensive 
cooperation. The reasons for this state of affairs can be best illustrated by an 
unsuccessful initiative of Pavel Grachov, Russian minister of defence. In 1995, 
without informing the Russian MFA and without an earlier consultation with 
the Chinese side, he proposed to China to establish a joint security system in 
East Asia, consisting of Russia, China, the USA, Japan and both Koreas.1059 
This utopian idea was bound to fail from the very beginning: China as a rule 
does not join any alliances. Unsurprisingly, Beijing politely rejected the sug-
gestion. China, like Japan or South Korea, felt no need to tie its hand with joint 
security schemes in the region, preferring tried and tested channels of bilateral 
agreements with the United States. Russia was not needed here – thus in the 
1990s there was no real cooperation. It started to change, however, in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s. A high level of dialogue was established, with reg-
ular meetings of the ministers of defence and chiefs of general staff, and the 
joint commission on military-technical cooperation (the major forum for arms 
sales).1060 In March 2008, Russia and China established a hotline between the 
ministers of defence.1061  
In 2005, the then-Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, summarized 
Russia-China military relations as consisting of three aspects: “military-politi-
cal consultations, and practical action of the troops during military exercises, 
as well as military-technical cooperation.”1062 So, in other words, the first as-
pect means the influence of military issues on politics (promoting multi-polar 
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world) which was summarized in the “War Doctrine of the Russian Federa-
tion” from 2000 and remained a priority for a long time1063; the second aspect 
means joint drills, while the third one is arms sales. The first and third aspects 
have already been described here, so it is time to elaborate on the second one – 
joint drills. This became important in bilateral relations in the mid 2000s. Nat-
urally, all three aspects were combined: arms and technology sales to China 
and joint drills served as geopolitical means of undermining American hegem-
ony there, where American interests contradicted Russian and Chinese ones. 
The exercises that started as a political tool against the U.S. hegemony (for 
Russia) and a way to modernize the military (China) within a decade “symbol-
ically marked a new stage of collaboration.”1064 
The first, historical, Russian-Chinese joint exercises called the “Peace Mis-
sion” took place between 18 and 25 August 2005 under the aegis of the 
SCO1065. These drills lasted eight days: 1800 Russian and 7200 Chinese sol-
diers participated in them.1066 Although officially the drills were aimed at com-
bating terrorism and the coordination of actions within the SCO, the weapons 
used and the scheme of exercises (amphibian landing, sea blockades and other 
operations unrelated to Central Asian deserts) – contradicted this claim.1067 
The “Peace Mission” of 2005 was therefore more a political declaration to-
wards the West than real exercises.1068 In the month prior to the exercises Rus-
sian and Chinese disagreed on several matters that showed the limitations of 
Sino-Russian cooperation. The Russians vetoed the idea of conducting a drill 
in the Zhejiang province (as a too obvious reference to Taiwan), whereas the 
Chinese changed the initial name for the drills – “Friendship Mission”.1069 
However, there was no friendship there: the drills were joint only in name. 
During them there was practically no contact between the Russian and Chinese 
armies – they exercised separately. Besides, the Chinese soldiers apparently 
performed quite badly and the Russians could not refrain from showing them 
their superiority (the bad performance of the Chinese army reassured Russian 
generals that the hypothetical threat from China is out of question for the very 
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near future).1070 Geopolitical goals aside, the exercises served to foster trade – 
they were a kind of commercial show of Russian arms aimed at securing the 
Chinese contracts. During these drills, Russian presented Tu-95 and Tu-22M 
strategic bombers, Ilyushin-76 and Ilyushin-78 cargo aircraft (which the Chi-
nese indeed bought later on).1071 Nevertheless, political implications played the 
most important role: the drills were intended to demonstrate to the West that 
Russia and China consider themselves leading players in Asia-Pacific.1072  
In August 2007, political considerations overshadowed other exercises –, 
though the reasons were different. On this occasion the “Peace Mission” was 
conducted on a more neutral ground – in Cheberkal.1073 The drills did indeed 
looked like anti-terrorist exercises. Apparently, China in particular benefitted 
from the exercises as its army trained on international ground.1074 The drills 
reverberated and took a traditional anti-American agenda – the U.S. military 
observers were not invited, journalists, however, were. Nevertheless, they 
could cover only the non-Chinese part of the drills – the Chinese army, remem-
bering the poor performance in 2005, closed all exercises to the public.1075  
After the “Peace Mission 2007” Moscow fundamentally changed its secu-
rity policy in Central Asia. Since then, the emphasis has been put on the CSTO 
instead of the SCO – the marginalized joint Russian-Chinese exercises. For 
example, the “Peace Mission 2009” in Khabarovsk and in China’s Dongbei 
was conducted on a much lesser scale – only 1300 soldiers from each side – 
and without an important politicized element1076. These exercises were indeed 
joint ones: soldiers were training together. But this came with a price – the 
Chinese had to pay for everything.1077 
A subsequent “Peace Mission” was organized under the SCO banner on 9-
25 September 2010 in Kazakhstan.1078 During the drills, the Chinese for the 
first time used aircrafts outside their borders and tested the new equipment 
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(Russia did not send the newest one).1079 On the other hand, Chinese perfor-
mance this time “impressed and worried Russian experts (…) since the Chinese 
military demonstrated a capability to wage long-range land operations against 
Russia. This was not lost on the Russian high command (…) In 2010, Russia 
staged its biggest military exercise in two decades, Vostok-2010, in its far 
east.”1080 That is also why the Russian side lowered the agenda of another 
“Peace Mission”: the 2012 one took place in a limited scope in Tajikistan.1081 
Since 2012, the agenda of the Peace Mission has started to transform from 
vaguely anti-terrorist goals to primacy of regional challenges, such as the po-
tential instability of post-American Afghanistan.1082  
Much more important were the first joint maritime drills, which, since 2012, 
have been staged yearly. The first took place in the Yellow Sea in 2012 on 22-
27 April. Another in the Sea of Japan between 5 and 12 July 2013. These ex-
ercises showed that Russia and China decided to put stress on the navy coop-
eration – so far rather overshadowed – and again politics was the key. The area 
of exercises – the Japan Sea (the Chinese navy exercised here for the first time 
in history) and what was being exercised (resistance against unexpected assault 
from air and sea) proved that these drills were politically directed against Ja-
pan.1083 
Soon another “Peace Mission” (2013) took place, this time bilateral, a Sino-
Russian one. Differently from previous ones, these exercises “included a lot of 
socializing.”1084 This demonstrational rapprochement was intended to show 
deepened Sino-Russian cooperation. In 2014, military relations “Joint-Sea 
2014” again became the most important one. These drills that involved twelve 
Russian and six Chinese vessels took place on 20-26 May and were opened by 
the PRC’s Chairman Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin1085. The 
area of the exercises – the South China Sea (first time in history) again indi-
cated the political hidden agenda, clearly visible in the context of disputes over 
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the South China Sea. By agreeing to place these exercises on the South China 
Sea, Russia sent a clear political message to Japan (which introduced sanctions 
on Russia); it may be also understood as Russia’s repayment for China’s neu-
trality in the Ukrainian crisis.1086 Nevertheless, Russia’s support was not full – 
it distanced itself from the most political part of the exercises that concerned 
directly the disputed islands.1087 Earlier this year, in January 2014, China and 
Russia conducted the first exercises on the Mediterranean Sea, near Syria, that 
reflected China’s growing ambitions there.  
In mid-May both sides staged the Joint-Sea-2015 (I) drill in the Mediterra-
nean (the drills followed the 2014 programme, but this time on larger scale) as 
well as Joint Sea-2015 (II) in the Sea of Japan in August. From a military point 
of view, despite impressive political scale, these “features were still far behind 
the scope and degree of interoperability of the US-led drills”. But again it was 
politics that mattered here. Although “No one in either China or Russia has 
offered a convincing explanation for conducting two Joint Sea drills in 2015”, 
the reason for that seemed to be political: “The choices of the exercise areas – 
the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan – were widely perceived as sensitive 
to the West and Japan”.1088 
In general, the growing importance of maritime drills over the land ones 
“fitted first and foremost Beijing’s strategic needs and reflected China’s in-
creased self-confidence in security and defence relations with Russia”; China 
“started playing the Russian ‘military card’”.1089 These drills reflected the po-
liticized nature of Russia-China defence relations: just as Russia played the 
Chinese card in the 2000s against the USA, so China played the Russian card 
against Washington and its East Asian allies in the 2010s.  
In 2016, both sides announced the will to hold more drills1090 and in May 
2016 this materialized with the first-ever joint anti-missile drills in Russia 
(“Aerospace Security 2016”) in Moscow1091, which were a clear reaction to the 
US-announced will to place the THAAD system in the Korean Peninsula; and, 
even more remarkably, with Russia-China maritime drills near disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on the East China Sea: on June 9, 2016, one Chinese 
and three Russian warships entered the waters “in a contiguous zone” to the 
unpleasant surprise of Japan.1092 Contrary to the non-controversial September 
2016 SCO Peace Mission drills in Kyrgyzstan (first time in this country), other 
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Joint Sea Russian-Chinese (12-19 September 2016) maritime drills were con-
ducted in a “hot” place: on the South China Sea (first time ever); both sides, 
however, due to diplomatic dynamics (Philippines, Vietnam) lowered down 
the scale of drills by dispatching the smallest amount of combatants and plac-
ing the drills just off the Guangdong Province and far away from the disputed 
islands: they wanted “to speak softly while carrying a concealed, or semi-con-
cealed, stick.”1093 
In general, the joint drills helped “to minimize and overcome” the differ-
ences between the two countries and, along with military-technical coopera-
tion, they led to “arguably the highest period of cooperation” between Russia 
and China ever.1094  
3. Summary 
In the 2000s and the 2010s Sino-Russian military relations have intensified, 
which, since 200,5 was best exemplified by yearly or twice-yearly joint exer-
cises (first on land then on land and on the sea). Although these drills, later 
supplemented by maritime drills, served political goals mainly, they nonethe-
less led to deepening of the relations. Trust between Russians and the Chinese 
in military relations improved a bit in the last years, too. Anxiety about China 
becoming a future aggressor, still present among some Russian generals, no-
ticeably decreased. Russia knows that main vectors of China’s foreign policy 
are directed to the east and southeast (Taiwan, South China Sea’s islands) – 
this fact reassures Russia. Another factor that eases this anxiety is the aware-
ness of the Russian army’s fundamental advantage over the Chinese one. Alt-
hough the PLA made remarkable progress lately, it is still far behind the Rus-
sian army. All those factors resulted in the intensification of arms sales in the 
early 2000s and again in the 2010s. Contrary to the 1990s, Russia stopped be-
ing afraid of selling China arms – strategic anxiety gave way to a commercial 
one (that China is copying and reselling these weapons further on). That is why 
Russia for a long time had optedto not sell the most advanced military technol-
ogies to China; this started to evolve in the late 2000s and culminated in 2015 
when Moscow finally gave up by agreeing to sell the Su-35. The anxiety over 
copying Russian equipment probably must have been overshadowed by finan-
cial necessity resulting from Russia’s difficult economic situation after the 
Ukrainian crisis. 
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Part Three: China’s Appendix? The Russian Far East  
The Russian Far East plays a very specific role in Sino-Russian relations. In 
the 1990s, it was the main obstacle to Russia-China rapprochement, with eco-
nomic backwardness and strong anti-Chinese resentments that culminated in 
the infamous and illegitimate accusation of a Chinese “demographic expan-
sion”. Since the early 2000s these voices started to tune down thanks to politi-
cal pressure from Moscow and economic realities. Despite attempts,  Russia, 
however, failed to develop this region and it remains quite stagnant. Since then, 
the Russian Far East has encapsulated “in the most direct sense the ambiguities 
of the Sino-Russian relations”; although the territorial question has been re-
solved, the regional future is unclear: the “Russian Far East has the potential 
to become the center of a new quality of bilateral and multilateral engagement 
in Northeast Asia, or a ‘dead zone’ fertile only in suspicion and recrimina-
tion.”1095 So far neither of these have materialized. In the late 2000s, Moscow 
decided to bandwagon to Chinese rise and to use it as an engine to the Russian 
Far East development; the results, however, are not impressive, at least not for 
now.  
1. The Domestic Context 
The Russian Far East is a unique place in Russia-China relations. Here these 
countries “met” for the first time in the 17th century. In the 19th century the 
land had seen the Russian Empire’s most spectacular conquest. Here the two 
communist powers clashed over 1km of Damansky/Zhenbao Island in 1969. 
During Soviet times, Russian Far East had been heavily invested and supported 
by central authorities and – in almost the exact reversal – completely left alone 
after the USSR’s fall. After 1991, the region became “the forgotten place” and 
voices about its “falling apart” from Moscow started to be heard. The Russian 
Far East has become the symbol of the negative consequences of the Russian 
transformation. The pioneer spirit, so present in the very first years of coloni-
zation, has given way to fatalism and demoralization.  
The USSR’s dissolution turned out to be a shocking experience for Far East-
ern Russians. Liberalization of prices became a catastrophe for heavy-industry-
based and central subsidies-based region. Poverty sunk in. Moreover, Moscow 
distanced from the Russian Far East even literally: the removal of subsidies on 
transportation cut inhabitants of the region off from the rest of the country. 
Moscow became an inaccessible place. Economic, financial, cultural and per-
sonal ties with the rest of the country were loosened, if sometimes not cut. Far 
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Eastern Russians found themselves at the rear of the country that had forgotten 
about them, in a place where the weakened central government could barely 
reach.1096 Against this background, the first massive interaction with the Chi-
nese took place. It was far from positive. After initial years, Soviet nostalgia 
soon set in, combined with anti-Chinese xenophobia and “siege mentality”. 
The Russian Far East became the most vulnerable aspect of Sino-Russian re-
lations, full of strains, mutual suspicions, distrusts and dislikes. It was there 
where the fear over “yellow peril” and “demographical expansion” – as well 
as local protests against demarcation of the border – came to haunt Sino-Rus-
sian relations and influence their economic relations.  
2. From Open to Closed Borders: The Russian Far East 
in Russia-China Relations in the 1990s 
The Russian Far East’s influence on Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s was 
significant: it proved that these relations were very good only on a top level. 
The Russian Far East considered China a threat, or even an enemy, not a “stra-
tegic partner” and that is why the region became the biggest obstacle on the 
development of China-Russia relations.  
Russia-China cooperation in the region in the 1990s had a very important 
influence on overall Sino-Russian relations. This influence can be divided into 
three periods: 1) in 1992-1993 when cross-border relations led the way to im-
proved bilateral ties, 2) 1994-1995 when they spoiled the mood of the “con-
structive partnership”, 3) 1996-1998 when they were unable to undergird “stra-
tegic partnership” with economic substance.1097  
The first period was marked by a “euphoria of the lack of borders” from 
1991-1993. It was influenced by factors from the 1980s: Chinese hopes for an 
economic connection of Northeastern China with the opening Russian mar-
ket1098; Gorbachev’s perestroika and liberalization in trade1099 and growing im-
portance of regionalism – regional authorities, such as Vladimir Kuznietsov, 
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the first governor of Primorski Krai after 1991 and a big lobbyist for the coop-
eration with China, supported trade and hoped to integrate the region with the 
Asia-Pacific structures. On the other side of Amur, he found an even more 
enthusiastic supporter of border trade – Heilongjiang governor, Du Xianzong, 
who used to say “borders are limits, but there’s no limit to border trade.”1100 
These were there origins of “crazy trade” in the beginning of the 1990s.1101  
When the USSR fell and the borders opened, the madness started: “border 
fever”, “hot point”, “euphoria of no borders” and many other euphemisms de-
scribe what happened in 1992 and 1993.1102 All visas and Soviet bureaucratic 
obstacles for Chinese people were lifted so they very quickly found the loop-
hole in the lack of foreign trade in the regions. Moreover, without having many 
requirements and without demanding hard currency, they were competitive. 
Given the fall of governmental subsidies and uncontrolled rise of prices, the 
Russian Far East’s economy collapsed. Trade with China became the only way 
to survive: “the Chinese saved Far Eastern Russians from empty shelves.”1103 
Most Far Eastern Russian politicians “favoured compensating for the central 
government’s neglect with increased autonomy; they developed the slogan: 
‘there’s no money, give us freedom’ (niet dienieg, daetie svobodu).”1104 As a 
result, the region was “invaded” by Chinese traders (in 1993 alone almost 2.5 
million people crossed the border), while Russian border traders crossed the 
borders many times with cheap clothes, shoes, consumer goods, household ar-
ticles. China imported construction materials, iron and other metals, fertilizers 
and fish. Russia has opened great trade opportunities for the Chinese; it was 
reflected in the saying: “if you want to make quick money, go to Russia.”1105 
Russia in Chinese eyes became the symbol of a place for making quick money. 
Although both sides were eager to trade, the Chinese were more eager: they 
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did not mind barter and appeared to understand how to make a deal with min-
imum formality and paperwork; with a decrease of governmental contracts, the 
role of border traders increased, contributing to an unpredicted evolution of the 
model of trade between Russia and China.1106 This first period “took a primi-
tive form of barter mixed with direct administrative interference under weak 
market conditions and little institutionized oversight, which meant freewheel-
ing disregard for contracts without corrective punishment (…) the notion that 
a ‘time gap’ (shijian cha) existed that allowed the Chinese only a brief window 
of opportunity spurred short-term behavior such as to make quick money in-
stead of building long-term economic relations.”1107 It soon retaliated.  
In the second period (1993-1995), trade almost collapsed. The decrease was 
equally spectacular as the former increase: its sharpness surprised both Russian 
and Chinese governments. There were several reasons: poor quality of Chinese 
goods, influx of the culturally alien Chinese that evoked the old fear of “mi-
gration expansion” and political usage of this anxiety by Far Eastern Russian 
politicians in their domestic power struggles.1108 According to Far Eastern Rus-
sians, “Russia was selling its natural resources for peanuts (…) the RFE was 
in danger of slipping from an exploited outpost of central Russia to a true co-
lonial-style supplier to China.”1109 For Far Eastern Russians, the “Chinese love 
affair ended” and gave turn to an “allergy” to anything Chinese.1110 Here the 
media role was decisive. The press, freed from censorship, painted a dark pic-
ture of the Chinese minority. This combined with the policy of the new gover-
nor of Primorski Krai, Yevgeni Nazdratenko’s, prepared ground for the peak 
of siege mentality in the region in 1994. Anti-Chinese resentments became an 
important social factor which led to the conviction that in the “good, old days” 
life was easier and less dangerous.1111 This atmosphere, together with concrete 
political actions, such as introduction of visas, merciless chasing of Chinese 
immigrants, administrative repression on joint ventures with Chinese capital, 
restriction and tight control with travel documents, tightening of fiscal policy, 
introduction of new, higher customs and import and export tariffs as well as 
several other factors, directly contributed to the collapse of trade.1112 The last 
factor was poor quality of Chinese goods. Out of all these reasons, uncontrolled 
trade from 1992-1993 led to a situation where economic contacts instead of 
building trust, created enmity: “the short-lived epoch of development of ‘wild 
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barter’ in Sino-Russian relations allowed many groups in the Russian Far East 
to survive the first period of transition reforms and handle the hunger for con-
sumer goods (some individuals made good money as well) but generally left a 
permanent trace in the mentality of Far East Russians.”1113 Mutual trust be-
tween Russians and the Chinese fell very low.  
Beijing, which wanted to maintain good relations with Moscow, accepted 
most of the Russian complaints and victimized regional authorities in Hei-
longjiang, in a way sacrificing them on the altar of good bilateral relations with 
Russia1114. This policy was repeated with anti-Chinese resentments on the Rus-
sian Far East. Beijing ignored the problem of local resentments and concen-
trated on developing relations with Moscow. Being sympathetic to the Russian 
fears over decentralization, China did not push for establishing special eco-
nomic zones, did not complain about slow demarcation of the border, silenced 
domestic criticism and resorted to “quiet diplomacy” based on the principle 
“first become friends, later do business” (xian jiao pengyou, hou zuo 
maimai).1115  
Making friends on the top level indeed succeeded. Making money was less 
successful. In the last period (1996-1999), both sides failed to transform the 
“strategic partnership” into real, economic achievements (though the trade in-
creased slightly in the late 1990s). The Russian Far East’s attitudes towards 
China remained the biggest obstacle to increase trade interaction: “in the re-
gions, Russian-Chinese relations are not driven by geopolitical calculations 
and strategic considerations; people are preoccupied with pedestrian issues, 
such as emergency purchases of fuel, regular shipments of meat (…) or crime; 
as a result relations at the local level quite often contradicts the direction and 
tone set in Moscow and Beijing.”1116 The Russian Far East has perceived China 
as a revisionist power (border demarcation issue)1117, as a state striving to 
achieve economic dominance (through migration and trade) and as an alien 
civilization that surrounds a European post. Given these perceptions, hypothet-
ical integration with Northeast China was considered a threat that could lead 
to inequality and a loss of the power status. For the Russian Far East, China 
remained a strategic rival rather than a strategic partner. Japan, not China, was 
                                                          
1113 В. Л. Ларин, op. cit., p. 25.  
1114 G. Rozman, Turning Fortress…, p. 191; E. Wishnick, Chinese perspectives…, p. 241. 
1115 G. Rozman, Turning Fortress…, p. 193. 
1116 T. Troyakova, op. cit., p. 219.  
1117 Russian researchers like to point out that Chinese historians still claim that Russia had con-
quered these territories in 19th century and this is the official version in Chinese textbooks; 
this overlapps with opinions in Chinese internet that Russia took away these lands; thus there 
is anxiety that one day in the future China may demand “justice”. А.В. Лукин, Россия и 
Китай…, pp. 664-665; Е.П. Бажанов: Китай: Oт cрединной империи до 
сверхдержавы XXI века [China: from Middle Empire to Superpower of 21th Century], 
Moсква 2007, pp. 305–306. 
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the partner of choice for Far Eastern Russians.1118 They considered themselves 
a part of Europe, looked towards the West (Japan was considered as such), 
purposely turned their backs on China. Knowing that integration with Asia-
Pacific is inevitable, they preferred economic contacts with Japan and South 
Korea. In 1997-1998, a Russian-Japanese political détente raised hopes for 
larger Japanese investments. Unfortunately, those did not materialize and Chi-
nese border traders filled the loophole with barter. The Russian Far East had 
no choice but to accept the cooperation with China.  
There was a slight improvement in economic cooperation between Russia 
and China in the late 1990s. Both sides signed a few agreements on regional 
cooperation to eliminate barter and to stimulate regional cooperation.1119 More-
over, during this time Russian regional administration approach towards China 
changed –politicians such as Nazdratienko tempered their anti-Chinese rheto-
ric, which helped to foster Chinese investments.1120 Thus, an increase in trade 
and development of regional cooperation followed. Nevertheless, this could 
not overshadow the generally negative outlook of all of this decade and the 
negative cultural and social consequences of the first mass Russian-Chinese 
contact in the borderlands.  
Despite initial enthusiasm, the first Russian-Chinese mass contact proved to 
have damaging consequences for Sino-Russian relations. It took both sides a 
long time to recover from the negative consequences of this “cultural shock” 
in the 1990s. The uncontrolled flow of the Chinese evoked old Russian fear of 
losing land. This anxiety was skillfully used by local politicians in their power 
struggles with the centre. Sino-Russian relations became the hostage of Rus-
sian domestic politics – this in turn had damaging consequences for bilateral 
relations. Throughout the 1990s, the Russian Far East remained not only the 
wasted chance, but also the biggest obstacle to the development of Sino-Rus-
sian relations in this period.  
3. The Final Demarcation of Russian-Chinese Border 
The 4195.22 km long Russian-Chinese border has long been a thorny issue in 
Sino-Russian relations. Leaving aside its genesis and border controversies 
from the 1960s, it is worth pointing out that the USSR and the PRC in general 
solved this problem thanks to the May 1991 agreement on the Soviet-Chinese 
border. According to this document, the border was delimitated in accordance 
                                                          
1118 А. В. Лукин, Китай: медьведь наблюдает…, pp. 313-314; G. Rozman, Turning For-
tress…, p. 196; J. L. Wilson, Strategic Partners…, p. 137. 
1119 М. Л. Титаренко, Россия. Безопасность через сотрудничество. Восточноазиатцкий 
вектор [Russia: Security Via Cooperation; The East Asia Vector], Moсква 2003, pp. 114-
152. 
1120 J. L. Wilson, Strategic Partners…, p. 139.  
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with international practice (the border line on rivers went along the main fair-
water) – China received 1281 island, whereas 1163 remained in Russia; the 
USSR declared to transfer a part of Primorski Krai lands as well.1121 This shift 
in the longtime status quo “indicated a sizable alteration of the balance of 
power – or more precisely, the imbalance of power – in the border area to the 
disadvantage of Russia.”1122 Although this agreement granted China 720 km², 
in light of (almost) complete demarcation of the border and to defuse potential 
territorial claims from China, it must be considered a big achievement of Rus-
sian (Soviet) diplomacy. That is why the Supreme Council of the RF almost 
unanimously (174 against 2 with 24 abstains) accepted this agreement in Feb-
ruary 1992.1123  
This was Moscow’s perspective. The Russian Far East had another one. 
From the regional perspective this agreement was dishonest, inadequate and 
made by a distant and irrelevant government; secrecy of negotiations and not 
publishing the text of the agreement only increased this perception. News that 
Russia must give China back almost 1000 km² was shocking for local inhabit-
ants. The ordeal started. Regional politicians quickly bandwagoned on these 
emotions by using demarcation as a tool to get support in their own games with 
central government.1124 Such governors as Yevgeni Nazdratenko (Primorski 
Krai) and Victor Ishaev (Khabarovski Krai), not only “tried to conduct their 
own foreign policies”1125, but also for of their own reasons, “having political 
goals in mind consciously provoked conflict over demarcation of borders” that 
significantly influenced Sino-Russian relations.1126 Khabarovski Krai faced the 
most serious problem. Two out of three islands excluded from the agreement 
of 1991, were located nearby Khabarovsk city.1127 Both governor and local 
Duma showed permanent enmity against any plans of giving China these is-
lands; governor Ishaev himself was quoted as saying “mainly, these islands are 
                                                          
1121 Соглашение между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Китайской 
Народной Республикой о советско-китайской государственной границе на ее Вос-
точной части [Agreement Between USSR and PRC on Soviet-Sino State Border on its 
eastern part], [in:] Сборник российско-китайских договоров 1949-1999…, pp. 117-125.  
1122 J. L. Wilson, Strategic Partners…, p. 116. 
1123 Верховный Совет Российской Федерации постановление от 13 февраля 1992 г. n 
2348-1 о ратификации соглашения между ссср и кнр о советско-китайской госу-
дарственной границе на ее восточной части [The Supreme Counsil of USSR decision 
on 13.02.1992 on Ratification of Agreement Between USSR and PRC on Soviet-Chinese 
State Border on its eastern part]. 
1124 Акихиро Ивасита, 4000 километров проблем. Российско-китайская граница [4000 kil-
ometers of problems; Russian-Chinese border], Moсква 2006, pp. 65-70. 
1125 В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. cit., p. 478. 
1126 А. В. Лукин, Китай: медьведь наблюдает…, p. 300; Akihiro Iwashita, The Influence of 
Local Russian Initiatives on Relations with China: Border Demarcation and Regional Part-
nership, “Acta Slavica Iaponica”, 2002, vol. 19, pp. 10-13. 
1127 Three Islands were excluded from the agreement and were left for ”future generations”: 
Bolshoi Ussuriski (Heixiazi), Tabarov (Yinlong) and Bolshoi (Abaigatu) near Manzhouli.  
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only sand” and that from Bolshoi Ussuriski island “one may bombard Khaba-
rovsk.”1128 Equally sharp emotions were evoked around the idea of free pas-
sage for Chinese ships.1129 Nevertheless, problems with Khabarovsk were fi-
nally solved thanks to postponing the demarcation of the two islands into the 
future and a compromise with Ishaev, who when the time came, decided to 
strike a deal with the Kremlin behind closed doors. 
Nevertheless, the island issue and navigation on the Amur remained thorny 
even after the demarcation in 1997. Local press has created the most unbeliev-
able stories about the Chinese conspiracy. According to these claims, Chinese 
diplomacy, “traditionally full of meanness”, would demand in future to “not 
only have those two islands but Khabarovsk itself, the ancient Chinese city of 
Boli, as well” which would lead to crisis and consequently – war between two 
countries.1130 As for giving back the island with graves of Soviet soldiers, it 
was considered a “national humiliation” whereas any concessions were “dig-
ging economic graves for Far Eastern Russians by our own hands.”1131 Even 
after 2000, when the temperature of disputes fell, Ishaev raised the island issue. 
He protested against any joint investments there and conducted several pro-
vocative actions such as planning to build a pontoon bridge linking the island 
to the mainland, thus preventing the Chinese from travelling along the water-
way, building an Orthodox Church on Ussuriski Island and claiming that ar-
cheological research “had uncovered artifacts proving its indisputable native 
Russian origins.”1132  
All those disputes and protests were overshadowed by the reaction of the 
Primorski Krai’ governed by Yevgeni Nazdratenko who accused central au-
thorities of lack of patriotism and short-slightness.1133 Nazdratenko, a former 
“Vostok” mining company director and a representative of industrial lobby 
with close ties to both military units and local mafia organizations, removed 
former governor Kuznetsov from power in 1993.1134 Since then Nazdratenko 
has ruled in a style that combined features of a Russian medieval prince and 
communist apparatchik – he quickly concentrated power in his hand, took over 
the media and ruthlessly removed subsequent, democratically elected oppo-
nents. He based his popularity on a sharp protest against demarcation of border 
and on playing the “Chinese migration threat” card (see: below). In his sup-
portive “Vladivostok” daily he published anti-Chinese pieces almost everyday. 
                                                          
1128 Акихиро Ивасита, op. cit., p. 77.  
1129 G. Rozman, Turning Fortress…, p. 193; А. В. Лукин, Китай: медьведь наблюдает…, 
pp. 300-301. 
1130 Ibid., p. 305. 
1131 Ibid..  
1132 J. L. Wilson, Strategic Partners…, p. 120. 
1133 А. В. Лукин, Китай: медьведь наблюдает…, p. 305. 
1134 M. McFaul, op. cit., p. 324; Kuznetsov, a democrat and reformer, opted for opening up the 
region to Asia Pacific, particularly China, В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. 
cit., p. 479. 
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He openly announced that he would sooner resign than agree on giving China 
back even a piece of Russian land. He found many supporters. Some consid-
ered China as an ecological threat; others protested against giving back land 
with soldiers’ graves; the most controversial, however, have been the necessity 
of giving back the land in the Khasan lake. In 1995 Nazdratenko announced 
that he would demand cancellation of the 1991 agreement (the Chinese MFA 
commented on it as an “absolute lack of responsibility”)1135, soon however he 
minimisedhis position by demanding only changes, not cancellation of the en-
tire agreement. Anyway, this did not lead to resolving the conflict: the local 
administration effectively blocked the conclusion of the demarcation1136. 
Moreover, Nazdratenko’s tactics on making a big media fuss over the demar-
cation problem started to bear fruits – the governor gained some support in the 
Duma.1137 Nevertheless, the Duma in 1995 confirmed Russia’s position on the 
1991 agreement while Yeltsin ordered to quickly finish the demarcation 
works.1138 The president’s administration was aware that time was running 
out – the final date of demarcation (1997) was within only two years. 
Nazdratenko did not even consider listening to the presidential order and was 
able to make a lot of problems for Yeltsin’s administration. Despite requests 
and threats, the Kremlin was not able to silence him. As a result, in 1997 the 
demarcation became the most important issue in Sino-Russian relations: in 
1997, chances of settlement were clouded and obscured by uncertainty.1139  
What was important in all of this chaos was the Chinese position. Beijing 
kept calm and considered Nazdratenko and other regional politicians’ behavior 
                                                          
1135 M. McFaul, op. cit., p. 322; Akihiro Iwasita, op. cit., p. 71. 
1136 Б. И. Ткаченко, Россия-Китай: восточная граница в документах и материалах [Rus-
sia-China: the Eastern Border in Documents and Materials], Владивосток 1999, pp. 277-
304.  
1137 Акихиро Ивасита, op. cit., p. 72. 
1138 Распоряжение Президента Российской Федерации от 19 февраля 1996 г. № 77-рп «О 
мерах по завершению демаркационных работ на Восточной части российско-
китайской государственной границы», Сборник законов законодательство 
Российской Федереаци [Presidential Decree on Terms of Ending the Demarcation Work 
on the Eastern Part of Russian-Chinese state border], Sbornikzakonov.ru. 
1139 Demarcation was difficult not only due to the obstruction from local administration. Yeltsin 
himself didn’t want to conclude it before 1996 elections – he didn’t want to lose voices and 
hence he slowed down its pace. Moreover, demarcation found objective problems – lack of 
sources, lack of benzene for ships, etc. Акихиро Ивасита, op. cit., p. 76; А. П. Деревяннко, 
Российское Приморе на пороге третего тысячилетия [Russian Primorie at the Turn of 
the Third Millennium], Владивосток 1999, p. 259; Б. И. Ткаченко, op. cit., p. 318; А. В. 
Лукин, Китай: медьведь наблюдает…, p. 304. 
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a result of the breakdown of the central authority in Russia rather than as Mos-
cow’s deliberate hidden agenda.1140 The Chinese “proved willing to compro-
mise” and they agreed to adjust the borderline in the Khasan region so that the 
graves of the Soviet soldiers would remain within the Russian territory; none-
theless “the Chinese also let it be known that there were limits to their pa-
tience.”1141 The threat of a split with China mobilized Moscow: “if the strategic 
partnership was not to sink into oblivion, Yeltsin had to stick to the 1991-1992 
commitment and to his 1994 declaration that the demarcation agreement is sa-
cred.”1142 Beijing’s position helped: the Khasan compromise, reached in Au-
gust 1997, moved the demarcation from deadlock1143. China yielded in the 
thorniest of issues: Soviet soldiers’ graves remained in Russia and with this 
compromise even a hypothetical possibility of gaining access to the Japan Sea 
by China disappeared.1144 At the same time, the Kremlin was finally able to 
silence Nazdratenko, probably as a part of a deal that Yeltsin would not try to 
remove him.1145 Thanks to all these, Russia was able to sign the declaration of 
the end of demarcation during Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing on 10 November 1997 
(it was this visit’s biggest achievement).1146 On the territory of 4204 km (with-
out three disputed islands), 1182 border posts and 24 buoys were posted (the 
last one three days before Yeltsin’s visit).1147 The border issue was almost com-
pletely closed (with the exception of three disputed islands, covering 408 km²) 
on 8 April 1999, when the Joint Russian-Chinese Demarcation Commission 
finally decided about the island sharing (1163 islands to Russia, 1281 to China) 
and the length of borderline – altogether 4195 km (578.18 km on land, 3547.01 
on rivers, 70.03 km on the Khanka lake).1148  
The final demarcation of the border had to wait for another decade to mate-
rialize. When it finally did, it became one of the most important events in Rus-
sian-Chinese relations in the 2000s. With the signing of the additional protocol 
on agreement on the Eastern part of the Russian-Chinese border in October 
                                                          
1140 G. Rozman, Troubled Choices for the Russian Far East: Decentralization, Open Regional-
ism and Internationalism, ”Journal of East Asian Affairs” 1997, no 2, p. 560; J. L. Wilson, 
Strategic Partners…, p. 121; Акихиро Ивасита, op. cit., p. 83.  
1141 L. Wilson, Strategic Partners…, p. 121. 
1142 G. Rozman, Sino-Russian Relations. Mutual…, p. 169. 
1143 Акихиро Ивасита, op. cit., p. 83. 
1144 Ibid., p. 83, Chen Qimao, op. cit., p. 295.  
1145 J. L. Wilson, Strategic Partners…, p. 119. 
1146 Cовместное российско-китайское заявление (о завершении демаркации восточного 
участка российско-китайской границы) от 10 ноября 1997 г.,[The Joint Russia-China 
Announcement on Demarcation of the Eastern Part of the Border] [in:] Сборник российско-
китайских отношении 1949-1999…, pp. 408-410. 
1147 Акихиро Ивасита, op. cit., p. 85.  
1148 Заключительная сессия российско-китайской демаркационной комиссии [Final Ses-
sion of Russian-Sino Demarcation Comission], ”Дипломатический вестник. Официаль-
ные материалы” 1999. 
210 
20041149 one of the longest and most complicated matters in Russian-Chinese 
relations has been resolved.  
Although other thorny issues had already been settled in the previous dec-
ade, at the beginning of the 21st century, the belongingness of the three islands 
on Amur and Ussuri – Bolshoi Ussuriski/Heixiazi, Tabarow/Yinlong and Bol-
shoi/Abagaitsu remained unfinished. On October 14th 2004, foreign ministers 
of Russia and China signed the “additional agreement”, while on 14 October 
2008 the border posts were erected. This is how the “400 hundred years’ border 
conflict” (and 40 years of difficult negotiations) ended.1150 The three disputed 
islands were divided in a compromise: Tabarov (Yinlong) was given back to 
China, whereas Bolshoi Ussuriski/Heixiazi and the third island, Bol-
shoi/Abagaitu, were divided divided in half.1151 Although in accordance with 
the previous principles (a borderline along the main fairway) it should have 
been returned entirely to China (it is located on the Chinese side of the Amur). 
It should have been entirely Chinese due to historical reasons, too – this island 
was captured by the USSR only in 1929. Nevertheless, its location (near Kha-
barovsk airport) and social sentiments made it impossible for Russia to accept 
its relinquishment.1152 In return for a concession on Bolshoi Ussuriski/Heixiazi 
Beijing was granted a concord on sailing for Chinese war and trade ships on 
the Amur and Ussuri. This agreement had a symbolic and compromise nature 
also because 50% of Bolshoi Ussuriski/Heixiazi Island constitutes 350 m², or 
500m2 less than the area of Damansky/Zhenbao Island which was fought over 
between the USSR and the PRC in 1969.1153 In general, China received 3575 
km². The official ceremony of transfer of the islands took place on 14 October 
2008 and was purposefully given a low rank.1154 It was a dual compromise. 
The Kremlin was able to silence the Far Eastern critics of this agreement, while 
Beijing managed to pacify the nationalistic voices that demanded the transfer 
of all Bolshoi Ussuriski/Heixiazi Island. Prudence won on both sides – after 
400 hundred years, Russia and China gained a mutually recognized border.  
                                                          
1149 Дополнительное соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Китайской Народной 
Республикой о российско-китайской государственной границе на ее Восточной час-
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Russian-Chinese State Border in its Eastern Part] [in:] Сборник российско-китайских 
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1150 Yu Bin, End of History…  
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Республикой….; Bolshoi/Abagaitu island is not always considered a distinct island (but the 
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Jeffries, Political Developments in Contemporary Russia, Routledge 2011, p. 389 
1152 А.В. Лукин, От нормализации к стратегическому партнерству…, p. 342. 
1153 Ibid.. Zhenbao/Damansky Island was given back to China in 1991. 
1154 Россия торжественно передала Китаю 337 квадратных километров близ Хабаровс-
ка, News.Ru, 14.10.2008; Ю. М. Галенович, История взаимоотношений…, p. 450. 
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4. Chinese Migration to the Russian Far East 
The Chinese migration to the Russian Far East remains one of the most con-
troversial issues in Sino-Russian relations. This topic was used ideologically 
in the 1990s and became a perfect pretext for Russian regional politicians in 
their struggle with the center. The “Chinese migration” issue was not associ-
ated with Sino-Russian relations sine qua non, but with the Russian domestic 
situation. It remains a great example of how the social ideological constructs 
influence, change and create the political reality.  
The mass arrival of the Chinese migrants at the beginning of the 1990s cre-
ated a great social change. Until then, a literally locked and militarized region 
all of the sudden became open and uncontrolled. The Chinese influx was 
clearly visible, the sketchy data, however, makes it difficult to estimate their 
proper amount (e.g. in 1988 in the Amur Oblast’ 6,233 Chinese crossed the 
border; in 1992 – 287,215) and therefore it opens door for speculation.1155 The 
sudden appearance of such a number of Chinese evoked old Russian anxieties 
about “Chinese demographical expansion” into the Russian Far Eastern re-
gions. This fear has long history.1156 In the late 19th century, the Chinese con-
stituted 1/3 of the population of this region.1157 However, the Stalinist purges 
and forceful repatriation of the Chinese in 1937 as well as tightened closure of 
the border practically eliminated their presence – in the next few decades in 
the Russian Far East “there were more Gypsies than Chinese.”1158 Now, after 
1988, these anxieties resurrected: the Russian antipathy towards the Chinese 
entering their country was based on a fear that this might contribute to the 
Sinization of the Russian Far East and the ultimate loss of sovereignty over 
these lands. Furthermore, due to deteriorating economic situation and elimina-
tion of state surcharges, a mass outbound migration of the Russian-speaking 
population left the region: as a result of depopulation of the the 1990s, the 
Russian Far East lost 7% of its former population.1159  
In 2000, the population of the Russian Far East consisted of 7.2 million 
people, whereas the three neighbouring Chinese provinces of the Chinese 
North-East had 105 million people. For some, these numbers spoke for them-
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selves. The message was clear: an uncontrolled Chinese migration into emp-
tied spaces is inevitable. The mass arrival of Chinese merchants after the visa 
lifting in 1988 and the fall of the Soviet controlled economy, as well as the 
need for cheap Chinese labor, all contributed to the noticeable Chinese pres-
ence in this so far homogenous region. This evoked old fears: in the mid 1990s, 
there was a deluge of articles and books about “quiet expansion”, “demograph-
ical incursion”, the “yellow flood”, the “go North movement”, the “dangerous 
invasion” or even the “yellow plague”.1160 The Chinese were depicted in black 
colours as a gang of thieves, contrabandists, bandits, mafia-men, who exploit 
Russians, pollute domestic economy, take away money and natural resources 
and make the ordinary people poor.1161 Governor of Primorski Kraj, Yevgenyi 
Nazdratenko personally said that “among the Chinese there is a bulk of crimi-
nals, sick and drug-addicted.”1162 The Chinese authorities were accused of all 
sins: from an attempt to get rid of the unneeded population and growing crime 
numbers, to charges that stimulating migration and creating Chinatowns is a 
purposely made policy to put forward territorial demands later on. Neverthe-
less, the reasons for the Chinese migration were of an objective nature: the 
Russian demand for consumption goods, need for cheap labor (in agriculture 
and construction sites), lack of control institutions on the border as well as lthe 
egal framework, growing economic integration of the neighboring regions, and 
a mass population gap between the two sides of the border. These objective 
reasons, however, did not matter – the phobias about “yellow peril” were soon 
exploited by local politicians, primarily governors Yevgeni Nazdratenko and 
Victor Ishaev who bandwagoned on to the anti-immigration wave.1163  
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фиктивными мужьями [Chinese Men Turn Out to Be Fake Husbands], “Российская 
газета”, 30.10.1999, p. 3; А. В. Лукин, Китай: медьведь наблюдает…, p. 296; Ishaev’s 
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These kinds of voices reached Moscow – it was not only the local press 
writing about “two millions” of illegal Chinese immigrants, it was also covered 
by Izvestiya (one of the main Russian newspapers) and later on, by other main-
stream media and the state TV. They all published information such as “The 
Chinese already outnumber Russians in the Russian Far East by 1.5-2 times” 
or that “some cities already have a Chinese outlook.”1164 The scholars were 
next to follow: Alexander Yakovlev from the Institute of Far Eastern Studies 
of the Russian Academy of Science concluded that “the Chinese intensify their 
mass infiltration of the Far East – of the lands they consider theirs.”1165 Profes-
sor Yevgeni Gilbro from the Diplomatic Academy of Peace under the 
UNESCO estimated the number of Chinese to be… 8 millions!1166 So far this 
is the record that vastly exceeds the most populist estimations. Finally, there 
were artists: Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Nikita Mikhalkov cried out about 
“Moscow’s indifference about the region and gradual, quiet Chinese occupa-
tion of the Russian Far East.”1167 But it was the politicians who exploited the 
“yellow peril” most – from nationalist Zhirinovski to liberal Yavlinski (the lat-
ter estimated the number of the Chinese to be 5 millions).1168 Even government 
members, like Defence Minister Pavel Grachov (who said that “Chinese want 
to conquer the Russian Far East by peaceful means”)1169, the Minister of Con-
struction Efim Basin (who wrote in an official article in 1995 that “the Chinese 
and Koreans are literally occupying our Far East”)1170 and Yelstin himself 
(“180 thousand Chinese live illegally in Khabarovsk oblast”) joined in.1171 This 
is how popular claims of “millions of immigrants” were followed by not only 
populists, politicians or journalists, but even high ranking governmental offi-
cials, such as the head of the Federal Migration Service, Oleg Romanovsky, 
who told the Russian state Duma that there were “between 400,000 and 
700,000 illegal Chinese migrants in the Russian Far East”; which meant that 
Romanovsky “had little idea of the actual number of the Chinese; whether 
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these ‘migrants’ were long-term settlers, seasonal workers, or shuttle-traders; 
or whether they were legal or illegal.”1172 
In general, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Chinese migration scale 
was permanently present in the Russian media and the political discourse – and 
it was always exaggerated: the number of 2 million was widely quoted. Myths 
about millions of Chinese immigrants resulted from concrete political actions 
of local politicians and had nothing to do with reality. It, however, became a 
part of culture – a fear that the Chinese would arrive in millions (“if one million 
Chinese cross the Russian border every day, they will be marching on for three-
and-a-half years”) is common in Russia.1173  
It was impossible to challenge these voices in the 1990s and only the fol-
lowing decade brought a change here. Reasonable commentaries, like the ones 
from the Foreign Ministry or the Presidential Administration (Emile Pain 
quoted Pavel Minakir’s research of the Russian Academy of Science which 
estimated that the Chinese made up only about 3% of the Russian Far East’s 
population, whereas at the beginning of the 20th century there were 1/3 of 
them) fell on deaf ears in the 1990s.1174 
Migration became a political problem and an issue in bilateral relations. Of-
ficially Beijing condemned illegal migration, but it emphasized that numbers 
proclaimed by Russians are vastly overestimated – according to the Chinese, 
there were around 1,000-2,000 Chinese illegal migrants. In accordance with 
Chinese statistics, there were around 300,000 Chinese in all of the CIS area, 
the majority on a non-permanent basis.1175 In general, the PRC government 
tried to ignore these aggressive statements; only the MFA limited itself to send-
ing a few protest notes against mistreatment of the deported Chinese citizens. 
At the same time Beijing was symphathetic to Russian anxieties: it tried to 
limit the migrant’s flow and was determined not to allow this issue to compli-
cate bilateral relations. 
The anti-Chinese campaign in the Russian Far East influenced Russian do-
mestic policy action. In 1994, the Russian government re-introduced visas for 
the Chinese and tightened control on trade; the regional authorities in their turn 
initiated strict control and deportation of illegal immigrants – this led to the 
dramatic fall of bilateral trade. The number of Chinese, never high, fell even 
lower, while the anti-Chinese campaign slowed down… to burn again in 1996. 
This time it was directly linked with Moscow’s attempt to remove 
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Nazdratenko. The governor fired back with his favourite trump card: blaming 
Moscow for the region’s financial problems and accusing it of dealing with 
China above Far Eastern Russian’s head. This worked – he succeeded in unit-
ing people behind him under the banners of xenophobia and anti-Chinese re-
sentments.1176  
This is why the mass campaign started. There was a flood of anti-Chinese 
articles showing unbelievable data about migration, threatening a conspiracy 
plot about the political background of this migration and Beijing’s planned ac-
tion, and lamenting about “treacherous Kremlin” who behind the Far Eastern 
Russian’s backs gave away Russian lands to the Chinese. Moreover, the Chi-
nese communities, homogenous and closed for others were supposed to be 
“spy-nests” or even “army back-up”. The record goes to the Novosti tabloid, 
which in March 1997 published an edition with a cover entitled “Will there be 
war tomorrow?”1177 In turn, monographs about “the yellow expansion” started 
to appear with press articles (such as a the 1996 book entitled “Yellow 
peril”)1178 as well as a series of documents about border issues. The Chinese 
were accused of all possible sins: from singular crimes, the PRC’s policy of 
mobilizing the army on the borders, to condemnation of Russia-China cooper-
ation even in such areas as drug-trafficking.1179 All these factors contributed to 
one tendency in the 1990s: limited access into the region. The actions taken by 
local authorities directly contributed to the creation of a “siege mentality” – 
the region remained “the first line of defence against the outside world”1180 and 
became “a zone of the political absurd.”1181 The Far East became the symbol 
of Russia’s weakness in Asia, “the sick man of Asia.”1182  
The numbers show clearly that the so-called “yellow peril” was nothing 
more than a power struggle between the centre and regions in Russia (and, 
from a social point of view, a belated mirror of the old Western stereotypes 
about Asia from the late 19th – the early 20th century). In 1997, the Moscow 
Carnegie Center conducted a special project “Chinese migration in the Russian 
Far East and Siberia” and thoroughly counted the number of Chinese migrants. 
According to Pavel Minakir, the director of the Economic Research Institute 
of the Far Eastern Branch of Russian Academy of Science, there was no more 
than fifty to eighty thousand Chinese people during 1992-1993 period.1183 
                                                          
1176 Quoted in: M. McFaul, op. cit., p. 330.  
1177 А. В. Лукин, Китай: медьведь наблюдает…, p. 298.  
1178 Желтая опасность [Yellow Peril], ред. Б. Дяченко, Владивосток 1996. 
1179 А. П. Деревянко, Российское Приморе на пороге третьего тысячилетия (Russian Pri-
more at the Turn of the Third Century), Владивосток 1999, p. 276.  
1180 T. Troyakova, op. cit., p. 222.  
1181 V. B. Amirov, op. cit., p. 277.  
1182 R. Menon, The Sick Man of Asia: Russia’s Endangered Far East, “The National Interest” 
2003, no. 73, p. 99. See also: Parag Khanna, The Second World. How Emerging Powers are 
Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty First Century, New York 2008, pp. 71-78. 
1183 P. A. Manakir, op. cit., p. 94.  
216 
Most of them were seasonal workers and students. The amount of illegal mi-
grants was even smaller: during the “foreigner” campaign conducted by border 
guards in Primorski Krai, Khabarovski Krai and Amur Oblast’ only… five to 
six thousand people were deported. During this campaign it turned out that the 
Chinese made up only a small percent of all the arrested – most were from the 
Caucasus.1184 According to different estimates done by L.L. Rybakovski, a de-
mographer and director of the Demographical Center in Moscow’s Sociopolit-
ical Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Science, the amount of im-
migrants was around hundred thousand.1185 Galina Vitkovskaya, deputy direc-
tor of Carnegie’s project claimed that the most realistic estimates told about a 
few hundred thousand (between two hundred thousand and three hundred thou-
sand, from Irkutsk to Primorski Krai); in October 1996 in Primorski Krai and 
Khabarovski Krai between thirty thousand to seventy thousand Chinese lived, 
including shuttle traders.1186 Moreover, Vitkovskaya in 1999 said that “the big-
ger Chinese communities in the Russian Far East simply don’t exist”: accord-
ing to her research the biggest group of Chinese lived in… Moscow (twenty to 
twenty five thousand people) and the majority of the Chinese migrants left 
Russia after the crisis in 1998.1187  
Other research results match these data. Based on his thorough research, 
conducted with other experts, Aleksander Larin in 2009 has proved that “the 
most reliable number of the Chinese in Russia is between two hundred to four 
hundred thousand; maximum five hundred thousand, while in the Russian Far 
East – around two hundred thousand.”1188 Vilia Gelbras, who was the first one 
to conduct all-encompassing research on the Chinese presence, agrees with this 
estimation – according to this researcher, there are around two hundred thou-
sand to four hundred and fifty thousand Chinese in Russia.1189 Naturally, the 
data from various sources differ. According to the Russian Federation national 
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census from 2010, there were twenty-eight thousand Chinese in Russia (the 
number is clearly lowered).1190  
Larin himself quotes the research done by S.Y. Prichod’ko and K. Vnukova 
that claimed that there were one hundred and fifty thousand totwo hundred 
thousand Chinese; the immigration service data1191 estimated the number to be 
around two hundred thousand; he writes also that within this range of two hun-
dred to four or five hundred thousand,  illegal immigrants are already listed 
(their number is decreasing year by year, though they still make up around half 
of all the Chinese in Russia).1192 Another important piece of research on Chi-
nese immigration is that of Anatoliy Vishnevskyi, Mikhail Alexeev and Vilia 
Gelbras. Vishnevski claims that there are between four hundred thousand to 
six hundred thousand Chinese in Russia (2009 data).1193 He has also showed 
that only around 30% of all Chinese in Russia live in the Russian Far East (the 
others live in Siberia – 29% and Moscow – 28%; St. Petersburg has only 
around 3,5%.”1194  
Even a glimpse at that data shows a great chaos in this matter. Different 
state agencies have completely different data, no to mention data from Russian 
researchers. Nevertheless, one thing is clearly visible: there are hundreds of 
thousands Chinese in Russia, not millions.  
Mikhail Alexeev noticed that the Russian Far East has “distinctly peripheral 
role in the global context of the Chinese migration”, the number of settled mi-
grants has been “statistically insignificant”. Most of the migrants were short-
term visitors: tourists, shuttle-traders, businessmen, employees, poachers, 
smugglers and students. The Chinese remained “a marginal ethnic segment in 
Primorski Krai and in the Russian Far East generally”. His work ends up with 
a clear statement: “forecasts of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Chi-
nese workers moving into the Russian Far East to develop its vast natural re-
sources so far remain in the realm of fantasy.”1195  
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Vilia Gelbras’ research was concentrated on the Russian Far East alone. 
Gelbras has noticed the increased number of Chinese arrivals, but commented 
that “most of the Chinese arrive to Russia legally”, while “the scale of that 
migration is too insignificant to panic, let alone to speak about Chinese demo-
graphic expansion”. Besides, “Chinese migration to Russia is not a spontane-
ous migration of people to a new place of residence, and not a search for a 
promised land. There has emerged a specific form of the movement of man-
power that serves the flow of goods”. Gelbras’ data from Vladivostok and Kha-
barovsk prove that the number of immigrants who live with their families in 
the Russian Far East has stopped; the Chinese consider the Russian Far East a 
place where one can get rich quickly, but not as a place where they would like 
to live.1196 Most of the Chinese who arrive to the Russian Far East are petty 
traders from markets or seasonal/short-term workers1197. In general, “the in-
come of the majority of the Chinese immigrants is low; the idea that they take 
away Russians’ jobs – a favourite slogan of xenophobes – is nothing more than 
a myth.”1198 Finally, the region itself (and the entireity of Russia) is not an 
attractive place to migrate: “few Chinese have decided to settle in Russia. They 
have been deterred by the cold climate, the lack of business opportunities and 
poor local hospitality.”1199 
The Russian Far East in not a popular destination for the Chinese because 
of the fact that – as Larin put it – “Russia is a factor that complicates one’s 
life” due to several reasons: “low efficiency of state structures’ work, wide-
spread corruption of governmental officials and time-consuming bureau-
cracy.”1200 The militia, or now the police, remains the most important prob-
lem – “probably there isn’t a single Chinese person in Russia who wouldn’t be 
harmed by militia”; Larin concludes, “the main obstacles faced by immigrants 
are the same as for their Russian colleagues; they are all parts of the same 
business atmosphere in Russia.”1201 
Nevertheless, the Chinese presence has been a serious problem, but not due 
to immigration. This threat was misunderstood as a “flood”, a “creeping immi-
gration” that foresees annexation by China. This was a modern reconstruction 
of the “yellow peril” syndrome from the late 19th and the early 20th cen-
tury.1202 Gelbras is right when he says that “the real problem is not the number 
                                                          
1196 V. Gelbras, Chinese Migration in Russia, “Russia in Global Affairs”, 2005, vol. 3, no 2 
(April-June), p. 179; see also: Idem, Китайская реальност… Москва 2001.  
1197 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., pp. 174-179.  
1198 Ibid., pp. 175-179 and 219.  
1199 Д. Тренин, Верные друзья?…. 
1200 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., pp. 215.  
1201 Ibid., pp. 186-187 and 192-273; It is fair to add, however, that recently Russia’s police atti-
tude towards the Chinese has improved.  
1202 A. Łopińska, The ”Yellow Peril” syndrome in contemporary Russia, “Sensus Histo-
riae. Studia interdyscyplinarne”, vol. VIII, no 2012/3, pp. 41 -58.  
219 
of Chinese immigrants but the fact of how they harm the economy.”1203.This 
is not a “criminalization” of social life, as anti-Chinese propaganda would like 
to see it. The most popular transgressions among the Chinese are of an eco-
nomic nature. The Chinese know Russian law poorly but this is due to the fact 
that they deal with official matters via middle-men and if they face militia (po-
lice) “it rarely has anything to do with rule of law.”1204 Moreover, the majority 
of economic transgressions are jointly done by Russians and the Chinese: 
“Russian economic and administrative mechanisms often not only allow but 
even provoke an immigrant to act against the law (…) the Russian grey econ-
omy forces the Chinese businessman to bypass the law. And the Chinese busi-
nessman acts as the Russian does: he simply follows the rules of the game – 
‘when in Rome, do as the Romans do.’”1205 As Larin rhetorically asks: “if we 
are unable to deal with our criminals who bring a lot of damage to the state, 
why should we demand from China to control their own citizens who do not 
harm their own country – they are just breaking foreign laws on foreign 
land?”1206  
Thus, the real challenge for the Russian Far East is of an economic, not 
immigration nature. The bilateral trade is unbalanced – China exports cheap 
consumption goods and imports natural resources, like timber. Moreover, most 
of the trade is illegal and conducted by criminal groups from both sides of the 
border. Their activity “inflicts damage on Russia’s economic security and 
checks the development of a civilized market economy”; furthermore, it 
“strengthens Russia’s position as a raw-material appendage of China; this turns 
Russia, primarily, into a market for Chinese goods, thus preventing economic 
growth, especially in the Far East.”1207 As a result, the Russian Far East instead 
of pushing Russia into Asia, “may become part of East Asian rather than Rus-
sian periphery, and increasingly subservient to Chinese requirements.”1208 
When one looks at Chinese policy toward the Russian Far East, one may find 
many similarities with the Chinese policy toward Laos; the same neocolonial 
mechanism functions here: China exploits the region for its resources and in 
return floods it with low quality goods.  
Far Eastern Russians are aware of China’s growing importance. The major-
ity of them claim that only China benefits from the cooperation and that the 
Chinese influence on the economy is negative. The general perception is that 
the Chinese are much better employees – entrepreneurial, talented, hard-work-
ing and sober. On the other hand, they are considered canny, sly, mean and 
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aggressive1209. An interesting recent phenomenon is the increase of mixed mar-
riages between Chinese men and Russian women – and a corresponding rise 
in Sinophobia among Russian men.1210 According to the latest data, only 8% 
of Russians support mixed marriages, whereas 40% are indifferent or against 
them: this result may be interpreted as “another example of chauvinism, or 
maybe chauvinism plus migrant-phobia.”1211 
Fears of “Sinization” are based on the hermetic closeness of the Chinese 
communities.1212 Far Eastern Russians dislike the Chinese because they stick 
together, help one another and do not assimilate. Nevertheless, the Chinese in 
Russia are not a Diaspora. They are temporary guest workers (most do not live 
there longer than five years), not citizens nor permanent inhabitants. They do 
not grow their roots and do not invest their capital here. They establish their 
own hotels and restaurants, but these function to serve the Chinese niche only. 
The Chinese do not fight for their political rights and do not want to challenge 
the equilibrium with the locals. In sum: they form “a quasi-diaspora.”1213  
So, why does migration remains a thorny issue in Sino-Russian relations? 
This is due to deep Sinophobia of Far Eastern Russians whose chauvinism is 
targeted not only at Chinese immigrants, but claims Beijing has bad intentions 
as well. Far Eastern Russians blame not only migrants, but also China for many 
misdoings.1214 In fact, the opposite is true. Although Beijing is unable to con-
trol many areas of economic and social life, the Chinese government tries to 
cooperate with Russia rather than leaving this issue alone – the Chinese offi-
cials are prone to accept subsequent Russian limitation of free movement.1215 
If China indeed has bad intentions for the regions, these are of an economic 
nature – to explore its natural resources instead of assimilating; this, however, 
falls far behind the top priority of China’s Russia policy: the secure China’s 
strategic back to have “peace from the North”. In the 2000s and 2010s, anxie-
ties over the “Chinese threat” significantly waned (“fear left everyday life; 
people care about practical cooperation with the Chinese neighbours”), though 
there are still such voices in Russia (such as a bizarre claim from Rodina party 
economist Mikhail Deliagin who said in 2006 that the Chinese “undertook mil-
itary drills inside Russia” (sic!) and that Russia should arm itself in the Far 
East, or the equally intriguing statement from general Vladimir Ovchinski who 
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claimed that the Chinese mafia is controlling Russia).1216 According to the lat-
est data (public opinion surveys from 2000-2013) Far Eastern Russian anxiety 
on losing land to China has recently waned (only 24% of respondents still fear 
that in comparison to 61% in 2000). At the same time, however, there is a 
paradox. Although the anxieties of losing land have waned, “geopolitical anx-
ieties and xenophobia remained at the same level”. There is still a common 
perception of “large migration”, the level of xenophobia remains high (approx. 
54% of all respondents called for the deportation of all immigrants, legal and 
illegal, including their children), while the perception that China gains more in 
bilateral trade strengthens. Besides, Far Eastern Russians often have contacts 
with the Chinese even less (a drop from 84% to 61%), have even more negative 
attitude towards mixed marriages (approx. 90% are against marriages of their 
relatives with immigrants) and more often (77% opposed to 65% in 2000) sup-
port the slogan “Russia for Russians”, Россия для русских). This data can be 
interpreted via the prism of strengthening central authority and its efficiency, 
the increase of income of the inhabitants and their more frequent visits to China 
(though these trips do not lead to lowering the negative opinion towards the 
Chinese). At the same time the claim that the Chinese consider the Russian Far 
East theirs and that they would demand this land in the future, has remained 
high.1217 This may be interpreted as follows: thanks to the consolidation of 
power by Putin, Far Eastern Russians stopped being afraid of losing their land 
to China today, but they still are afraid of that scenario tomorrow. The dislike 
toward the Chinese has not lowered either.  
All these resentments are born out of the general anxiety about Russia’s 
future (combined with China’s rise). The general depopulation trend in Russia 
and growing population in China is a good example. Beijing’s concrete actions 
mean little when compared to different demographical patterns of the neigh-
borhood regions. Real actions cannot reduce the anxieties if Russians still be-
lieve in “territorial determinism” – if they are many and we are few, sooner or 
later they will come here. When a Russian “hears a Chinese partner’s casual 
remark that Lake Baikal is the ‘common heritage’ of both countries, he shiv-
ers”1218 (the same happens when the Chinese call for “one economic space” in 
the Russian Far East and Northeast China).1219 
 Sinophobia makes it impossible for Far Eastern Russians to see that, as a 
matter of fact, there are too few Chinese in the Russian Far East, not too many. 
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Economically speaking, only the Chinese are able to fill the gap created by 
depopulation; without it, the further development of the Russian Far East is 
impossible.1220 Northeast Chinese are perfect immigrants here – they are ac-
customed to the Russian climate, many are peasants and have experience of 
working in Russia and dealing with Russians.1221 Yet, firstly, Chinese workers 
prefer to go to work elsewhere (Western Russia, or better still, Western Eu-
rope)1222 and secondly, Russia has no possibility to assimilate the Chinese, it 
is unable to make them useful citizens; Russia lacks the ability of being a 
“melting pot” like the USA; local intolerance, xenophobia and dislike mixed 
with growing nationalism, anxiety of territorial demands in the future – these 
all make a “Russian melting pot” rather impossible to materialize.1223 As for 
the sources of the Far Eastern Russians’ approach toward the Chinese, these 
are “Russia’s weak economic, political and military position in Asia-Pa-
cific.”1224  
5. Big Plans, Little Results: Russia and the Russian Far East  
in the 2000s 
Vladimir Putin upon taking his office started dealing with the Russian Far East 
energetically: he dismissed governor Nazdratenko who symbolized the dark 
1990s.1225 Then, in Blagoveshchenks Putin made an important speech – he said 
that unless Russia immediately starts investing in the region, it would loose it, 
while the Far East’s inhabitants would start speaking Chinese, Korean and Jap-
anese.1226 This was combined with Putin’s general vision of strengthening the 
state and its central institutions. He was able to resolve the border issue. How-
ever, other major impediments, such as the dysfunctionality of the local econ-
omy, unprepared for market realities and dramatic depopulation, remained. 
The demographic issue, combined with political and security issues, presented 
Putin with a dilemma – he wanted to develop relations with China, which 
meant increasing trade and human contacts, including interregional links with 
Chinese provinces. On the other hand, he could not ignore economic and social 
tensions arising from local Sinophobia. There was also a strategic dilemma: 
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“could Moscow use the injection of Chinese commerce to revive the RFR and 
satisfy consumer demand without risking a de facto Chinese take over?”1227. 
After sixteen years Putin in power, this dilemma is still present, though Mos-
cow in the late 2000s and the early 2010s moved rather towards cooperation 
with China than balancing it.  
Since the fall of the USSR, Moscow has been striving with a permanent 
failure to create a development strategy for the Russian Far East. Although 
there were strategies in the 2000s, they remained mostly on paper.1228 As Rus-
sian researchers admit, the “distance between understanding the challenge and 
ways to react to it turned out to be impossible or irreducible” as “the gap be-
tween declarations and real actions by center became very wide.”1229 The Rus-
sian Far East continues to be one of the most backward regions in Russia; its 
economy is increasingly dependent on Chinese goods, services and labor, de-
population trends are not reversing, while Putin’s policy is barely more effec-
tive than during Yeltsin’s era.1230 The Kremlin has no idea what to do with this 
region. It has been trying to stimulate domestic migration from Western Russia 
and that of Russians living outside Russia (in the former USSR) but this have 
been successful. Even if they arrived in vast numbers they would not fill the 
full need for labor; besides there is not a clear economic basis for this idea of 
resettling Russians from other regions.1231 The idea to develop the region 
through grand energy investments so far has failed, too. Such projects are not 
labor-intensive, so its effect on unemployment is marginal; they are more often 
virtual than real and always combined with present geopolitics; if they are fi-
nally fulfilled, profits end up in Moscow or on private accounts.1232 The idea 
to attract Japanese and South Korean investments (which could create jobs), in 
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opposition to resources-interested Chinese only – was dear to central and re-
gional leaders alike, but never materialized.1233 Political problems with Tokyo 
and Seoul, high level of corruption (even by Russian standards) and criminality 
discouraged investment there. As a result, the central authorities neglected the 
region, its main sources of income come from China; without Chinese goods 
and Chinese traders, Far Eastern Russian consumers would not be able to sur-
vive1234: The Far Eastern provinces’ dependence on China on foodstuffs and 
consumers’ goods is around 60-80%.1235 This is unsurprising: without revenues 
from Moscow, Far Eastern regions turned toward China, but the intraregional 
cooperation between the Chinese and Russian provinces could be stronger, 
should the Russians not block such ideas as free trade zones.1236 They are 
blocking them in classical bureaucractic manner: regional Russian officials 
formally support cooperation with China but informally they make its fulfil-
ment difficult by introducing bureaucratic barriers.1237 They have been doing 
this out of a “defensive mentality in which the fear of losing control outweighs 
the sense of opportunity”1238; this fear is present in the reluctance for an even 
stronger dependence on China and in the belief that trade benefits China 
mostly. The Russian Far East exports mainly timber (around 47%) and oil-
products (19,5%), while importing machinery (44%) and textiles (30%).1239 
Until 2010 there were no bigger Chinese investments, while Russian compa-
nies did not venture to the Chinese market. To make things worst, most of the 
trade has been done illegally or semi-legally.1240 This all results in Moscow’s 
lack of an idea of what to do with the region: ”the result is policy confusion, 
with the emphasis on half-backed schemes such as attracting labor from west-
ern Russia or prestige projects like APEC 2012 in Vladivostok”1241 (the latter 
costed “50 percent more than the London Summer Olympics a month ear-
lier”).1242 Since the USSR’s fall Moscow has regularly proclaimed the need to 
revive the region and to create a development strategy; in 2012 the Kremlin 
even founded a separate ministry (Ministry of the Development of the Far 
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East), headed by Victor Ishaev, former governor of Khaborovsk.1243 In reality, 
however, the region has been forgotten by central authorities, their ambitious 
programmes remain on paper, while bureaucratic structures, such as the al-
ready mentioned Far East Ministry do not fit the reality (the latter was implic-
itly confirmed by Putin by dismissing Ishaev in 2013).1244 Hence, China re-
mains the only real option for the region. Ambiguity has been the result. On 
the one hand the regional administration benefits from economic contacts with 
China; this keeps the region alive (socially and politically stable). On the other 
hand, “Russians loath to admit the extent of their dependence, both because 
they fear it and because it is humiliating”1245. They “see the danger of becom-
ing a simple ‘raw materials appendage’ to their neighbor but hope to be able 
to rebalance the relationship later, by producing semi-finished goods on their 
territory.”1246 So far it has been only wishful thinking.  
6. Pivot to China: The Russian Far East in the 2010s 
On a political level, Moscow and Beijing have done a lot to minimize tensions 
that arise from the Chinese presence. Beijing has always been cooperative 
when Moscow wanted to strengthen the visa regime or regulate border trade; 
it has reiterated that it has no territorial claims and reacted with restraint to the 
accusations of Far Eastern Russians. Moscow in turn rejected the notion of the 
“Chinese threat” and allowed the border trade to grow. The dialogue on both 
sides improved remarkably, particularly on the thorny issues from the 1990s – 
the demarcation of the border and “illegal migration”. The border trade grows, 
intraregional relations between local politicians are good, if not friendly – but 
“economic opportunities stemming from co-operation with China were bal-
anced with security concerns.”1247 This was part of the problem: “the largely 
positive state of relations in the RFE” relied “disproportionately on the ‘sus-
pension of disbelief.’”1248  
In the late 2000s and the early 2010s Russia understood the importance of 
Asia-Pacific in global politics and the role the Russian Far East plays in at-
tempts to upgrade Russia’s profile. As Fyodor Lukyanov wrote, “the main 
                                                          
1243 Указ Президента Российской Федерации о структуре федеральных органов исполь-
нительной власти [RF President’s Decree on structure of Federal Executive Organs] , 
”Российская газета”, 22.05.2012. 
1244 Указ Президента Российской Федерации о Ишаеве В.И. [RF President’s Decree on 
Ishaev V.I.], Kremlin.Ru, 31.08.2013.  
1245 B. Lo, The Axis of Convenience…, p. 67. 
1246 Д. Тренин, Верные друзья?…. 
1247 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, p. 77. 
1248 B. Lo, The Axis of Convenience…, p. 69. 
226 
challenges associated with Russia’s Asia future are from inside, not out-
side.”1249 The Russian Far East is crucial here: the region is “at once Russia’s 
shop-window in Asia, and a barometer of its turn to the East”: so far it has been 
“one of the most backward regions in Northeast Asia, exceeded in this respect 
only by North Korea” which translated to regional recognition of Russia as 
“little more than a purveyor of natural resources and weapons”; but “if the 
Kremlin could transform it into a hub of intra-regional cooperation, then Rus-
sia would become an Asian-Pacific power.”1250 Hence, as Russia’s most im-
portant regional goal has been to remain in the Asian game, Moscow needs to 
develop the Russian Far East – “Russia’s future in the East depends on what it 
will do with Far Eastern provinces.”1251 Regional cooperation (with such initi-
atives as Great Tumen Initiative1252 or Tumangan project1253) being far away 
from “big politics”, plays a key role here. Domestically the basic challenge is 
the “new colonization” of Siberia and the Russian Far East, without doing so, 
“Russia will not be able to dream about playing a significant role in Asia.”1254 
This is combined with the necessity of the development in Siberia and the Rus-
sian Far East through infrastructural projects.1255 The Russian Far East needs 
“dual integration” (with Asia-Pacific and with the rest of Russia); or it will slip 
into being “double periphery.”1256 In short, Russia needs to use the dynamism 
of Asia to develop its Far Eastern part.  
The most important rationale behind these plans is, obviously, the need to 
keep a great power status: “three hundred years ago the great power status was 
dependent on the position on the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea; now it depends 
on the position on the Pacific.”1257 Hence, from the Kremlin perspective, the 
Russian Far East matters “as a springboard for asserting Russia as a Eurasian 
empire and Pacific power”, which in effect made the 21st century objective 
(upgrading economic conditions of the region), a mirror of 19th century mission 
“of asserting Russia’s “great power-ness” in Asia; Regional development for 
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its own sake holds little attraction for the Kremlin.”1258 Thus, making full use 
of the Pacific potential “is a passport to the future; failure to integrate the east 
would spell the demise of Russia as a major player.”1259 The latter would equal 
to “a cascade of domestic and external risks: further deindustrialization (and 
criminalization) of the local economy; social demoralization and unrest; and 
the steady erosion of Russian sovereignty.”1260 
In search for ways to develop the Far East, Russia has finally accepted the 
reality and turned to China. Moscow wanted – as Putin wrote it – to “catch the 
Chinese wind”1261, to turn the “fortress into free trade zones.”1262 Thus, the idea 
of the Far East’s development was based on external sources (capital), mostly 
Chinese ones.1263 The pro-Chinese agenda of Moscow with regards to the Rus-
sian Far East was a substantial turn: it “implied a growing Russian openness 
and acquiescence to a Chinese presence in the Russian Far East”, this “incre-
mental shift has confirmed Russia’s gradual accommodation to the new bilat-
eral balance of power.”1264 Moscow again decided that it must accept the real-
ity (of Chinese domination) and make the most of it. The programme of devel-
opment of the Russian Far East with participation of the Chinese capital 
(around 250 joint ventures, such as new infrastructure, roads, railways, termi-
nals, bridges, border crossings; investments in exploration of natural resources 
and manufacturing), accepted in 2009, was a clear sign of this new policy.1265 
In this “milestone programme” two key ideas seemed to exist: “attracting in-
vestment from China into Russia’s Far East and coordinating the development 
of the two states’ adjacent border regions.”1266 This was followed by opening 
special economic zones in Russia’s Far East (comprising of Vladivostok and 
15 other maritime administrative districts) in 2015.  
Russia agreed to this programme because the perception of China in Russia, 
or at least among the Russian elite, had changed: “for the last 300 years Rus-
sians have been accustomed to seeing China as weak, backward, and inferior 
in virtually every respect”1267; even a few years ago “Russians were asking 
whether the Chinese have TV sets, now they see China’s power.”1268 Now 
when they look at China today, “they see an economic giant; a financial power 
armed with the world’s largest foreign exchange reserve, a new science power 
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and technology producer; and an increasingly capable military force.”1269 But 
old habits die hard, and the Russians’ approach to China combines fascination 
with anxiety: “Moscow is far from ready to accept China as the senior partner 
and more influential power. To admit this would be at odds with the message 
of a resurgent Russia second to none.”1270 Nevertheless, despite reservations, 
Russia decided to bandwagon and to attract Chinese investments to the region 
and develop it using them. On the other hand, Moscow “made a virtue of ne-
cessity” – nobody but China wants to invest there, while Russia is too poor to 
develop it by itself. In the deteriorating financial situation, “Russia may not 
allow to spend a billion investments in a region neglected for decades.”1271 
That is why it considers Chinese shares better than nothing. The Russians 
simply came to terms with inevitable (for the Russian Far East there is no 
choice: China or nothing)1272 and decided to gain as much as possible.  
Unfortunately, from the perspective of 2017, the programme of Chinese in-
vestments and other incentives cannot be considered successful – only a couple 
of projects have been fulfilled; the rest remain on paper. This is due to the fact 
that “the mechanisms of fulfillment of the Programme have not been in-
cluded”1273, “one may come to a conclusion that the programme is not being 
fulfilled.”1274 Furthermore, the investment climate in Russia contributes to the 
fact that there are roughly two types of investments into the Russian Far East: 
“projects that consider Russia as an resource appendix to the Asian economy 
and semi-legal or illegal schemes to deliver Chinese production into Russian 
markets.”1275 Moreover, many profits from Chinese investments instead of 
supplying Russian economy are stolen by private individuals.1276 Finally, con-
trary to what they proclaim, the Chinese are not rushing to invest in the region 
either. Firstly, they changed the concept of development of China’s Northeast 
(Dongbei). In the 1980s and 1990s they sought to advance cooperation with 
Russia1277; now they have decided that concentration on deepened cooperation 
with Southern China is a better option instead; secondly, the Chinese are not 
keen to invest in the Russian Far East because “they simply want to take the 
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resources and nothing more.”1278 Currently, cooperation with the Russian Far 
East is of primary importance to only one Chinese province (Heilongjiang); 
even for other Dongbei’s provinces (Jilin, Laoning) it is not so important 
now.1279 This is why the “cooperation programme” that was intended to be the 
engine of regional development becomes another factor in the Russian Far East 
becoming a raw material appendage to China. 
Facing the failure of this programme, Russia did not give up but decided in 
2011 to re-engage China and renew the list of joint ventures – one of the major 
goals was to attract Chinese investments in manufacturing, processing and in-
frastructure construction; judging by the recent perspective, however, “China 
has been able to increasingly define the direction the Far East development 
takes, according to its own needs; the support it provided for the joint devel-
opment of the region focused on creating transport infrastructure and the ex-
ploration of resources; Russian hopes (…) have not been fulfilled.”1280 Thus, 
from the perspective of 2017 not much has yet changed.1281 The Russian Pres-
ident’s Envoy to the Russian Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev in 2015 
openly blamed the Chinese government for not encouraging Chinese investors 
to go to Russia, moreover, he must have been deeply frustrated, because he 
even compared Russia to… Angola and pointed out that unlike in Angola, 
China is not eager to invest in Russia: “Does Angola really have a more stable 
and favorable investment climate than Russia?” he asked rhetorically.1282  
This scenario means increasing the dependence on China. In the long term, 
if not already, the cooperation with China becomes a vital necessity for Far 
Eastern Russians – something inevitable.1283 If Russia fails to succeed in the 
challenging and “truly intimidating national task” of upgrading Asia-Pacific’s 
backwater: the Russian Far East, “a byword for bad governance, corruption, 
and neglect”1284, then the economic Sinicization of the Russian Far East, not 
its military annexation, seems to be the most probable scenario for the future: 
“Russia may not necessarily ‘lose’ those provinces in a formal way to China, 
but it will see them increasingly gravitate towards it. In another great reversal, 
the 21st century Khabarovsk, a Russian border city on the Amur, may look like 
the late 19th century Harbin, founded by Russian merchants and railwaymen 
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in the middle of Chinese Manchuria: a foreign outpost in a neighbouing coun-
try, and the centre of an expanding zone of influence.”1285  
The Kremlin policy makers are aware of this challenge. Therefore, while 
embracing China, they have tried simultaneously to balance its influence by 
other Asian states. Hence, the idea of the “Russian pivot to Asia” (or the Rus-
sian turn to the East – more in the last chapter). Its basic concept is the idea of 
a comprehensive Asian strategy that combines coordinated domestic develop-
ment alongside positioning itself in the Asia-Pacific as well as enlarging and 
deepening ties with Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indo-
nesia, so that cooperation with Asia-Pacific is not limited to China.1286  
Nevertheless, the success of the Russian pivot  remained doubtful from the 
beginning due to domestic reasons. Even supporters of the Russian pivot saw 
big obstacles that would hamper its fulfillment. The preferred development 
model (basing on energy super projects) “cannot be applied here – the eco-
nomic and geographical realities do not favor it.”1287 To make matters worse, 
the Russian elites “are too busy worrying about day-to-day survival to draw up 
a consistent policy for relations with Asia”; that is why the “Kremlin’s Asian 
policy will be for the most part an imitation (…) It is no surprise that journalists 
joked that the (APEC) summit looked just as absurd as a man in a bird suit 
flying with Siberian cranes (as Putin tried to do).”1288 What was even more 
disturbing, was the traditional disjunction between rhetoric and substance, poor 
implementation of programs, no follow-up and lack of sustained interest in 
long-term development of the region; the current economic situation does not 
help, either: “at a time of recession and tight budgetary constraints, the pro-
spects for the RFE look very bleak without massive foreign investment”; at-
tracting non-Chinese Asian partners failed, too: “in the current environment 
China is not just the partner of choice, but sometimes the only partner.”1289 The 
Ukrainian crisis and its aftermath effectively stopped the dreams of a  Russian 
pivot to Asia. Moscow, busy with confrontations with the West over Ukraine, 
despite all its grandiose declaration to the contrary, has turned its attention 
away from Asia: developments after the Ukrainian crisis “confirmed that what 
passes for an Asian strategy is often directed at fulfilling ‘greater’ goals: coun-
tering the United States in global geopolitics; establishing an alternative legit-
imacy to Western-led governance; reinforcing Russia as an independent center 
of power; and reaffirming its uniqueness and indispensability.”1290 
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Judging by early-2017, Russia’s pivot to China has not brought a substantial 
change and many deals have traditionally remained on paper due to several 
factors. The most important one was the fall of commodity prices, particularly 
oil, which hit Russian-Chinese trade hard. But there were Chinese domestic 
reasons, too. China’s economic slowdown as well as Xi Jinping’s anti-corrup-
tion policy made Chinese companies very cautious on investing in new pro-
jects, particularly in the energy sector. Moreover, contrary to Russian hopes, 
Chinese banks and financial institutions are as strict as Western ones about 
compliance with the sanctions regime (they feared Western contractions, since 
the West is much more important to China, Chinese banks decided not to take 
chances) and are not executing interbank transactions with Russian banks; to 
make matters worse, Russian companies are unable to issue debt or equity on 
Chinese stock exchanges (even in Hong Kong). Finally, Chinese banks are un-
willing to provide loans in dollars or euros to Russians (with the exception of 
strictly political banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-
Import Bank of China which gave loans to the Yamal LNG project following 
a personal order from Xi Jinping himself). Therefore, “on balance, Russian 
elites’ hopes that Chinese financing would make up for the loss of Western 
capital markets appear exaggerated.”1291 Thus, the hope that Shanghai, Hong 
Kong and Singapore would replace London, New York or Frankfurt for Rus-
sian banks has failed.1292 
Despite the lack of results, however, Russia continues its attempts to turn to 
the East, which strengthens the already deep asymmetry in favour of China. If 
Moscow follows this path, it will probably soon be forced to accept Chinese 
companies’ ownership of substantial stakes (including joint control with Rus-
sian minority stakeholders) in strategic deposits of natural resources or/and 
joint ventures between Chinese companies and Russian businessmen with ties 
to the Kremlin, in those joint ventures Beijing would provide technology and 
financing while Russians would ensure the Kremlin’s approval of projects and 
bids. In this new scheme, “the mutual benefits that both sides derive will com-
pensate for the growing inequality between them. China will offer Moscow an 
economic lifeline, while Russia will provide vital resources (military and ci-
vilian technology, natural resources, and diplomatic support, including in the 
UN Security Council) to propel China’s rise as a global powerhouse that can 
compete with the United States.”1293 The paradoxal social consequence of 
Kremlin’s turn to China is that “one of Moscow’s atavistic anxieties— Chinese 
domination of the RFE and Eastern Siberia— is closer to being realized.”1294 
That is why, from the perspective of mid 2017, the Russian pivot to Asia may 
be metaphorically summarized by Deng Xiaoping’s well-known words; Deng 
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said that different names given to Vladivostok by the Chinese and Russians 
have reflected different political goals: the original Chinese name, Haishenwai, 
meant “sea slug,” whereas the Russian name means “the ruler of the East.”1295 
Today, despite Russian plans and dreams about pivoting to Asia, Vladivostok 
in the political sphere is more a “sea slug” than “the ruler of the East”. 
*** 
Putin’s governance of the Russian Far East meant a modernization and reform 
attempt. The finalizing of the demarcation of the border with China was un-
doubtedly a success, as was silencing voices that made claims of “immigration 
expansion” by China in the region. Reforming the Russian Far East was much 
less successful: it remains one of the most neglected regions of Russia. The 
ESPO-based development attempt has failed. Russia, therefore, turned to an 
idea of cooperation with China. Nevertheless, from the perspective of April 
2017, this has not yet been fulfilled. Beijing is more interested in the import of 
the Russian Far East’s natural resources than in participation in its develop-
ment. Beijing’s policy toward the Russian Far East is reminiscent of that taken 
toward Laos. On the one hand China exploits the region economically, taking 
resources and other raw materials, on the other hand it floods it with low qual-
ity goods. As a result of this neocolonial economic policy, the Russian Far East 
is beginning to become China’s raw material appendix. This is a result of the 
Chinese monopoly in the region and Russia’s weakness there. The Kremlin 
elites are aware of the consequences – thus they initiated the “Russian pivot to 
Asia” to get Russia out of isolation in Asia-Pacific. Unfortunately, from the 
perspective of early 2017, this “turn to the East” remains “wishful thinking” 
more than a reality, and if it is a pivot, then it is to China only, not Asia. It 
increases instead of decreases Russia’s dependence on China. Therefore, the 
only reasonable thing Russia can do in this situation is to make best use of what 
is on the ground: to try to work out benefits in the game played by Chinese 
rules.  
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Part Four: Central Asia:  
Towards Sino-Russian Condominium 
Central Asia has a special place on the geopolitical map of the world. This 
region has a unique geopolitical feature: it is landlocked and hardly accessible; 
it is removed from the global political and economic centers (which makes it 
difficult for Central Asian states to develop external relations); and finally it is 
handicapped hydrologically: the deficit of water remains the source of perma-
nent tensions between Central Asian states (which are relatively weak politi-
cally and divided over many issues). Geographical location and vast natural 
resources are the main factors of great powers’ interest in the region1296. Here 
interests of Russia and China became convergent right from the beginning.  
1. Russia in Central Asia 
Since the 19th century Russia has “enjoyed a hegemonic position in Central 
Asia”, consequently “Moscow has invariably looked upon Central Asia with a 
patrimonial eye.”1297 For Russia, Central Asia is a part of the “near abroad”, 
while its dominant position here has been based on economic and communica-
tion connections between the region and Moscow inherited after the USSR and 
on personal contacts with Central Asian elites whose security Moscow safe-
guarded (arms deliveries, garrisons) and on the universal fluency in Russian 
language in the region.1298 This all gave Russia a giant advantage over other 
powers in the region. For years, the great powers respected Russia’s position 
and have not interferred with the Central Asian affairs – Washington did not 
even do it during the Cold War. Even after 1991 it had “predisposition to look 
to Russia to guide these states into more stable and democratic futures and to 
play the role of policeman if good guidance failed.”1299. Moscow, however, 
initially after 1991 was not eager to play this role. Russian reformers consid-
ered Central Asian republics an unnecessary burden for Russia, while Central 
Asian elites appeared to share this outlook.1300 The Russian perspective was 
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based on a “paternalistic assumption” that Central Asian republics are destined 
to be dominated by Russia.1301 Consequently, “it was not that the republics 
seceded from the USSR, but that the USSR simply abandoned them to their 
fate.”1302 Russia had been steadily withdrawing from the region – its engage-
ment to a bigger extent was based on inertia and mechanical use of all Soviet 
connections.1303 This, combined with a more active policy of other actors (the 
USA, Turkey, Iran) and the de-sovietisation process, de-rusification in local 
conditions, led to Russia’s decreased position in the region.1304 Only Prima-
kov’s nomination in 1996 slowed this negative process down. He conducted 
his first foreign visit to Central Asia and emphasized that relations with the 
region would be “the highest priority of Russian foreign policy.”1305 Neverthe-
less, Moscow’s deeper engagement materialized only in the next decade. 
Russia’s re-engagement with Central Asia in the 2000s was in a way pro-
voked by the external development – the U.S. incursion into the region, which 
questioned Russia’s hegemonic position in Central Asia. Initially the Russian 
Federation not only did not oppose the US intervention, but even supported it. 
Soon however, the Kremlin policy-makers realized that a long-term American 
presence threatenedRussian interests. Consequently, Moscow turned toward 
Beijing. Russia and China joined on mutual need to remove the USA from the 
region. That is why the mid 2000s saw intensified Sino-Russian cooperation 
in the region, best exemplified by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO). Nevertheless, cooperation started to coexist with competition when 
China started steadily challenging Russia, with its New Silk Road project – in 
competition with the Russian Eurasian Union. The result was an ambiguity in 
Russian and Chinese policy in Central Asia.  
Despite Russia’s re-engagement after 09/11, “Russia’s influence has eroded 
significantly over the past two decades since the collapse of the USSR”; only 
after Russia declared reintegration of the post-Soviet area as one of its top pri-
orities in 2012, the further erosion of Russian influence was halted.1306 For 
Moscow, Central Asia is “often viewed as a ‘soft underbelly’, i.e. a buffer 
whose presence could improve the impermeability of the Russian borders”, 
besides it matters as “a major source of raw materials (uranium and hydrocar-
bons that are re-exported to the West) and of a cheap workforce”; moreover, 
Central Asia is important as an area covered by Russian integration initiatives”; 
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finally it “is the last part of the Soviet ecumen, apart from Belarus and Arme-
nia, where the Kremlin can still feel like a political leader (…) For this reason, 
Moscow’s presence and influence in Central Asia are essential for its prestige”; 
thus “Russia’s basic and most important goals are to maintain its influence 
there (and expand it, in the optimal scenario) and to restrict the influence of 
other actors (…) The loss of this region, understood as the dominance of an-
other external player being entrenched there (…) would also be painful for 
Russia in symbolic terms.”1307  
2. China in Central Asia 
China for the first time appeared in the region as an important actor after the 
USSR’s fall. For Beijing, Central Asia mattered mostly for its implications for 
Xinjiang. The declarations of independence of the new post-Soviet republics 
threatened transferring freedom tendencies from Central Asian nations inside 
China. The Xinjiang issue and its separatism became Beijing’s main con-
cerns.1308 That is why “security issues are at the core of Chinese engagement 
in Central Asia – China wants to protect Xinjiang from possible destabiliza-
tion, while the main field of play for China are economic issues”; China’s re-
lations with Central Asia “have been an effect of two parallel processes of fun-
damental significance for the global order: the disintegration of the Rus-
sian/Soviet empire in Asia, and the other – the sudden rise in China’s position”; 
Xinjiang’s relations with Central Asian countries and this province’s growing 
rise have been the local equivalent of these processes – for China, Central Asia 
has functioned mainly as the way to make Xinjiang rich and stable.1309 That is 
why after the USSR’s fall China put emphasis on economic cooperation with 
the region, hoping that increased trade volume would lead to greater prosperity 
and consequently – stability of the difficult Xinjiang province.1310 At the same 
time, China started advocating development of transport network which was 
supported by the UN and Asian Development Bank.1311 Nevertheless, trans-
portation lines with China in the 1990s remained sporadic and increased only 
in the 2000s and the 2010s. This was the exact opposite to the integration of 
Central Asian economies with Russia – a common heritage after the USSR’s 
fall. Unsurprisingly then the region’s volume of trade with China fell behind 
the one with Russia (trade with Russia was seven times larger in 1995 while in 
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2000 – six times). This is, however, only the official data. The real volume of 
trade between China and Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan has been difficult to estimate – for example in the early 1990s it was 
mostly barter, which makes it impossible to show accurate data.1312 Neverthe-
less, there is no doubt that Central Asia’s cooperation with China in the 1990s 
had been much lower than with Russia – this changed only in the 2000s.  
Having their policy goals of Xinjiang in mind, China since 1991 has done a 
lot to establish good relations with new the republics’ leaders and persuade 
them that it is better to base their interests in Beijing rather than to care about 
their cousins the Uygurs in Xinjiang. Although Central Asian leaders initially 
had difficulties with understanding the Chinese specifics, they were quick to 
learn the realities. China was too big and too important to risk looking for trou-
ble with it in the case of the Uyghurs. That is why since the 1990s Central 
Asian leaders have tried to intensify top-level relations with Beijing and they 
have not mentioned the Uygur issue. It came easier for them thanks to the fact 
that Uygur separatism was potentially dangerous for their regimes as well. 
Therefore, by supporting China’s integrity, they cared for their own business, 
too.  
The anxiety over spreading of disliked ideologies such as liberal democracy 
or Islamic fundamentalism to the Chinese territory was another factor in 
China’s engagement with Central Asia. Here Beijing could count on leaders of 
Central Asian republics.1313 In general, their cooperation with China was sta-
ble, though in regional capitals the anxiety over China’s weight, its potential 
and possible imperial aims never ceased to exist. It was another reason to come 
closer to Russia, particularly after 1996: “given the choice between Russia and 
China, most in Central Asia would choose ‘the devil’ they know over the one 
they do not know.”1314  
Initially China respected traditional Russian dominance in the region. For 
China, Central Asia is “a region with a high potential for instability”; that is 
why Beijing “respected Russia’s interests and initiatives regarding regional se-
curity issues.”1315 In the 1990s and the early to mid 2000s, Beijing considered 
this region as zone of exclusive Russian influences and interests which meant 
that China, contrary to other international actors “initially approached in cau-
tion and respectfully to Russian interests (…) which contributed to both coun-
tries’ general rapprochement.”1316 China concluded “a tacit bargain with Mos-
cow”: in return for recognition of the status quo in Central Asia and deference 
of Russia’s regional leadership, Moscow continued “to take care of business”; 
for China it meant one thing: “with its ‘strategic rear’ covered, China could 
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then focus on domestic modernization and Taiwan.”1317 Central Asia through-
out the 1990s and until the late 2000s remained the place where Russian and 
Chinese interests converged and overlapped, cooperation became “harmoni-
ous.”1318  
For the time being, Beijing had been able to “forge its weakness into a pos-
itive image of a country which does not interfere with the internal problems of 
its neighbours; this ‘affirmative’ policy was also based on discreet support for 
individual countries in case of tension in relations with Russia or the USA.”1319 
At the same time, however, China since the 2000s had been preparing to enter 
the oil and gas market in the region to ensure steady supply of resources to 
Chinese economy. Energy aside, another dimension for China has been trans-
portation – establishing the New Silk Road since the 2010s.1320 
China’s entry to Central Asia in the 2000s diametrically altered the strategic 
picture of the region and in the long-term it proved to be more important than 
American involvement (see: below). China’s renewed interest has been con-
sistent with “more permanent realities” not just “extraordinary concatenation 
of circumstances” like in the case of the USA.1321 The United States is leaving 
Central Asia, whereas China is here to stay – for a long time. China wants to 
achieve a dominant position not out of historical or messianic reasons (like 
Russia), or ideological ones (like the USA), but because a stronger presence 
meets its interests – the Chinese are convinced that economic cooperation is 
linked with security issues: fighting poverty will remove the cause of “three 
evils” (terrorism, separatism and extremism), and would protect Xinjinag.1322 
So far it has proven to be true – “in the post-Soviet Central Asia time appears 
to be on the Middle Country’s side.”1323 
Access to energy, the need to diversify deliveries and the creation of a web 
of oil and gas pipelines connected with domestic ones have been China’s other 
key interests here.1324 Moscow’s unreliability as an energy provider made Bei-
jing intensify its involvement in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – 
Central Asia is said to have the third biggest energy resources while geographic 
proximity plays to China’s advantage. Contrary to Russia, whichstrived to 
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keep its monopoly in the region, China wanted to eliminate Russia’s interme-
diacy and establish direct contacts with Central Asian republics.1325 Russia 
wanted to keep its position of the unquestionable leader, whereas China hoped 
for a “concert of Central Asia.”1326 At the same time, however, China in the 
long-term strives to establish the traditional Chinese vassal model of state-to-
state relationship in Central Asia; Beijing wants to peacefully subordinate 
these countries without the need to establish direct control1327. Moscow, in its 
turn, was very cautious in masking its dissatisfaction with the growing Chinese 
involvement: the Kremlin decided to use the local anxieties of Chinese domi-
nance – the Central Asians fear China more than Russia.1328 For a long time 
the camouflaged competition with Beijing gave way to joint containment of 
the USA in Central Asia1329, with Chinese growing involvement, however, this 
may change.  
3. Border Issues: “The Shanghai Five” 
The border issue was one of the most challenging problems inherited after the 
USSR. There is no natural border between China and Central Asia and there 
has never been one between Russian and Chinese territories. Soviet-Chinese 
conflicts from the 1960s and unregulated border issue did not help to stabilize 
and normalize the relations. China for its part strived not only to demarcate but 
also to demilitarize it and build confidence measures. Here Shanghai’s agree-
ment on strengthening mutual security and confidence-building measures – 
subsequently called the “Shanghai agreement”1330whereas its signatories, The 
Shanghai Five – proved to be the single most important step. The agreement 
itself meant that China dropped its earlier claims against the Russian Empire 
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and the USSR.1331 That is why the Chinese concession must be understood as 
a compromise made to normalize relations with Central Asian republics; this 
compromise cost Beijing little, but enhanced Chinese possibilities of political 
influence as well as opportunities of economic benefits. Besides this, the mech-
anism applied during the Shanghai Five agreement proved to be “a textbook 
example of the general emphasis on agreements and multilateral negotiations 
as typical features of the Chinese diplomacy.”1332 Since then, the “Five” format 
has started being used as an effective platform of cooperation between China 
and the region and expanded impressively.1333 Since the very beginning China 
became the leader of the “Five”; Russia largely neglected the formula. The 
“Five” achieved success because “the countries involved share similar interna-
tional norms of behaviour they have taken a gradualist approach which allows 
time to build up trust and coordination among themselves.”1334  
4. The USA Moves In 
11 September 2001 became the time limes (latin: boundary) for Central Asia. 
In Russia “Putin was said to have made a ‘strategic choice’ (…) Russia was 
powerless to stop the United States from entering the region” – Putin simply 
“made a virtue out of necessity.”1335 Besides, the US entry had its security ad-
vantages: it removed the Taliban, the “Sword of Damocles” that loomed over 
Central Asian countries.1336 Putin aimed at making a breakthrough in Russian-
American relations to get material profits necessary for rebuilding the Great 
Russia.1337 This thinking was based on one crucial assumption: that the Amer-
ican presence would be temporary. This began to change when the Kremlin 
realized that the Americans were planning to stay for longer and intended to 
promote democracy (“colour revolutions”). This was too much for Moscow: 
the United States became “part of the problem”, not the solution.”1338 This led 
to choosing option No. 2: cooperation with China to contain the Western inter-
vention.  
9/11 had a decisive importance for Chinese policy towards Central Asia, 
too. Putin’s speedy endorsement of the American military cooperation “came 
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as a shock to the Chinese leadership”; Beijing could not believe that Moscow 
would permit, let alone support deployment of the US troops in Russia’s sphere 
of influence; to make matters worse, “relations with China were unceremoni-
ously pushed into the background.”1339 That was a very bad news: “the Chinese 
leadership perceived a significant political discomfort due to the unexpected 
arrival of American troops in a region abundant with natural resources that lies 
at China’s rears.”1340 The old Chinese fears of the Middle Kingdom’s encircle-
ment by hostile countries reappeared with new power. Putin’s behavior made 
Beijing realize a number of truths – the first: for Russia, relations with the West 
“would always take precedence”, the second: Sino-Russian axis is still a func-
tion of Russia’s relations with the West; the third: “Russia would not support 
Chinese interests in Central Asia, except on a purely coincidental basis”; the 
forth: the United States was now a major power in the region, not Russia.1341 
Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership, in accordance with the tradition of Chi-
nese strategic culture, has hidden the feelings. They kept calm and waited for 
the cooling of Russian-US relations and weakening of the US status in the re-
gion. This allowed China to gradually and quietly build its position in the re-
gion without alarming the other powers. Nevertheless, “the key lesson of the 
early post-9/11 period remained: in Chinese eyes Russia became both untrust-
worthy and weak”; thus, China started more active policy towards Central 
Asia, one that involved expansion of ties with Central Asian republics.1342 The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization became the tool for this policy.  
5. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization  
Not so long time ago the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) drew at-
tention and caused considerable stir. To some it was a positive multilateral or-
ganization that addressed the “universal threats”; other saw it as “anti-NATO”, 
a quasi-alliance directed against the Western model of democracy. The apolo-
gists claimed it successfully resolves practical issues, while critics argued that 
the organization is an empty shell.1343 Recently the SCO has been losing its 
influence in the region.  
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Officially, the SCO is built on the Shanghai Spirit1344, but this concept is 
rather vague.1345 The SCO’s hallmark has been its fight with “three evils”: ter-
rorism, separatism and extremism1346. Compared with other organizations, the 
SCO language of statements and documents is rather defensive/conservative: 
member-states dislike the propagation of democratic values and emphasize 
non-interference in domestic affairs instead.1347 Protest against “hegemonism” 
and “imposition” of the Western patterns was quite frequent in its announce-
ments, particularly in the mid-2000s.1348 The overall impression the SCO mem-
ber-states tried to convey was that of “an organization that was growing dy-
namically, but from a modest base.”1349 
Initially nothing but geography united the member-states.1350 The SCO was 
founded on 15 June 2001 in Shanghai by Shanghai Five countries and Uzbek-
istan (that was admitted a day earlier).1351 During that summit the “Shanghai 
convention combating terrorism, separatism and extremism” (the “three evils”) 
was adopted.1352 In accordance with the SCO chapter, all member-states are 
equal and the decisions are taken without a vote (consensus) and without veto 
right.1353 Mongolia was granted an observer status in 2004, followed by Iran, 
Pakistan and India in 2005 and Afghanistan in 2012 (India and Pakistan be-
came members in 2017). With the exception of Mongolia, each time the ob-
server status aroused controversies. Probably that is why the SCO stopped 
granting this title and replaced it with a more flexible formula – a “dialogue 
partner” (Belarus and Sri Lanka in 2010, Turkey 2012, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Cambodia, and Nepal in 2015). The declared main goals are security issues, 
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economic, social and cultural cooperation.1354 In reality, avoiding conflicts be-
tween member-states remains the most important goal1355, while “maintaining 
border and regional security” remains the most fundamental function of the 
SCO.1356 
The SCO official declarations are grandiose in form, but lacking in sub-
stance, without details of implementation and with a gap between declarations 
and the real actions; subsequent statements appear to conceal the lack of pro-
gress or ritual hollow preaching.1357 Parallels with the NATO and the EU are 
“obviously absurd.”1358 More appropriate are the ones with the OSCE, but the 
latter has more members and more power.1359 The SCO is first and foremost “a 
platform that potentially enables member-states to fulfill their specific 
goals.”1360 Somehow the SCO reminds the CIS – the rhetoric outweighs 
achievements – “there is no the SCO policy per se”, much of its activity is 
“geopolitical bluff” intended to create “the perception (or at least the illusion) 
of there being a new and serious player on regional and international scene.”1361  
However, the SCO “amounts to more than just a mini-CIS plus China”: the 
SCO has demonstrated “an impressive solidarity on occasions”: the 2005 call 
for a final timeline for the removal of US soldiers from Afghanistan1362 or a 
contribution to closure of the US air base in Khanabad in 2005.1363 Besides, 
the SCO has some achievements in the security sphere, like combating terror-
ism. Finally, the SCO is “a genuinely multilateral organization, even if some 
member-states are more equal than others” (the weakest, Kyrgyzstan and Ta-
jikistan, can make themselves heard).1364 The Georgia crisis in 2008 and the 
SCO unwillingness to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia proved it 
well.1365 For many, China is the real leader of the SCO, the Organization re-
mains an important tool for Beijing’s Central Asian policy.1366  
In the mid-2000s it was very popular to perceive the SCO as an opposition 
to the West. There were voices about the SCO being “anti-NATO”, “Eastern 
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NATO”, “new Warsaw pact”1367, or even “League of Dictators”1368. This per-
ception was based on conviction that the prime reason to exist for the Organi-
zation is to undermine the American presence in Central Asia; the SCO itself 
gave some ground to this kind of assessment.1369  
Although the SCO is neither a full security organization nor a trade block 
nor anything else, it would be wrong to consider the SCO as nothing more than 
simply a geopolitical bluff: Central Asian republics are concerned about secu-
rity, Islamizm and only when the US started the export of democracy “they 
bought into Moscow’s overtly anti-U.S. agenda”; similarly, China’s top prior-
ity has been “the security of China’s far west rather than strategic competition 
with Washington.”1370 To sum up: “ultimately the SCO is a modest organiza-
tion of modest achievements, a reality implicitly recognized by its members, 
whose main foreign policy activity is either directed elsewhere (Russia, China) 
or channeled through bilateral relations (Central Asian states).”1371 Member-
ship in the SCO has paid off to every member-state: for Russia it has been a 
forum to maintain its position and to control the Chinese cooperation with the 
region; for China it has legitimized its ties with Central Asian republics and 
allowed to increase its status via growing economic advantage. For both Russia 
and China the SCO allowed keeping the foreign powers (the USA) away from 
the region, or limiting their influence. As such it indeed became “a significant 
development of Sino-Russian cooperation in Asia”, as Mikhail Titarenko 
wanted to see it.1372 For Central Asians the SCO have been helping to maintain 
independence and have at least pretended an equal voice with Russia and 
China. The mid-2000s concerns about the SCO were premature because the 
member-states, let alone observers, are much diverged, with contradictory in-
terests that make it difficult to find a common language. This all highlights the 
internal limitations – the normative convergence is too narrow, integration re-
mains scant and cooperation is hampered by cultural differences, mutual dis-
trust and contradictory interests.1373  
The SCO is a temporary solution – a tool for Russia and China to check one 
another and control ambitions.1374 These have been different: Moscow wanted 
to use the SCO as a tool to keep its monopolistic position on energy and energy 
transit in the region, whereas China intended it to be the engine of trade and 
investments in the region. Thanks to the SCO formula, these interests have 
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been meeting and balancing – the cooperation within the organization limits 
the possibility for a conflict.1375 Nevertheless, cracks have already appeared 
and are likely to increase in the future. Currently the SCO has two wheels – 
security and economy, the former being more important.1376 Beijing wanted to 
shift the SCO’s agenda towards economic cooperation and integration, while 
Moscow underlined security issues and military and geopolitical aspects.1377 
This conflict of interests was clearly visible in the Russian veto for Chinese-
backed idea of the SCO free trade zone. The member-states cooperate closely 
in trade, but not financially or in the banking sector – the Central Asians “do 
not want the Soviet-time hegemony to reappear, this time with Beijing as the 
decision-making center.”1378 As for Russia, its approach towards the SCO has 
been moderate – it supported the Organization politically but remained cau-
tious in practical cooperation.  
Moscow’s organization of choice in Central Asia has not been the SCO, but 
the CSTO. Since the very beginning, Moscow has tried to foster a closer co-
operation between the SCO and the CSTO – it wanted to become a “bridge” 
between those two organizations; such a “marriage of convenience” would 
strengthen Russia’s position in Central Asia.1379 Unfortunately for Moscow, 
this idea was first blocked by Uzbekistan, and then by China1380. Lack of any  
real achievements by the CSTO1381 makes it difficult for it to camouflage its 
main geopolitical goal: fostering a Russia position in the region.1382 That is 
why the most important difference between the SCO and the CSTO lies it the 
fact that the former is Beijing’s multilateral instrument of influence, whereas 
the latter – is Moscow’s one.  
In the 2000s there were two most important approaches to Sino-Russian 
relations in Central Asia. According to the first one, those two countries effec-
tively cooperated in combating terrorism and ideological and strategic threats 
from the West. The alternative one claimed that real cooperation is scant and 
possible only thanks to a common foe – the United States; without it Russia 
and China would compete (or already had started competing). Both approaches 
were correct to some extent.1383 That is why the SCO served well within the 
concept of a “partnership” – non-enemy and non-friend, or in other words, a 
“peaceful buffer.”1384 With time, however, especially after 2013, the buffer is 
becoming less and less useful. Russian veto for a Chinese-backed SCO free 
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trade zone and/or bank and Chinese veto for Russian-backed SCO fund1385 
have de facto blocked the development of this organization. Russia prefers to 
work on financial mechanisms outside the SCO framework, such as BRICS.1386 
As for China, although it is visibly the dominant member of the SCO, Beijing 
is frustrated with current state of affairs within the SCO that does not allow for 
further economic development “and could not wait for Russia to start the eco-
nomic cooperation within the SCO.”1387 Thus China has allowed Russia to 
symbolically dominate the SCO recent agenda and orientate it towards inter-
national and security issues instead of regional – “thus the the SCO is becom-
ing a forum, symbolically dominated by Russia, for coordinating the members’ 
positions on global issues” instead of being “an organization which actually 
influences the situation in the region.”1388 It remains to be seen whether the 
admittance to the organization of India and Pakistan as full members (accepted 
in 2015, confirmed in 2016 and included in 2017) will change these dynamics 
(or the opposite: strengthen the recent ineffectivness). According to some, like 
Li Jinfeng or Alexander Lukin, this will make the SCO a China-Russia-India-
led organization and boost its importance.1389 Others, like Yan Xuetong, say 
that this is the final nail in the Organization’s coffin (“the SCO is in fact 
dead”).1390 Whatever the outcome turns out to be, China has accepted this en-
largement, seen as benefitting Russia, but blocked further enlargement of Iran 
in order not to complicate its relations with the West.1391 Beijing has been try-
ing, too, to use the SCO institutional framework to enhance its One Belt One 
Road project, but the results are not yet satisfying. What is certain is that China, 
seeing structural obstacles within the organization, lost its primary interest in 
the SCO (at least for the time being), and turned toward bilateral diplomacy 
instead.  
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6. Russia’s and China’s Relations with Central Asian Countries 
All Central Asian republics enjoy strong political, social and cultural ties with 
Russia. Despite that, they all jealously guard their independence. Central Asian 
leaders entered international politics in 1991 having little experience in dealing 
with non-Soviet world. Former nomenclature members after the USSR fall 
found themselves nationalists and set a clear course for independence and sov-
ereignty. This meant an attempt to liberalize from Moscow’s zone of influence, 
or at least maneuvering much more space than during Soviet times. This forced 
them to conduct a balancing of powers policy that started in the early 1990s 
and continues until now. This differentiates the regional political landscape 
from the pre-1991 era: the Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan, 
are no longer passive subjects in the great powers’ games1392; they have an 
empowered position and they are able to play off one another’s contradictions 
and maximize benefits for their own sake. Central Asian elites tried to coun-
terbalance Russia’s influence by the West first, but Washington’s agenda and 
its support for colour revolutions led Central Asians to turn toward China, a 
more suitable model for them. Thanks to Beijing’s engagement in the region, 
and its credits, the republics are now able to demand higher rates from Moscow 
for their natural resources. Chinese policy success in this regard is even more 
remarkable when the initial reserve, alienation and endangered, that character-
ized Central Asians’ approach to China in the early 1990s, is taken into ac-
count1393.  
Uzbekistan, the most populous Central Asian country, stands as a good ex-
ample of the balancing policy – it has been maneuvering most spectacularly 
with its “‘sinusoidal’ policy (involving longer periods of co-operation with the 
West, interspersed with periods of closer relations with Moscow)”; under Is-
lam Karimov’s leadership Tashkent set a clear course for independence, dis-
tanced itself from Moscow (Uzbekistan is the only country without Russian 
military bases in the region) and tried to achieve leadership in Central Asia in 
an assertive way (that quite often meets with neighbours’ opposition)1394. Tash-
kent believed that the balancing policy, sometimes in an aggressive way, is the 
best way of preserving its independence and sovereignty.1395 Independence in 
the Uzbek style meant a public fight with “postcolonial syndrome” – desoviet-
isation and derusification.1396 At the same time, however, Tashkent “developed 
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cordial, albeit quiet, military ties with the United States and NATO.”1397 The 
interest was mutual: the USA had chosen Uzbekistan as a buffer against both 
Islamism and Russian expansionism. In 1999, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM 
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), now GUUAM, an ephemeral at-
tempt to establish a pro-Western alternative to the CIS1398. Nevertheless, Uz-
bekistan did not break its relations with Moscow – the Collective Security 
Treaty was established at the Tashkent summit in 1992 (in 1999 Uzbekistan 
pulled back and did not join the CST successor – the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization created in 2002).1399 Moreover, Karimov was the first one in re-
gion who showed in public China as an alternative development model, one 
worth implementing in Central Asia.1400 At the beginning of the 2000s, Kari-
mov was the West’s biggest ally; against this background ties with Russia “re-
mained anemic.”1401 Moreover, Uzbekistan has distanced itself from integra-
tion initiatives. This all changed after the Andijan events on 13 May 2005.1402 
Karimov feared losing his power while Moscow and Beijing were able to con-
vince him that the Andijan protestors/rebels were supported by the USA. When 
the Western countries condemned bloody pacification of Andijan, Moscow 
and Beijing supported Karimov, who thanked them by making a spectacular 
political turn. He quit the GUUAM in May 2005, after the SCO summit in June 
2005 he demanded the Americans to leave Khanabad air base1403 and signed 
an ally treaty with Moscow in 2005 that made him return to the CSTO and 
agree to have Russian soldiers on Uzbekistan soil.1404 Tashkent’s turn has been 
so spectacular that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has called this country 
their “key strategic partner in Central Asia.”1405 Despite all that, Karimov has 
not cut all his ties with the West: the reason was Uzbekistan’s economy being 
in such a bad shape that it needed external sources. That is why although Ka-
rimov expelled the US airbases in Khanabad, he allowed the Germans to main-
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tain a refuelling station in Termez for the US and European air military per-
sonnel.1406 At the same time he has been cultivating close ties with Beijing that 
transcended the improvement of economic relations. Uzbekistan has been the 
key transit country on the Chinese gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that broke 
the Russian monopoly in the region. Moscow has tried to keep Uzbekistan 
within its orbit but Tashkent’s suspension of membership in the CSTO on 20 
June 2012 – that demonstrated Tashkent’s ambition to conduct independent 
policy – worsened Russian-Uzbek relations. This suspension came only two 
weeks after Vladimir Putin’s visit; this undermined the regional image of Rus-
sia and its president.1407 This solidified Uzbekistan’s image in the Kremlin as 
“a prickly partner”, ready “at any moment to jump into bed with the United 
States or China”, with whom relations “have gone through many ups and 
downs, and remain difficult” and whom Russia would like to ignore but cannot 
do so given geopolitical considerations.1408 As a result, “political relations be-
tween Moscow and Tashkent are characterized by total distrust”, but Russia 
remains the transit monopolist for Central Asian resources to Europe and is 
still a vital trade partner for Uzbekistan.1409  
When summarizing Uzbek policy, one may clearly see a permanent – better 
or worse – attempt to balance Russia, China and the West and keep them at 
arm’s length – Uzbekistan’s “foreign policy can be compared to pendulum mo-
tion: every two to three years, Uzbekistan turned away from Russia and other 
CIS partners and moved closer to the West, and vice versa.”1410 This balancing 
has not been as skillful as Kazakhstani (see: below): Tashkent “has managed 
to alienate Moscow and Washington at different times, partly because of the 
crudeness of its balancing, and partly because President Islam Karimov has 
proved a capricious ‘ally.’”1411 It remains to be seen whether Uzbekistan will 
be able to maintain balancing policy after Karimov’s death in September 2016 
and Mirziyaev’s ascendence to power (after all, Mirziyaev is from the same 
Samarkandian clan). 
Kazakhstan remains Central Asia’s most important country, its economic 
leader, “the bright point of Central Asia”, with a prosperous economy, stable 
society, velvet authoritarianism and Nazarbaev’s effective foreign policy of 
balancing foreign powers.1412 It “has been the most successful of the ex-Soviet 
republics judged by the criteria of political stability, economic growth, and 
foreign policy management.”1413 As the result, Kazakhstan has won its regional 
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rivalry with Uzbekistan over Central Asia’s leadership – its stable political sys-
tem, and favorable economic development has become a pattern for the re-
gion.1414  
From Kazakhstan’s very beginning of independence, Nazarbaev has maneu-
vered brilliantly between Moscow, Beijing and Washington and he continues 
to conduct a multi-vector policy until now: he has “achieved all this without, 
for the most part, upsetting Russian sensitivities or provoking imperial envy in 
Moscow – Kazakhstan remains “Russia’s most reliable and useful partner 
among the ex-Soviet republics.’”1415 His “multisector” policy ended with good 
relations with all major players and even enabled the country to play beyond 
its real position. Favouring regional integration projects was part of this strat-
egy (Nazarbaev was the first to propose the creation of the Eurasian Union in 
1994) – it was considered a good way to balance Chinese influences, but 
mostly as a nation-building process which emphasized stability, international 
cooperation and being a sovereign subject with global ambitions.1416  
Astana has strong ties with Moscow – economic (most of Kazakh’s oil has 
been transported via Russian pipelines), political and military (membership in 
regional organizations, presence of Russian army and Baikonur enclave) and 
psycho-political (protesting against democratization and human rights).1417 In 
the the 1990s there were also good personal relations between Yeltsin and Naz-
arbaev. Nevertheless, problems such as discrimination of the Russian minority 
and nation-building on rejection of Soviet heritage have continued to exist and 
made Nazarbaev distance himself from Moscow in the 1990s. Russia was not 
interested in closer ties either – Yeltsin even affronted Kazakhs by not attend-
ing the official inauguration of the new capital – Astana in 1998.1418 Although 
Nazarbaev indeed distanced himself from Moscow, he did it without burning 
bridges.  
As for relations with China in the 1990s, the Uygur issue played a decisive 
role. Kazakhstan has the biggest population of Uygurs outside China but 
Astana has supported Chinese position and kept its own Uyghurs with tight 
grip. Nevertheless, in the quasi-free Kazakh media, pro-Uygur voices did ap-
pear, but never to an extent where they could harm relations with Beijing. Ka-
zakhstan did not have the slightest interest in supporting Xinjiang’s Uygurs – 
such an action might have had negative domestic implications (the transfer of 
separatism to Kazakhstan). The politically troublesome border with Xinjiang 
had, however, its economic benefits. In the 1990s Kazakhstan became China’s 
biggest regional trade partner. Development of trade has not been disturbed by 
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frictions and anti-Chinese resentments (e.g. immigration threats and com-
plaints over the low quality of Chinese goods).1419  
Since the 2000s, Russian-Kazak political relations have been good1420, but 
economic relations remain problematic. Moscow and Astana have been di-
vided by contradictory interests: Moscow wants to maintain its dominant po-
sition in energy transit, while Kazakhstan tries to undermine it and lesser its 
dependence on the Russian transit routes. The two sides are, however, able to 
compromise,  so that “Russian-Kazakh relations can nevertheless (with some 
reservations) be determined as partnership-based, which cannot be said about 
Russia’s relations with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmeni-
stan.”1421 At the same time Kazakhstan actively cooperates with the United 
States and with China. The USA is one of the biggest investors in this coun-
try.1422 Thanks to a skilful foreign policy, until recently Kazakhstan has been 
able to “play an international role beyond its size.”1423  
The 2000s saw an impressive development of Sino-Kazakh relations, par-
ticularly in the economic sphere (increase of trade volume, especially in en-
ergy). Kazakhstan is China’s biggest Central Asian neighbor and the most im-
portant Central Asian country, and since until recently it was the only country 
in the region to have signed a strategic partnership agreement with China1424. 
As a result, it became China’s most important trade partner in the region, in 
terms of both import and export.1425 Kazakhstan benefited from the increased 
Chinese engagement in the region and Sino-Russian stalemate over the ESPO 
pipeline. In 2006, the Kazakhstan-Xinjiang three thousand kilometers’ long oil 
pipeline started operating, diversifying the Chinese need for oil from Rus-
sia.1426 Despite this pipeline and the fact that Chinese companies have domi-
nated the Kazakhstani upstream oil sector, most of Kazakhstani (as well as all 
Central Asian) oil continues to be exported via Russia.1427 In other words, 
Astana played the “Chinese card” without burning bridges with Moscow. 
Astana continued successful “dual-track” tactics even after the conflict in 
Georgia in 2008. Nazarbaev decided not to irritate Moscow by withholding 
Georgian investments and rejecting taking part in the NATO drills in Georgia, 
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but at the same time intensified actions aimed at diversification of deliver-
ies.1428 Kazakhstan has been promoting the Russian project of the Eurasian 
Union, but at the same time set the boundaries for this process and is distancing 
from Moscow.1429 From the Astana perspective, the Eurasian Union is a secu-
rity net against too much dependence from China.1430 However, after Russian 
actions in Ukraine, Kazakh’s anxieties over Russian dominance resurfaced1431, 
despite the official backing of the Kremlin’s policy.1432 
To sum up, one may say that so far Kazakhstan has been the biggest bene-
ficiary of Sino-Russian-US rivalry in Central Asia. Thanks to a wise balancing 
policy Astana has maintained good relations with all of them and thus gained 
a lot. In the changing circumstances of the intensified Russian integration pol-
icy, emergence of an alternative Chinese project and succession isuue com-
bined with recent systemic changes in the Kazakhstani system of power, how-
ever, the question is whether Kazakhstan will be able to maintain its independ-
ent, successful policy.  
Turkmenistan was self-isolated in the 1990s and became important in Cen-
tral Asian policy in the 2000s. In the 1990s, Turkmenbashi-Niyazov’s Turk-
menistan had been another rhetorically anti-Russian state in Central Asia. 
Turkmenbashi, an unusual political figure, has tried to conduct an independent 
policy (“permanent neutrality”).1433 Anti-Russian rhetoric did not disturb him 
from selling gas to Moscow (Turkmenistan remains Central Asia’s biggest res-
ervoir of gas) for very little which allowed Gazprom to re-sell it to European 
markets for much more. It helped Turkmenbashi to isolate the country and pro-
ceed with more and more grotesque social engineering based on his personality 
cult. Until his death in 2006, relations with Moscow concentrated on gas, 
whereas relations with Beijing – although correct – did not reach noticeable 
dynamics. This changed after Turkmenbashi’s death in 2006. His successor, 
Gurbanguli Berdimukhamedov changed the isolationist policy of his predeces-
sor and dynamically started seeking new partners to make himself independent 
from Russia.1434 Although Berdimukhamedov has not departed from neutral-
ism and isolationism fully, he allowed foreign investment in the economy’s 
most important sector: gas exploration. His goal was to internationalize coop-
eration to liberate Turkmenistan from Russian dominance in gas delivery. Ber-
dimukhamedov still sells gas mostly to Russia, but the “gas conflict” in April 
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2009 made him realize the necessity of diversification – Turkmenistan suffered 
from this conflict more than Russia did.1435 Ashkhabad faced a dilemma: 
whether to subordinate to Russia or seek new sources of income. The Chinese 
extended a helping hand at the decisive point by offering a USD4 billion load 
for future gas deliveries. This was a breakthrough: the finalization of gas con-
tract in 2009 (Central Asia-China gas pipeline that goes from Turkmenistan 
via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China) that broke the Russian monopoly in 
the region.1436 Since then, the ties between Ashkhabad and Beijing have been 
becoming more and more close – Turkmeni policymakers look toward China 
now.1437 During Xi Jinping’s September 2013 visit to Central Asia new gas 
agreements, that monopolized Turkmeni gas resources, have been signed 
which “have finalized the process whereby China has replaced Russia as Turk-
menistan’s patron and main sponsor.”1438  
Two remaining Central Asian countries – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – 
clearly fall behind. Tajikistan is closely linked to Russia via historical, cultural 
and social ties and the Russian military presence (that will remain there for the 
next 20 years).1439 This state has been the most vulnerable and unstable in the 
region, the least well governed, it has undertaken the most painful transfor-
mation and it has had the biggest number of islamic fundamentalists.1440 Tajik-
istan’s most traumatic experience was the civil war in 1992-1997.1441 It ended 
with a compromise between the fighting sides: the opposition gained access to 
power (30%) whereas Russia remained the guarantor of the country’s stabil-
ity.1442 Consequently, since then Tajikistan remains Moscow’s closer ally and 
has been in a state of strong dependency from Russia.1443 Like other countries 
of the region, Tajikistan used the US intervention in Afghanistan to strengthen 
its position: it allowed the USA to use Tajik airports and air zones. Moscow, 
however, backfired. Until now the Kremlin’s favorite tactic has been a carrot 
and stick approach. Hydro energy and Tajik guest workers in Russia (the most 
important part of economy – their income covers 47% of Tajikistan’s GDP and 
ranks it in the first place in the world in this category) are the effective instru-
ments of Russian influence. Thanks to these factors, despite Tajik attempts to 
maneuver (such as rejection of Moscow’s proposal to put Russian soldiers on 
                                                          
1435 W. Górecki, Even Further from Moscow…, pp. 60-64.  
1436 A. Petersen, K. Barysch, op. cit., p. 3. 
1437 Ibid.  
1438 A. Jarosiewicz, Chinese tour de force... 
1439 Russians Continue to Guard the Tajik Border with Afghanistan, Satrapia. The Gazette of 
Central Asia, 21.09.2012. 
1440 K. Strachota, Tadżykistan: czas próby [Tajikistan: Test Time], Warsaw, OSW working pa-
per no. 15, 10/2004. 
1441 Ibid.  
1442 M. Olimov, The policy of Russia in Central Asia: a perspective from Tajikistan [in:] Russia 
and Asia…p. 121. 
1443 W. Górecki, Even Further from Moscow…, p. 46. 
253 
the Tajik-Afghan border), Russia maintains the dominant position in Tajiki-
stan. Although the “Rakhmon regime’s near-total dependence on Russian sup-
port undercut its leverage” in dealings with Russia, Dushanbe, however, is able 
to secure some benefits from the Kremlin by “threatening Russia with weak-
ness, playing on fears about regime collapse and regional destabilization (…) 
in these circumstances, Moscow believes that it has no choice but to maintain 
substantial assistance to Tajikistan.”1444 China, which has been building roads 
and investing twice as much as Russia in Tajikistan, has been becoming Du-
shanbe’s almost equally important partner. This came with a price, though: in 
2002 Tajikistan ceded thousand kilometers in Pamir to China in return for 
dropping the claim for 28 thousands km².1445 This decision evoked anti-Chi-
nese resentments in Tajik society. Tajikistan, like Kyrgyzstan, maintains good 
relations with Russia and China alike to hamper the regional power ambitions 
of Uzbekistan and such Tashkent’s belligerent moves as closing of the bor-
ders1446. Tajikistan remains an outlet for Chinese goods (consumers goods and 
machines; China exports mainly resources and scrap metal).1447 How will Ta-
jikistan use the competition between Russian and Chinese integration projects 
remains to been seen. Balancing may become beyond its capabilities.  
Kyrgyzstan has remained another weak Central Asian country. It has been 
the most democratic country in the region and (perhaps because of it) one of 
poorest and most unstable countries of the region and at the same time a place 
where the interests of Russia, China and the USA cross. China is Bishkek’s 
main trade partner (2/3 of all imports), while Russia remains the most im-
portant political partner. Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar Akaev initially 
sought to turn to the West which enthusiastically supported his efforts to intro-
duce democracy, liberalization and “transform his country into ‘the Switzer-
land of Central Asia’”1448; he even called it, bafflingly, “the country of the hu-
man rights” (!)1449. Soon, however, he resigned from these, potentially danger-
ous for his regime, experiments and returned to his good, old authoritarian 
ways. He governed badly, though – the country sunk into corruption, nepotism 
and malaise. In his foreign policy, Akaev initially sought to balance Russia 
with the Western influence. With time, however, he became more and more 
compliant and did not question the pro-Moscow status quo in the region. As 
for China, Kyrgyzstan as a border country was naturally interested in develop-
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ing relations, particularly the economic ones. The increase in the bilateral vol-
ume of trade in the 1990s was impressive: China became Bishkek’s fourth 
trade partner; in 1997 alone the volume increased by 47% in comparison with 
the previous year; in the 1990s Kyrgyzstan – thanks to border trade – became 
China’s second Central Asian partner (after Kazakhstan).1450.  
In the 2000s, Kyrgyzstan went through two upheavals (the revolu-
tions/coups d’état in 2005 and in 2010), two dictatorships (Akaev’s and 
Bakiev’s) and ethnic clashes (Uzbek pogroms). The Tulip Revolution from 
2005 resulted in Kurmanbek Bakiev taking over power. Like his predecessor, 
he continued to give the green light for existing and stationing Russian and 
American bases alike (for a long time Kyrgyzstan had been the only country 
in the world to have them both) – for the USA Kyrgyzstan mattered because 
of the need to provide supplies to Afghanistan. Moscow has pushed Bakiev to 
close the American base in Manas and in January 2009 he announced this de-
cision. However, already in June 2009, he changed his mind and enraged Mos-
cow by allowing Americans to stay (he changed the name “air base” to a 
“transit point” and increased the lease three times, to 60 billion USD).1451 Mos-
cow revenged this by introducing a 100% export toll for oil1452 and by endors-
ing the 2010 revolution that overthrew him. The current president of Kyrgyz-
stan is Almazbek Atambayev, who took the office on 1st December 2011. He 
tried to maneuver with the Manas base, too. Finally, however, he yielded in 
2013; the base was closed in June 2014. Since Bakiev’s removal Russia’s in-
fluence has been increasing – Moscow is steadily making Kyrgyzstan more 
and more dependent, despite balancing attempts by the Kyrgyz elites.1453 As 
for Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, trade naturally dominates – the Kyrgyzstan-
China volume of trade surpasses that of Kyrgyzstan-Russia three times.1454 
Kyrgyzstan is an outlet for Chinese goods (consumption goods, equipment, 
machineries; all financed by Chinese loans) but has a negative trade bal-
ance.1455 Should the New Silk Road materialize, it is likely to increase. Besides, 
anti-Chinese resentments are visible in Kyrgyzstan (social anti-Chinese anxie-
ties hamper the economic relations between Beijing and Bishkek); that is why 
Bishkek tried to balance Chinese influence with good relations with Russia 
(see: joining the Eurasian Union). Moscow agreed on this, due to being “anx-
ious about China’s expanding footprint”, although subsiding Kyrgyzstan “does 
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not come cheap, the anticipated strategic dividends and psychological comfort 
make the expense worthwhile for the Kremlin.”1456 
Finally, there is also Mongolia. Although it is not a Central Asian country 
by the region’s narrowr definition, it can be understood to be so in the wider 
form. This is a country with probably the most difficult geopolitical location 
in the world.1457 Mongols have learned to play Moscow and Beijing off one 
another, to win contradictions between them and to keep an equal distance. 
Most importantly, they’ve tried to find “a third neighbour”1458, which unfortu-
nately did not work out. Mongolia therefore needs to balance Russia and 
China, and so far it has done it successfully.1459 For Ulan Bator in the 1990s, 
distancing from Moscow (with the withdrawal of 100,000 Russian troops in 
1992) did not mean intensifications of relations with Beijing (the ethnic fric-
tion in Inner Mongolia as well as mutual prejudice made any real normalization 
impossible). As for China, it considers Mongolia “a country only temporarily 
independent which should return to their supervision”1460 and given the size of 
China there are “strict limits to Mongolia’s ability to alter the rules of the game 
that China has set.”1461 Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to Mongolia (the first one in 
eleven years), officially called by China “visiting relatives”, may be under-
stood this way.1462 Fortunately for Ulan Bator, so far the Chinese tactics in 
Mongolia has been patient: “China has had the luxury of just waiting for the 
ripe fruit to fall into its hands.”1463 Given the decreasing geopolitical options 
for Ulan Bator, Mongolia realistically has no choice – the most natural option 
seems to be leaning to Russia, considered a lesser evil.1464 Mongolia has tried 
this by its “skip China” strategy of building a railway to Russian seaports in-
stead of the Chinese ones (much shorter and cheaper).1465 But relying on Russia 
is very controversial in Mongolia –Mongolians are unwilling to agree with the 
Russian saying that “one old friend is better than two new ones.”1466 Russia 
itself does not make this decision easier. Russia’s “bulldozer tactics certainly 
hampered its image as a self-proclaimed friend of the Mongolian people” – 
                                                          
1456 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder…, p. 126.  
1457 B. Niedziński, Czy Mongolia powinna odejść od balansowania między Rosją a Chinami? 
[Should Mongolia leave its balancing policy between Russia and China], polska-azja.pl 
27.06.2014. 
1458 Mongolia's 'Third Neighbour' Foreign Policy, Asia Society, 23.06.2013. 
1459 B. Niedziński, Czy Mongolia powinna odejść…  
1460 Ibid.   
1461 S. Radchenko, Sino-Russian Competition Competition in Mongolia, “The Asian Forum” 
22.11.2013. 
1462 Visiting Relatives and Friends to Discuss Cooperation Joining Hands to Develop a Better 
Future, MFAPRC, 22.08.2014.  
1463 S. Radchenko, op. cit. 
1464 B. Niedziński, Czy Mongolia powinna odejść…. 
1465 Yu Bin, Russia’s Pride and China’s Power, “Comparative Connections” vol. 16, no.3. 
1466 S. Radchenko, Sino-Russian Competition…  
256 
Moscow has supported the pro-Russian candidate for presidency Nambaryn 
Enkhbayar in the 2009 elections; not only did he lose, but ended up in prison 
for corruption.1467  
So far Moscow and Beijing have been happy to maintain a balance in Mon-
golia: “they have been very careful with respect to each other’s positions in 
Mongolia; neither is openly calling the other a ‘competitor’. (…) instead, the 
Sino-Russian competition is more like shadow boxing, with each trying to un-
dercut the other’s interests but only indirectly. Unfortunately for Russia, it is 
almost certain to lose this match, simply because it is in the wrong weight cat-
egory. The Sino-Russian relationship today is a throwback to Nerchinsk and 
Kyakhta, and will certainly not change in Russia’s favour.”1468  
To summarize these descriptions with the post-crisis landscape, the years 
after the economic crisis of 2008 have intensified Russian and Chinese actions 
in the region and weakened Central Asian republics’ position vis-à-vis Russia 
and China respectively. That meant Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are de facto de-
pendent on Russian help. Moscow has also retained significant influence over 
Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani energy sectors.1469 Thus, the weaker Central Asian 
states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were subordinated politically by Russia. 
Central Asia’s strongest countries Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 
however, have been able to secure to bigger or lesser extent a great dose of 
their independence by maneuvering between Moscow and Beijing. Mongolia 
still balances China and Russia’s influences but is likely to be dominated by 
China.  
7. Between New Great Game and Sino-Russian Condominium 
Since 2008, China has been engaging with Central Asia more and more boldly. 
It has “secured access to the bulk of natural resources and managed to signifi-
cantly increase its economic profile”, Russia in turn has “lost its pre-eminence, 
but held on to its dominant position in the areas of politics and security”.1470 
These new political realities of a more assertive China and uncompromising 
Russia have been best symbolized by their integration projects: China’s 2013 
the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, or the “New Silk Road” and Russia’s Eurasian 
Union. Thus, two contradictory integration concepts emerged that best illus-
trate the growing competition between Russia and China in Central Asia, 
called by a catchy phrase “new Great Game”. So far Moscow and Beijing were 
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able to manage their competition and create a kind of joint great powers’ con-
dominium. It remains to be seen, however, whether they are able to maintain 
this status quo.  
International relations in Central Asia have induced many researchers to call 
the geopolitical realities there “a new Great Game.”1471 According to this nar-
rative, this new great powers’ competition started with the US incursion into 
the region in 2001. From the perspective of 2017, the US presence in the region 
proved to be temporary, while a more and more assertive Russia and China 
have remained on the battlefield and are bound to clash in the future. This nar-
rative is challenged by an alternative one that claims that so far Moscow and 
Beijing are able to maintain compromise and that their cooperation outweighs 
competition – thus “a new status quo has emerged in Central Asia.”1472 
As long as the United States remained in the region, Sino-Russian interests 
were perfectly converged. With Washington’s pulling out, however, contradic-
tions became more and more visible. The economic crisis strengthened China’s 
position in the region (Beijing became the region’s largest trading partner) and 
showed Russia’s inability to help Central Asians economically. This strength-
ened the potential for Russia-China competition: Russian regional dominance 
in security is difficult to reconcile with Chinese economic expansion in the 
long term. Energy is the most famous ground for competition: China was able 
to break the Russian monopoly on the delivery of oil and gas by constructing 
a pipeline from Kazakhstan in 2006 and the three spur Central Asia-China gas 
pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Before the eco-
nomic crisis, the region was locked in by Russia in the energy sector, after the 
crisis China was able to successfully launch “a full scale expansion in the en-
ergy sector” that had two effects on Russia-China relations: new pipelines de-
prived Russia of its monopoly on the transit of Central Asian gas and China 
“locked in Central Asian gas supplies for its own needs, replacing Russia in 
this role.”1473 Moreover, the growing trade volume between China and Central 
Asia, as well as Beijing’s financial engagement there weakened Russia’s posi-
tion.  
This all caused the intensification of Russian attempts to integrate the post-
Soviet area, in Central Asia this is best illustrated by the strengthening of the 
security sphere (such as amendments to the CSTO’s status that give Moscow 
the right of veto of a possible deployment of other states’ armies in the region). 
Moreover, Moscow attempted to capitalize on anti-Chinese resentments in the 
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region (resulting from settling the border issue – most of the countries had to 
concede to Beijing’s wishes; and from fear of the long-term economic impact 
of Chinese influence and distrust of Chinese intensions) – as result elites and 
(even more) societies of Central Asia are still oriented towards Russia.  
The most visible sign, however, was economic reintegration, best symbol-
ized by the Eurasian Union: “Putin’s flagship project”1474, so far the most so-
phisticated – and successful – integration process in the post-Soviet area. It 
was motivated by pure political, not economic, ideas: intended to maintain 
Russia’s great power status, counterweight the EU and China economic expan-
sion, as well as loosening of the CIS-Russia ties.1475 This is the best example 
of Russian “pseudomultilateralism”, more subtle than in Soviet times (yet less 
effective from the Kremlin’s point of view), where the “line between the bilat-
eral and the multilateral effectively disappeared” and Moscow dominates: “for-
mally, decisions are reached on the basis of consensus, but in practice the con-
sensus that matters is the one in Moscow.”1476 In other words, this is the best 
example of attempts to secure a “Russocentric cultural sphere” in the post-
Soviet area.1477 The Eurasian Union, a hybrid of the European Union and the 
Soviet Union, in Russian plans is supposed to become the bridge that links 
Europe with Asia-Pacific. This was very bad news for China. Should the Eur-
asian Union achieve success, the consequences for Beijing would be negative: 
rising tariffs and institutional barriers to China’s trade with Central Asia, 
threatening the plan to make Central Asia China’s corridor to Europe (espe-
cially evident in case of Kyrgyzstan), obstacles for Chinese companies in doing 
business with Central Asia and possibly even limitation on access to the re-
gion’s energy resources.1478  
That is why China has different plans: its own integration idea called the 
“Silk Road Economic Belt” (later on called One Belt One Road), popularly 
called “the New Silk Road”. This plan does not oppose Russian integration 
projects directly, but in reality it poses a challenge to them: Beijing at mini-
mum does not want to be pushed out from the region; at most it wants to dom-
inate the region.  
Xi Jinping’s visit to Central Asia in September 2013 inaugurated the New 
Silk Road plan, the best symbol of China’s new assertiveness in the region. It 
ended the evolution of China’s Central Asia policy – from calm, steady, con-
servative, hidden behind Moscow’s backs in the 1990s through to more and 
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more active: first directed at containing US influences and then towards liber-
ating itself from Moscow in the energy sector, to Xi Jinping’s “tour de force” 
in September 2013.1479 Formally the Chinese initiative is not anti-Russian: Bei-
jing as before tries to avoid direct confrontation with Moscow and still does 
not question Russia’s political primacy over the region. China “respects tradi-
tional Russian interests in the region”, and accepts – as Li Fenglin put it – that 
“Central Asia is Russia’s backyard”, but “one has to care about its own back-
yard, water the plants so that it does not get weedy.”1480 In accordance with 
this logic, China concentrates on gaining advantage via economic means in-
stead: “having actively pursued its interests in the sphere of energy, Beijing 
showed tangible restraint with regard to the security realm and maintained its 
practical engagement in security issues at low levels (…) Beijing tacitly ac-
cepted Russia’s security pre-eminence in Central Asia and Moscow’s military 
posturing was not regarded as threatening by the Chinese; China did not object 
to Moscow building up its security and defence presence, nor did Beijing dis-
play any aspiration to play an independent role as region’s security pro-
vider.”1481  
Nevertheless, the New Silk Road is against Russian interests, particularly 
against the Eurasian Union. The new Silk Road is its opposition: it does not 
require political integration, it is only a kind of political superstructure for nu-
merous bilateral investments. China just wants to make Central Asia a geopo-
litical conveyor belt for Chinese goods to the West. This in turn requires de-
veloping ties, instead of creating barriers, like the Eurasian Union does.  
The New Silk Road raises the risk of Central Asian republics “being an-
nexed into the Chinese sphere of influence” which is the exact opposite to Rus-
sian interests. Moreover, development of economic relations between powerful 
China and weaker Central Asian countries is “inevitably leading to a situation 
where the Central Asian states are, to varying degrees, falling into political 
dependence on China, which in some cases is even taking on a neo-colonial 
character.”1482 The question whether China succeeds and whether it is able to 
accommodate Russia, remains open. Beijing has already showed that it has 
ways to bypass the Eurasian Union’s regulations.1483 On the other hand, Mos-
cow proved that it can block Chinese plans in the region (by blocking the de-
velopment of railways to China). Thus, a very complicated and nuanced polit-
ical picture emerges in Central Asia. The followers of the “new Great Game” 
narrative would say that Moscow and Beijing under the presence of coopera-
tion and convergence began a hidden competition to dominate Eurasia and that 
it will be Central Asia where their “strategic partnership” will finally break, 
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being destroyed by conflicting interests. Dramatic events in Ukraine have only 
added dynamism to this process. It is too early to estimate the final result – 
rivalry or cooperation are both possible with many interim options.1484  
What is certain for now is that both Russia and China want to avoid con-
frontation and find a way to reconcile their interests. In accordance with this 
logic, “a peculiar division of influence has emerged”1485 as Russia and China 
are striving to achieve “a stable division of labour.”1486 In other words, China 
and Russia have designated their zones of influences in the best concert of 
powers scenario: Moscow took security whereas Beijing economics. Moscow 
has been tolerating this new state of affairs, albeit with difficulties, since 
China’s entry to region has unintentionally fulfilled Moscow’s strategic goal 
of keeping the West in general and the EU in particular, away from Central 
Asia. Thus, Moscow decided that Beijing is a lesser evil. Russia has concealed 
its consent to a condominium in the region by evoking the Greater Eurasia 
concept which, in practical terms, equals to “Moscow’s de facto abandonment 
of its attempts to block China’s economic expansion in Central Asia.”1487 Rus-
sia, again, has made a virtue out of necessity and tried to use the OBOR project 
for its purposes: to place itself as “a bridge between Europe and Asia” that 
promotes a “dialogue between civilizations” in which “Russia plays a pivotal 
role by virtue of its geographical location, historical antecedents, and close ties 
with Europe, Central Asia, and China”; this tacticly “represents a form of soft 
balancing” which “serves the purpose of positioning Russia as the indispensa-
ble power.”1488 The results are, however, so far dissatisfying: despite attempts 
to link OBOR and Eurasian Union (e.g. create a trade agreement) “nothing 
really happened” in 2016: “the two sides were simply unable to find any mech-
anism to link the Chinese and Russian visions for Eurasian integration”: Putin 
proposed a “broader economic partnership between the EAEU, the SCO, and 
the ASEAN” (Greater Eurasian Partnership), while the Chinese were busy at 
advocating OBOR; in the end the former remains a vision whereas the latter is 
still in its early stages.1489 Despite an inability to link the OBOR and the EAEU 
(yet), according to Zhao Huasheng, the real value of the decision to link those 
projects is political.1490 Consequently, Russia and China kept their relations 
stable.  
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All these developments led to the “emergence of a new status quo in Central 
Asia; the new configuration has been far from optional from either Moscow or 
Beijing, but has nevertheless been satisfactory enough to remove Central Asia 
from the list of pressing problems”; so far “Russia and China have managed to 
steer their relations in Central Asia off a collision course and found a modus 
vivendi, despite fundamental shifts in the material distribution of power.”1491 It 
remains to be seen whether they can maintain this state of affairs.  
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Part Five: Asia-Pacific: Overshadowed by China 
In the Asia-Pacific region politics has almost always been viewed through the 
bluntly realist lens of immediate material interests and military security. Per-
haps it is because Asia-Pacific has traditionally been the arena of the clash of 
interests of great powers– “interactions between states have been characterized 
by constant competition and often outright hostility (…) zero-sum calculus and 
the balance of power have greater currency (here) than anywhere else on the 
planet” which, combined with the fact that there is no collective regional iden-
tity or tradition of cooperation, makes it “the ultimate geopolitical arena.”1492  
1. China’s and Russia’s Profile in Asia-Pacific 
The positions of Russia and China in Asia-Pacific have been diametrically dif-
ferent. In Asia-Pacific, China has traditionally been “the Middle Kingdom”, 
the central country for regional political, economic and cultural relations, the 
reference point for all major interests, hopes and anxieties, the regional power, 
which main interests are located here. It was here where Sinocentric world of 
tianxia existed before and dominated the pre-modern East Asian international 
relations.1493 Nowadays, China considers itself an Asian country and the most 
important Asia player that is on the way to bringing the old system back.  
Since the 1990s, Beijing has been building its position in Asia, usually by 
economic means which granted it pre-eminence.1494 Beijing was able to con-
vince Asia-Pacific states of its benign intentions, best illustrated by peaceful 
rise/development slogan.1495 Since the late 2000s and the early 2010s, how-
ever, China has become more assertive, which led to growing tensions, partic-
ularly in the South China Sea and resulted in the US pivot to Asia, as well as 
hedging polices of China’s neighbours (Burma/Myanmar, Vietnam, Philip-
pines, Indonesia). Consequently, Beijing’s achievements of the previous dec-
ades have been partly reversed.1496 Nevertheless, China remains the most rele-
vant Asia-Pacific country and the rise of China as the greatest regional power 
makes it the most important long-term political phenomenon in Asia-Pacific. 
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Against this background, Russia that “is in Asia, but is not of Asia”, pales 
into insignificance.1497 Russia has been “overshadowed by China” in Asia-Pa-
cific.1498 After the USSR’s fall, Russia ceased to be an Asian power and since 
it has never been an important economic actor in Asia, its ways of influence 
(like military position) decreased further or even disappeared. The Russian po-
sition was handicapped due to two reasons: first by domestic weakness and 
inability to attract investments to the Asian part of Russia and second by lack 
of wider foreign policy in the region. Consequently, Russia’s cooperation with 
Asia-Pacific was mainly limited to arms sales.  
In the 1990s, Russia became secondary power not only to the USA, but also 
to China or to Japan. Moreover, Moscow traditionally considered Asia as a less 
important policy vector than Europe, particularly in the 1990s: “Kozyrev paid 
little attention to Asian affairs and almost everywhere in Asia receded into the 
background. As a result not only were ties with former Soviet ideological, po-
litical and military allies such as Vietnam or North Korea both changed in sub-
stance and severely curtailed in scope and intensity, but even relations with 
India, a major political and trade partner in Asia since the mid-1950s, went into 
decline.”1499 Russia itself in the 1990s has been perceived in Asia as a Euro-
pean state, worse – a colonial one.1500 By looking for its place in Asia and 
dreaming the old dream of being a superpower, Russia has tried to play a role 
no longer possible; hence it became a regional outsider.  
It begun to change after the nomination of Yevgeni Primakov, who in-
creased the status of Asia-Pacific in Russian foreign policy conception from 
the 6th place to the 3rd one. Moscow has been trying to improve its position in 
the region by evoking methods of selective engagement on bilateral grounds, 
successful in the West, as well as by trying to join Asian integration economic 
and security processes.1501 China was key in this strategy: privileged relations 
with China were intended to increase Moscow’s possibilities of political ma-
neuvering in Asia and beyond. China’s choice, however, was not the result of 
a calculated strategy, but a logical consequence of failed attempts to initiate a 
closer cooperation with other countries or to formulate wider political strategy 
for the region – in the 1990s “China has been Russia’s only real option for 
cooperation in Asia”1502 as well as “a factor of strengthening Russian position 
against the USA.”1503  
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So again the “Western factor” appeared in the Russian policy: Moscow con-
sidered its Asian politics as a counterbalance to marginalization in the Euro-
pean affairs and to global dominance of the USA. It was best shown by initia-
tives such as Primakov’s idea of Moscow-Beijing-Delhi triangle to balance US 
influences. Then, however, neither China nor India was enthusiastic about this 
proposal. Moreover, China in Russian plans was intended to help increase Rus-
sia’s role in regional structures, such as the APEC, the ASEAN or the ASEM. 
Although, indeed, China backed Russia’s bid to the APEC (1998) and to the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (1996) (Russia was accepted in the ASEM only in 
2010), when it came to concrete, real support to strengthen Russian weak po-
sitions in Asia, China did little. Russian-Chinese rapprochement has not be-
come a “Far Eastern Rapallo.”1504 For China, Russia in Asia-Pacific mattered 
only as an element of maintaining balance in the region and counterweight for 
US factor, but real Chinese and Russian interests in the region were contra-
dicted. With the exception of hoping to avoid conflict in the Korea Peninsula, 
China and Russia had little in common in East Asia. China has not become 
Russia’s “door keeper” in Asia: a country that helps Moscow to regain its 
power position in the region. China was doing little to help Russia in Asia: 
Beijing simply had no interests in this scenario.1505 Beijing “does not want to 
‘share’ Russia with others” – it wants Russian resources and not to assist a 
(re)entry of Russia to Asia-Pacific.1506  
2. Taiwan 
Taiwan is a different matter that needs to be described, yet it is difficult to be 
orderly placed within the structure of this book; thus, it will be, a bit separately, 
covered here. The rebellious island has always been a vulnerable point for Bei-
jing: Taiwan issue has been the central and fundamental domestic and interna-
tional point of reference for Beijing, while preventing Taiwan’s declaration of 
independence remains top priority. Beijing tries to isolate Taiwan and demands 
from all its partners fulfilling basic requirement: accepting the “one China” 
policy1507. Russia was not different here, though initially there was a significant 
crack.  
Yeltsin’s new administration at the beginning was skeptical about China. 
Taiwan, on the other hand, was considered by some Russian politicians as a 
progressive, democratic country. The Taiwanese realized the opportunity and 
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started lobbying for recognition. They won a supportive ally – Oleg Lobov, 
Yeltsin’s old friend. Lobov used the structural chaos in the newly existing state 
as well as his old acquaintance with Yeltsin. On 2 September 1992 Lobov got 
from – a not quite aware – Yeltsin his consent to set up the Moscow-Taipei 
Coordination Commission on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, financed 
by Taipei, with diplomatic status, Russian civil servants and the right to issue 
visas.1508 Beijing’s reaction was excessively harsh: Chinese threatened to can-
cel the Russian-Chinese summit. This forced Yeltsin to announce a decree on 
15 September where he confirmed the “one China policy.”1509 This counter-
plotted Lobov’s plans – at that time he was already conducting a semi-official 
visit to Taiwan. Despite this failure, Lobov did not give in and continued lob-
bying for Taipei. In June 1993 he was able to open the Moscow-Taipei Coor-
dination Commission on Economic and Cultural Cooperation in Moscow and 
Yeltsin called him up to serve as the head of Russian office in Taipei.1510 In the 
meantime, however, Russian learned the Chinese rules of the game and under-
stood that it was not worth it to sacrifice relations with the Big Dragon for 
relations with the Little Dragon.1511 They postponed the opening of the Taipei 
office and started isolating the Moscow office.1512 Due to these delays, Russian 
office in Taipei was opened only in December 1996, which was a clear sign of 
a change in the Russian agenda. In the mid 1990s, Russia and China finally 
worked out an unwritten understanding on the Taiwan issue: Russia would not 
make any steps in favour of recognizing Taiwain, whereas China would not 
oppose development of unofficial and economic relations.1513  
In the mid 1990s, Taiwan found itself an extravagant ally in Russia – Vla-
dimir Zhirinovski, the leader of the LDPR. Zhirinovski has tried to raise the 
Taiwain issue a few times, but it is uncertain whether that was a genuine polit-
ical move or another public show. The latter is more probable, and it ended up 
this way.1514 In the meantime the official Russian policy had been becoming 
more and more pro-Chinese. In November 1998, Yeltsin announced the “four 
no” policy towards Taiwan.1515 A full pro-Beijing turn occurred in parallel with 
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equal Russian-Taiwanese disappointment. Taipei understood that there were 
no chances for Russian recognition and lost its interest in economic coopera-
tion with Moscow. Russia on its side was unable to create favourable condi-
tions for Taiwanese investments.1516  
After the DPP’s victory in the election in 2000, Taiwan became China’s 
obsession. Russia drew conclusions from previous decade and supported Bei-
jing’s stance; Russian elites agreed on considering the Taiwan issue a “domes-
tic Chinese family quarrel.”1517 Moscow supported Beijing in the 2001 
treaty1518 and by acknowledging the 2005 Anti-Seccesion Law: an “under-
standing between Moscow and Beijing means that Russia would not make any 
significant steps toward development of relations with Taiwan without Bei-
jing’s consent.”1519 In the 2000s, the influence of such individuals as Oleg 
Lobov diminished; while trade intensified (though without impressive results); 
despite some attempts from the DDP there was no breakthrough in Russian-
Taiwanese relations; they improved only after the KMT came back to power 
in 2009 as it lowered down the political atmosphere over Taiwan Strait.1520 
Taiwan, despite minor relations with Russia, plays a subtle, though indirect 
role in Sino-Russian relations. As long as the island remains independent, Rus-
sia feels completely secure from China and may continue to sell arms to it.1521 
Moscow knows very well that Beijing’s number one goal is to regain Taiwan. 
Until then, there will be no real or potential attempts to question Russia’s sov-
ereignty over the Russian Far East.  
3. China-Russia Ambiguity in Asia-Pacific 
Since Putin’s first term in 2000, Russian foreign policy has been marked by a 
noticeable “Asianization” – he has pursued closer relations with China, Japan, 
North and South Korea, and Vietnam. The Kremlin wanted to return to the 
region neglected in the previous decade. Moscow wanted to “capitalize on the 
fact that not a single state regarded Russia as a potential threat” – it success-
fully established “a network of political and diplomatic contacts with all the 
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relevant actors” as well as became a member-state of region’s multilateral or-
ganizations and forums (APEC, EAS).1522 Thanks to all this, “the slogan of 
multi-vectored foreign policy has acquired genuine substance.”1523 This was 
combined with hopes for attracting investments into the Russian Far East and 
integrating this region with the dynamism of Asia. Nevertheless, despite these 
efforts “geographical balance in Russian foreign policy remains elusive”; rela-
tions with major Asian powers have certainly grown in recent years, but from 
a very low base and Asia – despite ambitious attempt to re-orient Russia’s for-
eign policy, such as the “turn to the East” – is still not the Kremlin’s highest 
priority.1524As for Russia’s approach to China, after several attempts to balance 
Beijing’s influence in the 2000s, Moscow finally after 2014 gave up and de-
cided to bandwagon with China.  
From the very beginning of Putin’s first presidential term, Moscow realized 
that China is the key to a come back in the Asian game. The Kremlin realized 
that without China, gaining back the great power status is impossible for Rus-
sia. On the other hand, Russian policymakers were afraid that once China be-
comes the leading power, it may no longer be so restrained.1525 Anxieties about 
the Russian Far East aside, politically dominant China may undermine Russian 
attempts to play a more active role – this made Moscow ambiguous towards 
Beijing in relations to Asia-Pacific; there was understanding that to succeed in 
Asia, Russia must look beyond China.1526 Basedg on this understanding, “the 
Russian elite worked out the consensus on basic ramifications for Russia’s 
place in the East Asian order: politically as a balancing force between China 
and the US; economically as the supplier of energy resources and weaponry; 
and as a transportation link between East Asia and Europe”.1527  
China has responded to this calmly: Beijing has been fully aware of Russian 
plans, but decided to turn a blind eye on it. China knows perfectly well that “if 
there is one area where the great Asian powers (…) agree, it is that the region 
does not need the added complication of a state whose sense of entitlement 
greatly exceeds its real contribution.”1528 China does not support Russia’s as-
piration because firstly, this goes against Chinese interests, and secondly, this 
would damage the vulnerable image – already questioned after the disputes 
regarding the South China Sea – of a country that respects limitations, a one 
being a “responsible stakeholder” and a responsible subject of international 
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law (Russia is not one). Finall,y it would undermine the fundamental concept 
of Chinese foreign policy – mutual benefits (what kind of benefit would Bei-
jing get should Russia become more involved in Asia-Pacific?).  
At the same time, China does not compete with Russia in Asia-Pacific as 
they are in different weights. The Chinese conduct a calm policy of awaiting 
and achieving maximum possible benefits because they know that “Russia re-
mains a weak player in the region with few friends” and does not threat Chi-
nese interests.1529 Moscow, however, did not want to accept this situation and 
in the 2000s embarked on a series of attempts to upgrade its position and de-
crease overdependence on China.  
4. Russia’s Balancing Attempts 
Russia sought to escape the isolation – and overdependence from China – 
through various ways. One was participation in the Asian regional multilateral 
structures.1530 The awareness of its own marginalization and the need to liber-
ate itself from an image of a country that considers Asia only a tool in geopo-
litical games made Russia suspend its typical policy of the predominance of 
bilateral ties. Moscow has tried to bandwagon to regional integration pro-
cesses.1531 Until 2015, Putin has attended nearly all major Asian multilateral 
summits (ASEAN, APEC, ASEM, EAS; later, after 2015 he lost his heart for 
it… to regain it in May 2016 while hosting the first Russia-ASEAN summit) 
and has visited most of the Asia-Pacific countries; Moscow organized the 
APEC summit in 2012 and started sending its high ranking representatives to 
influential forums such as the Shangri-La dialogue. Moscow’s interest in the 
Asian organization was welcomed in the region – e.g. an invitation to the EAS 
was interpreted as “implicit balancing against China’s rise”.1532 Russia has 
even tried convincing others that it shared the “Asian way”1533 – built on Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and an emphasis on pragmatism, practical 
matters, discretion, consensus-building and non-confrontational attitude.  
Despite these actions, Russia has been sending contradictory signals, while 
declarations disjointed with political practice. The best example was the arms 
sales to China. Moscow declares a peaceful approach and at the same time sells 
weapons to Beijing, which “does not sit well with its efforts to portray itself as 
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a good citizen of the Asia-Pacific.”1534 Pacific Asians cannot understand this 
approach: “What was the reason for this, the Indian wondered: are the Russians 
blind, stupid, or too obsessed with the United States?”1535. Moreover, Russians 
were not able to hide their distance for regional forums: they used these gath-
erings as opportunities for bilateral meetings with big players (USA, China) or 
for lobbying for investments; consequently, their interest for pan-regional af-
fairs has been “superficial” and their contribution “lack substance”: e. g. Putin 
“used the 2013 APEC summit in Bali not to detail what Russia could do for 
the Asia-Pacific region, but as a fishing expedition for outside investment in 
the Russian Far East.”1536 Finally, Russian resolution of Georgian and Ukrain-
ian crises was a blow to the attempts of building an image of a “peaceful coun-
try that shares Asian values”. It had little to do with the “Asian way” – it has 
broken probably all the major meta-principles of this philosophy, such as re-
spect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in 
domestic affairs, peaceful resolution of disputes, liberty from foreign interven-
tion or renouncement of the use of force.  
Worse still, Russia limited itself to words mostly. Moscow in the multilat-
eral organization “was hardly active” – it “did not bring fresh ideas nor did it 
push forward the implementation of Moscow’s regional designs”, it stayed 
aside the core issue in Asia-Pacific, also the South China Sea disputes (and 
later it leaned towards China); thus “Russia’s balance sheet in multilateral eco-
nomic co-operation is equally limited (…) Moscow’s failures are underpinned 
by the absence of any viable economic offer.”1537 Moscow wanted to use its 
traditional means: energy to reduce its dependence on China and improve its 
bargaining position vis-à-vis Beijing. Initially it worked to some extent: South 
Korea and Japan became major buyers of Russian LNG gas from Sakhalin-2 
as well as its oil (Japan bough it from the ESPO terminal, too); Japan agreed 
with Russia for deliveries from the planned LNG plant in Vladivostok. How-
ever, “these plans did not boost energy co-operation with Japan to an extent 
that would balance Russia’s energy relations with China”, moreover, Russia 
failed to convince Japan to invest in the exploration of Siberian and Russian 
Far Eastern resources.1538 With the Ukrainian crisis and its aftermath, hopes 
for closer cooperation with Japan were dashed, which was best symbolized by 
the postponing of the construction of the LNG plant in Vladivostok. Russia 
realized that East Asia will not replace China as major energy client and after 
2014 decided to bandwagon to China. This too-close rapprochement with 
China after 2014 has, however, not been well-received in other Asian countries 
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(“a specter is haunting Asia—the specter of Sino-Russian collusion”)1539, 
which further diminished Russia’s posture in Asia-Pacific.  
Another Russia’s attempt to balance China in the 2000s was its tacit ac-
ceptance of the US role in the region. According to this narrative, “much as the 
Kremlin would like to challenge American dominance, it does not really want 
to become China’s junior partner. To spite Washington is one thing; to accept 
a junior position vis-à-vis Beijing is quite another.”1540 The understanding that 
the US presence may be beneficial, however, was never dominant – it was 
challenged by the anxieties that the US presence blocks Russia’s possibilities 
in the security sphere. In the 2010s, the latter understanding prevailed in the 
Kremlin policymakers’ thinking, which led to growing cooperation with Bei-
jing – that in turn diminished chances for decreasing the Chinese dependence 
here. Moscow, despite having a potential to influence the security policy in the 
region, has not had a clear vision of its own presence. Consequently, its policy 
“has been erratic”, and “lacked a clear-cut strategy”, thus it “wavered between 
hedging against China’s rise and defying the US position.”1541 Finally, the 
Ukrainian crisis diminished chances for establishing Russian military bases in 
the region, as most of Asia-Pacific countries are pro-US in the military sphere 
and cannot anger Washington by letting Russians in, at least for now.  
That is why the Russian “beyond China” engagement with Asia-Pacific in 
security sphere was practically limited to short-lived attempts with Japan (see: 
below) and selling weapons to Vietnam and India. In Soviet times Hanoi has 
been its traditional balancer of China in East Asia and despite downturn in 
bilateral relations in the 1990s (Russia had been withdrawing from Cam Ranh 
Bay which culminated in 2002), in the early 2000s the relations were invigor-
ated – Hanoi and Moscow established a strategic partnership in 2001 that was 
upgraded to “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2012.1542 In the 2000s 
the relations intensified thanks to weaponry sales and energy cooperation. Rus-
sia-Vietnam ties had been interpreted as a Russian way to resist dominance in 
East Asia; unfortunately Moscow-Hanoi rapprochement had its limits – Mos-
cow distanced itself from China-Vietnam tensions over the disputed islands on 
the South China Sea, while Hanoi still did not agree on the return of the Rus-
sian fleet to Cam Ranh Bay (and is unlikely to do so given the present geopo-
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litical circumstances); this all showed the structural limitations of Russia-Vi-
etnam cooperation.1543 Besides that, to put in bluntly, Vietnam is not in the 
same category as China to be a real balancing option; the same can be said 
about other Southeast Asian states (Malaysia, Burma/Myanmar and Indonesia: 
important receivers of Russian arms); Southeast Asia still remains a backwater 
of Russian foreign policy.1544 
India is a different story. India has always been Russia’s traditional ally in 
Asia, its “strategic partner”, or even “specially privileged strategic partner.”1545 
Russia has much in common with India – traditional close ties in military rela-
tions; joint views on reforms of the UN Security Council, situation in Afghan-
istan or India’s bid for presence in the SCO. Initially, after the USSR’s fall, 
Moscow distanced itself from Delhi, but already in 1993 realism returned.1546 
Nevertheless, both sides did not consider each other the most important part-
ners. India cared for relations with Russia – its main supplier of arms, but noth-
ing more except this materialized. Delhi did not even notify Moscow about its 
planned nuclear attempt in 1998. This discontent (and India-China uneasy re-
lations) explains the failure of Primakov’s “strategic triangle” Moscow-Delhi-
Beijing in the 1990s1547 – this idea resurrected in the next decade but still has 
not gained much power – “it has become little more than a forum for exchang-
ing polite views about the international situation.”1548 Throughout the 1990s, 
the main feature in Russian-Indian-Chinese relations has been Russian arms 
sales – Moscow’s cooperation with Delhi went further than with Beijing 
(newer weapons, technology transfer) that frustrated China.1549 Since the 
2000s, Russian-Indian relations intensified on political level (much more con-
tacts) and on economic level: trade volume grew (cooperation in oil, gas and 
exploitation of Russian deposits by Indian companies and civilian nuclear en-
ergy – Kudankulam power plant), though the bilateral trade remains low. Thus, 
arms sales remain the most important part of bilateral relations. The scale of 
this cooperation exceeded significantly cooperation with Beijing1550, though 
slowed down in the late 2000s. This, combined with limited political coopera-
tion made it impossible for Russia to balance China by India, let alone that 
New Delhi is more interested in economic cooperation with the USA than with 
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Russia. Furthermore, New Delhi has an “aversion to geopolitical games” and 
to forming any anti-US alliance, the lack of normative likemindedness between 
Russia and India, recent Russia-Pakistan rapprochement and lack of substance 
in bilateral agenda, all make Russia-India relations “relatively stable and trou-
ble-free, but undynamic.”1551 Recent problems with Russian policy towards the 
Taliban and Russian willingness to participate in the China-Pakistan corridor 
(via India’s claimed, Pakistani controlled, part of Kashmir)1552 showed the lim-
itations very well. Thus, India could not become Russia’s balancer in Asia-
Pacific, neither. For this role, however, another country has been better suited: 
Japan.  
5. Japan as the Balancer 
Russia’s relations with Japan have showed clearly that Moscow had been ready 
to sacrifice the cooperation with China should a better opportunity appear. 
Thus Russian-Japanese relations underwent sinusoid throughout the 1990s, the 
2000s and the 2010s. Tokyo remains the key in Russia’s hopes to return “to 
the game in Asia”: “Japan is an obvious candidate to become a strategic part-
ner. A Russo-Japanese rapprochement, while not necessarily at Beijing’s ex-
pense, would leave Russia less reliant on China.”1553 Japan, thus, is a perfect 
balancer for Russia in Asia-Pacific: “such a balance would greatly reduce the 
potential for Chinese aggression against the Russian Far East (…) it might of-
fer Russia opportunities to act as the ‘swing’ power in East Asia.”1554 In the 
1990s for many in Russian elites, mostly reformers, Japan was the partner of 
choice in Asia-Pacific1555 and the Kremlin hoped for “parallel wheels” (the 
territorial question and economic cooperation) to be “discussed simultaneously 
but separately” which “appeared to offer a way forward.”1556 Furthermore, the 
elites and people of the Russian Far East in the 1990s were oriented towards 
Japan, not China.1557 It was Japan, not China that remained the key in Russian 
hopes to renew relations with East Asia. Moscow had been dreaming of Japan 
becoming in Asia what Germany has been to Russia in Europe.1558 
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Initially, after 1991, Moscow-Tokyo relations were worse than cold. The 
Japanese still considered Russia a threat and demanded it give back all four 
Kuril Islands. This cancelled any possibility of a compromise (Yeltsin appar-
ently was prone to such). Moreover, Tokyo staunchly protested against Rus-
sia’s inclusion into the G7. The relations reached the lowest level after the can-
cellation of Yeltsin’s visit to Tokyo in autumn of 1992. Until 1997, Russian-
Japanese relations remained in a stalemate. Only Moscow-Beijing rapproche-
ment made Tokyo improve relations with Moscow and modified the “Russia 
policy”. Under prime-minister Ryutaro Hashimoto who met with Yeltsin twice 
on “no ties” meetings (November 1997 and April 1998) Tokyo started its new 
approach. It was ready to invest in the Russian Far East before the returning of 
the Kuril Islands and withdrew its veto against Yeltsin’s presence at the G7. 
Russia, in turn, supported new Japan-US agreement. This frustrated China, al-
ways sensible about the possibility of the encirclement by its neighbors.1559 
The culmination of the Russian-Japanese détente happened in November 1998 
when Yeltsin and the new Japanese prime-minister Keizo Obuchi signed a 
“creative partnership” between Russia and Japan.1560 Nevertheless, long-term 
Russian-Japanese relations did not materialize mostly due to structural reasons, 
such as chronic weakness of the Russian economy, hammered even further by 
economic crisis in 1998: “it was not the political obstacle (Kuril Islands) but 
rather a general perception among Japanese businessmen that Russia is a frus-
trating, inhospitable and generally unpromising place of investments that dis-
enable a flow of Japanese capital”1561 (this perception remains in place until 
today).1562 The full benefits of ties with Japan would not emerge “unless Rus-
sian economy becomes more open, orderly, and predictable; China, however, 
needs not such changes.”1563 This is why Russian-Japanese breakthrough in the 
1990s never materialized.  
Putin upon becoming the president has tried to develop relations with Japan 
by expanding trade volume considerably and balancing China’s influence with 
the ESPO pipeline – he hoped that a Chinese-Japanese competition for Russian 
resources between Japan and China would neutralize them and allow Russia to 
play them off against one another in a “resource competition.”1564 Putin’s main 
goal has been to normalize relations with Japan on the Russian terms. This is 
based on “the method of ‘strategic patience’, a hope “that Tokyo will sooner 
                                                          
1559 H. Gelman, The Changing Asia Area, [in:] Rapprochement or Rivalry…, p. 424. 
1560 Moscow Declaration On Establishing A Creative PartnershipBetween Japan And The Rus-
sian Federation, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1998, 13 XI; Tsuyoshi Haseg-
awa, Russo-Japanese relations and the security of North-East Asia in the 21 century, [in:] 
Russia and Asia…, p. 318; G. Chuffrin, op. cit., p. 484. 
1561 H. Gelman, p. 418.  
1562 A. Габуев, Вернуть нельзя сотрудничать… ; Results of JETRO’s 2015 Survey on Busi-
ness Conditions of Japanese Companies in Russia, Jetro.Go.Jp, 21.12.2015. 
1563 S. W. Garnett, op. cit., p. 29.  
1564 B. Lo, The Axis of Convenience…, p. 121. 
274 
or later become ready to accept the compromise” on Russian terms (on Kuril 
Islands) and increase Japan’s economic engagement in Russia.1565 Kremlin has 
been operating “on the premise that it holds all the high cards in its dealings 
with Tokyo (…) and “feels under no particular pressure to surrender the dis-
puted islands.”1566 Giving back (all) the Kuril Islands simply couldn’t fit into 
Putin’s vision of rebuilding Russia’s great power status. Consequently, his 
stance has toughened in comparison with Yeltsin. Putin offered only Shikotan 
and Khabomai which was unacceptable for Tokyo (which underwent a series 
of domestic problems: a succession of weak and short-ruling prime-ministers). 
By 2006 the two sides reached an impasse that prolonged until 2012. After 
Japan parliament’s declaration of sovereignty over all Kuril Islands in 2009 
and Medvedev’s visit there in 2010 Russian-Japanese relations “hit rock bot-
tom.”1567 This led Russia to embrace China once again and act “in a way that 
both (Moscow and Beijing) know very well – symbolic manifestation” – Mos-
cow and Beijing started using Japanese historical faults extensively.1568 Both 
sides are to blame for this situation. The Russians believed they can separate 
economic relations from the “contaminating effect” of Kurile: they hoped that 
time “would either heal historical wounds or encourage forgetfulness”; the Jap-
anese thought “the rise of China would make Moscow ‘see sense’ and agree to 
the return of the islands under certain conditions” such as ‘Hong Kong op-
tion.’”1569 Both sides operated on the assumption that the other side is in the 
weaker position and is going to give in soon.1570 The result was stagnation.  
Improved Tokyo-Moscow relations re-started after Shinzo Abe came back 
to power in December 2012. Abe set up an ambitious plan to gain Japan back 
economic power and the Asia-Pacific leader’s position, lost to China. Normal-
ization relations with Russia lied within this framework so he tried to improve 
relations with Moscow. That is why in 2013 a “fresh breeze started to blow” 
in Russian-Japanese relations – Abe visited Moscow in April 2013 and was 
supposed to find a common ground with Putin (they refer to each other by their 
first names, share a love for dogs and met four times in 2014).1571 This is un-
surprising, given the fact that they are both realists and share global ambitions 
                                                          
1565 W. Rodkiewicz, The Turn to the East…, pp. 6 and 26.  
1566 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder…, p. 152. 
1567 Ф. Лукьянов, Отношения России и Япония достигли дна [Russian-Japan relations hit 
the bottom], Mail.Ru, 2011, 30 IV. 
1568 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations… p. 103. 
1569 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder…, p. 151. 
1570 A. Габуев, Вернуть нельзя сотрудничать…. 
1571 Ф. Лукьянов, Три к одному (Three Against One), ”Россия в глобальной политике”, 2013, 
21 II; Премьер Японии приехал в Москву за весной [Japan’s PM Arrived to Moscow Seek-
ing Spring], Окно в Россию 2013, 30 IV. 
275 
of regaining great power status for their countries and understood that a “Sino-
centristic continent [is] not in their interests.”1572 Moscow and Tokyo agreed 
on establishing a 2+2 formula (meetings of foreign and defence ministries of 
Russia and Japan), joint maritime naval drills; moreover, Russia has granted 
Japan a status of observer in the Arctic Council (it ignored China’s bid) and 
supported Tokyo bid for Olympic Games in 2020 in public.1573 Finally, there 
were intensive plans of development of the economic relations – Japan was 
interested in a gas pipeline from Sakhalin and the LNG terminal in Vladivos-
tok1574 while Nissan and Toyota increased their presence in the Russian market 
and Tokyo imported “record volumes of Russian oil and LNG.”1575 In general 
it seemed as if Russia wanted to improve ties Japan in order to balancethe  ris-
ing power of China. 
Nevertheless, all these plans have been (so far) been dashed by Ukrainian 
crisis and its aftermath. Japan, forced by Washington, condemned Russia and 
introduced sanctions. As a result, Russia sided with China again by finalizing 
the gas contract in May 2014. This means that until relations with Japan im-
prove, Putin is unable to fulfill his “strategic diversity” vision – this in turn 
benefits China. Judging by the recent perspective, “the ultimate impact of the 
‘Japanese card’ on Moscow’s relationship with Beijing remained insignifi-
cant.”1576 Although in September 2016, Russia and Japan achieved a “mini-
breaktrough” at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok and thanks to 
Abe’s “onsen diplomacy” Putin met with Abe in December 2016 and achieved 
signing of 80 documents (mostly non-biding memorandums) on Japanese in-
vestments to Russia without any concession on territorial issue1577, it still re-
mains to be seen whether this will transfer to any politically significant out-
comes. For now, despite “a window of opportunity” between Moscow and To-
kyo, unresolved Kurile issue and U.S.-Japan alliance “temper optimism for 
rapid improvements in the Japan-Russia relationship.”1578 
6. The Dream of the Concert of Asia 
In the 2000s, Russia started dreaming of the “concert of Asia” – a kind of great 
powers’ condominium supervising the region, where they would collectively 
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deal with the most important issues in Asia-Pacific.1579 Moscow wanted to see 
“a strategic architecture of check and balances” in East Asia which would have 
two cardinal virtues: it would restrain the exercise of hegemonic influence of 
Beijing or Washington and it would allow secondary actors, such as Russia, a 
greater say in regional decision-making.1580 The “Concert of Asia” is derived 
from a general vision of the “relations between powers in a new, polycentric 
international order” preferred by Moscow, that “should be based on an oligar-
chic consensus of great powers, civilisational pluralism, the de-ideologisation 
of interstate relations, the absolute non-interference in the internal affairs of 
‘great powers’, respect for their spheres of influence, and the prioritization of 
business co-operation.”1581 Russia’s policy towards Korea is the best example 
of this concept.  
In the 1990s, Russia’s position in the Korean peninsula lowered since Soviet 
times. Yeltsin continued late Gorbachev’s redirection towards South Korea: he 
chose Seoul as the place of his first visit to the region and during his presidency 
Russia ceased to support North Korean economy due to its own bad condi-
tion.1582 Moscow had hoped to get into the South Korean market (it turned out 
to be wishful thinking only, as this market has already been dominated by the 
USA and Japan, which was best illustrated by the history with Russian arms 
sales to Seoul).1583 There were ambitions to mediate between the two Koreas, 
too, but these ended up in a failure due to weak contacts with South Korea. The 
most visible sign of Russia’s weakness in the Korean Peninsula has been its 
exclusion from North Korean nuclear programme peace negotiations – Russia 
was not included in four-party talks and Pyongyang has rejected Russian offer 
of providing energy in return for abandoning the nuclear programme. The 1998 
economic crisis has ruined Russian ambitions in the Peninsula completely. 
China, Russia’s strategic partner was not supporting Moscow here. Beijing 
neither supported the idea of inclusion of Russia into four-party talks nor to 
help Russia to enter South Korea (where it could compete with Chinese invest-
ments). Thus, in the 1990s, China maintained its central position on the Penin-
sula, whereas Russia was not able to play the role of a balancer and lowered 
its position in the region when compared to Soviet times.  
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Responding to a sense of Korean “strategic regret”1584, at the beginning of 
the 2000s, Putin decided to regain Russia’s position on the Korean Peninsula. 
He knew he could not count on China.1585 Russian and Chinese interests were 
contradictory here. China wanted to keep the North as a buffer against US in-
fluence and to keep Japan out, while Russians were be interested in Korea’s 
unification. That is why China did not feel the need to invite Russia to the four-
party denuclearization talks that collapsed due to Pyongyang’s tough stance. 
Thus, Putin has opted for “personal diplomacy” to get Russia in the negotia-
tion’s table – and he was right. Thanks to his rapprochement with Kim Jong-Il 
in the early 2000s, North Korea (not China!) proposed to include Russia in six-
party talks to keep the balance. Participating in the talks had been Russia’s 
biggest success on the Korean Peninsula in the 2000s and showed how Russia 
perceives the idea of the “concert of Asia” – as a kind of great powers’ condo-
minium that deals collectively with regional problems (here: the North Korean 
nuclear programme); Russia, even being the weakest point, still remained in 
the talks which was important for Moscow for prestigious reasons.  
Unfortunately, this beneficial status did not last long due to the actions of 
North Korea which in 2006 conducted nuclear weapons testing. All powers 
reacted toughly, even China which “lost face” – North Korea showed in public 
that China did not control it (nobody does; Pyongyang “has made a living of 
such blackmail for 20 years now, having successfully mastered the part of beg-
gar with a stick.”)1586 Nevertheless, although Beijing’s public stance tough-
ened, Sino-North Korean relations intensified – China started investing heavily 
in North Korea. 2009-2013 saw a significant intensification of economic rela-
tions between the PRC and the DPRK.1587 China therefore fulfilled its main 
goals – to vassalize North Korea and to prevent Korea from unification. As for 
Russian policy after the 2009 stalemate, it usually joined China in joint actions 
on North Korea and did not try to conduct an overly ambitious policy as it 
tacitly acknowledges its little importance there; consequently, Russia’s Korean 
policy became “an extension of its partnership with Beijing.”1588  
After Kim Jong-il’s death in 2011 and his son, Kim Jong-un’s succession, 
Pyongyang has been trying to liberate itself from the Chinese dependence – it 
became Beijing’s “rogue ally”1589 – and at least partially diversify foreign in-
fluences in Korea. This opened the “window of opportunity” for Russia, which, 
in its “turn to the East” has tried to return to Korea. Moscow has cancelled 90% 
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of North Korean debts (USD11 billion), offered to build a gas pipeline and a 
railway to North Korean SEZ Rajin, as well as trans-Korean railway linked 
with the Trans-Siberian Railway.1590 Nevertheless, the Ukrainian crisis again 
dashed Russian hopes for playing a more active role in North Korea, out of a 
simple reason – Moscow squeezed by sanctions had no fonds to finance these 
ambitious projects (a nearly bankrupted Pyongyang could not finance it from 
the very beginning). Besides, there is a more important, structural obstacle to 
the Russian plans on the Korean Peninsula: Russia’s main goals in Korea are 
contradictory with Pyongyang’s and Beijing’s. Russia hopes for grand inter-
Korean projects, such as gas pipeline and railway which need unification to 
materialize. Moscow hopes that a unified Korea would turn to Russia to bal-
ance China, Japan and the USA.1591 But the unification of Korea is against both 
Pyongyang’s and Beijing’s interests and is unlikely soon.  
Moscow’s plans for intensification with South Korea failed, too. In 2010, 
Russia and South Korea signed a memorandum on South Korean participation 
in the Russian Far East modernization.1592 It was important then – “a strong 
political signal, as a similar memorandum with China was signed only a year 
later” – but proved to be a gesture only: “Russia has not achieved any break-
through so far.”1593 The same applies to the idea of gas pipeline via the Korean 
Peninsula from 2011-2012. It was conceived as a potential leverage in negoti-
ations with China, but small size of it (10-bcm) made it symbolic only, whereas 
political risks involved in it undermined the idea from the very beginning; fi-
nally when Gazprom signed the contract with Beijing, this made the “imple-
mentation of the project almost impossible.”1594 Although South Korean-Rus-
sian trade indeed improved (but not to important numbers), and recently Russia 
started selling oil to South Korea, but these are not game changers. Seoul has 
been more preoocupied in persuading Moscow to join anti-Pyongyang initita-
tives than in helping bilateral economic relations to flourish.  
Thus, Moscow’s success on the Korean Peninsula in the 2000s with six-
party talks has proven to be short lived. Although Moscow for the past fifteen 
years succeeded in “maintaining an even-handed approach that made little po-
litical or moral distinction between North and South (…) by balancing growing 
economic cooperation with South Korea with closer political and security ties 
with North Korea”, these “modest achievements hardly amount to game chang-
ers.”1595  
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In more general terms, the idea of the “concert of Asia” has not taken root 
out of two major impediments. The first is the continuing lack of a collective 
regional identity and tradition of transnational cooperation.1596 The other one 
is that “concert of Asia” “presupposes a rough equivalence between the major 
powers” which is impossible in Asia-Pacific now.1597 Because Moscow is un-
able to establish a “concert of Asia”, its interest is exactly opposite to the ma-
jority of Asia-Pacific region. Pacific Asians strive for peace and prosperity, try 
to avoid conflicts – all this is the exact opposite of Russian politics whose fa-
vourite element is war.  
7. Russia’s Pivot to Asia 
“Russia’s pivot to Asia” or “Russia’s turn to the East” has been Moscow’s 
newest attempt to “return to Asia”. It was born out of the realization that Russia 
must be strongly present in Asia and that “Asia matters in and of itself” – the 
Kremlin elite moved toward a “sharper, more sophisticated consciousness of 
Asia”; it was the changing geopolitical circumstances (“post-American 
world”) forced the Kremlin “to make counterintuitive choices, including over-
coming the prejudices and ignorance that have historically constrained Rus-
sia’s approach toward Asia.”1598 Moscow hoped, too, to “make Russia a fully-
fledged player in East Asian politics, a sui generis third party for the smaller 
states squeezed between the United States and China” and by becoming “at-
tractive to East Asian states, Russia hoped to revive its own Far East.”1599 
Internationally it started with the APEC summit in Vladivostok in Septem-
ber 2012. Declarations were grand (with slogans like “Russia can pivot to Pa-
cific, too”), and comparisons were full of pathos: “if Peter the Great were alive 
today, he would almost certainly leave behind the old Russian capital, Mos-
cow, to establish himself (in) an already-built city, Vladivostok.”1600 Russia 
dreamed of becoming “a swing state” between USA and China thanks to its 
“turn to the East.”1601 The “turn to the East” was dreamed to  
“be a game changer, both for Russia’s relationships with individual Asian 
countries and in terms of its broader influence in the Asia-Pacific region.”1602 
Unfortunately, although there has been some progress in comparison to the 
pre-2012/2014 period, the results are far behind expectations and grandiose 
proclamations. 
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Big investments in Vladivostok were supposed to be the proof of Russia’s 
genuine interest in Asia. Although Putin was declaring the will to “catch up 
the Chinese wind”1603, one of the implicit rationale of the turn was to reduce 
Russia’s dependence on China. As before, the notion behind it was that over-
dependence from China blocks Russian policy options. The initial response 
from Asia-Pacific countries that welcomed Moscow’s decision with the hope 
of gaining an “additional hedge against Beijing’s great powers ambitions”, also 
offered good perspective for Moscow.1604  
However, Russian policy from the very beginning was contradictory and 
half-hearted. Moscow wanted to maneuver itself into a better place in the re-
gion without harming relations with China at the same time – it wanted to “eat 
cake and have it, too”. The Kremlin believes that “the road to a more secure 
and influential Russia ultimately runs through Beijing; no amount of improve-
ment in ties with other Asian countries can compensate for a deterioration in 
relations with China.”1605 Thus, the Kremlin “was unsure whether to hedge 
against China’s rise or to continue its Sinocentric policy”, this ambiguity re-
sulted in failure in capitalizing “the anxiety of smaller states” in both economic 
and security spheres (they turned to the USA instead), therefore “Moscow’s 
failures to develop close political and economic ties with other Asian states 
have perpetuated the Sinocentric orientation of Russia’s East Asian policy.”1606 
Unsurprisingly, the “turn to the East” ended up in a “flawed diversification of 
Russian foreign policy.”1607 Perhaps because of this lack of success, the Krem-
lin soon lost interest in Asia. Vladivostok in the wider political and geopolitical 
sense has been forgotten and the Kremlin concentrated its effort on another 
grand enterprises – Sochi Olympics in 2014, football World Cup in 2018 and 
financing Crimea instead. As a result, until May 2014 nothing important hap-
pened. As one Russian researcher aptly summarized, the “Russian pivot to 
Asia” ended up… where it had begun, on Russky Island in Vladivostok (where 
the APEC summit took place).1608  
However, after Putin’s visit to Shanghai and the signing of the gas contract 
in 2014, voices about the “Russian pivot” reappeared. This pivot was supposed 
to “really begin”1609 with the Ukrainian crisis as its catalyst1610. In this outlook, 
                                                          
1603 В. Путин, Россия и меняющийся…,  
1604 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, p. 102. 
1605 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder…, p. 144. 
1606 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, pp. 108-109. 
1607 W.Rodkiewicz, The turn to the East…  
1608 Private conversation with Prof. Oleg Tomofeev, Lodz 07.06.2014.  
1609 Поворот России в Азию. Реплика Федора Лукьянова [Russia’s Turn to Asia], Kavpolit 
23.05.2014. 
1610 Логичное партнерство [Logical Partnership], ”Российская газета” 21.05.2014. 
281 
the gas agreement with China was supposed to become the real, long-term co-
operation that is “acquiring truly strategic depth.”1611 The signing of gas con-
tract with China, however, increased Russia’s dependence on China instead of 
decreasing it, and distanced Russia from other Asian countries: “the crisis was 
not a game changer in the sense of introducing a new set of assumptions to 
Russia’s relations with China and Asia. What it did was to reinforce long-es-
tablished truths (…) the Ukrainian crisis has exposed the flimsiness of its at-
tempts at diversification, the extent of Russia’s strategic dependence on China, 
and the narrowness of the ‘turn to the East.’”1612 The Ukrainian crisis enhanced 
the already existant dominance of China in Russia’s Asia policy and the nar-
rowing place for maneuver: “Sinocentrism is by its very nature self-reinforcing 
and self-excluding. The more Moscow stakes on China, the closer it ties itself 
to Beijing’s interests and priorities, and the harder it is to develop more fruitful 
relations with other Asian countries. Excessive Sinocentrism is the antithesis 
of a flexible and comprehensive Asian strategy.”1613 Instead of liberating from 
China’s dependence, Russia became even more dependent – the “pivot to 
Asia” has transformed itself to “pivot to China”. 
2014 and afterwards events showed that Russia instead of focusing on Asia, 
concentrates its efforts on the consolidation of the “near abroad” (the Eurasian 
Union, Ukraine) – this is the priority combined with wrestlings with the West; 
“pivot to Asia” is far behind. Thus, again the practise of Russian foreign policy 
contradicts its rhetoric about pivoting to Asia. That is why the “turn to the East” 
has “failed to bring about the heralded fundamental change in relations be-
tween Russia and its Asian partners, nor has it significantly reinforced Russia’s 
position in East Asia. It has also failed to create an effective mechanism for 
harnessing the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region for the purpose 
of modernizing Russia’s Far Eastern territories (…) Diversification has been 
restricted to the political and diplomatic dimensions, and does not extend to 
the economic realm.”1614 Due to the inability to address three most important 
obstacles of Russian policy in Asia (instrumentalism of its relations: “anti-re-
lationship with the West”, an excessive Sinocentrism and the disconnect be-
tween grandiose rhetoric and underwhelming achievement), Russia’s eco-
nomic integration with Asia-Pacific “is superficial at best”, while “Russia’s 
footprint on the Asian continent remains shallow, and few there believe that it 
has much to contribute beyond natural resources and weapons.”1615 Thus the 
Chinese dimension remains the main one in the Kremlin’s Asian policy: “Si-
nocentrism is self-evident in Russia’s Asian policy” and remains the “major 
structural obstacle to Russia’s turn to the East”, consequently, “Russia failed 
                                                          
1611 D. Trenin, Gas deal entails China-Russia strategic depth, “The Global Times”, 25.05.2014. 
1612 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder…, p. 145. 
1613 Ibid., p. 138. 
1614 W. Rodkiewicz, The Turn to the East…, pp. 5-6. 
1615 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder…, p. xxi. 
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to do in East Asia what China managed to do in Central Asia: become an equal 
participant in regional politics.”1616 Despite diversification efforts “Russian 
policy in Asia has become more, not less, Sinocentric. And this was true even 
before the Ukraine crisis pushed the Kremlin further toward Beijing” (…) its 
relationships in Asia, with the exception of the Sino-Russian partnership, are 
weak and underdeveloped”; thus, Russian policy in Asia-Pacific equals to 
“China-plus”, but China “matters above all because it is the next global power, 
not because it is Asian.”1617  
Thus, the outlook of Russian policy in Asia-Pacific is that it has tried (in 
vain) to liberate itself from Chinese domination. Nevertheless, all its attempts 
ended up in a partial or full failure and as a result, in the end, Moscow always 
leaned toward Beijing. The Kremlin considers cooperation with China on Chi-
nese terms (with China benefiting from it most) better than nothing: Moscow 
has no choice but to lean toward China. That is why Russia’s policy toward 
Asia-Pacific, despite attempts to balance, remains Sinocentristic. Beyond 
China it is mainly symbolism and arms sales. 
  
                                                          
1616 M. Kaczmarski, Russia-China Relations…, p. 108; Idem, Russia-China relations and the 
West… 
1617 B. Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder…, pp. 137,143 and 164. 
283 
Summary: The Asymmetric Win-Win 
Russia-China rapprochement has been one of the most spectacular phenomena 
in international relations in the last twenty-seven years. It is even more impres-
sive when one takes into account bilateral historical problems, cultural and 
ideological differences, decades of psychological mistrust and general strange-
ness felt by the two countries towards one another. Lacking common identity 
or even mutual affinity, Moscow and Beijing have successfully built their con-
temporary relations on pure and simple interests. They proved the adequacy of 
Thucydides’s maxim: “identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether be-
tween states or individuals”.  
The highly complex, complicated, ambiguous and yet truly successful rela-
tionship between Russia and China in the last twenty-seven years (1991-2017) 
is difficult to grasp theoretically. Russian and Chinese elites are hard-core re-
alists in their foreign policies and neorealist school in international relations 
seems to be the most adequate one to research Sino-Russian relations. Realis-
tically looking at Sino-Russian relations in the last twenty-seven years, one 
observes that throughout this period, China has achieved a multidimensional 
advantage over Russia: Beijing has made the Sino-Russian relations a growing 
asymmetry to its favour. Yet, at the same time, these two countries do not fol-
low the patterns of power politics and are undergoing – as the constructivists 
would call it – a peaceful power transition. Beijing knows its limits and does 
not go to extremes by humiliating Russia or exploiting it completely. Rather, 
China successfully seeks to build a long-term stable relationship based on Chi-
nese terms where both sides gain, but China gains more. Beijing gradually sets 
the agenda for Sino-Russian relations in accordance with Chinese needs, par-
ticularly the economic ones, and makes Russia a raw materials appendage to 
the Chinese economy. Russia in this agenda does not necessary lose (it gets 
money for its resources), but rather gains less from this asymmetric deal. Thus, 
a new model of bilateral relations emerges, a one that encompasses the paradox 
nature of Sino-Russian relations which may be called – paraphrasing the slo-
gan of Chinese diplomacy – as “asymmetric win-win” formula.  
The highly paradoxical and ambiguous nature of Sino-Russian relations en-
forces intellectual flexibility in researching it. Instead of proposing an all-en-
compassing theory that would dare to explain the complexity of international 
relations in the dimension of Sino-Russian relations (would such a theory be 
possible in the conditions of post-modern science?), this work sets itself a more 
modest aim of eclectically combining achievements of main schools in the 
field of Sino-Russian relations. Although some may find the theoretical ap-
proach proposed in this book a hazardous choice, this eclecticism is done on 
purpose. The specific nature of these countries that are states and/or civiliza-
tions at the same time, require going beyond the strictly realistic categories. 
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Moreover, this eclecticism is intended to be, at least in a way, intellectually 
healthy. 
That is why this work uses tools of the neorealist school as well as that of 
the social constructivism school and asymmetry theory. In other words, it 
mixes neorealism with constructivism and with asymmetry theory and draws 
on several different influences. It emphasizes deeply rooted historical (Russian 
and Chinese imperial traditions – “collecting Russian lands” and Chinese Tian-
xia), cultural (“Russian idea” and Russia’s great power syndrome; China’s Si-
nocentricism and its trauma after colonial humiliation, Russian and Chinese 
approaches to war and peace and their perceptions in Asia) and psychological 
(punching above its weight for Russia, hiding behind a “strategic screen” for 
China) determinants of foreign policy that continue to shape Moscow’s and 
Beijing’s agenda. It shows the different global roles they play (throughout 
those twenty-seven years China has exchanged places with Russia as the 
West’s most important interlocutor and partner) and the pragmatism derived 
from knowing geopolitical realities: both countries consider one another as 
safe rears (Russia represent “peace from the North” for China, China is equally 
safe rear for Russia in accordance with the “Alexander Nevsky paradigm”). 
The book describes common Russian and Chinese axiological approach to in-
ternational relations, summarized by the phrase “democratization of interna-
tional relations” which encapsulates their joint outlook that global matters 
should be resolved through collective decision-making of the great powers, not 
unilaterally by the strongest one (they dream, particularly Russia, of global 
concert of powers).  
Russia and China share the worldview: they see the globe as the playground 
for great powers, through the prism of the 19th century power struggle, with 
the sole difference being that the USA constitutes a single hegemonic power, 
albeit weakening. They reject this state of affairs, albeit gently: they are “soft 
revisionists” of the current system which they consider unjust, a place where 
“organized hypocrisy” dominates and the logic of consequences prevails over 
the logic of appropriateness. They, too, reject democracy and human rights as 
Western instruments of enlarging the zone of influence and interfering in do-
mestic affairs of other countries. Instead, they propose a world built on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.  
Despite the similar approach, however, Russia and China represent two dif-
ferent forms of authoritarianisms: in general, there is more social freedom in 
Russia and less economic efficiency and the other way around in China. This 
does not exhaust the list of differences – these are present to such an extent 
that Russia and China are not normatively converged. What is common, how-
ever, in both countries, is that the authoritarian nature of Russian and Chinese 
political systems enforces concentration on the importance of individuals in 
politics (Yeltsin and Putin in Russia, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and particularly 
Xi Jinping with his growing assertiveness under the “Chinese dream” slogan), 
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in accordance with the well-known logic that the importance of individuals in 
politics increases in non-democratic countries. Particularly the role of personal 
ties between Putin and Xi and their “Bismarckian” style of policymaking 
should not be underestimated.  
In general, this book follows the mainstream of Western academia in saying 
that Russia-China relationship is a “marriage of convenience”, based on Real-
politik imperatives (national security, power projection, management of the 
strategic balance and emphasis on the primacy of state sovereignty), geopoli-
tics, and common interests, but not on values or mutual affinity; Russia-China 
relationship is certainly a pragmatic relationship, as all marriage of conven-
ience are. Yet at the same time, this book claims, following the constructivist 
school, that Russia-China relationship is stable and will remain so. It is, to use 
the international relations categories, a “normalized asymmetry” or “positive 
asymmetry”. After all, bilateral relations are usually based on pragmatic inter-
ests and the pursuit of these interests is the very essence of foreign policy. And, 
as it often happens in life, the most long-lasting marriages are those based on 
convenience.  
What is new in this book is presenting of what may be called a retrospective 
approach to Sino-Russian relations. It claims that the asymmetric win-win 
model of Russia-China relations is a kind of “return to the past” – it is a con-
temporary equivalent of the first, initial model of Russia-China relations: the 
modus vivendi from the 17th and 18th centuries.  
For the first time in contemporary history, though not first time in their re-
lations, Russia faces a China stronger and more dynamic than itself. The pre-
sent model is a contemporary equivalent of the initial Sino-Russian relation-
ship achieved after the Nerchinsk treaty. Moscow then, having lost the military 
duel with China, sacrificed its Far Eastern territorial gains for peace and trade 
with China, knowing that Russia had more important foreign policy dimen-
sions to take care of. Qing court, on its side, having achieved dominance in 
bilateral relations, had granted Moscow a privileged – in comparison to the 
Western powers – position within the Sinocentristic waifan world in order to 
achieve a long-lasting peace and stability. In other words, Russia, although 
weaker and forced to withdraw from the Amur region, was nevertheless strong 
enough to be able to construct an acceptable modus vivendi with Beijing. 
China, though stronger, could not fully impose its will and had to restrain; the 
deal was broken on Chinese terms, but Russia did not become a tributary state, 
even though it was not equal to China. This model, indeed, proved to be very 
stable – it lasted until China’s decline under colonial expansion in the mid 19th 
century. Thus, the retrospective approach presented in this book allows seeing 
striking comparisons with contemporary times.  
Now, as before, China is stronger and Russia does not challenge it. Instead, 
Moscow quietly accepts this fact, as its most important interests are focused 
elsewhere, and it tries to maximize its options in the new situation. China sets 
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the agenda of bilateral relations, as it was in the 17th and the 18th centuries 
(which leads to the predominance of the economic sphere of the relations), but 
Beijing does it with the long-term agenda in mind. Thus, China does not over-
use its advantage over Russia; it does not exploit it completely. Moreover, as 
in the 17th and the 18th centuries, the system is again based on the contempo-
rary equivalent of “cultural neutrality”: an opposition against the Western val-
ues: Beijing does not enforce on its partners the expected patterns of political 
behavior, and neither does Moscow . Finally, there are, as in the 17th and the 
18th centuries, narrow communication lines between the two societies (but not 
between the two elites) which help to minimize the potential for conflicts. All 
these features help to keep this system firm and stable and suggest optimistic 
prognoses for stable and peaceful bilateral relations, at least in the short-term 
period.  
Naturally, so many things have changed, and it is a platitude to say that the 
21st century is not the 17th or the 18th century – systematically speaking, the 
Sinocentristic world order in Asia and Westphalian state system in the West 
are gone; the scope of bilateral relations is much different, wider and more 
complex; Russia and China are completely different states than they were in 
the 17th and the 18th centuries, etc. – differences ale clear and obvious. But 
this does not falsify the proposed retrospective approach. All the mentioned 
differences are important, no doubt, but this is the external decorum around 
Russia-China relations only; the very essence of bilateral relations, the mech-
anism, or the systematic logic under which they operate, bears striking simi-
larities to the initial, 17th and 18th century model of Sino-Russian relations.  
As in the 17th century, when Sino-Russian relations started with disputes 
and clashes, so the contemporary (1991-2017) bilateral relations started with 
the negative heritage of Soviet-Sino hostility from the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Furthermore, the modernizing paths chosen by Russia and China after the de-
mise of communism did not help either. Moscow and Beijing looked at each 
other with reservations, if not dislike. This has changed due to geopolitical 
realities – Russia’s failed hopes to deliver equal relations with the West and 
Chinese pragmatism. Both countries understood the benefits of mutually 
friendly relations: strengthening their positions vis-à-vis the West being the 
most important one. So, again as in the 17th century Nerchinsk, the external 
factors made Moscow and Beijing negotiate, initiate rapprochement and work 
out a mutually beneficial model of relations. This model, started from a modest 
basis, turned out to be stable and long-lasting.  
In the 1990s, it was the opposition against the West that became the engine 
of their relations. Moscow and Beijing shared a similar perception of global 
affairs: both opposed to the American unilateralism and disliked the Western 
values. The NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, in particular, had far reaching 
consequences. It strengthened their belief in the US hegemonic attitude. Their 
opposition against the West united them and made their rapprochement in the 
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1990s possible. It was not, however, an alliance or a bloc. Russia and China 
simply strengthened their own positions against the West. In the 1990s, both 
Russia and China were quite ambivalent in attitudes to one another. Moscow 
took a dual approach – on the one hand it has proclaimed a strategic partnership 
with Beijing, while on the other it still considered China a threat to the Far 
Eastern provinces. Beijing was no better. The Chinese officially accepted the 
importance of relations with Russia, but when it came to concrete facts (choos-
ing key investors in the country’s modernization), they always preferred the 
Western ones (like in the case of the Three Gorges Dam contract). It can there-
fore be summarized that in the 1990s, Sino-Russian relations were not much 
more than an appendix to their ties with the West. Nevertheless, they achieved 
some significant success: the demilitarization and demarcation (though not 
full) of the border (for Russia giving back 720 km² was a difficult psycho-
political task, but again, it was in Russian long-term interest: it postponed the 
threat of much serious Chinese territorial claims, at least for the time being), 
non-interference in domestic affairs (it may seem quite pale in comparison to 
other achievements, but given 400-year history of Sino-Russian relations, it 
must be considered a remarkable success, particularly from Beijing’s posi-
tion – China hates to be advised and generously rewards those who do not do 
it); arms sales, the “glue” of their relations in the 1990s, establishment of the 
mechanism of cooperation and even the economic relations and growing trade 
volume. The Chinese goods saved Far Eastern Russians from empty shelves 
whereas China’s vast purchase of arms saved Russia’s military-technical in-
dustry. Finally, Russia and China created an institutional and structural base 
for mutual contacts. This has proved to be fruitful within the new decade. 
Within the 1990s however, the partnership was more practical than strategic, 
and more limited than comprehensive. Where Russian and Chinese interests 
overlapped (Central Asia), there they gave support to one another. Where these 
interests were divergent or contradictory, Russia and China did not pay atten-
tion to one another (it was particularly evident in East Asia, where China did 
not become Russia’s “door keeper”) and were ready to sacrifice “strategic part-
nership” for better relations with the USA. The most important divergence, 
overshadowing most successes, or rather pushing them into background, was 
Russia’s and China’s main orientation towards the West. It always had priority 
over the “strategic partner” reaction: Washington had always been more sig-
nificant for Moscow and Beijing.  
In 1991, both countries were more or less equal in their international sta-
tuses. Russia, however, did not maintain its superpower status, was badly ex-
perienced by transformation to free market and fell to a secondary power sta-
tus. China, with its pragmatism and lack of emotions in politics (with the ex-
ception of the Taiwan issue) steadily and consequently was striving towards 
its fundamental goal – rebuilding its central role in East Asia and beyond. This 
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is why in the late 1990s, China’s position was already stronger than Russia’s 
one.  
The 2000s brought forth significant changes (particularly on the Russian 
side where Vladimir Putin started strengthening the state) that helped to de-
velop Sino-Russian relations further on. At the beginning of the decade, how-
ever, Sino-Russian relations repeated the 1990s scheme. Initial rapprochement 
with China (best symbolized by the 2001 treaty) was soon overshadowed by 
Putin’s pro-Western turn after 11 September 2001. This rapprochement, how-
ever, ended in bitter disappointment. Moscow – strengthened by rising oil and 
gas prices – turned to Beijing again to balance Washington.  
This time the Sino-Russian rapprochement had stronger fundaments. Their 
partnership became more multidimensional, substantial. It has normalized. The 
two sides were able to completely demarcate the border, which must be con-
sidered a historical breakthrough. Even the economic relations – which have 
always been the weakest point - have improved, with China becoming Russia’s 
second trade partner. Russia and China were able to build a successful rela-
tionship. In a sense, this is one of their foreign policies’ biggest achievements.  
Despite strengthening and normalizing Russia-China relations, they have 
not stopped being prone to changeability. The rise of raw material prices al-
lowed Russia to play a more ambitious role in the world, which in the case of 
China-Russian relations had consequences on Putin’s Asian politics. He had 
tried to repeat his successful European politics of balancing the powers and 
playing them off against one another in order to carve a place for Russia on the 
Asian chessboard. The tool was energy and the main intended partners were 
China, Japan and South Korea. This worked out – Russia was repeating its us-
age of energy for geopolitical reasons with the ESPO pipeline – but only for a 
while. Around the late 2000s, Moscow understood that there was no chance 
for this grand scheme, as Japan and South Korea were unwilling and/or unable 
to present Russia with real alternative to China. When Russia was severely 
struck by economic crisis of 2008, it finally yielded and realized, in the Hege-
lian spirit, that “what is real is rational”: there was no option for Russia in Asia 
but China. Thus, Moscow decided to deepen relations with China and to try to 
make use of its economic success. It other words, it tried to make a virtue out 
of necessity. As Asia-Pacific has never been the most important vector of Rus-
sian foreign policy (these have been “near abroad” and the West), it was easier 
for Moscow to accept the situation on the ground and take China as it is. Thus, 
the conditions forced Moscow to change its Asian policy from balancing China 
to bandwagon to it. This was best reflected in the ambitious, yet shallow slogan 
of Russian elites: the “Russian pivot to Asia” initially was intended to free 
Russia from overabundant domination of China, but in 2014 ended up as the 
“pivot to China” instead. Thus, China became the most important partner of 
Russia in Asia and the second most important in the world after the United 
States. Beijing became the biggest winner of this new reality: China was able 
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to forge the agenda of the relationship in accordance with its own vision that 
reflected first and foremost the Chinese interests: making Russia a stable raw 
material base for the Chinese economy.  
Sino-Russian relations intensified even further after 2012, when the fifth 
generation of Chinese leaders under Xi Jinping took the power. Responding to 
the geopolitical challenge from the United States which, with its pivot to Asia, 
tried to contain China’s rise in Asia-Pacific, Beijing intensified relations with 
Russia. As in the 1990s or after 2003, the American factor contributed to the 
Sino-Russian rapprochement, but this time rather simply enhanced and inten-
sified the existing political cooperation. The Ukrainian crisis intensified the 
relations even further – Moscow felt endangered in its core area of interest 
(“near abroad”) and decided that in order to withhold the Western pressure, 
including sanctions, it needed China’s support at all costs and yielded to China 
by accepting the gas contract which only deepened the already existent asym-
metric model of bilateral relations. Moscow was aware of that, but chose to 
accept nolens volens this fact as a temporarily necessity that will be changed 
in the future. In doing so, the Kremlin’s elites evoked the example of a medie-
val Ruthenia’s prince Alexander Nevsky who successfully fought German in-
vaders while remaining loyal to his suzerains: Mongol khans. According to this 
rationale, Ruthenia bent, but was not broken by the Mongols and later emerged 
as a powerful, sovereign state. Thus, this policy can informally be called the 
“Alexander Nevsky paradigm”. It remains to be seen whether nowadays Rus-
sia will be able to emerge from the dependence on China. For now, the situa-
tion on the ground is that Sino-Russian relations are more and more asymmet-
ric in favour of Beijing, yet stable at the same time.  
China is more important to Russia, than Russia is to China. For Moscow, 
Beijing plays a psycho-political role of the West’s equalizer - a strategic alter-
native, no matter if real or virtual (see: the crisis in Ukraine). More importantly, 
relations with the People’s Republic of China touch upon many aspects of Rus-
sia’s domestic (notably in the development of the Russian Far East) and foreign 
policy – only the United States are more important to Russia in this aspect. In 
the present day, Russia needs China, sometimes perhaps being dependent on 
it.  
On the other hand, Russia carries much less importance to China: it is a 
useful, albeit not the only and not the most reliable, source of supplies. It is 
important as a partner that secures strategic rears, assures energy supplies and 
serves as the ideological opposition against the West. Russia is, too, an im-
portant tool for China’s PR: that is, its claim that China is “peaceful”. Russia 
for China is not, however, an ally in confrontation with the West (it is a con-
venient smokescreen behind which China can hide and win the interests of the 
Chinese quietly). China realistically assesses Russian possibilities and sees that 
Russian influences are shrinking globally and regionally. Russia is insignifi-
cant to the Chinese domestic policy and it is not central in Beijing’s foreign 
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policy. It is only a complement to the general strategy of “returning to the right 
place”.  
The asymmetry is best seen in the economic sphere. Despite an impressive 
increase in trade in the 2000s and the 2010s, Russia remains China’s sixteenth 
trade partner only while China is Russia’s second partner – after the EU. The 
structure of trade favors China and has an almost neo-colonial character: Rus-
sian resources in exchange for Chinese consumption goods and food (energy 
makes up around 70% of the value of Russian exports). Furthermore, two Rus-
sian attempts to engage actively with Asia through grand energy projects – oil 
pipeline ESPO and gas pipeline The Power of Siberia – instead of decreasing 
Russia’s dependence on China, increased it and pushed Russia even further 
into becoming China’s resource base. On the other hand, something is better 
than nothing: Russia gets money for its energy, has an alternative route and 
long-term, stable contracts for it. That is why this asymmetric model is in a 
way beneficial for both sides, not only for China, though naturally more for 
China.  
The economic backwardness of the Russian Far East enhances the asym-
metry in favor of China even further. Despite many declarations, some high-
profile initiatives (the APEC summit in 2012 in Vladivostok), and the hope of 
development via grand energy projects (the ESPO), Moscow has been unable 
to reform the Russian Far East; it remains one of the most neglected regions of 
Russia. The sorry state of this strategically key-located place marginalizes Rus-
sia’s role in Asia-Pacific and hinders Moscow’s ambitions (“Russian pivot”) 
to play an active role in Asia-Pacific. Realizing that, Moscow in the 2010s 
turned to China again in hope to develop the region via the increased coopera-
tion with China (“catching Chinese wind”). In other words, Russia decided to 
like what it has, instead of hoping for something it likes: to make the best use 
of what is on the ground, by trying to work out benefits in the game played by 
the Chinese rules. So far, however, the results have not been impressive. China 
is more interested in importing the natural resources from the Russian Far East 
and turning this region into a material base for Chinese economy, than in par-
ticipation in the Russian Far East’s own development – China takes resources 
and other raw materials and sends commercial goods, food and IT products. 
This enhances the asymmetric win-win model: China gains more, but Russia 
at least gets something.  
The low status of the Russian Far East, Russia’s weak position there and 
Chinese de facto economic monopoly there, all translate into Russia’s weak 
position in the whole Asia-Pacific region – this is another place where Sino-
Russian asymmetry in favour of China is equally clearly seen. For Moscow, 
the region was almost non-existent in the 1990s; since the 2000s, however, 
Putin had been trying to find Russia a proper place in this most important eco-
nomically region of the world and liberate itself from the overdependence from 
China. Moscow tried to use Japan as a balancer, dreamed of concert of Asia, 
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increased its presence in regional multilateral organizations, developed rela-
tions with India, Vietnam and South Korea, and announced its own pivot to 
Asia. In the end, however, all Russian attempts ended up in partial or full fail-
ure, or were simply unable to balance China’s dominance. Consequently, Mos-
cow again decided that “what is real is rational” and leaned toward Beijing by 
considering cooperation with China on Chinese terms better than nothing. 
Thus, Moscow lost space to manoeuvre, but gained access, although second-
ary, to decisions in regional affairs. The Sinocentricism of Russian policy in 
Asia-Pacific is yet another strong proof of the asymmetric win-win logic be-
hind Russia-China relations.  
A more balanced situation takes place in Central Asia, where Russia and 
China now enjoy a more orless equal position (or, in the scenario more opti-
mistic for Moscow, China is catching up with Russia). This situation itself, 
however, testifies to the extraordinary success of Beijing which was able to 
achieve this position from a very low basis. In 1991, Russia was everything for 
Central Asia while China was almost nothing – Chinese influences practically 
did not exist there. Yet Beijing, thanks to its wise policy of gradual and peace-
ful engagement and not provoking Russia at the same time, was able to gain 
stronghold there, particularly after the economic crisis in 2008. China broke 
Russia’s monopoly on resources and transportation of energy there, became 
region’s most important partner and announced unprecedented, ambitious New 
Silk Road (One Belt One Road) initiative. At the same time, however, Beijing 
is trying to appease Moscow and avoid confrontation. So far Moscow has been 
able to tolerate this new situation (though with difficulties), mainly because 
China’s entry to the region has unintentionally fulfilled Moscow’s strategic 
goal of keeping the West in general and the EU in particular away from Central 
Asia (in other words, the Kremlin decided that China is a lesser evil). Thus, a 
new status quo emerged in Central Asia, one that is far from the New Great 
Game logic. China and Russia have designated their zones of influence in the 
best concert of powers scenario: Moscow took security, whereas Beijing took 
economy, which effectively made Central Asia their joint condominium. This 
has worked out so far, it remains to be seen, however, how long they can main-
tain this state of affairs. The very fact that Russia must “share” Central Asia 
with China – albeit without major conflicts – proves the very asymmetry in 
their relations. Had Russia been stronger, this would have been impossible and 
Moscow would have been able to keep any other country, including China, 
away from Central Asia. On the other hand, this asymmetry is not so detri-
mental to Russian interests, as it keeps the West outside Central Asia, so situ-
ation in Central Asia again fits into the proposed asymmetric win-win model.  
The only important sphere where it is Russia that still has significant ad-
vantage over China is the military sphere. Here the Russian army’s fundamen-
tal advantage over the Chinese one – despite the impressive modernization and 
development achieved by the PLA in the last two decades – reassures Russian 
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elites; as does the fact that the main vectors of China’s foreign policy are di-
rected to the east and southeast and that it is the United States, not Russia whom 
China wants to replace as a global hegemon. The understanding of this fact 
resulted in the intensification of arms sales in the early 2000s and again in the 
2010s. Although Russia had been reserved for long over the idea of selling to 
China its most sophisticated weapons (contrary to the 1990s when arms sales 
to China was enforced by the dire situation of the Russian military-technolog-
ical base, in the 2000s commercial anxieties were the dominant reason), this 
has changed in the 2010s, particularly in 2015 when the Kremlin finally agreed 
to sell the Su-35. Financial problems resulted from Western sanctions most 
probably have forced Russian elites to yield and accept increased arms sales. 
In general, the Sino-Russian military relations show what a long way those two 
countries have gone in the last twenty-seven years: from considering one an-
other as almost a threat, to deep, multidimensional cooperation, beneficial for 
both sides, but more for the Chinese side (it gets most sophisticated weapons 
that it is unable to purchase anywhere else due to Western embargo, for a good 
price). Thus, military relations also show the general trend in Russia-China 
relations, emphasized in this book: asymmetric win-win in favour of Beijing. 
Although Russia is, indeed, stronger in the military relations, and it does not 
lose in cooperation with China, it is China that achieves more gain in these 
relations, as it gets a way to improve its military capabilities (so crucial given 
Sino-American competition in Asia-Pacific).  
The Kremlin elites are aware of the asymmetry and the consequences be-
hind becoming China’s junior partner. Nevertheless, they choose to cooperate 
anyway. This happens for a few reasons. 1) They make a virtue out of neces-
sity: they wanted to, but couldn’t balance the Chinese influence, so they band-
wagoned. 2) They are aware that so far Russia can stay calm: China’s position 
is far from hegemony. The rise of China is not yet dangerous for Russia, be-
cause Moscow knows that – for now – the strategic ambitions of China are 
concentrated on East and Southeast Asia, not Northeast Asia. 3) China supports 
Russian actions in the post-Soviet area, at least rhetorically. 4) Although Rus-
sians acknowledge the success of the Chinese, they realize that the Chinese 
modernization is still unfinished; China still has a long way to go. 5) Contrary 
to the USA, China does not interfere in domestic affairs nor instruct others in 
public how they should conduct their own affairs (thus Beijing does not seek 
regime change; the opposite is true – China wants to have a stable partner and 
Putin fulfils this goal). Moreover, China knows Russian sensibilities: it shows 
Russia respect, praises Russia as the ‘great power’ (the Chinese learned how 
to tackle Russians: they know how to make use of the Russian megalomania) 
and knows its limits – the Chinese take advantage of their dominance in Sino-
Russian relations but do not overuse it in order not to provoke Russia. This all 
makes China a much more bearable “senior” partner for Russia. 6) The rising 
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China weakens the United States and forms a more balanced international sys-
tem, giving Moscow a place to manoeuvre. Russia, although anxious about 
China, knows that Chinese historical resentments are focused on the West ra-
ther than on Russia. Moscow also understands that it is the United States, not 
Russia, whom China wants to replace as a global hegemon. Henceforth, alt-
hough Russia is dissatisfied with the growing asymmetry, it is not a basic, fun-
damental anxiety about the state and the regime’s stability. Consequently, in 
spite of being asymmetric, the relations are strong and stable – it is the asym-
metric win-win – and it will remain so in the near future. 
This comprehensive win-win asymmetry for China is a stable relationship, 
because this asymmetry can be classified as “normalized asymmetry”. Such 
asymmetry exists when the relations are not without strains, but both sides are 
confident of fulfilling their basic interests and expectations of mutual benefits. 
In other words, benefits outweigh the losses and both sides consider this situ-
ation worth keeping in accordance with the “acknowledgement-for-deference” 
logic. Russia-China relations can also be categorized as “positive asymmetry” 
where there is economic dependence, but not enmity: where the chief benefi-
ciary (China) continuously deludes or coerces the lesser beneficiary (Russia), 
while the lesser beneficiary turns a blind eye on it by believing that this is a 
temporary necessity. Finally, Russia-China asymmetry may be described using 
“asymmetric option model”, where both the stronger (China) and the weaker 
(Russia) state’s approach is “open”, which resolves bilateral issues coopera-
tively. China acts in accordance with this model – it promotes a stable asym-
metric relationship, knowing that this is China’s responsibility as the stronger 
partner to minimize misperception and increase involvement in its relations to 
the weaker partner, and to promote voluntary deference instead of facing re-
sistance. This seems to be the success behind stable Sino-Russian relations.  
Finally, having described the present state of affairs between Russia and 
China, one may dare to speculate and forecast about the future of Russia-China 
relations. If the historical experience evoked in this book – that the present 
asymmetric win-win is an equivalent to that of the 17th and the 18th centuries’ 
Sinocentric model, with China at the apex and Russia in the subordinated po-
sition – is correct, then the future of their bilateral relations may unfold in ac-
cordance with the logic of this system. It would therefore be as before 1842, 
when the Sinocentric world order of tributary relations did not necessarily in-
volve any significant political control carried out by China. It did require, how-
ever, the lesser political entities to recognize a hierarchical structure with 
China at the apex. In this scenario, Russia would have a chance to develop and 
even reintegrate the former USSR’s area. This would occur, however, under 
one condition: the recognition of the Chinese primacy and becoming China’s 
junior partner. If China were able to finish modernization and become a global 
hegemon – both at land and at sea – Russia would slip in to be its vassal state 
(though probably the most important one). And the relations with Russia might 
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serve as a model for other, lesser, though important, entities. If this happens, 
then from the Chinese perspective it would not only be the return to the past, 
but also the return to what is natural.  
This scenario is, however, roughly speaking, far from certain – China may 
stop on the development path due to domestic problems and/or American con-
tainment policy which would mean a chance for Russia to act beyond its power 
(which Moscow does brilliantly).  
For here and now, however, one thing is sure. Historically speaking, the 
present, asymmetric win-win model of Sino-Russian relations means that Rus-
sia-China relations came back to the past: to the first, initial phase, when China 
was stronger and set the agenda of bilateral relations. Thus, the example of 
Sino-Russian relations shows what many Asians take for granted: that the 
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